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Abstract 
 
This thesis challenges existing nationalist and colonialist interpretations of the 1767 
expedition to Nepal on behalf of the British East India Company, and those encounters 
that followed before the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816. The thesis then posits an 
alternative interpretation that explores the agency and influence of previously neglected, 
marginalized figures, by drawing upon the works and criticisms of postcolonial/decolonial 
approaches and Subaltern Studies, and new interpretative frameworks pioneered by 
borderlands studies.1 Marginalized historical agents played a significant role within the 
events of 1767, determining the expedition’s outcome and influencing subsequent 
approaches. There is furthermore a wider pattern of influential marginalized historical 
agency in Anglo-Himalayan encounters. Therefore, the inclusion of such marginalized 
experiences, agencies and agendas in our analysis of encounters proves critical to existing 
and emerging debates around who pulled the strings of EIC eighteenth-century 
colonialism.  
  
                                               
1 Postcolonial and Decolonial are historiographical approaches for which the parameters of each, and relation 
between the two, are not widely agreed upon. For the purpose of this thesis, the former incorporates the 
critique of colonial discourse, and the latter; a specific development from that critique that aims to bypass the 
colonial lens or pursue alternative readings within it. 
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Introduction 
 
‘From Sidely [Sindhuli] to Napaul, the road is reckoned extremely good,’ wrote Captain 
George Kinloch to the English East India Company’s Select Committee in 1767.1 Kinloch 
intended to lead an army down this road, en route from Patna in modern day Bihar to 
Kathmandu in Nepal. This would be a military intervention: earlier that year the Company 
had received a request for help from Jaya Prakash Malla, the Raja of Kathmandu. His 
position was severely threatened by Prithvi Narayan Shah, the Raja of the neighbouring 
Gorkha city-state. Shah had been waging a long war against the Malla dynasty cities of 
Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur. His Gorkhali soldiers had conquered a succession of 
smaller states in the Himalayan foothills and encircled Nepal Valley. At this point, the 
Malla King wrote to the British, requesting assistance. The Company, newly established in 
Bengal and Bihar after the battles of Plassey and Buxar, were at first hesitant. However, 
increasingly concerned that the inter-Himalayan conflict had reduced trade in timber and 
silk from Tibet, they eventually decided that these incentives warranted involvement. They 
ordered a detachment of sepoys, led by Kinloch, into the hills to break the Gorkhali siege.2  
Before the year was out, Kinloch would regret his early optimism. Late in the 
summer he led the delayed expedition through jungles, villages and mountains in what was 
to be a disastrous failure. The unlucky troupe found the terrain far tougher than was 
expected and were harried at every point and turn, suffering famine, fever and defeat. 
Disappointment and miscommunication characterized the journey. The surviving remnants 
of the Bengal Army filtered back to the East India Company (hereafter EIC) outpost at 
Bettiah whilst Shah broke Malla resistance in the valley, going on to conquer and unify 
what was to become the modern state of Nepal. 
After 1767 the EIC maintained their interest in Nepal and the wider Himalayas. 
Successive Governor-Generals in Calcutta hoped for greater authority and presence in the 
region with which to enhance the security of their Bengal possessions, increase commercial 
profits and obtain lucrative access to overland trade routes to China. To that end, a number 
of expeditions followed the 1767 invasion: commercial, diplomatic and military in their 
composition and mission. These included the ventures of James Logan in the 1770s, 
George Foxcroft in the 1780s, William Kirkpatrick and Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan in the 
1790s, and William Knox and Alexander Buchanan-Hamilton in the 1800s. Alternative 
avenues were pursued in Tibet and Bhutan through the exploits of George Bogle, 
                                               
1 Note from George Kinloch to the President of the Select Committee, on the information of a Journey from Patna to Kathmandu, 
in British Library (hereafter B.L.) IOR/P/A/7 Bengal Proceedings 9 Jan 1766 -16 Dec 1767.  
2 A sepoy was a South Asian recruit within the EIC army. 
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Alexander Hamilton, Samuel Turner, Samuel Davis, and William Moorcroft. Their 
objectives ranged from gift exchange and espionage to greater ambitions of territorial 
acquisition, ratifying treaties and the establishment of a Nepalese residency. Yet by 1814, 
these efforts had achieved little. Himalayan trade remained merely a trickle, relations had 
deteriorated, and the EIC teetered on the brink of an expensive and expansive war with 
Nepal.  
Important factors and people have been marginalized in explanations for the failure 
of Kinloch’s expedition: various local, subaltern and peripheral characters rarely feature in 
existing historical accounts, which instead contribute to either a ‘colonialist’ or ‘nationalist’ 
interpretation of the past in which there is little space for the agency of such individuals. 
British colonial histories dismissed the significance of the defeat and prioritized the agency 
of Kinloch himself, subscribing to what has been termed an ‘orientalist’ view of the 
Himalayas.3 Nepalese accounts on the other hand regard the campaign as a key event 
within the nation-state’s formation, emphasising the influence of Shah and his generals, a 
martial identity and overarching resistance to British expansion. In both narratives, local 
decisions, political allegiances, and economic factors have been rendered passive. This 
thesis therefore revisits EIC-Himalayan encounters between 1767 to 1814, investigating the 
influence, agency, and agendas of those marginalized factors and historical actors. The 
thesis asks; what role did they play specifically in the expedition of 1767? Are there any 
consequences of that role, and patterns in marginalized historical agency, to be observed in 
subsequent encounters up to 1814? Finally, how do the findings of this thesis relate to 
existing debates about British colonialism, Nepalese state formation and EIC-Nepalese, 
Anglo-Himalayan encounters in the late eighteenth century? 
The findings of this thesis have a number of ramifications for wider debates within 
colonial and South Asian studies. Firstly, they allow for a closer investigation into the 
practical manifestations of what Edward Said called ‘orientalism’, and place significant 
emphasis on the role of South Asian collaborators and South Asian agency in the direction 
of colonialism. Secondly, they allow for critical engagement with an emerging Nepalese 
national identity. Finally, the findings emphasize the hybrid and changing nature of 
marginalized agency throughout the Himalayas, adding nuance to methodological debates 
surrounding the study of the encounter and opening new lines of enquiry into EIC-
Nepalese and wider Anglo-Himalayan relations.  
 Chapter I first outlines problems within the existing historiography on European-
Himalayan encounters in the late eighteenth century, exploring colonialist and nationalist 
                                               
3 The usage of Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism is discussed in more detail in chapter II. 
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discourse and the exclusion of marginalized historical agents. The historiographical debates 
that their inclusion could contribute to are then discussed. Chapter II explains the 
conceptual and analytical frameworks adopted, as well as the source-based, methodological 
parameters, that allow the historian to explore marginalized agency and influences within 
these encounters. Chapters III focuses on the belligerents involved in the 1767 expedition 
including its causes, plans and preparations. Chapter IV considers the role of previously 
marginalized historical agents within a series of encounters, as Kinloch’s expedition made 
progress to Kathmandu. Chapter V then charts the significance of those encounters, and 
the continuing role of marginalized agency, in the expedition’s aftermath and further 
relations between Nepal and the EIC until 1795. Chapter VI continues that restorative, 
explorative project yet expands its boundaries both spatially into Bengal, Bhutan and Tibet, 
and chronologically into the early nineteenth century. Chapter VII then concludes, by 
highlighting ways in which the findings of the thesis contribute to and intersect previously 
outlined historiographical debates surrounding British colonialism, Nepalese state 
formation and identity, and the nature of the ‘encounter’ in the late eighteenth century.
11 
 
Chapter I - Limitations of Colonialist and Nationalist Accounts of 1767 
 
Summary 
 
Two historical approaches have dominated writing on the 1767 expedition and those that 
followed: a selective interpretation in Great Britain that fits into a colonialist discourse, and 
a fiercely nationalist interpretation in Nepal. This chapter takes the primary features of 
those two narratives, beginning with colonial visions of the Himalayas then considering 
history writing in Nepal, and situates them alongside recent developments, both in a 
historiographical sphere and a political one, in a postcolonial demonstration of their flaws. 
Both are equally outdated and dismissive of the complexities of the 1767 expedition, 
rendering significant local, subaltern and peripheral factors passive. Existing challenges to 
these established interpretations are then outlined, with an appraisal of their successes and 
explanations for their limitations. It is then posited that the approach of this thesis, an 
investigative project in which the roles of marginalized historical agents are explored and 
emphasized, will provide answers to the many questions raised by the shortcomings in 
existing historiography, and furthermore contribute significantly to our understanding of 
EIC-Nepalese encounters, colonial power and resistance in this era.  
 
I:1 Forgetting Kinloch 
 
In British history writing, a selective interpretation of the 1767 expedition has endured that 
fits into a colonialist discourse: perpetuating stereotypes and prioritizing the EIC’s agency, 
agenda and perceptions above those of the people that the expedition encountered. This 
interpretation is notably manifest in the expedition’s omission on the basis that it ended in 
defeat: the venture rarely features in textbooks about the EIC.1 Even in more specific 
works detailing Britain’s martial relationship with Nepal, it is sometimes absent. For 
instance, George MacMunn’s history of the Gurkhas does not feature the events of 1767, 
despite including a similar intervention a few years previously on behalf of the Nawab of 
Murshidabad.2 Historians attempting to write a narrative of the EIC over centuries and 
continents may be forgiven for the omission of some smaller ventures, yet according to 
most reports Kinloch set out with somewhere in the region of 2,400 soldiers, accompanied 
                                               
1 For instance, John Keay, The Honourable Company (New York: Macmillan, 1994) or Nick Robins, The 
Corporation that Changed the World (Abingdon: Pluto Press, 2012). 
2 George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1933), p.186. 
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by an entourage of family members and merchants. Sources indicate the Bengal Army in 
1770 was composed of 4,000 Europeans and 26,000 Indian Sepoys, making this a sizeable 
enterprise with almost ten percent of the Bengal Army on the march.3 In the case of the 
1767 expedition, the inclusion in any historical writing of such a disastrous venture, and 
South Asian triumph, would have challenged visions of British martial prowess and power. 
Histories of British relations with the Himalayas that do address the expedition fit 
squarely into a colonialist discourse, reconciling the aberration of Kinloch’s failed 
expedition as a necessary learning curve for eventual success, achieved in the later Anglo-
Nepalese war.4 There is no acknowledgement in these accounts that the expedition was 
undermined by the non-co-operation and resistance of marginalized agents, or that there 
were regional political agendas involved in the establishment of communications and 
supplies that would prove critical to the expedition. Instead, human error on behalf of 
Kinloch, and the intervention of unpredictable natural forces, orchestrated the failure. 
Many other EIC attempts to establish relations with Nepal that are discussed within this 
thesis have likewise received as little scholarly attention as they did public attention at the 
time: the diplomatic missions of James Logan in the 1770s, George Foxcroft in the 1780s, 
and William Knox in the 1800s. Those ventures more likely to feature, both in 
contemporary and in historical accounts, were those considered more successful – that of 
William Kirkpatrick in the 1790s and Alexander Buchanan-Hamilton accompanying Knox 
in the 1800s. Discussion around their political, commercial agendas is still limited, since in 
that respect they likewise ended in failure for the EIC. Instead, these two experiences exist 
as anomalies because they contributed to an emergent colonial knowledge base and 
discourse through the publication of associated travel accounts. 
In many histories of the 1767 expedition there are elements of what Edward Said 
has called ‘orientalism’. He described this as a ‘western style for dominating, restructuring 
and having authority over the Orient’.5 The application of this by British colonial officials 
to Nepal is noticeable in the depiction of Shah as an ‘oriental despot’. Although this theory 
had a long tradition in western culture, it appeared more regularly from the seventeenth 
century onwards, being applied to the Ottoman Empire, Persia and the Mughals in order to 
‘both characterise these Islamic governments as distinct from European ones and to warn 
against absolutism in Europe’.6 It was particularly espoused by Montequieu in his 1748 De 
                                               
3 Figures taken from P. J. Marshall, ‘British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical 
Revision’ in Journal of the Historical Association, 60:198 (1975), p.41. 
4 Such as that found in William Henry Paget, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India (Simla, Government 
Monotype Press, 1907), p.7. 
5 Edward Said, Orientalism, 3rd edn (England: Penguin, 2003), p.3. 
6 Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, ‘Romantic Attitudes toward Oriental Despotism’, The Journal of Modern History, 85:2 
(2013), p.284. 
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l’esprit de Lois, which drew upon travel accounts such as that of Francois Bernier. 
Montesquieu ‘deﬁned despotism as a system of government based on fear, one in which 
the ruler stands above the law, unlimited by intermediate political powers such as an 
independent aristocracy. Arguing that the inhabitants of warm climates are by nature 
servile, Montesquieu maintained that despotism was inevitable in Asia, whose inhabitants 
lacked the will to defend their freedom. He further argued that the passivity associated with 
Oriental despotism was among the reasons why Asian societies remained unchanged for 
thousands of years’.7 It was a theory reinforced by Alexis De Tocqueville in the nineteenth 
century, who likewise did not believe that South Asian states were capable of any other 
form of governance without the intervention of the Christian missions.8 This interpretation 
was therefore already established when Captain Kirkpatrick visited Kathmandu on a 
diplomatic mission in 1793. His observations included ‘the cruelty he manifested in the 
treatment of inhabitants of kirtipoor [Kirtipur, Nepal Valley], in his ungenerous rigour 
towards the Patan sovereign and some other occasions’.9 Kirkpatrick was referring to the 
Siege of Kirtipur in 1766 that begun the Gorkhali descent into the valley. He perpetuated a 
story of Shah’s personal ruthlessness, wherein he notoriously ordered soldiers to cut off the 
lips and noses of the defeated inhabitants and executed the Raja of Patan. This account was 
published in 1811. Within three years, the EIC had invaded Nepal – regarding it as 
aggressive and expansive. Kirkpatrick, influenced by previous reports of violence, had 
reinforced an orientalist knowledge of Nepal that was then used to justify invasion and 
partial annexation. In doing so, he assumed the validity of despotic imagery, neglecting the 
nuances and complexities involved in the siege of Kirtipur.10 
What is also striking for the purpose of this thesis’s reinterpretation of Kinloch’s 
expedition is how reactionary and passive the local population is in these narratives. The 
view from the central British colonial metropole was that the periphery was reactionary, 
shaped by a British directorate in London that revolved around trade and wealth 
accumulation.11 The flipside to London’s centrality and the EIC as the primary historical 
catalyst is that the local is neglected. As a result of this, for the greater part of the twentieth 
century Nepal has mostly been defined in British histories of the colonial era by its 
relationship to British India. In the specific example of the 1767 expedition, whilst the 
                                               
7 Ibid. 
8 Lawrence Ziring, review of Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and 
India, by Michael Curtis, The Review of Politics, 72:2 (2010), 370-373. 
9 B.L. IOR/H/395 Memoir of Nepal by Captain William Kirkpatrick, 1798.  
10 This event is discussed in greater detail in chapter III. 
11 This trend is summarized by Sudipta Sen, ‘Colonial Frontiers of the Georgian State: East India Company’s 
Rule in India,’ Journal of Historical Sociology, 7 (1994), p.368. 
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Gorkhalis are at least credited (or discredited) with influencing the outcome of events to 
some degree through their guerrilla tactics, the form that influence takes is predetermined 
by an orientalist discourse that describes them as ‘behaving despicably’.12 Although there is 
some discussion of Kinloch’s difficulty moving through the country, there is no account of 
his difficulties in communicating with the villagers and people he met along the way. Those 
societies local to the space in which this expedition takes place are thus entirely absent and 
entirely passive in both the nationalist and colonialist accounts, something this thesis 
intends to rectify. 
The colonialist discourse interpreted the Gorkhalis that opposed Kinloch as 
militant and martial, with some notable adaptations that benefited colonial agendas. This 
derived from nineteenth-century Darwinism and ideas of ‘martial races,’ a construct that 
allowed for the progression in British history writing of a Gurkha martial identity. This was 
initially responding to a particular set of colonial problems – the EIC in 1816 had found 
their campaigns against Gorkha tougher than expected and were now faced with a defeated 
state on the edge of their subcontinent possessions that could hunger for revenge. The 
solution was to instil in this populace a natural identity that counteracted that hunger, by 
amalgamating the resistant forces that the EIC faced into its own military ranks. The 
Bengal army was increasingly stretched, yet the recruitment did not just bolster the army, it 
also pacified that frontier.  
This is an identity that has endured and developed despite a successful critique of 
the concept by Heather Streets, who specifically engaged with the martial identity of Sikhs, 
Highlanders and Gurkhas.13 For Streets, what began as either a colonial anecdote or 
scientific theory could be augmented by the other, told and retold, until it became an 
accepted identity. In turn, they then worked their influence on military recruitment officers 
and commanders in India, from whence they originated.14 Nepalese assistance during the 
1857 rebellion helped further establish them as one of Britain’s martial allies, with loyalty 
biologically determined, and thus different to the untrustworthy, rebellious sepoys. This 
became increasingly important as Indian nationalism gathered pace, and British colonial 
officials rallied around what MacMunn called ‘their lack of interest in…anti-British intrigue 
and hatred’.15 The continuance of these nineteenth-century constructions has influenced 
the regional cultures of the Highlands, Punjab and Nepal. They came to overshadow other 
                                               
12 Quoted in Shaphalya Amatya, ‘British Diplomacy and its various Mission in Nepal from 1767 to 1799’, 
Ancient Nepal, 6 (October 1969), p.1. 
13 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 
14 Ibid., p.54. 
15 MacMunn, The Martial Races, p.199. 
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regional, marginalized expressions of cultural identity. Stanley Wolpert’s description of 
Nepal is such a reduction, in which ‘Nepal’s Hindu royal family… and their Brahman 
ministers ruled over a predominantly Tibeto-Mongol populace of hearty martial Gurkhas 
and peasant Newars’.16 This depiction is far from true, since the Gorkhali and Newari 
populations made up a minority throughout the eighteenth century. It is an interpretation 
informed by the discourse of martial identity, combined with an elite figurehead, that 
neglects the local parties Kinloch encountered: neither Gorkhali nor Newari, instead 
occupying a borderlands space, often either non-military or conscripted soldiers.  
A further defining feature of the colonialist vision of eighteenth-century Nepal that 
continues throughout its history is one of isolation, mystery and exclusivity. This is a view 
that is extended beyond Nepal to other Himalayan states such as Kashmir, Tibet, Bhutan 
and Sikkim. This began before 1767 with a simplicity of geographical determinism – that 
the hill-states of the Himalayas were rendered inaccessible from the EIC’s position in 
Bengal and the plains through its terrain. Gorkhali protectionist measures however 
intertwined with South Asian apprehension over trading contact with British Bengal, and 
Shah was soon interpreted as highly isolationist. This infringed both the EIC’s commercial 
ambitions and Adam Smith’s visions of free trade, ideas promulgated by different parties in 
eighteenth-century Britain. Colonial reports then drew attention to the ritual cleansing of 
travellers returning to Nepal Valley, and the supposed universal detriment of Gorkhali 
trade restrictions to Nepalese and Bengalis alike.17  
Such a historical interpretation greatly patronizes the Nepalese state and 
population, contributing to the wider colonial trope wherein South Asians were infantile 
and naïve, localized and isolated. This could then be used to justify colonial intervention 
and ambition in this space. Yet in 1767 it was far from the truth: both Shah’s own wide-
ranging diplomatic links, as well as travel, migration and trade networks of the Gorkhali 
population, demonstrate this. Shah courted the subservience and support of states far afield 
such as Mustang, whose Raja paid both land revenue to the Gorkha Durbar and trade 
duties to the Dalai Lama.18 Likewise people owing allegiance to Gorkha would regularly 
travel throughout the Himalayas, and loyalties shifted. Land rent was reviewed annually. 
Some tenants would take the opportunity to abandon tracts in favour of rates offered by 
the EIC, depending on whether the rates were lower, or whether the Company collectors 
                                               
16 Stanley Wolpert, India, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.19. Newari is a cultural group 
within Nepal Valley. See the glossary. 
17 According to Richard Burghart this was observed by Italian Missionaries and plays on the concept of a 
Hindu Realm as an autonomous universe. Richard Burghart, ‘The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State 
in Nepal’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 44:1 (November, 1984), p.106. 
18 Ibid., p.109. The term ‘Durbar’ refers to a South Asian royal court. See the glossary. 
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were ‘over-zealous’.19 This extended to Nepal Valley, where merchants and courtiers alike 
had developed strong bonds with Gorkha.  
This vision of mysterious and secluded mountainous kingdoms, initially hostile yet 
overcome through the symbolic taming and harnessing to British colonial interests of the 
Gorkhali martial prowess, are components of a widespread, romanticized representation of 
Nepal. The country is now associated with the loyalty of the Gurkhas, alongside the 
imposing but conquerable silhouette of Everest, and the mysterious but accessible ‘Shangri-
La’ experience. In the development of this representation, colonialists have identified 
Nepal as formidable but controllable. This renders western control over the people (the 
Gurkhas) and the country (Everest) all the more impressive, and creates an 
inferior/superior relationship. This representation is rooted in histories of that first military 
encounter of 1767, which began the dismissal of local populations as passive, the trope of 
the militant and violent Gorkhali, and the isolated, resistant hill-states. In light of this 
historiography, the expedition requires a reinvestigation.  
 
I:2 Remembering Shah 
 
Histories from South Asian scholars on the subject of early EIC-Nepalese encounters have 
been ardently nationalist in their interpretation: emphasizing the roles played by royalty and 
state leaders, anti-colonial sentiment, the political centre, and a national martial prowess. 
Much like colonial accounts, these narratives reflect the political priorities of the time in 
which they were written: either at the moment of decolonization in South Asia, during 
monarchical rule in Nepal from the 1960s through to the 1990s, or in the throes and 
aftermath of the Nepalese Civil War, up to the present, in what has been a turbulent half-
century of national fusion and fissure. The assertion of a nationalist historical interpretation 
thus mirrors a period of nation-state and national-identity formation, in which the political 
centre of Kathmandu attempted to establish control over its peripheral territory and 
population in a country of over a hundred caste and ethnicity nationalities, speaking more 
than ninety languages and dialects.20 In light of that construction this narrative is now being 
challenged not just in historical debate, but in that of the wider Nepalese public sphere.  
The first pillar on which the Nepalese interpretation of 1767 rests is a prioritization 
of the role of royalty, Shah’s leadership and personal contribution towards Kinloch’s 
                                               
19 Ibid., p.105. 
20 These figures taken from Sean McDonald, Bruce Vaughn, ‘Autonomy in the Southern Borderland of 
Nepal: A Formula for Security or Cause of Conflict?’, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 28:2 (2013), p.155. 
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defeat, over those of other historical agents. These histories write about Shah in glorifying 
language, for instance describing ‘the noble ambition of the Gurkha Raja Prithivi [sic] 
Narayan Shah’s unification of Nepal’.21 They forge a link between royalty and stability; a 
link that has been cultivated for centuries, drawn upon by succeeding kings and royalists in 
moments of political turmoil (notwithstanding the hiatus of the Rana family interregnum, 
wherein prime-ministerial authority superseded that of the monarch.) It perpetuates the 
presumption that the history of Nepal can be explained through elite-level politics: other 
figures prioritized in traditional interpretations of the 1767 encounter are the rajas of 
Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur, as well as Kinloch himself. To many, this reflects the 
balance of political power in Nepal. Kamal Malla reflected in 2006 that ‘the State in Nepal 
has always been the stronghold of a few elite families, the so-called thar-ghar, and this has 
not changed. Superficial changes in the political system have not succeeded in making any 
dent in the exclusivist political structure over the last half a century’.24  
This narrative is certainly reductionist. It does not consider the distance between 
Shah and his soldiers opposing Kinloch – engaged in the siege of Nepal Valley, separated 
by the foothills in which communications took time and the chain of command involved 
great degrees of autonomy, it is unclear how Shah could have played a more important role 
in these events than his soldiers in the region. More glaringly questionable is the link 
between royalty and stability emerging from Shah’s campaigns of war and violence, a link 
that was broken by the tragic massacre of the royal family on the night of 1st June 2001. 
This event prompted many Nepalis to ‘re-examine their views on the monarchy and seek 
some clarity’.22 Not only had the departed King Birendra been considered the epitome of 
royalty and national stability during a turbulent time, his successor King Gyanendra was 
deeply unpopular amongst non-royalists, dismissing parliament and ruling with absolute 
powers. This mounting pressure on the narrative of royalty and glory occurred alongside 
the rise of popular politics movements and a Maoist insurgency.  
In response, defendants of Shah and a royalist-focused narrative have rallied 
around concepts of colonial resistance and the country’s unity. An interpretation has 
developed in which Shah foresaw the Himalayan states struggling to compete with the 
ascendant powers of the time: ‘even 250 years ago, it was evident to the country’s founder 
that his new nation had to contend with the geopolitical influences of its … powerful 
neighbours.’23 Faced with this vision, Shah annexed the smaller states around Gorkha as a 
                                               
21 Amatya, ‘British Diplomacy’, p.1.  
22 Manjushree Thapa, Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy (India: Viking, 2005), p.53. 
23 Kunda Dixit, ‘Nepal: Dictated by Geography’, World Policy Journal, 7 (Winter, 2013/2014), p.36. 
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counter-colonial strategy. Baburam Acharya, one of the most prominent Nepalese 
historians, certainly emphasized this nation-founding agenda.24 Similarly, the equally 
canonical Dilli Raman Regmi wrote ‘Prithvi Narayan Shah was a nationalist to the core of 
his heart. With him, if conquest was the aim of life, patriotism was the guiding factor for 
any action’.25 This features in more recent histories, such as that of Hem Raj Kafle who 
found ‘discernible features of opposition and resistance, manifest in the Nepali military 
encounter with the British army in 1767’.26 Because the Gorkhalis fought the British, their 
campaigns were anti-colonialist. Such a strategy was seen to justify the more violent 
episodes of Shah’s conquest: ‘to see only the weaknesses of Prithvi Narayan Shah by 
highlighting the myths of cruelties is to be deliberately blind and deaf towards his 
contributions,’ going on to state ‘the use of military force was essential’.27 The fact that 
most of the states involved in this process now comprise the modern state of Nepal 
supposedly distinguishes Shah’s campaigns as an act of unification, rather than empire-
building.  
This interpretation of the Gorkhali conquest of Nepal as anti-colonial, in its vision 
and realization, is problematic. Firstly, the term ‘unification’ suggests there was something 
to be unified, identifiable by shared characteristics. Yet the many hill states present in what 
later became modern-day Nepal varied wildly – they did not share the same language or 
religion, and by all means shared similar topographies, but no more so than they had in 
common with Bhutan to the east, or Kashmir to the west. ‘National unification’ implies the 
creation of a new, Nepalese national consciousness, which is not reflected in this ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and political diversity. Unification histories are also accompanied by the 
notion that these states were fragmented from a former whole, yet there was no previous 
political entity that corresponded so neatly onto Nepal’s present boundaries. For this 
reason, historians like Kumar Pradhan have preferred the term ‘conquest’.28 Further 
questions remain. Why for example, with the vision of a colonialist squeeze, did Shah 
resort to violence against other Himalayan states as opposed to a communication of this 
vision? Did Shah not consider consolidating the existing Himalayan confederacies of the 
                                               
24 Baburam Acharya, Nepal Ko Samikshipta Vrittanta (A Brief Account of Nepal) (Kathmandu, 1966).  
25 D.R. Regmi, Modern Nepal: Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century (Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961), 
p.100. 
26 Hem Raj Kafle, ‘Prithvi Narayan Shah and Postcolonial Resistance’, Bodhi: An interdisciplinary Journal, 2:1 
(2008), p.138. 
27 Ibid., p.144. 
28 Kumar Pradhan, Gorkha Conquests, 2nd edn (Patan: Himal Books, 2009), p.xxvii. 
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Chaubisi Rajya and Baisi Rajya?29 Scepticism on this point is reinforced by the fact that 
Shah’s unification campaigns began well before the EIC’s victory at Plassey. In this sense, 
they were arguably a continuation of an existing Gorkhali expansion project. Gorkhali anti-
British resistance therefore does not account for 1767, although it did emerge in the 
aftermath, featuring in the Divyopadeś, a document that Shah is credited to have written in 
the 1770s.30 Before then, there appears only mutual disinterest between the Gorkhali and 
British until Jaya Prakash Malla chose to involve the Company, contrary to the nationalist 
narrative. 
This is a history from the centre: from the perspective of Kathmandu. In this 
interpretation, the encounter between Kinloch and the Gorkhali takes places in a 
nondescript, irrelevant space, somewhere between Nepal and British occupied Bengal. It is 
pitched as a battle of interests from the political cores of the belligerents – Shah and his 
court, Governor Verelst of the EIC in Calcutta. As Prayag Raj Sharma summarized, ‘it is 
the history of this place [Kathmandu] which seems to have set in motion the course of 
events, as it were, happening in Nepal’s distant and outlying regions.’31 This casts all other 
districts and former kingdoms as peripheral and reactive. Histories engaging with Kinloch’s 
expedition have not considered these spaces – the frontier between Bihar and the jungles 
of the Tarai: the Sindhuli District foothills formerly of the Kingdom of Makwanpur. One 
such historian Ramesh Dhungel wrote: 
In shaping Nepal as an independent country in South Asia, both the ruling elites 
and the common people of the region seem to have come forward with their full 
and whole heartened support under the leadership of the rulers of the tiny hill 
Kingdom of Gorkha. They appeared as if the entire populace of the region 
belonged to the same cultural tradition and ethnic background. Self-determined 
natives from their states and villages stood in unison to save the newly founded 
Himalayan state of Nepal from the common colonial enemy of the region.32  
Dhungel did not believe there was any noteworthy evidence of conflict or violence from 
the eastern Kirant region during the unification era. However, he looked for this evidence 
within archives ran by a government that censored educational material and opposed 
                                               
29 Both loose confederacies in western Nepal, the former consisting of 24 states (including Gorkha) in the 
Gandaki river basin mostly annexed from 1775 onwards, the latter consisting of 22 states in the Karnali-Bheri 
river basin annexed in the 1780s and 1790s. 
30 This document is discussed in more detail within chapters II and III. 
31 Prayag Raj Sharma, ‘Nepali Culture and Society: A Historical Perspective’, Contributions to Nepali Studies, 10:1 
(December, 1982), p.4. 
32 Ramesh K. Dhungel, ‘Understanding Nepali History in the Context of Changing Political Situation’, Centre 
for Nepal and Asian Studies, 37:2 (2010), p.170. 
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histories of resistance from the peripheries, without any consideration into how such 
material could be read ‘against the grain’.33 Instead, he rejected the notion that there was a 
political consciousness worth considering outside of Gorkha itself and the Nepal Valley, 
calling the communities there ‘politically indifferent and silent’.34 
Yet it is clear that the communities in this space were not politically indifferent. By 
Dhungel’s own admission, rulers within Kirant were actively negotiating alliances with 
Sikkim and Tibet, to the extent that once conquered, Shah could not trust the Kirant elite 
in positions of power.35 Moreover, violence and regional resistance did occur during Shah’s 
campaigns. Grégoire Schlemmer, writing on historical record-keeping and historical 
memory on the same marginalized region of Kirant, argued there was a violent war in 
which the Gorkhali were confronted with strong armed resistance. For this reason, Shah 
had to make accommodations upon conquest, granting resistant groups a certain amount 
of political and cultural autonomy with regard to land ownership.36 Similarly Kumar 
Pradhan found, contrary to Dhungel, that there were political entities in the Tarai and 
Madhesh region, in which the 1767 encounter took place, evidenced by their payment of 
tribute to other hill-state rajas such as that of Tirhut.37 He made the further point that 
smaller political communities, ‘though under the nominal suzerainty of the Sens, [the rulers 
of the Makwanpur state] enjoyed complete autonomy in the hills. The people knew only 
their immediate superiors, or their respective tribal chiefs.’38  
In today’s political arena, these regions are vociferous in their dissatisfaction with 
centralized control. This is currently prevalent in the low-lying strip of land at the bottom 
of the Himalayan foothills, a part of which Kinloch would have travelled through in 1767, 
which has been a centre of civil unrest in the wake of the 2015 constitution. In the western 
Tarai, Tharu people were unhappy that the resultant federal boundaries separated their 
traditional homelands whereas in the east, Madhes with social and cultural links to northern 
India were frustrated by new nationality laws within the constitution. These grievances 
fostered the ‘Quit Tarai’ movement, accusing Kathmandu of interfering in Madhes affairs 
as well as oppressing them through unfair representation.39 This fraction between a 
perceived centre and periphery, alongside Pradhan’s observations that there were 
                                               
33 Ibid., p.171. This methodology is discussed further in chapter II. 
34 Ibid., p.185.  
35 Ibid., p.179. 
36 Grégoire Schlemmer, ‘New Past for the Sake of a Better Future: Re-inventing the history of the Kirant in 
East Nepal’, European Bulletin on Himalayan Research, 25-26 (2003-2004), p.120. 
37 Pradhan, Gorkha Conquests, p.84. 
38 Ibid., p.87. 
39 The new constitution reduced the number of official posts determined by proportional representation – 
there are over six million Madhes in Nepal. For a summary of this political situation, see McDonald, Vaughn, 
‘Autonomy in the Southern Borderland’, pp.153-168. 
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marginalized political entities that did wield some political autonomy, calls into question the 
interpretation of Shah and the unification of Nepal as a national symbol. This thesis instead 
will therefore explore what Shah’s victory in 1767 meant for the borderlands in which the 
conflict took place: how the Madhes there received Kinloch’s expedition, whether they had 
historical links to India and eighteenth-century Bihar and Bengal. The thesis will ask how 
this region received Gorkhali expansion: whether, rather than being an anti-colonial 
champion, Prithvi Narayan Shah was something of a colonizer himself, whether they 
supported or resisted his campaigns, and how that choice directed his fortunes.40  
Another enduring feature in the existing literature is an idea of Gorkhali martial 
supremacy against the odds, woven deeply into a Gorkhali identity so much so that it has 
become a martial one, cultivated for centuries since by the exploits of Nepalese, or Gurkha 
regiments around the world. It stems from a narrative that the Gorkhalis won a pitched 
battle in September 1767 at Sindhuli Gadhi, in contrast to British accounts that record 
Kinloch's successful siege and occupation of that fort.41 Despite the uncertainty of how this 
conflict unfolded, Nepalese histories argue that the British were consequently put off 
further military intervention because of Gorkhali prowess, being further persuaded to 
recruit Gorkhali soldiers into its ranks during the Anglo-Nepalese war in 1814-1816. 
Sindhuli Gadhi is now the site of a yearly commemoration, taking place on 11th November, 
wherein crowds gather and the national flag is raised by military representatives.42 
The immediate problem with this imbedding of the martial Gorkhali into the 
national identity of Nepal is that the Gorkhali soldier represented only a minority of a 
country that they assimilated by conquest. Therefore, the victory that forms the genesis of 
this identity is not one that the whole of Nepal shares in. If a historian were to investigate 
the military history of the rest of the country, they would find defeat at the hands of the 
Gorkhalis – a relationship of failure and opposition rather than success and collaboration. 
Secondly, whilst Gurkha recruitment by overseas military forces like the British has since 
expanded its geographical base to encompass the whole country, it remains a national 
martial identity that excludes the overwhelming majority: many are either employed 
elsewhere, or ineligible by gender. A further problem developed during the Nepalese Civil 
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War, wherein the Nepal Army became tainted by reports of war crimes, blunders, and 
innocent fatalities. Their competence was further questioned by their failure to dislodge the 
Maoists, a guerrilla force estimated around 7,000 to 10,000 strong that had forced a military 
stalemate against their larger, better equipped state counterpart. Alleged boasts from the 
Army chief in November 2001 that the conflict would be over in six months further 
hindered its public image.43 Finally, the martial reputation has been shaken by the struggle 
for political rights fought by Gurkha veterans around the world. Their battles in a political 
arena for rights of citizenship have drawn attention to a perceived mercenary status. One 
observer wrote: ‘Our textbooks had insisted that in all of South Asia, Nepal alone had 
never been colonized; the British were so cowed by us that they had recruited our Gurkha 
troops. But no one told us that the Gurkhas were, in fact, lesser paid, dispensable mercenary 
soldiers.’44 Therefore, Gorkha’s military success from 1743 to the conquest of Kathmandu 
in 1767 should not entail the assumption of military prowess, or military strategic vision on 
behalf of Shah. This thesis consequently revisits the fighting strength and performance of 
the Gorkhalis and British sepoys in 1767, by questioning the recruitment and contracts of 
soldiers on both sides, the circumstances and surroundings in which they had to fight, and 
the reliability of the chains of command and bonds of discipline whilst operating in this 
borderlands space.  
This version of a highly nationalist history blanketed over Nepal brings to mind 
Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’. For Anderson, it was imagined because ‘the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’.45 
The nationalist historians were attempting to propagate a shared history in the interests of 
stability and unity, without threatening the hegemony of elite control. This was problematic 
– they essentially had to fabricate or exaggerate the ‘image of communion’ Anderson spoke 
of. Their solution was to create and disseminate a version of historical events wherein that 
image was a benevolent, well-intentioned centre, drawing unconditional support in martial 
opposition to external, colonizing states like India or Britain. The problem is that this 
narrative is not shared by all – It celebrates the elite, the high-caste, the royal, and the 
martial from Kathmandu. In contrast, those outside that group are excluded, such as the 
conscripted recruits within the Gorkhali army from 1767 to 1814, the exiled messengers 
and guides serving EIC expeditions, non-belligerent villagers that they encountered, and 
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those living along the Tarai borderlands, subject neither to Kathmandu nor Calcutta for 
most of this era.  
 
I:3 Existing Challenges and their Shortcomings in Nepalese History Writing 
 
Outside of Nepal, similar nationalist and colonialist historiographies have been reduced to 
rubble by postcolonial theory, and the contours of British rule around the world are being 
redrawn to emphasize marginalized and local participation, resistance and agency. As Huw 
Bowen has neatly summarized, ‘the models of Empire that are generally more persuasive 
now are ones of interaction, of exchange, of local difference rather than centralized 
uniformity, of micro-narratives contradicting the stately progression of the grand sweep, 
and these shifts have had the effect of producing a renaissance of interest in the early forms 
of imperial contact.’46  
In a South Asian context, historians have shifted from a vision of an eighteenth-
century ‘dark age’ in which Mughal order rapidly collapsed and chaos ensued, towards one 
of de-centralized power and cultural vibrancy.47 Amongst those advocating for this 
alternative reading were P.J. Marshall (who described it as an ‘evolution rather than 
revolution’), and Burton Stein (who emphasised pre-colonial continuity over political and 
cultural collapse) amongst others.48 Notable bodies of work have therefore emerged on a 
number of South Asian polities, for example Stewart Gordon’s expansive work on the 
Marathas that drew a link between war and prosperity, or that of Muzaffar Alam, which 
showed how remarkable economic growth resulted in zamindari unrest and eventual de-
centralization.49 The EIC’s relations with these South Asian states have notably been 
explored by Christopher Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, a book that invested great 
significance in mercantile organisations, powerful intermediary groups, military fiscalism 
and wider global connections. This focused less and less upon the fortunes of elite power-
brokers like Robert Clive, and more upon a series of localized relations, seeing the EIC-
Indian encounter as one component within a much wider network.50 The application of 
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orientalism to South Asia has been charted by Ronald Inden, whilst Robert Travers has 
traced the extent to which oriental despotism informed EIC-South Asian relations, 
amongst other political ideas.51 The complexities of South Asian involvement in EIC 
expansion is well reflected in Kumkum’s work on Indian credit.52 Questions of agency have 
been asked within Jon Wilson’s India Conquered, and there exists a vibrant field of South 
Asian borderlands studies, which is explored further in chapter II.53 A further cohort of 
revisionist historians identified with the Subaltern Studies Collective from India, 
spearheaded by Ranajit Guha in the 1980s. 
 Considering recent events in Nepal, such as the fall of the monarchy, and the 
problems evident in existing historical interpretations outlined so far, it is surprising that 
similar processes have not occurred within the historical writing on Nepal from 1767 to 
1814. There have been very few historical accounts of Kinloch from British historians, let 
alone attempts to accommodate Nepalese regional or localized agency within that narrative, 
or those of subsequent expeditions. Likewise, in the Nepalese academy Shah’s role and the 
centrality of Kathmandu have continually been prioritized.54 This is present in both the 
academy and wider public discourse: on 12th January 2018 Shah’s birthday was celebrated as 
‘National Unity Day’ for the first time in over a decade.55 These historiographies endure 
and the focus has not shifted to the non-elite, local or subaltern.  
Nor has the history of Nepal been considered more comparatively alongside wider 
developments in the historiography of eighteenth-century South Asia. Interjections from 
Nepal are notably missing in discussions regarding decline and decentralization – there has 
been a continued emphasis on Malla rule as cultured and theatrical, the Gorkhalis violent 
and barbaric. Further opportunities have been missed, for example whether the rising 
Gorkha state holds any meaningful similarities with that of the Maratha Confederacy or the 
Sikh Empire. Whilst questions into the former could chart patterns in relations between the 
EIC and upland, confederate states with a supposed martial aptitude and martial reward 
system, a comparison with the Sikh Empire would be particularly poignant given that the 
two came into conflict in the early nineteenth century. The relationship between those 
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aforementioned intricate South Asian networks of mercantile and agrarian ties and the 
towns, valleys and villages of the Himalayan foothills has not been explored in sufficient 
detail, neither in the previously mentioned South Asian historical works such as that of 
Christopher Bayly, nor Nepalese or Gorkhali histories such as those of Kumar Pradhan or 
John Whelpton. Both academies stop short either side of the Tarai. 
The reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, history writing in Nepal has been 
subjected to processes of censorship and propaganda: an educational program initiated by 
King Mahendra in 1955 that still affects textbooks and academic institutions after the end 
of monarchy, limiting not just the lines of enquiry opened up, but the resources available. 
Then there is potentially a historiographical and methodological explanation for why 
historians writing from outside the reaches of domestic censorship have rarely engaged 
with postcolonial, decolonial, and subalternist approaches: many of the existing Subaltern 
Studies writers including the original Subaltern Studies Collective focusing on South Asia 
have chosen to exclude Nepal from that geographical subject. This is rooted in more 
general histories of the region. Take for example Crispin Bates’s sketch of the parameters 
for his survey book Subalterns and Raj: South Asia since 1600: ‘although Afghanistan and the 
minor states of Nepal and Bhutan are sometimes included in discussions of “South Asia” 
they are not the central focus of this book, which concentrates on the region conceived 
since ancient times as Bharat and which has in more recent centuries been imagined as a 
territorially defined productive space; they are mentioned therefore only indirectly.’56 This 
neglects the complex and long lasting political links between Nepal and the rest of South 
Asia. For example, the realm of the Bhāratas, from which the Republic of India takes its 
name and Bates takes his geographical parameters, included extensive lowland areas of 
what is now Nepal. Moreover, there are some Indian states that ceased being Nepalese 
territory comparatively recently, such as Himachal Pradesh in 1816. 
Peter Hansen has suggested that history writing on Tibet has lacked a subalternist 
influence because that country did not experience a western-colonial conquest in which a 
subaltern social stratum would be established, amongst other reasons.57 A similar 
explanation could account for both Nepal’s exclusion in histories of South Asia and its 
exclusion from the historiographical innovations of postcolonial, decolonial approaches 
and Subaltern Studies. This immediately raises problems for the histories of South Asia that 
exclude Nepal on that basis – they define South Asia by colonial subjugation, and ignore 
narratives of resistance like that of Nepal. On the other hand, to exclude Nepal on the 
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grounds that it was not occupied by a colonial power is to misunderstand the discourse of 
colonialism entirely. Nepal and the Gorkhalis are rightly credited with holding off a 
numerically and technologically superior EIC army in the 1814-1816 war, yet military 
occupation was just one of many ways in which colonialism could operate – another was 
the previously described adoption of Nepalese Gurkha soldiers into the colonialist 
conception of martial races. Mary Des Chene has argued that the lack of colonial 
occupation in Nepal has contributed to a persistence of orientalism. This observation was 
based firstly on the notion that, by staving off colonial conquest, Nepal and Tibet 
inadvertently contributed to a longevity of ‘Shangri-La’ imagery - particularly an ahistorical 
vision of these places; timeless and simple, lacking history or historical change. Secondly, 
Des Chene noted that a missing canon of colonial era ethnographers separated critiques of 
colonialism in Nepalese history (and that of Tibet and Bhutan) from the rest of 
postcolonial studies.58 
A lack of subalternist writers, and the projection of contemporary elite concerns 
onto the history of Nepal has been lamented by historians. Ludwig Stiller for instance 
noted as early as 1974 that there was ‘an anti-British syndrome in much of the historical 
literature of Nepal,’ that he considered anachronistic: ‘Certain historians have read into the 
late eighteenth-century history of Nepal attitudes that did not develop historically until the 
time of the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-1816, or later.’59 Pratyoush Onta likewise challenged 
the weighting towards political elites, arguing that ‘the history of the ruling elites is more 
often than not passed off as the history of Nepal’.60 He emphasized that it was not his 
intention ‘to suggest approaches and topics other than those of the ‘history from below’ 
variety had been exhausted in Nepal,’ nor to ‘identify the history of subaltern classes as 
‘social’ and that of the elites as ‘political’ or suggest that ‘elite and subaltern histories are 
somehow hermetically sealed and separate entities’. Instead, Onta drew attention to ways in 
which ‘the “history from below” approach was conspicuous in its absence in our historical 
literature’.61  
Marginalized ethnic groups within Nepal have long been a popular topic amongst 
British historical anthropologists. The difficulty is not so much a shortage, but that they 
have traditionally been quite isolated. They have remained exceptions to the rule, being 
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written by British historians, and have not extended their anthropological conclusions 
beyond very specific, often ethnically classified groups. They contrasted quite starkly with 
the nationalist, high political Nepalese studies previously outlined in what was once called 
‘the curious division of labour’.62 It would appear that British historians held an interest in 
the locality but not the nation-state, and the Nepalese academy vice versa. Since Onta made 
these observations in 1994 there have been contributions that transcend this division, some 
of which were showcased in a 2016 Himalaya journal.63 These adopt different categories of 
analysis to the locality and ask how applicable that could be elsewhere within the country. 
This thesis hopes to build upon that literature, stretching further back to an earlier period 
of history.  
There are notable works considering Gorkhali expansion and EIC intervention that 
shift the lens away from Kathmandu, Gorkha, or Calcutta and onto previously 
marginalized spaces, yet maintain an intersection with the wider Himalayas and thus do not 
become isolated and fragmental. For instance, Kumar Pradhan’s Gorkha Conquests, which 
has been described as a direct challenge to a nationalist orthodoxy by John Whelpton, in 
contrast to the texts of Baburam Acharya and the earlier work of D.R. Regmi.64 Pradhan’s 
work draws attention to wider networks in eastern Nepal as well as localized concerns with 
Gorkhali unification/conquest campaigns, significantly on behalf of the Chaubisi Rajya hill-
states between Gorkha and Nepal Valley. For a study of 1767, Gorkha Conquests is perhaps a 
little heavily orientated around eastern Nepal and Darjeeling, where he wrote, with its 
closer analysis spanning the 1770s and 1780s and the machinations of local elites: dewans 
and rajas of smaller hill-states, rather than communities and marginalized historical agents. 
It is likewise notably sparse on Nepalese-EIC relations altogether, contributing only a brief 
paragraph on the 1767 expedition.65 However, such detail was never Pradhan’s intention. 
Instead, as his editor observed, ‘Pradhan contributes to a more specialist theme… the 
internal dynamics of South Asian political systems parallel to early colonialism’.66 Its 
contribution thus augments studies of colonialism with inter-South Asian affairs, agendas 
and events, something wholly neglected by Colonial histories.  
Kumar Pradhan’s work inspired others to write from the margins, notably Arjun 
Guneratne’s The Tarai: History, Society, Environment, a product of the same publisher, Himal 
                                               
62 Pratyoush R. Onta, ‘Whatever happened to the Golden Age?’, Himal, 6:4 (1993), p.30. 
63 Sara Shneiderman, ‘Afterword: Charting Himalayan Histories’, Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal 
and Himalayan Studies, 35:2 (2016).  
64 John Whelpton, ‘Introduction to the 2009 edition’, in Pradhan, Gorkha Conquests, p.i. Acharya, Nepal Ko 
Samikshipta Vrittanta, and Regmi, Modern Nepal. 
65 Pradhan, Gorkha Conquests, p.111. 
66 Barun De, ‘Foreword to the 1991 edition’, in Pradhan, Gorkha Conquests, p.xxii. 
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Books, in 2011. There have likewise been efforts from Prashant Jha and Martin Gaenszle 
who promoted marginalized histories and oral histories from the twentieth century 
respectively.67 More recently, David Gellner has written directly about the Indian-Nepalese 
borderlands in a discussion of migratory groups.68 However, these remain contemporary 
studies, rarely spanning so far back as the eighteenth century. For that era, twenty-five years 
after the first publication of Pradhan’s Gorkha Conquests, the nationalist narrative remains 
the most prominent and these contributions remain exceptions to the rule. 
 
I:4 Conclusions 
 
The postcolonial, decolonial and marginalized approach to history, not yet thoroughly 
applied to that of Nepal, is certainly applicable to Kinloch’s expedition and those that 
followed, and could remedy existing historiographical problems. The purpose of this study 
is to take such an approach. The thesis will shift the historical lens away from Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, Kinloch, Verelst, and the Kathmandu elite, towards popular classes, 
different competing interests, local geographies, passive resistance and colonial ignorance 
rather than knowledge. Rather than reinforcing a narrative of martial Nepal at the exclusion 
of others, it will focus on circumstance, discipline and decision-making in times of 
adversity. Rather than accepting and reinforcing an orientalist view of history that reduces 
Nepal to a passive, mysterious space, the borderlands in which these encounters take place 
will be situated alongside wider developments across South Asia. This will firstly involve a 
historical contextualization of the belligerents that operates outside of the existing 
nationalist and colonialist discourses so far identified. The 1767 expedition will then be 
reinvestigated, critically engaging with Kinloch’s diary from the journey, asking questions 
over the individual’s agency and influence, existing knowledge and its providence, that 
governed each encounter between Kinloch and those he met. Finally, having established 
who orchestrated these events and to what purpose, the thesis will highlight the impact of 
the 1767 expedition on future encounters, and similar instances in which marginalized, 
peripheral characters could have influenced the events that unfolded.  
The findings of this thesis allow for the integration of eighteenth-century Nepalese 
history into that of South Asia, and its intersection with existing historiographical debates 
surrounding eighteenth century colonialism, state formation and encounters. They 
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demonstrate how orientalism and ideas of oriental despotism worked ‘on the ground,’ at 
the point of contact between EIC and South Asian historical subjects. They also challenge 
the notion that the fortunes of colonialism were directed from imperial metropoles, their 
success determined by resistance or co-operation. Instead, the thesis advocates a more 
nuanced and complex web of competing and colliding interests, with different layers of 
collaboration both passive and active. In addition, the findings have ramifications for the 
history of Nepalese state-formation and Nepalese national identity: with regards the 
former, the narrative from within Nepal poses a significant challenge to outdated 
representations of South Asian decline in the eighteenth century. With regards the latter, 
assumptions into the relationship of peripheral societies and people with Kathmandu and 
the Gorkhalis are revealed to be incorrect. Subscription to the Nepalese state and national 
identity was not guaranteed, but contested. Finally, the thesis places greater emphasis on 
the significance of the subaltern in the Himalayas than has previously been advocated – 
opening up new lines of enquiry around patterns of marginalized agency and influence, and 
its potential within the study of the colonial encounter.
30 
 
Chapter II – Navigating an Approach from the Margins: Historiographical, Methodological 
and Source-based Considerations. 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis builds upon postcolonial critique, adopting decolonizing, subalternist 
methodologies. Such a project invokes several difficulties that this chapter will address. 
Firstly, the usage of Said’s Orientalism is discussed: how the idea has been critiqued and 
developed, and its application within this thesis. The critique of ‘nationalist’ discourse is 
then engaged with, through a discussion on writing the history of EIC-Nepalese 
encounters from an ‘etic’ perspective and the use of Benedict Anderson’s work. The 
chapter then clarifies the definitions adopted by the thesis for some contested terms: 
‘agency,’ ‘indigenous,’ ‘local,’ ‘peripheral,’ and the ‘subaltern.’ The thesis is then positioned 
in relation to the borderlands field of study. Finally, this chapter focuses on the 
methodological approach used to study Kinloch’s expedition. It discusses the core text, 
how it is read, what particular problems are raised by the use of a colonial archive, and how 
these can be alleviated by decolonizing methods. 
 
II:1 Critiquing Orientalist and Nationalist Discourse  
 
Edward Said’s Orientalism stimulated widespread debate when it was originally published in 
1978, leading Sumit Sarkar to observe that ‘it has become obligatory in many intellectual 
circles to begin with a critique of orientalism, of colonial discourse, if one wants to acquire 
or retain a radical reputation’.1 However whilst many have praised his work and adopted 
Saidian frameworks as Sarkar suggests, others have dismissed it. For those reasons, this 
section outlines its utility for this thesis. It is posited that the difficulties and limitations in 
applying orientalism to the study of eighteenth century Anglo-Himalayan relations can be 
countered, by augmenting the discussion with a recognition of the role played by ‘oriental 
despotism.’  
 Said originally explained orientalism as a concept drawn from western readings of 
Asian texts, then distributed, elaborated and maintained in scholarly, economic, 
sociological, historical and philological texts.2 Such a construction is recognisable within the 
                                               
1 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Orientalism Revisited: Saidian Frameworks in the Writing of Modern Indian History’, in 
Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (London: Verso, 2000), p.239. 
2 Said, Orientalism, p.12. 
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secondary literature on Nepal, from the nineteenth century onwards. The French 
Indologist Sylvain Lévi for example wrote his canonical Le Népal: Étude Historique d’un 
Royaume Hindou having travelled to Kathmandu, collected and consulted Sanskrit texts.3 
This included reflections on the Divyopadeś, in which the script was dismissed as a collection 
of legends.4 This practice is likewise reflected in the work of Brian Houghton Hodgson, 
resident in Kathmandu during the early nineteenth century, and that of Daniel Wright, 
whose 1877 History of Nepal was completed after he consulted and translated the 
vamśāvalīs manuscripts. With this authority Wright then attributed a series of violent acts to 
Shah, including the massacre of surrendering Lalitpur nobles upon conquering that city.5 
Further afield, Chitralekha Zutshi has demonstrated ways in which colonial officials 
prioritised and discussed Sanskrit texts in nineteenth century Kashmir. Whilst alternative, 
local texts were dismissed, orientalist debate focussed overwhelmingly on the Sanskrit 
Rajatarangiri, usually taking the form of ‘sterile debates about whether these texts should be 
designated as objective historical texts or merely as poetry’.6 
 Although Said principally located oriental discourse in nineteenth and twentieth 
century texts, some historians have recognised the categorisation of the ‘East’ as the ‘other’ 
in earlier literary works. Ronald Inden for instance noted ways in which Hegel, Herder, and 
Schlegel ‘made sharp and essential distinctions between the different parts of Asia’.7 
Aspects of orientalism were certainly present within Robert Orme’s Historical Fragments of 
the Mogul Empire, for example in his reflection that ‘ a nabob is so far despotic in his 
government [that] he has nothing to apprehend, but poison, or assassination from the 
treachery or resentment of his subjects.’8 This echoes Said’s note that ‘Orientals or Arabs 
are therefore shown to be … much given to fulsome flattery, intrigue, cunning…’9  
In relation to the events of 1767 as they were understood by contemporaries such 
as Kinloch and Verelst however, the application of orientalism incurs one principle 
difficulty that needs to be addressed. Said grounded visions of the ‘Orient’ in readings of 
South Asian texts rather than a physical encounter with India. In doing so, he did not 
account for occasions such as that of 1767 wherein someone actually encountered the East 
                                               
3 Sylvain Lévi, Le Népal: Étude Historique d’un Royaume Hindou (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1905). 
4 Sylvain Lévi, ‘Les Éléments De Formation Du Divyāvadāna’, T’oung Pao, 8:1-5 (1907) 105-122. 
5 Daniel Wright, History of Nepal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877), p.231. For a discussion on 
Wright’s use of Nepalese sources, see Manik Bajracharya, Axel Michaels, ‘On the Historiography of Nepal: 
The “Wright” Chronicle Reconsidered’, European Bulletin on Himalayan Research, 40 (2012), 83-98. 
6 Chitralekha Zutshi, Kashmir’s Contested Pasts: Narratives, Sacred Geographies, and the Historical Imagination (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), p.5. 
7 Ronald Inden, ‘Orientalist Constructions of India’, Modern Asian Studies, 20:3 (1986), p.407. 
8 Robert Orme, Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire, the Morattoes and the English Concerns in Indostan from 1659 
(London: F. Wingrave 1782), p.400. 
9 Said, Orientalism, p.38. 
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itself, and had their existing knowledge challenged and reshaped. The colonial agent is 
denied the capacity to observe, then reject or augment their existing knowledge according 
to that experience within the encounter. Furthermore, Said’s idea of an orientalist discourse 
forged through elite, textual engagement has been said to ‘foreclose investigation of 
elements of resistance or partial autonomy, and rob subordinate groups of agency’.10 It is a 
discourse in which the agency of individuals like Daniel Wright and Sylvain Lévi is 
prioritised. Consequent studies have thus rejected Said’s notion of knowledge produced as 
‘a graft from the top,’ instead ‘arguing that colonial knowledge was dialogic, and that 
Indians participated in innovative and interesting ways in the production of colonial 
knowledge and that they were by no means entirely without agency in the endeavour’.11 In 
doing so, they dismiss the notion of a monolithic colonialist discourse dictated by a central 
colonizing power, emphasising a colonial experience that tends to be located in ‘a more 
negotiable cultural interface between Britain and India’.12 This allows for a plurality of 
experiences that better reflects the ways in which categories like gender, caste, wealth and 
literacy could shape the colonial encounter for an individual. It furthermore diminishes the 
stark contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ as the distance between the individual and the 
‘other’ waxes and wanes. This approach to colonial encounters is certainly applicable to 
Kinloch’s expedition: the local inhabitants that the soldiers encountered had varying 
knowledge of the British, and varying experiences of Gorkhali expansion, just as the sepoys 
and officers marching with Kinloch had varying familiarity with the Himalayan foothills. 
Once these different positions are accepted, it becomes apparent that those involved held 
different stakes on different bets. Any collective or individual response to the colonial 
enterprise was consequently unlikely to be passive and predetermined, but contested and 
changeable. 
 The most significant feature of orientalism in relation to the 1767 encounter is its 
emphasis on the concept of the ‘Oriental Despot.’ This was arguably rooted in the 
eighteenth century, featuring significantly in the works of Montesquieu amongst others (as 
discussed in chapter I). The theory consequently provides a bridge between the study of 
Kinloch and his contemporaries, and those later historical accounts to which Said’s concept 
is more directly applicable. Eighteenth century British colonial authors Robert Orme and 
Alexander Dow both used Oriental Despotism to justify colonial rule, albeit in different 
ways. Whilst both agreed that the climate and fertile soil in South Asia rendered its 
                                               
10 Sarkar, ‘Orientalism Revisited’, p.242. 
11 Lakshmi Subramanian, History of India, 1707- 1857 (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2010), p.96. 
12 Seema Alavi, ‘Introduction’, in Alavi, ed., The Eighteenth Century, p.41. 
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inhabitants ‘lazy’ and ‘incapable’ of overthrowing a despot, Orme argued that the brutality 
of despotism justified EIC intervention, whereas Dow argued that this natural order, 
combined with a precedent for ‘enlightened despotism’ on behalf of the Mughals, should 
inspire the British to practice despotic rule themselves in India.13 It is also a concept that 
has been deployed more recently. For example, consider Michael Curtis, who draws 
parallels between eighteenth century visions of the Orient and what he perceived as 
contemporary militant Islam. Curtis wrote in order to ‘retrieve European writing on the 
Muslim Orient as an aid to understanding contemporary Muslim Societies’.14 He argued 
that ‘it is reasonable to conclude that the concept of oriental despotism is not an arbitrary 
exegesis, the result of prejudiced observation, having little relation to Eastern systems, but 
rather reflects perceptions of real processes and behaviour in those systems’.15 Given its 
continued usage in characterisations of the East in accounts such as that of Curtis, its 
creation and curation is worth reiterating.  
 In comparison to orientalism, which has arguably discounted agency on behalf of 
the ‘oriental subject,’ an exploration of writing on oriental despotism allows for the 
acknowledgement of the colonial encounter, and the various historical agents present 
within that. Rather than knowledge of South Asia being derivative from European readings 
of South Asian texts, the concept ‘grew out of the interplay between travellers’ 
observations and theoretical interpretations’, according to Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi.16 
Writers on the subject drew upon people like Francois Bernier who had visited India and 
encountered the subject that they wrote upon, and at times showed recognition of the 
different factors present within such a construction. For example Robert Orme added a 
caveat that his observations were ‘a result of an attention given to this subject [Indian 
government] during a residence of several years in India, and that although I may be 
deceived myself, I can have no end in misleading others,’ before proceeding to explain that 
‘the influence of the emperor, however despotic, cannot but faintly reach those parts of his 
dominion which lay at the greatest distance from his capital’.17 This better reflects the 
aforementioned ‘negotiable cultural interface’ that Seema Alavi called for as an explanation 
for the colonial experience.  
                                               
13 Orme, Historical Fragments, pp.255-306 & Alexander Dow, A History of Hindostan (London: John Murray, 
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There is further space within the theory of oriental despotism to explore nuance in 
the different visions of Asia. This is arguably missing in Said’s framework, which has been 
accused of having ‘failed to notice the dissonance and polyvalence within colonial discourse 
as it developed over time, and then imbued it with an ahistorical, monolithic quality.’18 
Within the works of those identifying and discussing the notion of oriental despotism 
however, there are multiple positions. It has already been established that whilst Orme and 
Dow both asserted that it was present in eighteenth century India, and that it paved the 
way for British colonialism, they disagreed on whether it was a positive or negative model 
for rule. Edmund Burke on the other hand deviated from this. His attitude toward oriental 
despotism was dictated by his criticism of the EIC. In the impeachment trial of Warren 
Hastings, the Governor-General of India and Jones’s patron, Burke argued that Hastings 
had falsely justiﬁed company practices on the grounds that despotism was the traditional 
form of government in India, whereas in reality, according to Burke, Muslim states were 
governed by the laws of Islam and therefore were not despotic. At the same time, Burke 
accused the EIC of adopting the practices of oriental despotism and even introducing them 
into British politics.19 Burke joined a significant body of scholars who used observations on 
supposed oriental despotism in order to establish whether despotism was in fact being 
practiced closer to home. A more fundamental criticism from Abraham Hyacinthe 
Anquetil-Duperron rejected the notion of oriental despotism entirely. He argued in his 
Législation Orientale of 1778 that the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Mughal Empire 
enjoyed rational legal systems, condemning the theory of oriental despotism as an excuse 
for colonialism.20 
There has been much scepticism of British historians’ commentaries on how 
nationalist movements have unfolded in formerly colonial countries, or countries like 
Nepal that were subjected to colonial pressure and orientalist representation. This 
scepticism becomes more profound if that commentary is critical or undermining, and 
stems from widespread criticism of earlier theorists who differentiated between ‘western’ 
and ‘eastern’ nationalism. The former was seen to be enlightened and rational, the latter 
cruel, despotic and aggressive. This differentiation originated in European concepts of race, 
and served an imperialist purpose - by observing Asian nationalist movements negatively, 
European scholars could deny that their former colonies were ready for independent 
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nation-statehood.21 Alternatively, Asian nationalist movements have been written about 
positively, but only as colonial legacies – as much a European achievement as an Asian one. 
To take Indian historiography as a South Asian example, this is arguably the stance of 
historians associated with the Cambridge School. Anil Seal believed the emergence of Indian 
Nationalism, and the shape that independent India took, to be the result of Indian elites, 
educated in the United Kingdom, who upon their return to India ‘competed and 
collaborated’ with British colonial officials in their search for political power.22 Within that 
interpretation is the insinuation that Indian nationalism and the independence it was partly 
responsible for was a result of the elite’s patronage from British educational institutions. 
 This thesis has deployed Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation as an 
‘imagined community’ to demonstrate the construction of Nepalese nationalism, and its 
consequent effects on Nepalese history writing. However, this concept has been applied 
selectively, since Anderson’s original work does not map neatly onto Nepalese nationalism. 
The hypothetical imagined community he discussed was situated in Western Europe, 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. Beyond that, he discussed the newly 
independent republics of the Americas - nationalism only arose when ‘the belief that 
society was naturally organized around and under high centres - monarchs who were 
persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological 
(divine) dispensation - axiomatically lost its grip on men’s minds’.23 This contrasts starkly 
with Nepalese nationalism which rallied around the monarch as a semi-divine Hindu 
figurehead.24 It was rooted precisely in the belief that supposedly needed to lose sway over 
the population for Anderson’s imagined community to emerge. Anderson did address the 
subject of differences between ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ nationalisms, but stated that he 
himself did not believe that the most important distinctions among nationalisms ran along 
east–west lines.25 Instead, what emerges from Anderson’s later work is that nationalist 
movements manifest themselves differently around the world. Nepal in particular does not 
fit neatly into either of his models, the Creole Nationalism, Official Nationalism or 
Linguistic Nationalism (although government attempts to homogenize the Nepali language 
can be seen as failed Linguistic Nationalism.)  
There are furthermore some critics who do not believe histories of a country or 
society can be written from the outside – from an ‘etic’ perspective. They believe the 
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parameters of an individual’s European experience of nationalism restrict how accurate 
such a history can be. The basis of this argument is that the European historian, when 
faced with complex sources or unfamiliar contexts, is selective and reductive in their usage. 
Sumit Sarkar described the impression that ‘the majority among even the small section of 
the western intelligentsia interested in the third world prefers its material conveniently 
packaged nowadays, without too much detail or complexity’. The etic historian preferred 
the simplicity of sources previously transcribed or presented, to the more difficult approach 
that included first hand source consultation. Sarkar continues: ‘the West, it seems, to 
borrow from Said, is still engaged in producing its Orient through selective appropriation 
and essentialist stereotyping: orientalism flourishes at the heart of todays’ anti-orientalist 
tirade’.26 
It is a critique that has been directed at both cultural anthropologists and historians 
alike. One such targeted work was John Whelpton’s History of Nepal. Kamal Malla draws 
attention to the book’s bibliography, noting that of more than 250 items only five are in 
Nepalese, giving the reader ‘the impression that the account is mostly based on secondary 
sources available in English and other Western languages’.27 (Malla does not believe 
Whelpton to be an orientalist, stating that ‘at least, it is not yet another “historical account” 
by a pontificating British civil servant, or a medical surgeon, a postmaster general, a military 
colonel, or a travelling emissary with no formal academic training in the rigours of 
historiography’.28 His criticism is more that Whelpton’s history of Nepal does not derive 
from Nepali language sources.) Whelpton responded by stating his book was ‘not a 
presentation of original, front-line research but rather an attempt to produce, principally 
for the international English-reading public, a synthesis of what previous research has 
revealed’.29 This reflects Whelpton’s target audience and readership, but the problem 
remains that without the necessary translation skills an English language historian can only 
access visions of Nepalese nationalism through the lens of another English language writer, 
such as Whelpton, or the sources he in turn was assessing. (This can of course be 
counteracted by the use of the many Nepalese historians writing in English, which 
Whelpton’s critics do not include in their count.) 
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These criticisms have stimulated a call for histories to be written by South Asian 
writers, from an ‘emic’ perspective. Richard Burghart argues that this approach ‘emphasizes 
the uniqueness of cultures and aims at the systematic description of those cultural 
categories that inform native social behaviour’.30 Writing from an anthropological 
background, Burghart’s preference for ‘nativist’ history is rooted in the idea that such 
histories better explain that society’s categories of thinking – for instance how they view 
political power or the cosmos. This call was partly in response to subjective colonial-era 
histories either knowingly or unknowingly constrained by a colonalist discourse, and partly 
from the need for the previously oppressed and colonized to speak for themselves. 
However, as demonstrated by the Nepalese nationalist interpretations of 1767, histories 
written by the colonized or local can be just as subjective as colonialist ones.  
Moreover, emic histories can and have been appropriated by colonialist historians 
attempting to legitimize their own representations with an Indian voice. As Gyan Prakash 
describes it, ‘privileging the writings of historians from third world origins… renders such 
scholars to “native informants” whose discourse is opened up to further disquisitions of 
how “they” think of “their” history.’31 An example of this can be found by returning to the 
example of Kirkpatrick’s mission to Nepal. According to Kirkpatrick, the practice of 
history in Nepal is ‘without authentic records’ and ‘clouded by mythological fables’. The 
colonial observer does include a Nepalese historical voice, only to demonstrate this falsity – 
Prithvi Narayan’s conquest is narrated to Kirkpatrick by his grandson, King Rana Bahadur 
Shah. Kirkpatrick then casts doubt over Rana Bahadur Shah’s assertion that the people of 
Kathmandu rallied to support Prithvi Narayan’s soldiers.32 The recited narrative is 
considered either incorrect, or a deliberate lie. Neither of these scenarios reflect well on the 
Nepalese historical method. Thus, the colonialist’s usage of a ‘native informant’ only 
consolidates the colonialist’s representation of the South Asian subject. 
The futility of possessiveness when it comes to who writes whose history is that 
ultimately the historian needs to identify the potential frameworks that have influenced 
others in their position and may well be influencing themselves, regardless of whether they 
are writing as a cultural ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’. Whilst a European historian needs to 
acknowledge the discourse of orientalism that may influence their knowledge of Nepal, the 
Nepalese historian must recognize how the program of nationalist censorship may shape 
their own interpretation. Said’s eloquent thoughts on Western history writing resonate: 
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‘there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result 
of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the 
other hand knowledge that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation.’33 Moreover, 
it is difficult to establish who has a monopoly of understanding the perceptions and 
thought processes of a villager who encountered the EIC expedition, 250 years ago. If it is 
taken that a Nepalese writer is in a better position to research that history than a foreign 
writer, then in turn a writer from the Sindhuli district would be better placed than one in 
Kathmandu. Taken to its logical conclusion, the right to write would be the possession of a 
minute number.  
Sarkar’s critique, that etic histories would use a colonial archive out of convenience 
at the expense of originality, is a valid one given that the primary source for this study – 
Kinloch’s journal - is indeed an English language source. However, this is not a choice of 
convenience. It is the only day-by-day account of the expedition available and the only 
written record of these encounters. Nevertheless, an encounter is by definition something 
that generates multiple experiences, and its ramifications cannot be explained solely 
through one perspective. Moreover, Kinloch’s journal may be a more thorough record than 
the few contemporary Nepalese sources, but still incurs extensive questions of reliability. 
The nuances of using a colonial archive, and the Nepalese sources available to 
counterbalance this, are discussed in more depth shortly. This thesis treads a line between 
emic and etic, so that the colonial, English language sources are used more critically, and 
less exclusively, then Sarkar’s assertion would allow. 
 
II:2 Navigating Terminologies and the Subalternist Approach 
 
This thesis tries to recover the previously neglected agency of marginalized characters 
through a close reading of Kinloch’s expeditionary journal alongside other colonial and 
Nepalese sources. That agency, and its neglect, is the foundation for each specific 
encounter discussed. However, what exactly constitutes ‘agency,’ the reasons for its neglect, 
and the consequent marginalization of each character’s historical role, differ. It could be 
due to assumptions made about their South Asian identity, or the locality they occupy. It 
could be their peripheral relationship to the political centre, or their subaltern identity. 
These designations are not symbiotic, and their usage incurs historiographical debates that 
need to be addressed.  
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 ‘Agency’ as a mass noun according to the Oxford English Dictionary is an ‘action 
or intervention producing a particular affect,’ whilst an ‘agent’ is ‘a person or thing that 
takes an active role or produces a specified effect’.34 Taking such rigid definitions however 
obscures the complexity of their use in historical analysis. For that reason, a couple of 
amendments and clarifications on their parameters are required.  
In the context of colonial South Asia there are both individuals and groups of 
people whose ability to complete an ‘action or intervention,’ or to ‘take an active role,’ has 
been denied within historical accounts, since their actions were recorded with far less 
frequency than their colonizer counterparts. Moreover, through the British colonialist lens, 
the South Asian historical subject was apolitical and apathetic, incapable of aspiring to a 
‘particular affect,’ and thus in need of a guiding hand by colonialism. At the same time, 
South Asian Hindu agency was considered shackled to a despotic religious order. Ronald 
Inden argued that according to colonial discourse, ‘people of India are not even partially 
autonomous agents. They do not shape and reshape their world. Rather they are the 
patients of that which makes them Indian – the social, material reality of caste.’35 Therefore, 
recognition of South Asian agency within colonial sources has been hindered by the 
insistence that the South Asian mind had limited capacity for it, being restricted by South 
Asian society and religion. Conversely, both the agency of British historical subject, and 
their ability to erase that of the South Asian, is clear within colonial sources.36 It is therefore 
submitted that the practices of recording action and outcome within the colonial 
encounter, combined with the rigid Oxford Dictionary definition, obscures agency of 
behalf of the colonized. 
There are forms of agency that do not involve an ‘active role,’ or an ‘intervention.’ 
The agent may choose precisely not to complete an action, and thus the recording of their 
agency, not being described unless notably for the lack of action, is neglected. However, 
James Scott has demonstrated how significant that choice could be in contributing towards 
colonial resistance or collaboration in his outstanding book, Weapons of the Weak. Examples 
of such non-active resistance in Scott’s book, which collectively worked to undermine 
invasive capitalist agricultural practices in a rural Malaysian community, included reporting 
as unable to work for barely plausible reasons, claiming tools had been lost or stolen, non-
attendance or non-compliance through tardiness or a slow work rate.37 This form of agency 
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is repeated throughout the 1767 encounter and those that followed, therefore the thesis 
broadens the Oxford National Dictionary’s definition by including ‘inactive agency,’ the 
choice not to complete an action or intervention, within its remit. 
Having broadened the definition of ‘agency’ there remains inherent 
historiographical problems in attempting to recover agency on behalf of the marginalized 
agent. The first is the notion that the person or thing, the agent, is desiring a ‘specified 
effect’. Historians attempting to evaluate the extent of agency cannot do so by identifying 
the effect of an action, then allocating the desire for this effect to a historical subject, and 
arguing that the individual therefore had a significant importance as the architect of that 
desired effect. This is because there is very rarely an assertion by the individual within the 
archive that they held that desire. Such an argument is more indicative of how the historian 
wants the historical subject to be perceived. In a South Asian context this has often been 
associated with an intent to advocate for specific disenfranchised and marginalized groups, 
‘projecting political fantasies’ onto those subjects.38 To assume agency without investigation 
is therefore similar in its essentialism to the colonial orientalist discourse, and represents a 
misunderstanding of colonialism as a material and psychological force in which individuals 
were deprived of power, leading them to feel powerless, passive or silent. Indeed, Jon 
Wilson has argued that, if historians writing about marginalized historical agency intend to 
restore the humanity of individual subjects, a lack of agency can be just as important a part 
of being human as having it.39 The difference however is that in the past this lack of agency 
has been stated as categorical fact, whereas the opposite, that marginalized characters might 
be active in the course of events, has not. 
 The response to these challenges can no longer be to avoid the study of 
marginalized agency. Certainly, the deprivation of power and exercise of control occurred 
within the colonial experience, to the extent that historical subjects may have felt 
powerless, but that lack of agency should not be presumed. This thesis therefore highlights 
historical instances in which agency has been denied, then demonstrates ways in which the 
action or inaction of certain historical agents whose influence has previously been 
neglected had specified effects. However, it is not subsequently argued that the historical 
agent exercising agency does so with that specified effect in mind – their agenda is not 
presupposed. Potential motives and causal factors are certainly posited, but are rarely done 
so with certainty.  
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The term ‘indigenous’ also requires clarification. The key difficulty is what 
constitutes it: how long a people need to have occupied a space to be called ‘indigenous’. 
This is problematic in that it operates as a blanket term for all non-European historical 
agents, endowing the essentialized ‘colonized subject’ with a fixed narrative of long-term 
residency in the space that they are indigenous to. In a South Asian context, no such 
generalization can be made. Throughout history, peoples frequently migrated throughout 
the Himalayas, and charting them is difficult. Who is indigenous to what space can become 
highly politicized, setting up a hegemony of one specific group in a region, which has 
likewise been said of the term ‘native’.40 The connotation of the ‘indigenous’ likewise 
reinforces a juxtaposition of the passive, static and homogenous colonial subject versus the 
active, travelled colonizer of various European nationalities, which does not adequately 
reflect South Asian mobility and global contact: ‘historians wanting to recover “native 
agency” often consequently assume that these places do not have mobile cultures – that 
unlike Europe, Asia and Africa are full of ‘indigenous people’.41 For that reason, this thesis 
prefers to use regional identities: Bengali, Nepalese, Gorkhali, Tibetan, Indian, or South 
Asian if these more specific designations are either unknown or too narrow. It is after all 
their South Asian identity and ethnicity, rather than the duration that they have lived in 
South Asia or the extent to which they could be called ‘indigenous,’ that has marginalized 
these historical agents.  
By extension the ‘local’ is used to identify when a person lives, or has lived, in the 
specific area between India and Nepal (in Kinloch’s journal, this is not overt though there 
are identifiers - whether they are working there, and if that labour is permanent instead of 
seasonal, or whether they are living there permanently.) In many instances, we do not know 
much about the ‘local’. However, we can learn a lot of context for specific villages by 
statistical analysis – the social composition, population, occupations, tax yield and wealth 
can all be assessed in comparison to previous years and other places. ‘Local’ can also be the 
scale on which they politically, culturally or financially operate. So, a grain merchant may be 
described as ‘local,’ if his business is restricted to a small area of northern Bihar.  
The ‘local’ can also be described as ‘peripheral,’ but it is not the same. By all means 
the spaces in which many of the encounters studied take place are geographically 
‘peripheral’ to the political centres of Kathmandu and Calcutta, yet a character can be 
described as ‘peripheral’ to these centres for reasons other than geography - they may 
frequently visit Patna, such as the guide Ram Das who provided Kinloch with information. 
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They would therefore quite often have a close proximity to the ‘physical’ centre. However, 
they did not have any official authority or role in that place. Alternatively, a Company 
official, such as Edward Golding at the EIC’s Bettiah outpost who first received the Malla 
request for intervention, may physically be far away from Calcutta, but are certainly less 
‘peripheral’ in terms of official colonial status than Ram Das, travelling across Bengal 
reliant on alms. ‘Peripheral’ in this thesis therefore designates the lack of an official, 
recorded, relationship of influence at the political centres of Calcutta and Kathmandu. 
However, it must be remembered that this thesis specifically challenges that definition, 
arguing that the ‘peripheral,’ could still occupy such an influential position. ‘Peripheral’ 
identifiers may be their absence within official records or their occupation. This conceptual 
definition of ‘peripheral’ rather than a territorial or spatial one has drawn inspiration from 
Marsden and Hopkins’ employment of the term ‘Frontier’ to denote ‘not a bounded tract 
of territory but a space – part conceptual, part physical’.42 They explored different 
connotations of sarhad – the ‘frontier’ – and sarhadi – a ‘frontier person’ – in Afghanistan. 
The terms assumed different meanings in different contexts, at different times providing a 
distinction between ‘upland’ and ‘lowland,’ ‘urban’ and ‘civilised’.43 
The most problematic of all these terms is the concept of ‘the subaltern’. As 
guidance, this thesis considers the debates surrounding the Subaltern Studies Collective, in 
order to identify what exactly constitutes the ‘subaltern.’ There has been disagreement over 
this: the original ‘Subaltern Manifesto’ laid down by Ranajit Guha held a Gramscian-
Marxist agenda. Some marxist historians have consequently argued that since then, the 
Subaltern Studies project had lost its way: The absorption of Said’s Orientalism at the 
expense of theorists like E.P. Thompson encouraged a turn to textual, rather than social 
analysis, and these were texts which, by their nature, had primarily been written not by 
subalterns but by elites. Subaltern Studies ‘had begun to leave the subaltern out’.44 Critics 
on these grounds have mostly advocated returning to the original agenda. Sumit Sarkar for 
instance wrote that the way forward was to revisit E.P. Thompson’s work, stressing local 
resistance to hegemony through the appropriation of elements of it and through the 
pockets that remained free of foreign penetration.45 Others, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
have defended Subaltern Studies by arguing it was primarily a postcolonial project, and that 
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‘the subaltern’ is not necessarily always the rural poor.46 Gayatri Spivak likewise had an 
astute response: ‘Subaltern studies considers the bottom layer of society, not necessarily put 
together by capital logic alone. This is the theoretical difference from Marxism.’47  
If not their relationship to the means of production, what rendered a person 
‘subaltern?’ If we take it to mean ‘the bottom layer of society,’ an individual could occupy 
that layer as result of gender, poverty, occupation, class, and so on. Given such inherent 
variation, some historians find this definition of ‘subaltern’ guilty of homogenizing 
language in its discussion of subaltern political consciousness – this critique was levelled at 
the work of Ashis Nandy, who in trying to define the subaltern was accused of 
‘generalizing the cultural experience of the Bengali Literati to that of the whole nation’.48 
This thesis does not consider ‘subaltern’ a synonym for ‘working class’. Nor does it 
homogenize the subaltern within Kinloch’s journal. Instead, it interprets ‘subaltern’ as a 
relational concept. This idea is drawn from the work of Crispin Bates, who wrote that ‘the 
term “subaltern” does not simply connote the poor and the wretched, but all those placed 
in relations of subordination and domination to superordinate classes’.49 This allows for an 
appreciation of the diversity within the subaltern - though all subaltern subjects have that 
subordination in common, they may also be subordinate to each other, or have differing 
relationships with the political elite. This is the case within the 1767 expedition, which as 
we shall see is a showcase for subaltern heterogeneity. Take for example the village of 
Janakpur that the expedition marched through. The villagers fled to the local countryside 
days before Kinloch’s arrival. Whilst all the villagers resided in the same geographical space, 
and were subordinate to their local headman, some were then chosen to return and speak 
to Kinloch, whilst others were not. Defining subaltern as a relational concept also ensures 
it does not charter a homogenized subaltern mindset, or attempt a collective community 
consciousness in the regions Kinloch travels through – on the contrary, at times it charts 
differences in consciousness within a community not always opposed to elite rule, as 
Ranajit Guha insisted. For example, Kinloch postulated that the villagers fled Janakpur not 
out of fear, but to buy time whilst such differences of opinion within the community were 
being settled.50 
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It is important to note that EIC expeditions did meet local or peripheral characters 
whose agency has been marginalized, that can only tenuously be described as ‘subaltern’. A 
case in point would be the local grain merchant Dondao Chaudhuri that Kinloch met in 
1767. He was known to the Raja of Patna, and to Kinloch’s superiors. He also would have 
commanded local labour, and would have been comparatively wealthy. So, whilst he was 
geographically peripheral in the same way a ryot in the area was, he was certainly less 
politically peripheral, and he was not ‘working-class’.51 To call him subaltern, either with an 
original, marxist definition or because of his social hierarchal layer, seems unsubstantiated. 
And yet, unlike the superordinate figures of Shah and Kinloch, the grain merchant does not 
speak for himself within the archive: his words are only ever paraphrased by others. 
Despite his comparative wealth or political links, he has still been marginalized because of 
his local, Bengali identity. Therefore, he is not bound to the subaltern by a shared 
relationship to the modes of production, or a social identity, but he does occupy a similar 
position in his subordination to others, and an inability to speak for himself in the source 
base. A historical investigation into the 1767 expedition that concentrates on marginalized 
characters such as the grain merchant is therefore required, regardless of whether they 
neatly fit into original conceptualisations of the subaltern, if only to restore them as 
historical agents alongside Kinloch and Shah. 
 
II:3 Contributions from Borderlands Studies 
 
Having critiqued colonialist and nationalist discourse in previous interpretations and 
identified the subaltern, marginalized character, this thesis then attributes involvement in 
previously neglected networks and political concerns to various agents. These alternative 
interpretations are drawn in part from the subaltern approach previously outlined, and in 
part from recent studies on borderlands. Whilst area-studies of South Asia and Central Asia 
have omitted Nepal (and to a similar extent, Tibet) as aforementioned, nation-state and 
colonial-state histories have likewise omitted narratives from the periphery and the 
colonised respectively. The study of the spaces in between these areas and nations offers an 
opportunity to move away these pitfalls, towards what have been labelled ‘connected 
histories.’ This was a term coined by Sanjay Subrahmanyam in a rejection of ‘the binary 
between discrete geographical and cultural monoliths such as Europe and Asia, set up by a 
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great many comparative studies’.52 In a 1767 context, once the borderlands periphery of the 
lower foothills is considered alongside the centres of Kathmandu and Calcutta, the 
implications of different networks of languages, trade, family, political and cultural ties for 
Anglo-Nepalese relations become more visible.  
 Recently, Indrani Chatterjee has voiced scepticism unto whether this is possible in 
the Tibetan-Nepalese-Bengali borderlands, owing to the extent of disconnected histories 
written over the long durée, which make pre-colonial connected spaces very difficult to 
map.53 Chatterjee listed many connected histories that had previously been unread, 
including the sovereignty of the Mallas of Patan over the town of Jumla in the Karnali 
zone.54 Disconnected histories of the colonial era ‘embraced ideals of androcentric and 
absolutist sovereignty, of tribalism and territoriality. But they disregarded all evidence to the 
contrary’.55 It is the intention of this thesis to recognise such connections in its 
reinterpretation of 1767, by drawing upon the innovative ideas and approaches of existing 
South Asian borderlands studies.  
Zomia was a term used by Willem van Schendel to designate a geographical upland 
region, although there have been historians writing about the non-state people residing 
there avant la lettre.56 Van Schendel originally deployed Zomia as an attack on area studies, 
on the grounds that they often neglected the margins. His argument was geographically 
calculated – van Schendel’s Zomia intersected the peripheries of Central Asia, South Asia, 
South-East Asia and East Asia. 57 Sara Shneiderman then argued for Nepal’s inclusion.58 
This was then expanded upon by James Scott, who argued that Zomians perfected ‘the art 
of not-being governed,’ a form of resistance to colonial or postcolonial annexation 
characterized by flight, transportation of resources and an unstable, flexible cultural identity 
that withstood attempts at hegemony from the colonial or postcolonial nation-state.59  
The direct application of Zomia to this thesis is problematic: firstly, the term 
creates a new area studies, in which a centre is designated and essentialist characteristics are 
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drawn up. This consequently attributes Scott’s Zomian ‘art’ to all societies within the 
Himalayas: non-state, isolationist and evasive. It then imposes the geographical boundaries 
of Zomia, creates a binary divide between Zomian and Non-Zomian, and fails to 
appreciate the complex weaving of networks and interaction between different areas. Jelle 
Wouters led this critique with an examination of ways in which hill-tribes opposed colonial 
governance yet maintained a dependency on trade and interaction with the plains. They 
argued it was simply impossible in the barren hills to cut off the state absolutely.60 To 
neglect such fundamental links, for example those between Makwanpur and Awadh that 
led to Mughal intervention in 1763, incurs the risk that Himalayan polities like Nepal are 
once more excluded from South Asian historical developments.61 Secondly, whilst some 
marginalized characters did at times practice what Scott has called the ‘art of not being 
governed,’ such as flight from a locality, they also practiced a direct, belligerent resistance, 
such as the staunch defence of a key geographical feature. In 1767, there were examples of 
both these forms: the evacuation of villagers from Janakpur, and the defence of the pass 
beyond Sindhuli Gadhi.62 Furthermore, the marginalized groups on the border between 
eighteenth-century Bengal and Kathmandu are not what the prominent Zomian theorists 
van Schendel, Scott, or Sara Shneiderman would call a quintessential Zomian group: 
middle-to-high altitude cultivators, who supplement their diet with foraged forest products 
and who maintain a high level of mobility, a relatively egalitarian social structure, and a 
synthetic, exclusively oral religious tradition.63 There is likewise a problem with Scott’s 
quintessential colonial-valley state. Its key characteristics included the threat to Zomians of 
occupation and land annexation. However, the annexation of Nepal was neither a key EIC 
objective, nor long-term goal, behind eighteenth-century expeditions into the foothills.64 
Zomia, when augmented by Scott’s ‘art’, is best considered not as a replacement for 
Central Asia Studies or South Asia Studies, but an inversion of traditional centres and 
peripheries that focuses on the resistance of non-state, tribal groups to EIC and Gorkhali 
intervention, rather than the degree of success with which centralist, colonial or post-
colonial nation-state policy and control was implemented. This escapes the trappings of 
nation-state histories, for example prioritizing the political relationship between Nepal and 
the EIC, and instead sheds light on alternative political and socio-economic concerns that 
are considered in the locality but stretch across the Himalayas, which could have influenced 
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the colonial enterprise. Similarly, we should by no means accept Scott’s paradigm for 
resistance uncritically but could nevertheless consider forms of resistance on behalf of the 
people residing in this borderlands space, regardless of whether they match Scott’s Zomian 
attributes.  
One writer who has achieved such an inversion is Chitralekha Zutshi. Her 
rethinking of Kashmiri history represented a shift from a traditional focus on border 
disputes and clashes away from Delhi and Karachi, and instead considered Srinagar as the 
industrialized pivot for wider trade networks and imperial expansion throughout history.65 
Zutshi’s work is particularly significant for this thesis, given the nationalist and colonialist 
historiographical tradition that the region has been subjected to. As previously mentioned, 
Zutshi drew attention to ways in which a series of orientalist projects, ‘aimed at unearthing 
Kashmir’s Sanskrit texts and through them its classical past’, had by the nineteenth century 
attributed a specific author and date to the Rajatarangini, relegating alternative, Persian 
narrative traditions.66 Later, at the turn of the twentieth century, Rajatarangini was translated 
and appropriated by Bengali writers, ‘as a national text by claiming Kashmir’s past as a 
reflection of the grand narrative of Indian history.’67 Zutshi recognised these projects, and 
in tracing their developments, hoped to credit the ‘complex networks through which 
indigenous Kashmiri, orientalist and nationalist ideas interacted with and influenced each 
other.’68 Her book subsequently explores the different historical agents involved in this 
process, as they advocated their own readings of the Rajatarangini, and made 
accommodations for those of others. The production of colonial knowledge on Nepal 
within the series of encounters studied in this thesis can be considered likewise: Francis 
Buchanan-Hamilton’s Account of Nepal for instance can be described as an intellectual 
encounter between himself and the many informants who he consulted.69 
 Alternative lines of enquiry are similarly observable in the works of Benjamin 
Hopkins and Magnus Marsden, notably within Hopkins’ The Making of Modern Afghanistan 
and their co-authored Fragments of the Afghan Frontier.70 Their lamentations on existing 
historical writing chime with the observations made in chapter I: ‘this is a space that has 
been shaped powerfully by a poorly understood colonial legacy, as well as invisible histories 
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of everyday movement that are rarely the focus of scholarship’.71 The focus on mobility is 
particularly poignant. Within Fragments, Marsden and Hopkins wrote that ‘mobility has been 
a key feature of life on the frontier, with its inhabitants employing movement as a strategy 
of survival and response to political pressure, as well as economic opportunism’.72 Similar 
strategies are subsequently observed within chapter IV of this thesis, as Kinloch travelled 
through tracts of land either abandoned or occupied according to significant local changes 
in tax or security, and different migrants, singular or within a group, either avoided or 
sought out the expedition, seeking either opportunity or confrontation.  
It is further noticeable within this example that Marsden and Hopkins recognised 
mobility as a response to economic opportunism, rejecting any vision of South Asian 
uplands as spaces exclusively populated by state-evading peoples. Writing on 
anthropological contributions like those of Scott and van Schendel, they wrote that ‘such 
images of disjuncture and marginality are problematic as they obscure ways in which the 
Frontier was, and is, not only a space of uncontrolled freedom, but also one that binds, 
connects and thus helps to forge powerful forms of solidarity, community and collective 
identity that endure across space and time’.73 Marsden and Hopkins thus contested the 
understanding of the frontier as a ‘non-place,’ and as a ‘chaotic buffer zone’.74 A similar 
critique can be made of the Nepalese-Indian borderlands of the Madhesh, when viewed 
solely as a discontented space with competing interests between different ethnic groups. 
Nor did they assume characteristics across the varied groups within the borderland: ‘central 
to our study is the acknowledgement that the frontier’s inhabitants are not now, nor have 
they been, a homogenous group occupying a singular space’.75 Instead, they tread new 
ground between the non-state, disintegrated model of Scott, essentialising, simplistic model 
of one single ‘frontier people’ on the other. They ultimately call for ‘a greater recognition of 
the underlying dynamics and constantly evolving ties that simultaneously draw the 
Frontier’s spaces and fragments together, and also pull them apart’.76 This is relevant to 
territories of the Nepalese hill-states, such as Makwanpur, Nuwakot, Patan, and Gorkha. 
Though they were linked by trade, religion, and sovereignty amongst other factors, these 
linkages shifted, straining, breaking, mending and strengthening without rhythm.  
There are some recent contributions to Border Studies that focus on eighteenth-
century Nepalese local histories, from which ideas and interpretations can be applied. 
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Within a special journal issue on borderlands in South Asia, Vashuda Pande provided a 
survey of Kumaon as a trans-Himalayan borderland over the long durée. This encompassed 
some discussion on the region from 1767 until the end of the Anglo-Nepalese War. By the 
turn of the nineteenth century, Kumaon occupied a pivotal crossroads position: in a 
borderlands space between the Sikh Empire and the Gorkha Empire, Kumaon was 
connected to both via a well serviced east-west road.77 It had moreover shared a long 
history of exchange and interaction with Tibet, via an agricultural-pastoral network that 
involved the sharing of different habitats and resources (grain and salt) according to the 
seasons, and the movement of different groups through different ecological niches. 
Although physically not demarcated, the boundaries between these groups were maintained 
through a framework of ritual practices, customary rites and rights.78 
Pande’s contribution is particularly significant for the study of Anglo-Nepalese 
encounters in its exploration of the trans-Himalayan salt trade, and changing trajectories of 
communication and commerce. As will be seen in chapter V, the violation of traditional 
borderlands networks surrounding the salt trade played a part in the Nepalese-Tibetan war, 
which consequently saw an EIC expedition reach Nepal Valley. Pande also demonstrated 
ways in which any breakdown or shift in the orientation of these networks could pose a 
challenge to colonial authorities, shaping colonial endeavours in Kumaon, and other 
Himalayan borderlands such as the Tarai, for years to come. In 1815, Kumaon was ceded 
by Nepal to the EIC. However, Pande demonstrated how those existing networks made it 
difficult for the EIC to consolidate its new territory. No commercially viable routes had 
been developed to link this region with its possessions in the south, and the recent Anglo-
Nepalese War had led to a rise of banditry in the Tarai.79 Meanwhile, the severing from 
Kathmandu placed a new impetus on the well-established trans-Himalayan trade – the 
opposite direction to which the EIC hoped commerce would flow.80 Moreover, Gorkhali 
monetary tax demands during Shah rule had indebted many local ethnic Bhotia traders more 
used to a barter economy to the local elite in Almora – forging an internal link that the EIC 
would struggle to break. For example, it was noted in 1815 that those Bhotias were more 
likely to purchase Company goods such as cloth through established Almora middlemen, 
excluding the EIC from the trade of salt, despite their best efforts to sell directly.81 The 
complexities of borderlands networks therefore could cement ties between local 
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marginalized agents, either Bhotias in Kumaon or Madhes in the Tarai, and local elites in 
either Makwanpur, Gorkha or Almora.  
Pande’s long durée study concludes with British dominion over the region, as 
networks of roads, a massive cartographic exercise and military force in Tibet smothered 
Kumaon within the imperial fold.82 Pande nevertheless demonstrates ways in which local 
people could ‘modify state policies and borders through their responses to marking and 
maintaining boundaries’.83 As will be seen in chapters V and VI, such local responses in 
1767 and in subsequent expeditions had ramifications for wider EIC Himalayan policies 
and agendas.  
Finally, Graham Clarke’s reflections on the relationships between Himalayan state 
in the late eighteenth century draw attention to the different linkages between borderlands 
states. Clarke identified urban foci either astride hilltops (as was the case with Gorkha) or 
in the valleys (Kathmandu.) These occupied critical north-south or east-west crossroads.84 
The aforementioned Kumaon town of Almora is a further example. As waypoints, these 
centres became culturally significant not solely for its residents, but those travelling 
through. So, whilst elite, political relations were maintained by war, marriage and treaties, 
these networks also maintained the capacity to create cultural and religious corridors, 
linking different ‘borderlands’ states across a much wider area. The same communities 
could be politically divided and religiously bound simultaneously. Whilst Clarke asserted 
that ‘at a popular level there was an absence of any general, wider solidary political 
sentiment,’ local authority was nevertheless invested in the inheritance and curation of 
ceremonial and ritual sites.85 As this authority changed hands between Gorkha, Kathmandu 
and Tibet, so too did local allegiances. This is significant for a study of Anglo-Nepalese 
encounters, since an EIC observer solely describing the political could miss vital networks 
of loyalty. For example, Kinloch remarked whilst travelling the lower foothills that the 
residents ‘all profess the Hindoo religion, but I believe they know little of any other deity 
but Beem Sing’.86 The deity ‘Beem Sing’ whom Kinloch described was Bhima in Hindu 
mythology, also written Bhimsen, the patron deity of traders in Nepal, who made a journey 
of pilgrimage into the Himalayas. As Kinloch continues into the foothills, it becomes 
apparent that such a religious corridor existed through the popularity of this figure from 
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the Tarai up to within a few days’ march of Kathmandu, manifest in dedicated shrines and 
exclusive worship. 
 
II:4 Source Critique I: Kinloch’s Journal 
 
The key reading for this study is the expedition journal of Captain Kinloch. This includes 
daily entries from 26 August to 17 October, 1767. For the most part Kinloch wrote at the 
end of the day, recording the weather, distance and direction travelled, terrain, and events 
he believed noteworthy. It is a highly useful tool as the only such day-by-day account of the 
expedition. However, its provenance requires consideration and acknowledgement.  
There are two extant copies of Kinloch’s journal, both found within the British 
Library. The first is part of the Sutton Court collection, split between two notebooks of 30 
folios.87 The second is a mid-nineteenth century copy, inscribed with a private buyer’s name 
– J. Skerslake. This version also has a post-script, speculating on the fate of the expedition, 
signed by J. Davies.88 The content of the two versions does not differ significantly and the 
later copy is more or less faithful to the original text, with a few abbreviations. They both 
cut out at exactly the same point, on the 17th October. Both texts can be read alongside 
each other thanks to the excellent work of Yogesh Raj, who transcribed them, highlighting 
the instances where the second copy deviates, for the benefit of Nepalese historians who 
have only had access to sources from Prithvi Narayan Shah’s correspondence.89 
The first copy appears to have been written by Kinloch himself – other writers 
within the EIC had clerks, but not necessarily whilst they were in the field. This journal is 
written in the first person, and the handwriting is similar to that of his will, written 1 
August 1767, and a letter of his to the select committee earlier in the year.90 The 
handwriting changes within the second notebook, becoming less legible. Perhaps this was a 
reflection on Kinloch’s deteriorating health, as food shortages and fever set in. It is less 
clear who wrote the second copy, presumably someone who had access to the military 
archive, or Kinloch’s personal items, since it is a near perfect transcription. The post-script 
by J. Davies is in a different hand to the rest of the text so it is unlikely that they were the 
original author, yet the speculation it contains suggests they did have some knowledge of 
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the expedition. It is almost impossible to know whether J. Davies was the owner before or 
after it came into the possession of J. Skerslake, whose name is inscribed on it. 
Although Kinloch’s purpose for writing and audience is not directly stated, it is 
unlikely that Kinloch intended to publish his journal as a memoir, in what was then a 
burgeoning market for travel literature soon to be transformed by the publication of 
Cook’s voyages.91 If we compare the content of Kinloch’s journal to another from within 
the EIC archives that was written after Cook’s voyages, and the emergence of literary travel 
writing as a popular genre, it is apparent such a pubic audience was not on his mind. 
Captain Walter Lennon’s Journal of an Expedition to the Molucca Islands is one such text, 
undertaken in 1795 but later published for public consumption. Whereas Kinloch was 
engaged noting the terrain and provisions, Lennon made observations on whether or not a 
Dutch governor’s wife was dressed too scantily.92 A further comparison could be the 
example of Donald Campbell, who travelled to India in 1781, and like Kinloch was a 
military Company official. First arriving in Bombay, he was shipwrecked near Goa en route 
to Madras, and imprisoned by Hyder Ali. He was released in order to negotiate with 
Warren Hastings, travelling extensively overland between Madras and Ali’s Kingdom. His 
account of this, entitled A Journey Over Land to India, is vastly different in its publication 
history and format to Kinloch’s journal: it constituted a series of letters to his son, and was 
published in 1796, years after his time in India.93 Instead of this body of literary travel 
writing, epistolary form or otherwise, Kinloch’s journal bears more resemblance to the 
conventional ‘report’ or ‘relation’ in which, upon advice of the Royal Society, journals 
combined a chronological narrative with topographical descriptions.94 It is remarkably 
similar in form to the journals of his contemporary Hudson’s Bay Company ‘winterers,’ for 
instance those of Anthony Henday in 1755, or William Tomison in 1769.95 This perhaps 
reflects the criteria requested of them by their trading company employers, although of 
course Kinloch occupied a military position that reflected the EIC’s militarization. 
Nevertheless, the travel literature Kinloch read could still have a bearing on how he 
wrote, and the diaries are not entirely bereft of literary flourish: for instance, the duration 
of his hardships becomes a running account and dramatic device, concluding with the 
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‘thirteenth day of the famine’.96 A consideration of soldier’s and officer’s reading habits, 
and the dissemination of literature around the world, is useful here. Such a consideration is 
made possible by the online Reading Experience Database, which catalogues who read which 
books, and where, throughout history. From this resource we are able to observe the 
reading practices of other EIC officials, such as John Drummond Erskine, a Company 
writer who owned copies of Grammar of the Persian Language, as well as A History of the Late 
Revolution of the Empire of the Great Mogol, which he annotated.97 These resources are used 
with the acknowledgement that there are many, many variables in books an individual 
might have read, EIC employment being just one of them, and that without a list of 
Kinloch’s possessions, or notes from himself on the subject, we cannot be sure which texts 
he had read personally.  
It is most likely that this was a diary to be presented to Kinloch’s superiors. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence within the India Office Records of his being instructed 
to do so. But he may well have done this for his own sake – a diary, written as a reflection 
at the end of each day, is an opportunity for himself to shape his own role, covering any 
malpractice or highlighting his own successes. The structure and content are certainly 
indicative of a conventional military report from the time: Kinloch’s daily observations are 
strikingly similar to those recorded by other expedition commanders in the mid-eighteenth 
century, compiled in a manuscript within the British Library by an official called C.W. 
Mallet, for the attention of Warren Hastings. These reports consistently observe the 
condition of the road, as good or bad, dry or sandy, with further notes on distance 
travelled, whose territory the expedition travelled through, whether there is water supply, or 
the condition of the villages.98 Although not as thorough as this collection of itineraries, 
Kinloch would try to contribute this information to the best of his knowledge. The idea 
that this was strictly a military account is furthermore supported by the absence of any 
address to the reader – unlike in other private diaries and letters found within the archive. 
The letters of Major James Rennell for instance, which often featured illustrative accounts 
of the Himalayan foothills due to the time he spent there in his role as a cartographic 
surveyor, were specifically for the use of friends in Britain and as such are often engaged in 
a direct dialogue with that readership.99 No such dialogue exists in Kinloch’s journal.   
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Moreover, Kinloch as the commanding officer was perhaps more duty bound to 
provide a written account (no such record exists for the other EIC officers, and their 
experience is regrettably far less retrievable.) This raises the alternative possibility that the 
journal in its extant form was not written in the field but instead was prepared as a 
summary of the expedition, and a defence of the writer’s own conduct therein, composed 
either from memory or an original set of field notes now lost. This is certainly plausible – 
there are entries wherein Kinloch in the midst of disaster and turmoil has written pages and 
pages on Hindu deities.100 How he would have found the time for this is a mystery. Then 
there are passages which seem reflective, and seem to have the benefit of hindsight.101 
There are though many entries written in the present tense and on balance the diary as an 
account of the expedition, written after each day but on occasion with some time to reflect 
on how the material would represent what transpired, seems most likely. The submission of 
Kinloch’s original journal into the EIC archives, from the private papers of Robert Clive’s 
secretary William Stratchey, suggests it was kept within military hands rather than passed 
into the public domain, though of course this does not necessarily mean that was always set 
to be its fate – Skerslake’s private purchase of the second copy is evidence that it did make 
that transition eventually, but judging by the condition and binding of the book, this was 
completed long after Kinloch’s death.  
Kinloch’s journal is most useful to the historian as an indication of how Kinloch 
wanted himself to be viewed; how he performed as commanding officer. The journal also 
tells the reader much about how Kinloch viewed the Himalayas, and the events unfolding 
around him. What is more uncertain though, is whether Kinloch attributes actions to 
historical agents faithfully, or whether the roles ascribed to them were fictional – with 
agency emphasized here, downplayed there, in order to better support that view of his own 
position that he desired. Kinloch’s statements of agency and influence thus need to be 
treated carefully. In fact, rather than the passages in which Kinloch directly attributes blame 
or quotes to his guides, it is in the everyday that agency can be read: for instance, 
manoeuvres, logistics, timings, and delays. Even then, the narrative could be very carefully 
calculated by Kinloch. This is countered by a great degree of caution, and recognition of 
the potential for manipulation.  
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Ultimately, Kinloch’s journal is incomplete. He completed a second notebook of 30 
folios, which ends mid-sentence. At this stage he was ill and appears to have faced a critical 
event (his diary at this point records only that he was awoken by noise, and that he feared it 
was a mutiny.) If no further entries were ever written, it would suggest that Kinloch 
abandoned either his order to write, or his resolve to. This applies regardless of whether he 
wrote in the field or at Bettiah. However, this abrupt finish provides more questions and 
further difficulties than answers – it could simply be missing, or perhaps he did not have a 
third notebook in which to write. In the event that Kinloch never wrote the second half of 
his journal, or that any further documentation is irretrievably lost, we may never know for 
certain how Kinloch’s return to the Company outpost at Bettiah unfolded. However, whilst 
the alternative sources detailed below may help us sketch an estimate, there is a danger in 
focusing too much on Kinloch's return to EIC territory. Historians attempting to 
reconstruct this missing segment of the narrative may neglect the actions, agendas and 
agency of marginalized characters that we do know about from earlier on in the journey, 
and instead prioritize the historiographical mystery of what happened to Kinloch.102 Other 
historians focusing on the 1767 expedition may be reluctant to draw any conclusions from 
the extant copies, for fear of being undermined should any further documentation come to 
light.  
 
II:5 Source Critique II: The Colonial Archive 
 
Other sources used within this thesis include Kinloch’s correspondence with Thomas 
Rumbold at Patna, and his writing to the Select Committee. Further documents are taken 
from the extensive collection of Brian Houghton Hodgson, an early British resident of 
Kathmandu, living there from 1820 to 1843. The collection was deposited within the India 
Office library between 1838, whilst Hodgson was still resident, and 1864.103 Historians of 
Anglo-Nepalese relations value this collection very highly, Ramesh Dhungel having 
described it as an ‘uncategorized encyclopaedic record of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
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century Nepal’.104 The collection contains a vast array of texts that cover political, 
economic, cultural, religious, military and linguistic affairs in Nepal.  
Despite its appearance within the colonial archive, this is not simply a British 
resident’s account of ‘the orient’: Brian Houghton Hodgson was a keen scholar, dedicated 
to the study of South Asian languages and opposed to Macaulay’s reforms.105 For this 
reason, he was aided by a score of Newari and Nepalese research assistants, and the 
collection includes many documents in their original form and language. Although 
ultimately the documents within this collection may have been carefully selected by 
Hodgson, they provide descriptive details about Prithvi Narayan Shah, the Kingdom of 
Gorkha and Anglo-Nepalese relations that are not solely composed by British colonial 
officials. The collection is not without its problems. The documents have been acquired 
and translated and, in some cases, written almost seventy years after the 1767 expedition. 
They are not contemporary to Kinloch. Hodgson was evidently enamoured by the 
Himalayas. He spent time in Nepal, Kumaon and Darjeeling, and had a Nepalese partner 
and children. He was an advocate for British-Nepalese relations, and in later life is said to 
have been concerned over the treatment of Indians by British colonial rule. His enthusiasm 
and contribution towards Nepalese studies should not be discredited. However, it is 
noteworthy that he had been previously advised the pursuit and provision of local 
knowledge was a fast track to the position of resident.106 From that point on Hodgson 
began his collection. It is conceivable then that Hodgson may well have amassed and 
disseminated knowledge about Nepal not simply as a matter of individual interest, but self-
interest; to advance his career. Whilst the former motivation ensures a degree of accuracy – 
that Hodgson pursued an authentic account of Nepal, the latter motivation denotes a target 
audience, British colonial officials in high-ranking positions from which they made 
appointments, and a target volume of knowledge: as much as possible, perhaps even 
quantity over quality. In summary, Hodgson’s dedication to Nepalese studies does not 
release the sources he produced from an orientalist critique.  
Also available within the archives are accounts of similar expeditions throughout 
the subcontinent, and resources that provide an insight into the Bengal Army in the field. 
Kinloch’s expedition is discussed in relation to further expeditions – in an attempt to chart 
marginalized agency throughout an era of early British-Himalayan encounters. This 
includes George Bogle’s and Thomas Manning’s reflections on Tibet, James Rennell on the 
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banks of the Brahmaputra, and Kirkpatrick on Nepal. The texts through which these 
expeditions are studied are similar in their form to those relating to 1767: diaries written by 
those taken part, minutes, letters and maps. The same methodological questions applied to 
Kinloch’s journal are likewise applied to these, upon the introduction of each particular 
expedition. 
An inevitable process in any archive’s creation is the selection and presentation of 
items. For both these tasks, historical significance and meaning is attributed to the item by 
the archivist. This could affect which items are included and how they are categorized. The 
consequential collection is ‘essentially what the archivist believes it is’.107 An institution may 
seek to avoid subjectivity on behalf of the individual archivist by setting standards or 
guidelines, but even then, a decision is still made over what those standards are. Such 
constructive processes resound in the history of the India Office Records. It is noteworthy 
that the first EIC record keeper was not appointed until 1771 – after the Kinloch 
expedition.108 So, whilst records before that date had been kept and stored, there was no 
standard procedure for whether or not a document was archived. The archive itself has 
passed from one institution to another over time, often being reviewed. At times this has 
involved the destruction or loss of documents, for example after the transfer of rule to the 
India Office, when three hundred tons of records were sold on as waste paper. In both 
these instances somebody, or some people, exercised control over which documents were 
deemed historically significant.  
The ramification of this for a study of Kinloch’s expedition is that there could be 
missing letters, reports or journals, in which marginalized actions were transcribed. Whilst 
there is no way of knowing this for sure, there is certainly evidence that items relating to 
the expedition are missing. For example Kinloch refers his superiors to a map of his 
intended route that has since become separated from the journals.109 Consider this certainty 
of missing documents alongside the notion that during the two already identified moments 
of archival selection, in 1771 and in the aftermath of the 1857 rebellion, the prominent 
historical narratives focused on the roles of Kinloch and Shah in a colonialist discourse: It 
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becomes quite possible that an archivist choosing to omit documents relating to Kinloch 
would do so on the grounds that their subaltern subject was considered irrelevant, or 
incorrect. As one historian wrote, ‘even when the presence of others was admitted, their 
contributions to the exploration enterprise and its outcomes would invariable be obscured 
by their being reduced to ‘mere servants’ or ‘unnamed assistants.’110  
Beyond the construction of the archive, there are also questions over the nature 
and construction of the documents being produced, disseminated and read by the EIC. A 
notable exploration of these processes is Miles Ogborn’s book Indian Ink, which aims to 
intersect debates on both eighteenth-century print culture and eighteenth-century India 
with a focus on the editing, compiling, correcting, annotating, and anthologizing of 
manuscripts, as well as practical processes of production by scribes, compositors, and 
pressmen. Some useful insights made include the absence of a significant printing press 
sector in Bengal until the late eighteenth century, meaning each copy of a document from 
Kinloch’s era was subject to the highly selective process of transcription by an individual 
scribe – as Ogborn notes, ‘only in very rare circumstances was the early modern text a 
sacrosanct one.’111 
Ogborn’s contributions calls into question the natural state of the archive and allow 
for the recognition of South Asian processes and actors that shaped its construction. By all 
means the texts within the archive were written by colonial officials, certainly with 
deliberation, and at times with the intention of reinforcing the colonial mission. But there 
are also times when the construction of the archive, that process in which a text is created 
then stored, has been worked by marginalized forces unbeknown to the historian, or even 
to the archivist, themselves. The previous example of Brian Houghton Hodgson’s 
collection is a case in point: Which texts were collected, how they were translated, was 
often the prerogative of the Nepalese research assistant, employed from Newari elite 
circles. Their influence could account for the high proportion of Newari texts within the 
collection. In this instance, many processes and roles that Ogborn deemed crucial to the 
construction of a written source were controlled by South Asian contributors: the selective 
process of translation and composition, the role of the scribe and researcher.  
Jon Wilson wrote that ‘the colonial archive lies in the way of the historian’s 
recognition of the subaltern’s humanity or capacity to act freely for themselves’.112 This is 
certainly true: the constructed state of the colonial archive, in both the creation and storage 
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of records, allows for a narrow-minded colonial official to write the subaltern out of 
history. However, Hodgson’s case shows that there was space within that construction for 
the subaltern to shape their own representation. This thesis attempts to navigate the 
colonial archive in search of such agency, to extract South Asian experiences from the 
words of colonialist observers. Such a methodology is undoubtedly fraught with 
difficulties, deriving from the fact that South Asian experiences were rarely described. In 
the few examples where South Asian points of view have been written down, we have no 
way of knowing for sure that those words were their own. However, a recognition of both 
the processes of archival construction and the questions surrounding the authenticity of 
South Asian voices allows for a historical exploration of the subaltern role within the 
events transcribed. 
 
II:6 Source Critique III: Nepalese Sources 
 
There are historians who feel the use of a colonial archive such as the India Office 
Records, no matter how critically approached, is bad practice for the writing of 
postcolonial histories. Bidhan Golay described the problematic nature of the colonial 
archive in Nepal’s context as a fixation on colonial knowledge, ‘an innate feeling that the 
native’s history can be authenticated only when it is culled from Western sources. In effect, 
the colonial discourses have become canonical texts for the production of knowledge.’113 In 
an attempt to avoid Kinloch’s journal becoming such a ‘canonical’ text, a cross-referential 
approach has been taken – one that utilizes Nepalese, Indian and EIC sources.  
Any study of EIC-Himalayan encounters inevitably spans a wide geographical 
space. In total this thesis incorporates critical engagement with the history of Bengal, India, 
Awadh, Kumaon, Garhwal, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet, China, and Britain. An attempt 
to balance the source base with contributions from all these regions, or to draw 
conclusions that have trans-Himalayan implications, thus transcends multiple language and 
state boundaries.114 This in turn requires a wide access to archives and translated texts, in 
Kinloch’s case made all the more difficult by its eighteenth-century time period, that has 
either hindered or deterred such attempts. For that reason, it is fortunate that there are a 
handful of letters within the India Office Records from the time that were written by the 
Indian elite – vassals and rulers who were literate in English. There are also a number of 
                                               
113 Bidhan Golay, ‘Rethinking Gorkha Identity: Outside the Imperium of Discourse, Hegemony, and History’, 
in Tanka Bahadur Subba, ed., Indian Nepalis: Issues and Perspectives (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 
2009), p.87. 
114 Shneiderman has noted that many recent contributions to Himalayan studies, though moving away from 
elite nation-state narratives, have still been region-specific. ‘Afterword’, p.138. 
60 
 
Nepalese sources from both Kathmandu and Delhi that are contemporary to Shah and 
Kinloch and can be used alongside the colonial archive.  
The most prominent of these is a text known as the Divyopadeś, also written as Divya 
Upadesh and translated as ‘divine counsel’. This takes the form of a royal decree or speech, 
outlining Shah’s guiding principles for the governance of Nepal. It begins with his own 
account of the conquest of Nepal Valley, his motivation behind it, before instructing on 
foreign and domestic policy – how to best negotiate Nepal’s relationships with China, India 
and the EIC. The most widely known English language translation of this document was 
Ludwig Stiller’s Prithvinarayan Shah in the Light of Dibya Upadesh, written in 1968.115 Both the 
original Divyopadeś and the use of Ludwig Stiller’s version are problematic. To begin with, 
there are questions over the document’s authenticity. The traditional story is that it was 
written before Shah departed Kathmandu for the last time before his death. Since he died 
in January 1775, and alternated his residency between the valley city and Nuwakot, this date 
is usually set at 1774. However, it has been suggested that it was put together much later, 
during King Mahendra’s rule in the mid-twentieth century, to push the nationalist 
interpretation of history he was advocating.116 John Whelpton went further to suggest that 
as well as questioning whether the words and thoughts within the document were those of 
Prithvi Narayan Shah, we may also need to debate whether this speech was constructed 
and delivered on one single occasion: ‘the Upadesh might conceivably be a compilation of 
remarks made by the king at different times.’ He noted that Stiller had not discussed this 
possibility or questioned the document’s authenticity in any way.117  
The document opens with Shah’s address to a crowd: ‘what you who are gathered 
here will hear from me, pass on to your children, and they to ours.’118 However, since there 
are no other accounts of Shah delivering the Divyopadeś publicly, we cannot be sure that this 
took place, or that this was the document’s purpose, and this prologue could have been an 
addition. He may have meant for it to be disseminated with his legacy in mind or written it 
to ensure his heirs prospered. That is certainly the view of nationalist historians, who 
interpret this as a desire to see the unification of Nepal carried out beyond his death. 
Baburam Acharya for instance believed that the document was indeed the address of Shah, 
transcribed and collated by his brothers, sons, and courtiers in audience.119 The document 
does with the proverbial sounding statement, ‘when an old man dies, his words die with 
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him, so they say.’120 Until the document is dated though, much of this is entirely 
speculation, since there is little concrete evidence of Shah’s authorship. A more object-
based approach to the original document that Stiller transcribed, with careful analysis of its 
composition, the material on which it was written amongst other questions, might help 
here in asking whether when it was written down, by whom and for what purpose. That 
would require access to the original document on which Stiller relied, which appears 
elusive. Until then, the Divyopadeś must be used far more critically than previously.  
Regardless of whether the Divyopadeś is genuine or not, it is still to be used carefully 
in the context of Kinloch’s expedition, since it documents Shah’s attitudes and foreign 
policy towards the EIC seven years after the attempted invasion. There are however copies 
of letters from Shah at Kirtipur to his soldiers who were opposing Kinloch, and one from 
the Gorkhali king to the EIC at Patna, written shortly before the expedition. These shed 
some light on the encounter as it happened, rather than in hindsight. However, neither the 
letters from Bengali elite within the colonial archive, nor Shah’s Divyopadeś, nor the letters 
to his generals are representative of the vast majority of Indian and Nepalese society: the 
subaltern, marginalized classes whose role this thesis hopes to examine. Their experiences 
of these events are more difficult to extract from the sources available. This is mostly due 
to the lack of written sources, as Dipesh Chakrabarty laments, ‘historians of peasants and 
other subaltern social groups have long emphasized the fact that peasants do not leave 
their own documents.121  
One option that the historian has is to ‘read against the grain,’ a phrase most often 
associated with Carlo Ginzberg and his work The Cheese and the Worms.122 The metaphor 
refers to the fibres in timber – to cut the wood parallel with these is relatively easy, but the 
resulting split is predetermined by those fibres, and will inevitably follow them. To cut 
across them on the other hand requires more effort, and the woodcutter has to deliberately 
ignore the instructive fibres, yet the outcome could show different contours beneath the 
outer layer. Applying the metaphor to historical research essentially advocates a subversive 
reading of texts, such as those found within the India Office Records. It recognizes the 
dominant cultural belief systems (the fibres) that have affected these texts, nationalism or 
orientalism for instance, and then attempts to read the text differently, identifying and 
rejecting any description tainted by these systems. The result is often a reading of the text 
entirely oppositional to the one intended by the author, but no less insightful. Ginzberg 
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was reading the records of trials by Italian inquisitors, placing heresy into the narratives of 
the peasantry so that prosecution was justified. He found however that if a reader ignored 
the inquisitor’s assumptions and instead searched for the voices and explanations of the 
accused, their worldview and experiences emerged. By extension, Ann Stoler’s ‘along the 
grain’ concept can likewise be drawn upon: emphasising the colonial archive as a process, 
one that was far from perfect, gives the historian an opportunity through which to learn 
from the inaccurate and the incomplete within an archive.123 In this sense, the lack of 
marginalized characters within the colonial record, or the error with which their actions are 
reported, can still tell us much about their relationship with colonial agents and enterprises. 
These techniques are therefore applied to Kinloch’s description of the people the 
expedition met, and the places they passed through, in the hope that they sketch a more 
complex, varied and calculated Nepalese response to the British soldiers at their doorstep.  
When faced with the difficult task of recovering subaltern voices, some historians 
have turned to other disciplines for help, for instance anthropology, demography, sociology 
or archaeology. Using these methodologies can be a solution to the lack of written 
subaltern sources. For, as Eugene Weber has stated, ‘the illiterate are not in fact 
inarticulate; they can and do express themselves in several ways.’124 One such expression in 
Nepal was the oral tradition of folk songs, often sung with highly localized characteristics, 
some of which commemorate victory over the British. Alternatively, research could be 
undertaken into the Sindhuli Gadhi site and the landscape itself. Whether these features 
match up to Kinloch’s descriptions or not can indicate a host of things; for instance, 
whether he was in fact marching through the valleys he named, or whether he had been 
unknowingly led off course by his South Asian guides. These are all worthwhile lines of 
enquiry that could further our understanding of the 1767 encounter, however such is the 
extent of the new methodological problems they invoke that they mostly fall outside the 
practical parameters of this thesis, which adopts an archival, text-based approach. In the 
few instances where such sources are consulted, their context and usage are addressed. 
 
II:7 Conclusions 
 
The decolonizing, subalternist methodological approach taken utilizes Kinloch’s journal 
and those of other expeditions alongside the wider archive, British, Nepalese and Indian 
sources. Given that each of these source bases incurs their own set of problems, as 
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described in this chapter so far, the project may seem ambitious. It is nevertheless 
warranted by the historiographical impetus for the study of the marginalized historical 
subject as outlined in chapter I, and made viable by the parameters, considerations and 
approaches outlined within this chapter. Such an inter-methodological approach to singular 
events and actions gives strength to any conclusions drawn that would otherwise be 
hindered by the limitations of one particular practice. This allows for an exploration of 
marginalized agency – the positing of possibilities, and a clearer definition of restrictions 
beyond those imposed by colonial agents silencing the subaltern. From those discussions, 
continuities and connections in such agency are discernible.  
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Chapter III - The Root and the Rocks: Gorkha, Nepal, the EIC, and the Road to War in 1767 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter explores the web of competing ideas, interests, and considerations that led to 
the EIC expedition of 1767 setting out. The chapter first revisits a series of events in the 
conflict between Gorkha and Kathmandu that culminated in EIC intervention. The notion 
that Shah himself interpreted Gorkhali expansion as the protectionist unification of various 
Himalayan hill states against colonization has often been drawn from one particularly 
emotive phrase in the Divyopadeś – wherein the author of that document describes Nepal as 
‘a root between two rocks’.1 Nationalist historians keenly promoting the ‘unification not 
conquest’ interpretation have rallied around this phrase, with the rocks being China and 
India. Shah’s detractors on the other hand consider these campaigns violent, assertive, and 
authoritative in their nature and purpose. Both interpretations are reductionist, simplifying 
the narrative to a Shah-focussed, unification or conquest binary. This discussion therefore 
draws attention to the role of hitherto neglected agents and factors within those events, 
exploring incentives, actions and circumstances beyond those of Prithvi Narayan Shah and 
Jaya Prakash Malla.  
The chapter then demonstrates how EIC knowledge of the Himalayas and 
arguments for involvement in that space were shaped in part by external parties – a cast of 
intermediaries, European and South Asian, whose significance in providing information, 
and the importance of that information in determining EIC representation, has been 
neglected. The chapter then explores the decision to intervene: presented with the call for 
assistance from Nepal, and convinced of a Gorkhali threat to EIC interests, the Company 
had to decide whether to intervene and if so, how to go about it. Within those processes, 
individuals were able to manipulate information to force a particular outcome: the 1767 
invasion. Finally, the chapter introduces the different components of the expedition that 
were involved in subsequent encounters – what they consisted of and who they were, 
whether those individuals or groups chose to travel, and what was at stake for them.  
 
III:1 Re-interpreting Gorkhali Expansion, 1743-1767 
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High on a ridge in the central hills of what is now Nepal perched the city-state of Gorkha. 
The city housed roughly five thousand residents and was one of the smaller states within 
the Chaubisi Rajya confederacy, a loose alliance of over twenty states spanning central and 
mid-western Nepal. Prithvi Narayan Shah was born in the Gorkha Durbar in 1723, 
becoming king in 1743. From then until his death in 1775, Gorkha would transform. His 
conquests began with a series of attacks on Nuwakot, a city within the territory of Jaya 
Prakash Malla of Kathmandu. For two decades Gorkhali expansion involved the 
incorporation of the other Chaubisi Rajya states within the foothills through alliance or 
conquest, before expansion accelerated towards the Tarai and encirclement of Nepal Valley 
in the mid-1760s. Before his death in 1775 Shah had begun conquests further east towards 
Limbu and Morang, whilst much of western Nepal including the Baisi Rajya states held 
some form of tributary status. At its height in 1814, the kingdom would stretch to Sikkim 
in the east and the Sutlej river in the west.  
This section does not provide a narrative of Gorkhali expansion but instead 
critiques colonialist assumptions, moderates the attributed significance of the ‘unification 
or conquest’ debate within Nepalese historiography, and explores the significance of 
marginalized agency and influence within events that led to the political situation of 1767.2 
Examples are extrapolated either through a critical reading of existing narratives, 
contemporary Nepalese sources (such as the Divyopadeś) or views from colonial Calcutta 
present in the India Office Records, notwithstanding the methodological issues involved 
with this source base. The section focuses on a loosely chronological series of highlights 
that led to the Gorkhali siege of Kathmandu in 1767: Shah’s visit to Benares in 1743, 
relations with the city of Makwanpur, Nepalese resistance to Gorkhali expansion and 
military considerations during the prolonged campaign from 1744, and the conquest of 
Kirtipur in 1766.  
Despite the nationalist interpretation that Shah acted in response to British 
imperialism, Gorkha expansion and state consolidation had begun much earlier than his 
birth, let alone his ascendance to the throne in 1743 and significantly earlier than the British 
victories of Plassey and Buxar. His own father Narabhupal Shah had attempted to expand 
Gorkhali influence by securing alliances with Khanchi, Palpa and Parbat, three states 
amongst the wider Chaubisi confederacy, and had attacked Nuwakot in 1737.3 This 
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campaign notably ended in failure through factionalism within the ranks of the soldiers he 
sent. The two commanders whom Narabhupal sent ‘blamed each other for their failure’.4 
This enables us to consider Shah’s expansion campaigns as the continuity of his father’s 
agenda, rather than the result of anti-colonialist premonitions. 
A visit to Benares in 1743 shortly after Shah’s coronation casts further doubt on 
the ‘unification’ interpretation – it is assumed that Shah observed the rising threat of the 
EIC on that trip. Accordingly, he returned to Gorkha determined to create a force that 
could oppose this, realising that he would need to match their economical-political 
strength. Within this interpretation, ‘the unification was as much the means of Nepali 
sovereignty as the resistance against British imperialism’.5 Ludwig Stiller amongst others 
have queried this, asking, ‘one wonders what he might have seen,’ before coming to the 
conclusion that if his time in Benares turned him against the British, there ‘simply was not 
sufficient evidence for such a conclusion’.6 Instead, Stiller argued that the Gorkhali 
conquests were ‘part of a pattern of state-building and expansion across a wider area of 
Asia,’ which included the EIC’s seizure of Bengal and China’s increasing control in Tibet, 
and the expansion of the Marathas and Sikh Empire further afield.7 At the time of Shah’s 
visit, Alivardi Khan was limiting EIC power in Bengal quite competently, asserting 
independence from Delhi. Shah would have witnessed the conflict between the regional 
governors of Bihar and Awadh, enriching themselves at the expense of another part of the 
empire whilst still under the threat of the Marathas.8 He may himself have seen an 
opportunity – after all he did not then return to Gorkha and campaign for peace amongst 
the hill-states, but instead annexed them. He may also have cast his eyes upon the lapsing 
territories of the Mughal Emperor in the Tarai, oblivious to the EIC.9 Shah’s lesson from 
Benares was firstly that division created opportunity for expansion, and secondly that the 
Mughals had struggled to conquer the uplands region of India in their Maratha wars and 
would surely likewise struggle in the Himalayan foothills. A further observation is that Shah 
went to Benares to visit his father-in-law Abhiman Singh, to receive his endorsement and 
to purchase firearms – Across South Asia, precision firing infantry were winning the field: 
able to out-manoeuvre Mughal heavy artillery and keep Maratha cavalry at a distance.10 In 
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obtaining firearms, Shah was not so much countering the EIC threat with this acquisition, 
but preparing for expansion. Monarchical legitimacy and the extension of Gorkha’s war-
waging capabilities were therefore already on the agenda before he observed either the 
decline of the Mughals or the rise of the EIC. 
Having returned from Benares, Shah’s relations with Nepal Valley and the Malla 
city states did not begin with conflict, but with marriage. In his youth Shah was sent to 
Bhaktapur and placed under the tutorship of the city’s ruler Ranajit Malla, as part of his 
father’s efforts to establish a diplomatic relationship with that city.11 That connection 
secured his marriage to a Sen dynasty princess of Makwanpur, a small city-state strategically 
placed between the plains and the valley, with further links of its own to the Patan throne.12 
However, what was supposed to secure family ties soon turned sour, when the bride’s 
brothers barred her from travelling to Gorkha, which Shah considered a grave insult. The 
role of the bride herself and those deteriorated family connections are previously 
marginalized factors within the expansion campaigns: Shah’s Sen bride did not provide an 
heir in comparison to his other wife Narendra Lakshmi Devi (daughter of Abhiman Singh) 
and as such has partly been forgotten. She is not named in texts other than being 
recognized as the daughter of Hemkarna Sen, the Raja of Makwanpur. Yet her involvement 
in this quarrel was instrumental, laying the foundations for future conflict. By 1764 
Digbandhan Sen, Shah’s brother-in-law, had succeeded his father Hemkarna. Shah had not 
forgiven Digbandhan Sen for his refusal to allow his sister to travel, and Sen’s refusal to 
supply the Gorkhali with an elephant for the ongoing siege of Kirtipur worsened the rift, 
shunting Makwanpur towards an alliance with Kathmandu.13 By 1763 the brothers-in-law 
were at war with one another. This disturbed one of the ‘rocks,’ the Mughal successor 
states of northern India, from whence help was provided by Mir Kasim of Bengal, angered 
by Prithvi’s invasion of Makwanpur, a Mughal vassal state.14 If a powerful Mughal ruler 
intervened with force, the Gorkhalis could have been stopped in their tracks. However, Mir 
Kasim’s invading army was resoundingly defeated.  
Revisiting Gorkhali expansion from the initial attack of Nuwakot in 1743 to the 
1766 conquest of Kirtipur offers a number of opportunities in which to emphasize 
marginalized agency: ways in which the local resisted, ways in which the Gorkhali military 
countered this resistance, ways in which Shah had to accommodate the agendas of 
courtiers, and ways in which he was assisted by intelligence networks. Drawing attention to 
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these four factors in the following paragraphs challenges notions of anti-colonial 
unification, martial ethnicity, autocracy and individual responsibility respectively. 
Resistance on behalf of the localities that the Gorkhalis defeated has been 
downplayed by nationalist historians keen to emphasize a unity behind Shah. There are 
however a number of examples prior to 1767 that challenge that notion. Gorkha initially 
failed to subdue the neighbouring Chaubisi Rajya states: Pradhan notes that the state of 
Lamjung was highly suspicious of rising Gorkhali power, and that Shah could not proceed 
to Nepal Valley whilst that city remained to Gorkha’s rear. Rather than confront Lamjung, 
Shah sent envoys Harihar Pandit, Manikantha Rana and Gangadhar Pant to its rivals of 
Palpa, Kaski and Tanahu respectively, in the hope that they could persuade those states to 
side with Gorkha against Lamjung and then Nepal Valley.15 Their failure to do so may 
partly be attributed to those cities’ links to Tibet, and a concern for their security should 
Gorkha annex Nepal Valley, and partly to the performance of those envoys. Shah had 
more success upon sending a higher-ranking envoy to Lamjung itself and an alliance was 
formed. However, the agreement was never a sincere one – the Divoypades retrospectively 
reflecting Gorkha policy towards Lamjung: ‘Lamjung is like a hawk, Gorkha like a serpent 
and Nepal, a frog. The serpent must delude the eyes of the hawk, only then can it devour 
the frog’.16 By 1754 the Gorkhalis had seized Lamjung territory in order to blockade the 
Kuti Pass, and trust had broken down. By 1764, the Chaubisi states had collectively 
recognized that Gorkhali conquest was not in their best interests and launched an attack. It 
was only by enforcing conscription on all males over twelve years old that the Gorkhali 
were able to subdue them.17 
Gorkhali expansion was also stalled by widespread resistance from a more 
surprising quarter. By 1754 the Gorkhalis were impeding both the Kuti and Kyirong 
passes. Tibetan merchants were therefore aggrieved by Shah’s blockade of Nepal Valley 
and his attempt to establish Gorkhali minted coins as legal tender within Tibet (in the same 
way Malla’s Newari coins were accepted.) What followed was a series of rebellions and 
non-co-operation on their behalf that greatly hindered Gorkha’s commercial operations, 
and the financial backing for military operations that Shah relied upon. Gorkhali merchants 
were reportedly robbed along the border and required soldiers for protection; Tibetans 
refused them the sale of salt.18 They found ingenious ways of smuggling goods through the 
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Gorkhali blockade: it was customary for Hindus to transport their dead to the valley, 
wrapped in cloths, for funeral rites along the Bagmati. Noting the increased frequency that 
this was being practiced, the Gorkhalis suspected that something was amiss. Upon 
checking the deceased, they found the cloth more often stuffed with salt and other 
contraband.19 It is clear that Gorkhali expansion was not unilaterally accepted by those 
residing in the states threatened or annexed, this relationship more often being 
characterized by resistance and concession than acceptance and co-operation. The salt-
merchant’s methods in particular mirrored the endeavours of the Bhotia traders in Kumaon 
years later, who refused to sell salt directly to Companyment when the EIC took over the 
region, as outlined by Pande in chapter II. 
Gorkha did have a significant advantage in its military. This advantage did not stem 
from the martial ethnicity that both the colonialist and nationalist discourses endorse: a 
short investigation instead highlights key differences in the martial structure of Gorkha and 
other Himalayan hill states, noticeably Kathmandu. Gorkha victories in the field were 
predominantly a result of numbers, the incentives offered to those soldiers, and the choice 
of these marginalized agents to serve in such an occupation, rather than any marital 
prowess. 
Malla’s forces were small in number. Jaya Prakash was hindered by demographics, 
since Kathmandu was not a large city and could not contribute much manpower. KP Malla 
has drawn attention to its lack of standing army.20 Instead, the city state was forced to 
recruit heavily from the Tarai and the far western hills.21 This raises questions over the 
loyalties of these soldiers. In contrast, estimates of Gorkhali fighting strength reach 50,000 
– considerably more than the entire population of Kathmandu. Whilst Gorkha itself was a 
smaller city than Kathmandu, the region had a history of military conscription, a legacy of 
the Khasa Empire. The EIC held an impression of Gorkhali soldiers as reluctant. They 
harboured a belief that many would be easily persuaded to turn against Shah, and did ‘not 
believe that they fight for any regard or attachement to his [Shah’s] causes’.22 They knew 
very little of the incentives being offered, and accepted, by soldiers from newly conquered 
territories. The offer of land parcels surely motivated the subaltern recruit and marks a 
deviation from other military structures at the time, in which rulers rewarded the officers 
who then raised and paid regiments themselves (they often did not provide that pay.)23 
These individuals then made the decision to serve Shah efficiently and loyally. It was a 
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decision that balanced the reward offered with the risk posed, not a decision based on any 
inherent martial identity within the hill-states.  
Despite such rewards and incentives for military success, Shah’s Gorkhali state was 
not entirely a martial one and there existed aristocratic, courtier control over political 
positions and actions, including military ones. Whilst military success could be rewarded 
with land-parcels, military rank remained defined by caste, with Chetris dominating the 
officer positions, Magars and Gurungs as the rank and file.24 Nor does Shah consistently 
demonstrate the military genius often attributed to him. It took him a long time for 
instance to deploy the expensive and advantageous firearms that he purchased in Benares 
from his father-in-law Abhiman Singh. They were not utilized until the siege of 
Kathmandu in 1767.25 Any suggestion that instead Shah opted for an astute reliance on 
traditional, familiar arms is undermined by the prolonged length of time it took for his 
campaigns to develop, and the breakthrough that these firearms provided upon use.  
There were some strategic decisions attributed to Shah that influenced the course 
of the war. One such incisive diplomatic ploy was to write to the British, expressing his 
willingness to visit Patna for a negotiated settlement provided they guaranteed his safety. 
This was, according to Baburam Acharya, the Gorkhali king’s way of ‘assessing the English 
plan and to confuse them’.26 This letter arrived immediately before Jaya Prakash’s plea for 
assistance, suggesting Shah knew a request for intervention was imminent. It was enough 
to stall the British until the rains began. This constituted part of a more prolonged letter-
writing campaign: Nepalese historian Vaidya reported that Shah sent letters to Kathmandu 
courtiers, including Jaya Prakash Malla’s mother, in which he ‘was much obliged for their 
sincerity towards him and they would be well rewarded for their co-operation’. The letters 
were reportedly delivered ‘in such a way that they were received by Jaya Prakash’.27 
However, these ploys cannot be attributed entirely to Shah: whose idea it was to write to 
the EIC, either to confuse, negotiate or stall them, is not clear. Shah certainly would have 
endorsed the subterfuge campaign since the letters were signed in his name, yet there is no 
evidence that he participated personally in it – he did not deliver them or ensure their 
designed Malla interception, and may not have written them. Although the majority of 
those individuals involved in this network are unknown, the letters do name at least three: 
Nilakantha Josi, Abhusasingh Pradhan, and Kirtira Jananda Upadhyaya. The first individual 
worked in Bhaktapur, and was rewarded for his services being excused jhara military labour 
                                               
24 Ibid., p.50. 
25 Swaminathan, ‘A Eulogy’, p.4. 
26 Baburam Acharya, quoted in Raj, Expedition, p.20. 
27 Vaidya, Advanced History, p.43. 
71 
 
after the valley was conquered. Abhusasingh Pradhan, a resident of Kathmandu, was the 
receipient of the following correspondence from Shah: ‘serve my interests by all means, 
only your performance will prove that you are mine. Complete the task by creating a rift 
there’. Kirtira Janada received similar instruction, ‘complete the task by regarding the 
throne of Kathmandu by secret plan with your uncles… your landed property and 
priesthood are hereby assured’.28  Shah’s success would clearly not have been possible were 
it not for a competent degree of espionage by these individuals, who successfully infiltrated 
the upper echelons of Malla’s court. The role of the messengers and spies ensuring that this 
deception worked should not be overlooked. 
The Gorkhali breakthrough came in 1766 upon the fall of Kirtipur, a strategically 
important city within Nepal Valley. Kirtipur was first attacked in 1757, and again in 1764. 
After sustaining a seven-month siege, the town fell in March 1766, allegedly after a 
nobleman called Dhanavanta betrayed the garrison and opened the doors to the 
Gorkhalis.29 It is from this victory that one of the most enduring colonialist visions of the 
Gorkhali ‘oriental despot’ originated: the mutilation of citizens so reported by Kirkpatrick, 
previously discussed in chapter I. Yet the reality of Shah’s rule was certainly more nuanced 
than this discourse would allow: in weighing up the various reports and evidence, historians 
agree that upon the defeat of Kirtipur the inhabitants were attacked and dismembered. 
However, it may not have been Shah himself who decreed this act, but rather the more 
zealous of his soldiers.30 This would suggest a lack of control over these marginalized 
agents, rather than control enforced through violence as would be expected from an 
‘oriental despot’. Further reports on this would provide some clarity, for instance whether 
those who orchestrated the violence were then punished, but alas, these are not extant. 
Instead of asking whether Shah did perpetrate or orchestrate this act, a more productive 
line of enquiry may be to ask whether such violence was in fact out of the ordinary in 
eighteenth-century warfare. By all accounts the dismembering of defeated opponents at 
Kirtipur shocked Calcutta, since it was not a punishment the EIC practiced. Yet the 
Company execution of ‘blowing from cannons,’ wherein a prisoner’s body parts could be 
physically scattered, was particularly horrific to Hindus since it denied that person 
traditional death rites. Similarly, the introduction of the noose to Company retribution on 
campaign against the Nayaks in South India twenty years after Kirtipur, though intended as 
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a more humane punishment, was considered brutal in India, where public hanging was 
new.31 Historians evaluating Gorkhali rule could easily conclude that it was characterized by 
terror and brutality if unwittingly assessing Shah outside this eighteenth-century South 
Asian context.  
It was these factors combined, a narrative of marginalized resistance overcome by 
marginalized endeavours in support of Shah, directed by long-neglected political interests 
and loyalties, that meant by 1767 the Gorkhalis more or less encircled Kathmandu, Patan 
and Bhaktapur.  
 
III:2 Accounting for the Malla Request for Intervention 
 
Jaya Prakash Malla’s detractors would suggest the defeat of Mir Kasim by Shah in 1763 
would have been the ideal point at which to request further assistance from the EIC. 
Within the colonialist discourse, the failure to do so has been attributed to both an isolated, 
withdrawn foreign policy, and a prevalence of theatrics, on behalf of the states of Kantipur 
(Kathmandu), Lalitpur (Patan), and Bhaktapur (Bhadgaon), the three Newari cities. An 
examination of these ideas exposes their flaws: there were good reasons for caution before 
inviting EIC intervention, and developments elsewhere in South Asia may have been 
regarded by Malla, his advisors, and his rivals alike with wary eyes. Yet it was dissent within 
that courtly circle, and a deteriorating relationship with the wider population in adversity, 
that worsened the situation. 
The notion that the valley was too withdrawn from events elsewhere in South Asia 
patronizes the city-states, and the people within it, by isolating them and suggesting a 
naivety when faced with the Gorkhali and EIC. On the contrary, the Newari cities had a 
rich history of trade and commerce with Tibet, Bengal, Awadh, and further afield (Jaya 
Prakash Malla’s emissary, Muktananda, who was potentially Kashmiri, is indicative of this.) 
Kathmandu was also the junction for two routes to Tibet through the Kuti and Kyirong 
passes, and a stopping point since the Tarai couldn’t be travelled in summer, nor the 
mountains in winter.32 Moreover, although city-states in their own right, many kingdoms 
within the foothills had a peripheral, tributary relationship to those in Nepal Valley. It is 
similar to what Burton called the ‘segmented state’ in India, characterized by numerous 
political centres (Kathmandu, Patan, Bhaktapur) and recognition of a single ritual centre 
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and anointed king by lesser political centres, (client-states such as Makwanpur and 
Nuwakot) often through ritual forms.33 These various cities were not isolated, but woven 
close together through migration, trade, commerce, patronage and religion. The 
importance of this for the study of marginalized historical agents is that people’s 
experiences of outsiders would be much greater than pre-supposed. For example, those 
living in the foothills did not have previous experience of the EIC marching their sepoys en 
route to Nepal. However, upon encountering the 1767 expedition they would have known 
these were the soldiers of the Company Bahadur (the Nepalese term for the EIC) and would 
have known a great deal about the sepoy’s Bengal homelands.  
There is a tendency to see Malla rule as a ‘theatre state,’ a representation wherein 
the rivalries between the three descendant Malla kingdoms were played out in architecture, 
pageantry and performance, rather than through war and violence. Certainly, cultural 
achievements were not apolitical but invested in symbolic power, yet this representation 
idealizes and romanticizes the Malla era – small hermitic kingdoms that dedicated their 
resources to the advancement of culture and art, only to fall helpless victims to the 
rapacious, militant Gorkhalis. This is in keeping with a wider representation of cultural 
decline in South Asia in the eighteenth century that then legitimized colonialist 
interventions like 1767. Malla rule has been painted as weak, deteriorating, and vulnerable, 
rendering the Gorkha conquest inevitable. Such a narrative diminishes the actions of 
historical agents who secured certain outcomes against the odds or acted unusually at 
certain points in the events leading up to 1767. The Malla kingdoms were not at the height 
of their power and were comparatively more vulnerable, yet they were not helpless, and the 
Gorkhali were not bound to succeed. Jaya Prakash Malla lost his throne before in 1750 but 
regained it through military force. He had fought and repelled the Gorkhali for two 
decades: despite their expansion beginning in the seventeenth century, the war waged for 
Nepal Valley was long and Shah was thwarted on numerous occasions.  
The EIC’s turn to arms in the aftermath of Plassey and overt militarization had an 
immediate impact on Indian politics. The Company received a host of requests for officers 
to train infantry divisions from South Asian rulers, and even for contingents of Company 
troops to support royal armies.34 A Nepalese raja may well have sent a request for 
intervention hoping to secure the arms and force of the soldiers of the Company Bahadur, or 
they may alternatively have been acting out of desperation and urgency. For these reasons, 
it is quite easy to see how the EIC were sucked into Indian politics, deployed against other 
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South Asian forces, as regional powers sought out one particular commodity – military 
force – that the Company were often reluctant to part with.35 However, such assistance 
came at a great cost to the South Asian rulers, placing huge strain on the coffers and tax 
systems of these kingdoms, often leading to destabilization.36 Importantly it often came 
with the condition that the EIC cohorts were retained for a period of time after the 
conflict, a prerequisite that ensured the EIC continued to reap revenue long after the 
soldiers were required. 
Despite having minimal contact with the EIC, the damaging effects of this were 
immediately visible to the Mallas in neighbouring states. Pressed to solicit the EIC under 
threat from the Marathas, the Nawab of Awadh, Shuja-Ud-Daulah, became legally 
enthralled to this service. This continued after that threat was partly deterred in 1760 at the 
Third Battle of Panipat. In the following years Awadh rebelled against EIC, the Nawab 
siding with Mir Kasim on the following grounds:  
…You have interfered in the King’s country, possessed yourselves of districts 
belonging to the government, such as Burdwan and Chittagong, and turned out and 
established nabobs at your pleasure without consent of the imperial court and 
exposed the government of the King of Kings to contempt and dishonour; since 
you have ruined the trade of the merchants of the country, granted protection to 
the Kings servants, injured the revenues of the imperial court and crushed the 
inhabitants by your acts of violence and oppression, and since you are continually 
sending fresh people from Calcutta and invading different parts of the royal 
dominions, and have even plundered several villages and purgunnas belonging to 
the province of Allahabad, to what can all these your proceedings be attributed but 
to an absolute disregard for the court and the wicked design of seizing the country 
for yourselves.37  
The Nawab of Awadh was defeated alongside Mir Kasim at Buxar. The Company would 
then impose on him a new treaty in 1768 that limited his forces to 30,000. Other articles 
within the treaty granted English merchants the right to engage in trade with Awadh and to 
enjoy substantial custom privileges. Both these provisions brought the state into the vice-
like grip of the Company.38 Jaya Prakash Malla would have been aware of Shuja-Ud-
Daulah’s hostility to the EIC. He may even have shared the same concerns, and would 
have watched on in the aftermath of Buxar with apprehension. 
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If not Malla himself, there may have been courtly factions resistant to the prospect 
of EIC intervention. How would the residents of his city react? Would they consider EIC 
just as much a threat as the Gorkhali, and if so, could he guarantee their subordination? 
This question had troubled Jaya Prakash Malla in the past. In living memory (the 1740s) he 
had quelled a rebellion from within the army and was frequently engaged in a battle to 
maintain his own control over Kathmandu.39 These divisions caused by competing courtly 
interests can be emphasized further. Those with a greater stake in Kathmandu’s Himalayan 
trade, cut off by Gorkhali incursions, supported Malla. On the other hand, there were 
residents with bonds of business and interchange with Gorkha. After Kathmandu 
monopolized the Tibet trade from 1650 onwards, other city-states began cultivating a 
stronger relationship with Gorkha. In particular, merchants from Patan were allowed to 
establish themselves at there and use their coinage in the western hills.40 By 1767 there 
would therefore have been many trading Newaris with closer economic ties to Gorkha, to 
the extent that they may have even had family there.  
Jaya Prakash Malla was further undermined by the mood of the wider populace: the 
blockade lasted a long time and smugglers were severely punished. There was little food, 
and famine.41 It became apparent in 1764 that many of the pramans, merchant gentry in 
Patan and Kathmandu, had unbeknownst to Jaya Prakash Malla begun negotiations with 
Shah to re-open the Tibetan trade. Such an attempt was audacious: it would have involved 
subterfuge and secrecy. Malla’s response was brutal, involving execution, public humiliation 
and exile. In turn, a substantial portion of these traders threw their support behind Shah.42 
The point here is that owing to other competing interests, Jaya Prakash Malla could not 
control the support and allegiance of those in Nepal Valley. 
Ominous developments elsewhere in South Asia and internal resistance to the EIC 
led Jaya Prakash Malla to first seek help from the Mughals, not the British. The Mughals 
certainly had a history of aggression in the Himalayas, most notably by Jahangir in the early 
1600s, from Assam to Kashmir.43 However, since then the Malla Kingdoms had cultivated 
cordial relations. As already discussed though, Mir Kasim’s intervention on behalf of Shah 
Alam II in 1763 failed. Perhaps deterred by the troubling precedents to the south, Jaya 
Prakash Malla had by 1767 so far avoided knocking on the door of the EIC. It was the last 
one he turned to. 
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III:3 The EIC at Patna and the Formation of Colonial Himalayan Knowledge.  
 
 This chapter now asks how and why the EIC were established at Patna, what 
existing visions of the Himalayas they harboured, what incentives there were for 
involvement and importantly from which previously marginalized people and places these 
representations come from.  
 Although founded in 1600 and having first established a settlement in India in 
1618, the EIC would not achieve noteworthy territorial possession, other than the 
hinterlands of its major trading centres, until the 1760s. Victory at the battle of Plassey, in 
which the Bengali general Mir Jafar turned against the Nawab Siraj-Ud-Daulah, secured 
Company access and de facto control over vast swathes of Bengal. With this additional 
land came revenue, and a significant addition in personnel: the need for more traders, 
administrators, and soldiers. British presence specifically at Patna can be explained by 
highlighting a convergence of agendas. The commercial and strategic importance for this 
town was clear to the Company. It was central to riverine trade routes, in particular that of 
Rajmahal to Allahabad by the Ganges, crucially intersecting at Patna with the land route to 
Agra.44 Patna furthermore provided a gateway into the Bihar countryside, a base from 
which hinterland markets could be tapped. This agenda was achieved - a factory had been 
maintained there since the 1650s, trading silk and saltpetre alongside other European 
establishments. It was nevertheless highly isolated at times, apparent when it was overran 
by Mir Kasim in 1763. Not all Company officials posted there would have been content. 
Those with a smaller remit for commercial opportunism would perhaps envy the wider 
social circle and suspected luxury of Calcutta, and begrudge their failure to obtain a 
different post. On the other hand, the Nawabs of Bengal may have resented British 
mercantile and military presence so far within their territory. Yet that does not compose 
the entire South Asian experience, and the local merchant classes could have welcomed the 
opportunities it brought, at least to a small cohort of them. 
 From Patna and other outposts close to the foothills, the Company had begun to 
gather information about the Himalayas. From these reports, the EIC developed a 
commercial interest in Nepal. This involved potential trade revenue, and a desire for 
Himalayan goods such as salt, timber, musk, yak-tails, horses, metal utensils, honey, cassia, 
wax, rock oil, silk and cloth.45 This interest is certainly reflected in Kinloch’s observations. 
He noted the lack of pine timber, and furthermore not just the abundance of copper and 
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iron, but importantly that ‘their distance from any river and great difficulty of access 
renders the minerals of no use’.46 
However, that information was still very sparse. By 1767, the British had not yet 
mastered the extensive intelligence systems of their Mughal predecessors, which 
Christopher Bayly argued took place in earnest from 1785-1815.47 The Kinloch expedition 
thus predated regular posts, improvement in communications by seas and river (especially 
after French privateers had been expelled from the Bay of Bengal) and the harnessing of 
Indian informants on a larger scale.48 Instead, the agents in this earlier Himalayan 
knowledge accumulation were considerably more informal and were often only recorded in 
passing reference.  
One such group providing intelligence were those Europeans trading independently 
in South Asia, operating at the peripheries of Company control. The provision of 
information from these independent traders was deliberate, encouraged, instructed by the 
EIC and carefully constructed by the trader. This was the case for George Hurst, an 
independent merchant given permission to proceed to Bettiah by the Chief Factor at Patna 
on condition that he provided intelligence and reports. He was asked to ‘make enquiry in 
what part of the country the largest and greatest quantity of Fir trees are to be found and 
whether or not those parts are dependent on the Amil of Beteya [Bettiah] or the Hill Rajas,’ 
and furthermore to ‘forward to us immediate advices of your transactions of consequence, 
that we may thereby be able to transmit such further instructions to you from time to time 
as the nature of the service may require’.49 During his time at Bettiah, Hurst thus had an 
incentive to provide a calculated account of the Himalayas, one that provided enough 
evidence that assured he kept his side of the bargain and allowed him to remain, whilst 
avoiding any detail that might induce the Company to establish their own competition in 
the region. This conundrum could explain early representations of the foothills as sparsely 
wooded, in spite of the dense oak, bamboo and rhododendron forests that exist there. 
Furthermore, deliberate representations of this kind could help explain why the Himalayan 
trade remained largely untapped in the aftermath of Plassey, despite new commercial 
opportunities offered by territorial expansion and easier access to the existing trade 
between Tibet and the Gangetic plains, with Nepal increasingly considered the likely 
highway.50 
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The EIC increasingly entrusted merchants and traders with experience of the 
Himalayas to augment their knowledge, and there emerges from within the archives a 
scattering of familiar faces encountering Nepal either side of 1767 who provided 
information in return for personal enrichment. One such person was William Mirtle, an 
independent trader in northern India who specialized in timber, tar and other maritime 
supplies. He had already curried favour with the Select Committee earlier in 1763, 
providing materials required for repairs at a time when a French squadron roamed the Bay 
of Bengal. By March 1769, his interests and that of the Company aligned once more. He 
wrote to Calcutta, emphasising how he had ‘at a considerable expense obtained an entire 
knowledge of the hill country and fir trade there, which he alleges might be prosecuted 
with great advantage to the Company’. Upon offering his expertise, Mirtle was asked to 
investigate the feasibility with which he could ‘cut sticks for masts and yards’ as well as ‘the 
procuring of pitch and tar in the Morung [Morang] country’. In return, he would be 
granted a contract to do exactly that by the EIC, enabling him to continue his trade in the 
country. Alternatively, if the prospects of this endeavour did not look promising, Mirtle 
would be allowed to remain in India for another three years, ‘to settle his private affairs.’51 
Within this example, an independent trader was able to solicit the EIC, offer his knowledge 
in order to secure profit for himself. He was not the only one – Francis Peacock obtained a 
similar monopoly in 1770, the ‘sole right for cutting firs’ in the Tista region, on the basis 
that he had visited the country.52 
A further marginal source in the construction of British colonial knowledge were 
the European missionaries - Jesuits and Capuchin Monks who had travelled relatively 
extensively in the area. Portuguese Fathers Estevao Cacella and Joao Cabral were the first 
Jesuits to visit Nepal, returning from Tibet through the country in 1628. Before that, others 
had travelled to Tibet and Bhutan. The Italian Capuchins had an intermittent presence in 
Kathmandu from 1707. Their contribution to colonial knowledge has not been neglected. 
One historian writes, ‘Christian missionaries were one of the most important channels 
through which the European world received historical and ethnographic information about 
the Orient.’53 Of course, the Capuchins saw Nepal through an evangelical, missionary 
interpretative lens, and as such the exactitude, impartiality and truthfulness of their 
observations comes under scrutiny. Nor were they immune to the influence of political 
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engineering and other agendas. The Capuchins were invited from Patna to Nepal Valley by 
emissaries of Ranajit Malla of Bhaktapur and Jaya Prakash Malla of Kathmandu. Shah had 
originally invited them to visit him at Nuwakot, then expelled them upon conquering the 
valley. In 1775, his son Singh Pratap Shah invited them back on a more permanent basis.54 
It is perhaps these shifting degrees of hospitality that explain a great degree of barbarism 
and cruelty in the Capuchin’s information on Nepal. They are the foremost proponents of 
the mutilation accounts from Kirtipur.55 
The discourse of oriental despotism has already been discussed as a component of 
a colonialist historiography, and as the impression of one belligerent held by the other, it is 
critical to understanding Company reception of the Capuchin Monks’ knowledge. The 
process of South Asian subjection to this stereotype had begun a long time ago, yet it 
reached a peak in the mid-eighteenth century, owing in part to the extensive philosophical 
analysis of Asiatic despotism in the works of Montesquieu and Boulanger who related it to 
the ‘enervating effects of hot climates, and slavish traditions within Hinduism and Islam’.56 
Such a notion greatly served a British colonial presence – it cast the EIC as reluctant heirs 
to Mughal despotism, even the saviours of India regardless of whether or not they held 
grand designs for extensive conquest at this point.57 It is no wonder then that it can be 
found within the lexicon of the EIC, for example Robert Orme’s short treatise on the 
General Idea of the Government and People of Indostan written in 1753.58 The point here is 
twofold. Firstly, the Capuchin monk’s stories of barbarism would have chimed with 
existing notions of oriental despotism. Secondly, some EIC strategists would have digested 
these reports gleefully; the perceived threat of cruel and tyrannical Asian rulers increasingly 
held leverage as a flexible justification for British aggression.59 
The arrival of two figures at Bettiah in 1767 brings into discussion a further cohort 
of marginalized historical agents: wandering emissaries and religious ascetics. By far the 
most extensive account of Gorkha’s conquests and Kathmandu’s plight came from the 
messengers that Malla sent, who reportedly were able to escape the Gorkhali encirclement 
by disguising themselves as holy men. That vocation involved migrant travel across 
northern India, and religious nomads whether genuine or on political service naturally 
stored perceived knowledge of faraway places. For that reason, they were often asked to 
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give account, share their knowledge and shape the representations of others. These two 
particular travellers had a purpose. They had been asked to solicit the British, and so they 
did by approaching Golding at Bettiah, who then wrote on to Patna.60 Kinloch recorded 
their names with little consistency, but most often as Muctan Unda and Facquir Ramdass 
from which Muktananda and Ram Das, the names more often adopted in Nepalese 
secondary literature, are derivative. They gave a very calculated account, one that played 
upon commercial interests and despotic concerns, and that stressed a need for intervention 
and urgency, as well as simplicity. They exaggerated the pace and ferocity of Gorkhali 
expansion, indicating the conflict had only been fought for five years, in which Shah had 
gobbled up ten principle cities. They indicated that Kathmandu would soon capitulate since 
the Gorkhalis had taken the city’s chief grain supplies, and the onset of famine was 
imminent. Yet despite this pressing situation in which the populace suffered at the hands of 
Shah’s war of attrition and rapid conquest, they emphasized the ease with which the 
Company could intervene.61  
The account provided by the guides certainly augmented existing concerns for 
trade, and the presence of a despotic, militant regime on the borders of Bengal. Before 
their involvement, the Himalayan trade was not considered significant enough to warrant 
an intervention (Yogesh Raj argues that the anxiety of the Company officials stationed in 
the Tarai borders considerably increased when the Gorkhalis took control of the forts in 
Makwanpur in 1762 and Dhulikhel in 1763, yet we see no concern or authorization for 
action emanating from regional centres like Patna, let alone Calcutta.)62 However, such is 
the nature of the encounter, that this representation provided by the guides may have 
merged with existing knowledge on behalf of the colonial servant; a raft of expectations 
and possibilities. It is therefore feasible that the two guides involved in this encounter 
unwittingly evoked other incentives for intervention that collectively gathered velocity. 
Firstly, upon their assurances that both Nepal Valley and the Kingdom of Gorkha 
would be no match for the EIC, it is possible that Company officials began to size up the 
territory for annexation. This is certainly an incentive that Nepalese accounts promulgate, 
some suggesting the Company were simply waiting for the opportunity in a race for 
territory against the anti-colonialist Shah campaigns.63 Whilst such an overt EIC policy is 
lacking within the IOR records and Company documents, there certainly existed the simple 
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equation: territorial acquisition gave the Company more direct control over trade. What 
mattered was whether the costs of securing that acquisition and then administering political 
control were in fact worth the output from that region, or whether it was more productive 
to pursue commercial interests within that region from Bengal. Prior to the messengers’ 
representation of Nepal Valley, Company officials leaned towards the latter. Jelle Wouters 
for instance argues possession was not part of Britain’s plans for the hills, suggesting that 
for mercantile reasons, the British concentrated on administering the plains, which were 
commercially viable in ways the ‘barren’ hills were not. He drew upon the later politician 
Dalhousie to support this: ‘I dissent entirely from the policy which is recommended of 
what is called obtaining a control, that is to say, of taking possession of these hills, and of 
establishing our sovereignty over their savage inhabitants. Our possession could bring no 
profit to us, and would be as costly as it would be unproductive.’64 Nevertheless the 
consideration, whether to conquer, always took place. 1767 was no different and messenger 
impressions of Nepal’s military weakness were influential. 
A final consideration, one that the messengers were naïve to, is how their 
representation of conflict and threat in Nepal evoked notions of a hostile mountainous 
periphery, roughly two decades after the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. Gorkhali raids had 
reduced some villages to destitution, echoing Border Reiver legend and Bonnie Prince 
Charlie’s march. Shah’s perceived political patronage based on fraternal, ethnic and 
aristocratic links mirrored perceived Highland clan structures. Reports that the Gorkhalis 
relied on bow and arrow perhaps could have found resonance in fabled Highlander 
proficiency with the claymore. (the Highlanders likewise would in the coming decades be 
considered a martial race – with emphasis placed on their Britishness as a means through 
which to suggest all British men could aspire to such martial prowess.) Kinloch himself was 
one of many Company servants to whom Nepal evoked a comparison with Scotland: ‘I 
reached the very top of the mountain where I may truly say I was never so high before, 
although I have cross’d highest and wildest in the highlands of Scotland, yet I have found 
they wou’d bear no comparison with what I now saw.’65 Kinloch would have been a young 
man in the Scottish Lowlands at the time of the Jacobite Uprising. Whether these parallels 
were accurate or wildly amiss is not wholly relevant - as Ludwig Stiller pointed out, ‘it is not 
really significant historically how we regard either Nepal or the East India Company. It is 
how they saw one another.’66 Such a converged image of Gorkhali/Jacobite, 
Himalaya/Highland hostility may not have been consciously created – for Kinloch, it could 
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have evoked childhood memories of growing up in the Scottish lowlands - but it did 
reinforce the perceived magnitude of the threat, and the perceived likelihood that its defeat 
was achievable.  
The information provided by traders, priests and guides in their encounters with 
EIC officials in each instance was carefully crafted. This impression of Nepal collided with 
those officials’ existing knowledge and existing concerns, sometimes in ways the informant 
could not likely have predicted, in what ultimately provided a vision packed with threat, risk 
and opportunity. The Company now had incentives for intervention, and plenty of 
decisions to make.  
 
III:4 The Decision to Intervene 
 
EIC Military intervention in South Asia was by no means guaranteed and there was a 
considerable argument in opposition. First and foremost, expeditions were costly and 
without the assurance of success were often risky. The Company had a chequered history 
of such gambles backfiring, from Child’s War in 1686 to the more recent siege of 
Pondicherry in 1748 (which like the 1767 venture was struck by monsoon weather.) In the 
event of failure, removing those responsible would not recuperate the EIC’s investment. 
The public stance from Company headquarters in Leadenhall Street was often decidedly 
cautious, since directors were eager to press an image of thrift and mercantile peacefulness. 
Wars cost money, and deterred investors. They brought territory to manage, and the 
envying eye of the British government. For these reasons, directors often fretted about 
rising military costs, and argued on occasion for ‘pacifick measures’ in dealing with Indian 
rulers.67 P.J. Marshall made a case for this cautious approach: ‘neither the British 
Government nor the Court of Directors of the East India Company believed in using force 
in India for commercial ends. The Company had few of the incentives for seeking political 
control in India which are usually attributed to exponents of economic imperialism.’68 
There were also viable alternatives in 1767, for instance the EIC could have entreated Shah 
to end his siege. They could have contacted and bribed one of Shah’s generals, as the 
Company did with Mir Jafar at Plassey. Having had no contact with or loyalties to the 
Mallas prior to 1767, the EIC could cynically have supported the Gorkhali expansion, 
hoping that in return Shah would invite trade, perhaps also reinforcing an allied ‘buffer’ 
state alongside the territory of Awadh.  
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On the other hand, the Company certainly involved itself in inter-Indian disputes. 
Picking a side, assisting with military force and demanding some form of trade or financial 
benefit in return had been a key method of expansion since they backed the Nawab of 
Arcot, Anwaruddin Khan, in the 1740s, and by 1766 military expenditure accounted for 
forty-four percent of the EIC’s budget.69 1767 was therefore an opportunity to showcase 
British military strength as a mercenary force to the Himalayan hill states and indebt the 
Malla Rajas, or whomever controlled the Tibet trade, to the Company. Nor were the 
outlined alternatives straightforward – whether diplomatic entreaties would reach Shah in 
sufficient time was dubious, and little was known of the Gorkhali court factions. 
Accomplished EIC scholar Christopher Bayly argued once that historians assume the 
Company was hostile towards any military enterprise or expedition on the grounds 
aforementioned. Yet despite the directors’ public protests otherwise, there remained an 
intent to protect and expand with military if needs be, behind the official sovereignty of the 
Mughal emperor, as a ‘velvet glove concealing this mailed fist’.70  
It is clear in 1767 and throughout the long eighteenth century that although not 
necessarily its first expedient, the Company would often play its military ace. How that 
measure was reached in this instance is easier to grasp once the disparity between the 
Company in London and the Company in Patna is considered. Those receiving Malla’s 
letter regarded the opportunity and threat differently to those far away in Britain, with next 
to no experience of affairs in India, who were perhaps more reluctant to intervene. Many 
historians of the British Empire have argued the impetus for action, intervention and 
expansion came primarily from the existing frontiers, rather than the metropolis of 
London.71 This could apply to Kinloch and Rumbold in Bengal, where Company agents 
perhaps more keenly subscribed to notions of Indian barbarism and marauding in the 
aftermath of the slaughter of the British stationed in Patna in 1763.72 Likewise, they may 
have held a personal stake in the success of the Himalayan trade. Furthermore, being at the 
edge of empire may well have fostered a spirit of what Robert Travers described as 
‘frontier patriotism,’ a ‘gun-ho attitude towards protecting the Empire and challenging its 
enemies’.73 The course of action they would likely advocate in 1767 was one of intervention 
to secure these interests (though not one that necessarily involved annexation.)  
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Given the potential disagreement on the question of intervention, it is important to 
ask who was involved in the decision-making process. The challenges of time and 
geography here played an important role. It is widely agreed that the six-month sailing time 
between London and Calcutta gave a certain flexibility and autonomy to the Company’s 
‘men on the spot’.74 Put simply, they could act first; account for their actions later. London 
did have a say in imperial decision-making - in the 1750s, the Company’s servants were 
constantly warned against involvement with Indian powers or military adventures.75 
However, the fact that individuals so often ignored these intermittent warnings indicates 
the centre’s critical failure to leash its peripheral agents. Moreover, with the Court of 
Directors so distanced from the geographical sphere in which these events unfolded, 
peripheral agents were very much at liberty to package these enterprises in their 
correspondence with London however they saw fit, placing emphasis on the level of threat 
if needs be, celebrating successes and neglecting to report failures. This pattern was met 
with suspicion, Bowen noting ‘the directors suspected that information was being 
deliberately withheld from them by senior figures in India, and their attempt to secure what 
they wanted sometimes developed into an ongoing and at times bitter war of attrition 
between the East India House and the Presidencies’.76 
This binary of cautious and passive London Companymen, feisty and military 
frontier agents was not definitive: There would always be warmongers and patriots in the 
metropolis just as those living in close proximity to the larger Indian armies, for instance 
the fast-moving Maratha horsemen, whilst perhaps being stationed at an under-strength 
garrison themselves, would understandably be reluctant to stir trouble. Likewise, some 
would-be adventurers were perhaps warier of reprimands and withdrawal papers coming 
from London in the aftermath of a failed enterprise than others. In 1767 though, this does 
not seem to be the case: Kinloch proceeded without permission and Gorkha’s capacity to 
defeat the EIC sepoys was greatly under-appreciated. 
Given the many different factories governed by the EIC across South Asia at the 
time, with differing tendencies towards prudence or aggression, it becomes all the more 
challenging to pinpoint any universal British policy towards India, a notion that has been 
dubbed ‘an elusive concept’ by Marshall. Instead, he described how governors and 
commanders like Verelst and Kinloch had much scope for individual initiative and the 
development of ‘sub-imperialism’.77 Once we regard hefty decisions such as the invasion of 
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Nepal as a result of such sub-imperialism, then the influences upon that decision, those 
marginalized agents in close proximity to Kinloch, become integral to the trajectory of EIC 
expansion and enterprise. For that reason, it is productive to establish whether Patna was 
capable of exercising such independence from London. Fortunately, Patna does have a 
history of peripheral autonomy, and even provides a case study in the years preceding 1767, 
centred on an illicit opium monopoly.  
EIC agents and private traders alike faced a problem in the mid-eighteenth century 
– the struggle to make inroads into China during a lucrative era for the tea trade. Their 
infamous solution was to grow opium in northern India and peddle it, against the law and 
order of the Qing Dynasty, either overland or by sea to the Chinese. For that reason, vast 
swathes of land in Bihar and Bengal began cultivating the poppy and the trade flourished. 
Since it was unregulated, the purchase and sale of opium represented a lucrative 
commercial opportunity. EIC agents and independent merchants alike stationed at Patna 
did not miss a trick – the factory was already widely noted for the value of its private 
trade.78 In 1761, the Chief of the factory there, William McGwire, negotiated his own 
private monopoly independently with the local subedar Ram Narain by agreeing a Parwana. 
He then tried to have this arrangement legitimized by Calcutta. Governor Vansittart 
ordered the withdrawal of this privilege, but not before McGwire made a small fortune. His 
successor William Ellis continued to act independently in the opium trade, coercing local 
suppliers to provide the drug at considerably lower prices on the basis that the Parwana was 
still legitimate. In turn from 1765 onwards, under the chief agency of Thomas Rumbold, 
the Patna factors cornered the opium market in spite of Calcutta’s orders against such 
monopolies. From this point onwards, Rumbold’s inner circle lined their pockets.  
This stranglehold withstood the personal intervention of Clive in August 1766. 
Upon being asked that it cease, Rumbold wrote back denying such a monopoly ever 
existed: ‘Your directions with regard to the opium business shall be adhered to though we 
must beg leave to observe that this trade has never yet been conceiv’d here in the light of a 
monopoly as whoever had a proper authority & chose to purchase have always been at 
liberty so to.’79 The proceedings of the Select Committee in July the following year make 
clear that, despite Rumbold’s assurance that Clive’s request would be adhered to, the illicit 
trade continued.80 Ultimately, the Company itself formalized a monopoly in 1773 in an 
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effort to ensure all profits went through its books.81 Those acting with disregard to earlier 
instructions were by and large held unaccountable. The gross profit earned on their opium 
purchases by this cartel has been estimated to have ranged between 175 and 300 percent.82 
From McGuire’s policy of action before permission, to Ellis’s abuse of a Parwana that had 
been formally revoked by Calcutta and Rumbold’s denial that such a monopoly existed, the 
Chief Agents at Patna had demonstrated by 1767 that they could pursue their own 
commercial interests in spite of directions from the Select Committee and the Governor of 
Bengal, let alone the Court of Directors. 
There are no records from London in the months running up to Kinloch’s 
expedition to suggest there was in fact any disparity between the Court of Director’s 
approach and that of Kinloch, Rumbold and Verelst. This is simply because no notification 
of these events was received in London, in the short space of time between Malla’s letter 
being received and the expedition setting out (we know more about London’s reaction on 
receiving news of the expedition and its failure, which is discussed further in chapter V.) 
The emphasis placed on urgency perhaps dissuaded those at Patna and Calcutta from 
consulting the Directors, since it would have been redundant. EIC ships carrying messages 
‘were obliged to set forth during the annual sailing “season” determined by favourable 
prevailing winds and the monsoon, and the established practise was for most voyages to 
Asia to begin between December and April, with return legs commencing during the 
Autumn and early winter’.83 Correspondence normally took around eighteen months. At 
best then, any request for authorization from Kinloch, Rumbold and Verelst would not 
have left India until after October 1767. Assuming the Board of Directors then received 
the correspondence in time and acted upon it, the earliest that the instruction to proceed 
could have arrived in Patna was summer 1768. If that instruction was not decided upon 
before the sailing season of 1768 closed, Kinloch would have had to wait until 1769, by 
which time Kathmandu had fallen.  
Had London been given the opportunity to offer instruction, we do not know for 
certain whether they would have advised caution, as they often did, or whether they would 
have endorsed the enterprise. What we do know is that it would not have had any influence 
whatsoever on the liberty of those at Patna to choose the course of action they wished 
(despite the claim amongst Nepalese historians that Company directors at once decided to 
send an expedition as part of an overarching territorial design on the Himalayas.)84 This was 
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a choice made at the periphery, based on local intelligence, according to various interests in 
that space. The only role Leadenhall Street played was an abstract fear, felt on behalf of the 
periphery, relating to the ramifications from that centre if their chosen action was to fail. 
Ultimately swayed by impressions of oriental despotism and threats to profit that were felt 
more keenly in Patna, and convinced of the chance of success, the decision was made to 
intervene with Bayly’s mailed fist.  
 
III:5 Plans and Preparations 
 
This section investigates the plans made by the EIC for logistical difficulties, and the 
sources of advice and information upon which those plans were based. This includes what 
knowledge of potential routes Kinloch and his superiors prepossessed, and where that 
knowledge came from. The expedition’s composition, the marginalized historical agents 
that constituted the EIC column, and the reason for their participation, is then discussed. 
There was no previous EIC military experience in the Himalayas for Kinloch to 
draw upon, owing to their relatively new presence in the region. Instead, Kinloch 
continued his interviews with Ram Das and Muktananda, hoping to draw from these 
marginalized sources intelligence on the routes into Nepal, how the roads would be 
affected by the monsoons, and Gorkhali fighting strength. Kinloch willingly supported the 
messenger’s interpretations – as a candidate to lead the expedition, he wanted to ensure the 
enterprise went ahead and was wary of a possible reluctance by the Select Committee to 
provide their seal of approval. The outcome of these discussions was an unspoken 
collaboration between messenger and soldier. Kinloch would nevertheless be held 
responsible for this outcome, and as such was careful to point out the South Asian 
providence of the intelligence. He frames his ‘short account of the present situation in 
Napaul’ with that caveat.85  
Kinloch provided the Committee with a route plan, including distances and 
summaries of marching conditions. The expedition would travel northeast from Patna 
through Darbhanga and Janakpur, then north into the foothills passing Sindhuli, then 
westwards from Khurkot to Bhaktapur in Nepal Valley, via Dumja and Dhulikhel (now 
known as the B.P. Koirala Highway.) He wrote that from Patna up to the foothills, ‘the 
road is very good, from thence to Sidely [Sindhuli] is chiefly jungles through which cannon 
may pass without difficulty; from Sidely to Napaul the road is reckoned extremely good. In 
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the march to Napaul by the route, there are no rivers to be crossed, nor any hills to be 
passed. It will be necessary to carry Bullocks from Derbunga [Dharbanga] to Dumjah 
[Dumja], at the latter place the troops will be supplied with coolies from Napaul.’86 He also 
asserted that ‘water and provisions are to be met with at all these stages,’ believing that ‘the 
Rajah will supply the troops with provisions at Daupchah [Dumja]’.87 Within this summary 
are a few notable assumptions made by Kinloch – he expected good marching conditions 
with no major obstacles, anticipated that he would need a baggage train but only to a point 
where Jaya Prakash Malla could meet them with food and soldiers, and did not anticipate 
sustenance to be a problem.  
There was no reason for Kinloch to suspect this projection, since it paralleled 
existing knowledge of the region: a map of India from 1762 by T. Jeffreys shows the 
Bagmati flowing between two mountain ranges, meeting at the Tibetan top of a downward 
‘V’ with Bettiah at the open end and Kathmandu nestled in the middle. This visual 
interpretation significantly downplayed the challenge of the terrain between Bettiah and 
Kathmandu – also suggesting by the mountainous sides of the ‘V’ that there was a more 
prodigious mountain chain between Gorkha and Kathmandu that the Gorkhalis would 
have to traverse.88 Kinloch’s plans and the intelligence upon which they were drawn were 
thus flawed from the outset: whilst it was impossible for the messengers to either confirm 
or reject Malla’s ability to provide support, they should have known for certain that 
regardless of the season, there would definitely be rivers and hills to cross. These challenges 
were omitted in their collaborative report, perhaps in fear that their inclusion would deter 
the EIC.  
Malla’s messengers had arrived on the cusp of the monsoon season, requesting 
urgency. Kinloch thus had a case to investigate – what difficulties would a march through 
the rains incur? Were they surmountable and if so, did the situation warrant an urgent 
response? His verdict, again based on local assurances within the interview, was that a 
speedy departure would avoid the worst of the rains; such was the easy nature of the route. 
Much of Kinloch’s confidence came with the proviso that the expedition would depart 
soon, certainly before June. After that, the march would ‘be attended with greater 
difficulty… as the rains cause an immense growth of jungle which almost choaks up the 
road’. The question of whether to march at the end of monsoon season, in September as 
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the expedition eventually did or any other month after the rains, was not answered in his 
report, since he was also assured that were it to be delayed until that time, ‘the whole 
country will undoubtedly be in possession of the Ghorkwallah.’89  
Time passed over the summer and permission to depart was not sent from 
Calcutta. Kinloch’s preferred window came and went; he had to change his plans. Kinloch 
staked his reputation and commission on this decision – he lay vulnerable to military 
criticism having already made clear to the committee that he considered this timing unwise. 
It may well be Kinloch’s own enthusiasm for the enterprise that accounts for this volte-
face. An alternative explanation is that Kinloch once again consulted the messengers. They 
would not have been ignorant of travel conditions at this time of year, yet they do not 
appear to have offered any deterrent. We cannot know for sure if this discussion took place 
since there are no such records from Patna that summer. Ultimately though, the expedition 
set out on 26th August, precisely the time of year Kinloch had hoped to avoid.  
 Kinloch also presented to Calcutta his evaluation of intelligence on Shah’s military 
strength, specifically that provided by the messengers. This included a geographical 
representation of Shah’s operations, statistical estimates and information on the 
composition of Shah’s Gorkha armies. The former consisted of a plan of Shah’s present 
attack of Kathmandu and Patan. Though Kinloch did not rate the accuracy of this drawing 
highly, considering it ‘neither plan nor perspective of profile and altogether out of 
proportions,’ he did conclude on it that ‘the terrible situation of Jay Percass [Jaya Prakash 
Malla] may be easily seen notwithstanding the rudeness of the work’.90 It was drawn by 
Muktananda, who had also provided Calcutta with a map of the intended route, regrettably 
missing from the archive. It is interesting here that, despite Kinloch’s complaints regarding 
the draughtsman’s skill, the drawings were still sufficient to persuade him that the Gorkhali 
blockade was thorough: ‘these redoubts are so contrived, that there is no parsing between 
them out of Arrow Shot.’ He concluded though, by informing the Select Committee that 
‘by his accounts [Muktananda] there will be little difficulty in dispossessing him [Shah] of 
them’.91 Although Kinloch made clear that it is not his but Muktananda’s assessment, he 
accepted this intelligence and the expedition would go ahead on the basis of it.  
The final assessment Kinloch needed to make was that of the enemy’s fighting 
strength. Next to nothing was known about the Gorkhalis, other than that they were an 
emergent force in the Himalayas that occasionally plundered villages in northern Bihar. The 
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British had not previously conversed with Shah, despite his previous visit to Benares. The 
messengers then, provided new statistical detail: ‘with regards to the Forces of 
Goorkwallah they say his whole Army may be about 50,000 men, but a great part of them 
are employed in the defence of his country, and never more than 20,000 had been in 
Napaul. They are chiefly armed with Bows and Arrows.’92 Here Napaul referred solely to 
the valley, indicating to Kinloch that 20,000 would be the greatest force he would 
encounter, with limited firearms (the referenced bows and arrows also served to evoke 
savagery, reinforcing the notion that Shah was a backward, barbaric threat.) This was a 
calculated summary then, one that emphasized the scale of the threat to the EIC – 50,000 
was no petty state army – alongside the potential for success – if they could be caught so 
greatly reduced and poorly armed. 
His report did not thoroughly consider how the Gorkhali armies would respond to 
monsoon season. He assumed they would work the same way the EIC did and look for 
shelter, noting that Shah held ‘chains of small forts and redoubts round the places within 
which there are commodious houses for his people free from rain’.93 Nor does Kinloch 
appear to have considered whether the terrain would benefit the Gorkhali, or whether they 
could turn it to their advantage. This omission would prove costly and Kinloch ultimately 
faced a far more mobile enemy than anticipated. 
On conclusion of this interview, Kinloch crafted an intelligence report that 
emphasized the need for haste, in face of a barbaric enemy. There was potential though, 
from the information laid down by subaltern informants, for an easy march and an easy 
victory. By all means Kinloch drew attention to this information in the hope that the 
expedition would go ahead, but he was not the only one harbouring that hope.  
 
III:6 The Expedition’s Components 
 
Having assessed the available routes, timing and strength of the enemy, the EIC turned 
their thoughts towards the expedition’s composition. Two things necessitate an 
investigation into Kinloch’s entourage. Firstly, as previously noted, this was a sizeable 
enterprise, with most estimates situating it around 2,400, whilst the Bengal Army stood at 
26,000.94 Secondly, it is hoped that an understanding of their background may illuminate 
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their raison d’être in these historical circumstances – what possible duties and motivations 
they had may help explain why some individuals made the decisions that Kinloch attributed 
to them in his journal. This investigation takes its cue from the work of a growing number 
of historians that consider colonial exploration and expeditions as collective enterprises, 
involving a diverse labour force whom the ventures were dependent on, rather than a 
conventional emphasis on the exploits and achievements of a single heroic explorer.95  
Whilst this thesis hopes to move on from such a conventional emphasis, it does not 
neglect Kinloch himself completely – knowing more about the commanding officer helps 
readers of his journal understand his descriptions of the more marginalized historical 
agents. George Kinloch was born in Scotland, and belonged to the 70th Foot regiment, 
which he joined on February 4th 1760 as a lieutenant. He became a captain for this Madras 
regiment on 11th April 1764, at which point he volunteered for transfer to Bengal, arriving 
in May.96 We know very little of his early life although his will, written shortly before the 
1767 expedition, does give us a glimpse into his family circumstances. He hoped to divide 
his fortunes equally between his brother Charles, who would accompany him to Nepal, and 
his sister Cecilia in County Forfar. The will also stipulated that, should he die with more 
than four thousand pounds sterling, ten pounds would be paid annually to Christian 
Duncan residing in Kirrimuir, County Forfar.97 This was potentially a ward of his.  
Kinloch was chosen from a small pool of officers stationed at Patna. His known 
credentials reveal him to be a suitable candidate. Firstly, his seniority from April 1764 at a 
time of expansion for the Bengal Army meant he outranked most other more recently 
appointed captains. Secondly, he had experience of large detachments – letters from 
Colonel Champion record him in charge of five companies of European soldiers at Patna 
in September 1765, no small command given the considerably small number of British 
soldiers in India.98 He had also excelled in the field, being picked for recognition by Major 
Munro, who wrote to the Select Committee, ‘I hope you will also pay a due regard to his 
merit as also to that of Captains Hay and Kinloch with Lieutenant Duff of the Artillery 
who well deserve your notice,’ in the aftermath of the Battle of Buxar.99 He had also put 
down an uprising at Tipperah (Tripura.) His record was by no means unblemished: he is 
listed as taking part in the Batta Mutiny, wherein many European officers within the Bengal 
Army simultaneously handed in their notice in protest at lower field pay. The mutineers 
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hoped their resignation en masse would corner the EIC into offering better terms, but were 
foiled when Calcutta called their bluff, replacing them with Madras Army officers. Forced 
to re-apply, many were not re-employed and instead received a dishonourable discharge. 
Kinloch however was the highest-ranking officer to make Henry Verelst’s ‘list of officers 
judged worthy of being restored to service,’ most likely on the basis of his commendation 
from Buxar.100  
Kinloch was likely a man of ambition. He had previously partaken in the Batta 
Mutiny on the grounds that he was not paid enough. He thought it possible for him to 
accumulate over four thousand pounds. He does not appear to have any immediate family, 
spouse or offspring. It is therefore plausible that, in the course of the first exchange with 
the messengers, a plan hatched in Kinloch’s mind – not a plan to liberate Nepal Valley 
from the clutches of an ‘oriental despot’, but a plan to get rich. He therefore joins a cast of 
would-be adventurers throughout India at the time. Of course, it is difficult to know this 
motivation for sure. There are clues though, for instance his interest in the religious and 
spiritual landscape. Kinloch fills almost two sheets of his notebook with the story of the 
Hindu deities Ram and Sita.101 This could simply have been boredom on the evening of a 
long day’s march, or curiosity. It is more likely indicative of the adventurer’s ambition – 
knowledge of ‘the Orient’ was becoming increasingly high regarded and prized by the 
Select Committee, and would become a de-facto prerequisite for success under the 
governorship of Warren Hastings, who placed the following value on such knowledge: 
Every accumulation of knowledge and especially such as is obtained by social 
communication with people over whom we exercise a dominion founded on the 
right of conquest, is useful to the state… [I]t attracts and conciliates distant 
affections; it lessens the weight of the chain by which the natives are held in 
subjection; and it imprints on the hear[t]s of our countrymen the sense of 
obligation and benevolence.102  
Kinloch may have been appealing to such orientalists within the EIC. He may also have 
considered publishing or speaking opportunities upon his return to Britain, although as 
outlined in chapter II, the military-career imperative for writing is more probable. 
Immediately subordinate to Kinloch were his officers. We know very little of their 
experiences in 1767, although their actions are occasional catalysts. It is likely that they 
were from the same group of adventurer-soldiers, and some of them likewise held 
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commissions during the Batta mutiny, for instance Ensign Hardy, who was not involved. 
For all though, pay was a concern and would have been a motivation to join Kinloch: the 
batta itself was a perk of the job; the principle being that soldiers in the field or on 
expedition received higher wages. It had been considerably higher in 1757 when the 
officers of Patna requested it be doubled, arguing that their barracks were more or less ‘in 
the field’ continuously at that time.103 The Select Committee staunchly opposed this, and 
continued to erode it, replacing it with a flat rate in 1768.104 Officers based at Patna in the 
summer of 1767, having seen their batta reduced over the years then hearing rumours that 
plans were afoot to erase it, may have considered the Nepal expedition an opportunity to 
cash in. 
There was also a small detachment of European soldiers, recruits mostly but not 
exclusively from Britain who had signed up for service. The regular pay, food and pension 
that the military provided would have appealed to many regardless, yet Company service in 
particular developed a further reputation for riches and a lax disciplinary record that the 
British Army did not offer. Estimates suggest there were three companies, or three 
hundred of these soldiers in Kinloch’s entourage. This was not a small contingent – it 
would not be until 1769 that the number of European soldiers in the Bengal Army reached 
3000.105 Whilst they would have chosen EIC service, they did not choose to march to 
Nepal. They may have hoped to share the spoils of war, and enjoyed the batta that came 
from this deployment, yet they certainly would never have encountered mountainous 
terrain on this scale before and would potentially miss the relative comforts of Patna. The 
same applies to the officers. 
By far the expedition’s greatest numerical components were the sepoy units: South 
Asian recruits who numbered amongst Kinloch’s ranks in the thousands. This 
phenomenon has generated a rich historiography, to which Seema Alavi, G.J. Bryant, Dirk 
Kolff, and Channa Wickremesekera have made important contributions that the following 
paragraphs draw upon.106 The first observation made by these histories is that the EIC’s 
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success would not have been possible without their recruitment and labour. In 1767 they 
would have had more experience of South Asian warfare and marching conditions than the 
British soldiers. Most were recruited from upland regions – Jats from the north, Marathas 
from the west for example (and later, ‘Gurkhas’ from Nepal).107 Some may have previously 
served with Mir Kasim of Bengal in his invasion of Nepal in 1763, since from Plassey 
onwards the Company relied heavily on the same recruitment base of upper-caste peasantry 
in northern India, Bengal and Bihar.108 They may have then signed up with the EIC in the 
aftermath of Buxar and defeat of Mir Kasim. This potential upland background did not 
guarantee any proficiency in the Himalayan foothills – very few would have had such 
experience. What is more important is that the Company believed them well suited, and 
were reliant on their martial labour regardless. 
Beyond a dependence on the sepoy in meeting their own needs, Alavi has further 
explored EIC incentives for the recruitment of South Asian military labour. One argument 
made was that the sepoys were recruited precisely because they might otherwise have 
resisted, targeting specific regions and groups in order to ‘soak up those who might 
otherwise disrupt the stability upon which hinged British political and economic aims’.109 A 
related further incentive was that the sepoys had close links to peripheral communities, 
helping the British to ‘forge closer ties with rural society’.110 Through the individual sepoy’s 
connection to the village, the EIC could disseminate a message of employment 
opportunities and power, whilst also asserting control over that individual: their family and 
livelihood remained within EIC territory, should the sepoy choose to mutiny. Whether that 
message was effective is subject to debate. 
Over-emphasizing EIC dependence on sepoy service can overshadow a 
consideration of the sepoys’ own interests – why they would opt to fight for the Company 
Bahadur, an enquiry into the chain of decisions that resulted in their fighting for British 
masters, far from home in the Himalayan foothills. Sepoys were not necessarily paid more 
by the EIC than by Indian rulers, but they were paid more frequently.111 This was enhanced 
by a number of add-ons, such as the previously discussed batta field pay that initially 
applied to all marches away from barracks but on proving too costly was amended, not 
without complaints, to mean campaigns outside EIC territory. There is some suggestion 
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from contemporaries, such as Richard Owen Cambridge writing in 1762, that the batta was 
not simply for service abroad or in the field, but for service ‘in any country where garrison 
provisions are scarce’.112 Sepoys serving in Bihar prior to the autumn harvest during the 
monsoon might then expect this payment. Mir Jafar as Nawab of Bengal was considered 
generous with batta payments, and commanded armies in the region both alongside and 
against the EIC until his death in 1765. The Nawab of Awadh likewise paid field pay 
constantly after 1777, reducing the incentive for sepoys to defect to the EIC on these 
grounds. However, such rival terms of service on behalf of Indian princes were not tabled 
in the intervening years, and during that time the EIC did not experience a shortage of 
volunteers, as General Clavering observed, ‘I never heard that there have been any 
difficulty in recruiting our battalions of sepoys, on the contrary the regularity of our 
payment and the credit of our discipline makes the Company’s a favourite service.’113 
Clavering should have accounted for such favourable service by the regularity of Company 
payment in spite of its discipline rather than alongside it, but nevertheless the ease with 
which regiments were replenished stands testament to the veracity of his observation. 
In addition, there was the no small matter of prize money, all the jewels, gold and 
trinkets a sepoy could expect, either after its cash value had been calculated and shared out 
or potentially before, if they were quick to the scene untended and feeling opportunistic 
(needless to say, European recruits were much the same.) Prize and reward were often used 
as an enticement to sepoys, particularly by their own commanding subedars or religious 
leaders, as Alexander Champion lamented of a Mulla in 1765, ‘the most lavish promises 
were previously made to soldiers. They were told their cartouche boxes should be filled; 
that they should be loaded with rupees.’114 Life at the Patna barracks would consist of 
regular pay and food, but also regular drills and observation. An escapade to Nepal Valley 
on the other hand, whose Malla rulers were famous for their competing displays of wealth, 
combined with the potential for prize money, could appeal. It was an enticement that the 
EIC increasingly found alarming and sought to discourage amongst European and sepoy 
units – in preparing for his upcoming campaign against the Rohillas years later in 1774, 
Champion wrote to assure Hastings that this time around, ‘not the most distant hint of 
reward has been given.’115 
The sepoys were not exclusively motivated by pay. The military was traditionally a 
high caste career, a peak in masculinity and prestige. Alternatively, the more insightful 
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sepoy would potentially consider the trajectory of EIC power: the British were very often 
winning. Service could bring increased pride and increased security. They may have relished 
the chance for adventure, no different to the British soldiers in this respect – few would 
have been well travelled, since travel over large bodies of water threatened observations of 
caste, and jeopardized the integrity of that to an individual. At this stage, well before 
campaigns to Burma or China, Company service could offer an experience of new places 
(along with the aforementioned additional pay outside Company territory) without that 
risk. On the other hand, it may have been precisely the opposite: the option to remain in 
service within Bihar, rather than further afield. The battle of Buxar had seen the Nawab of 
Bengal’s armies crushed and diminished – from that point on, serving under an Indian 
employer’s banner would involve travel to Lucknow or Delhi. Local employment 
effectively became Company employment. The more reluctant sepoy could have been 
pushed towards military service rather than drawn, as society and labour reshuffled under 
EIC rule. For example, EIC acquisition of the diwani in 1765 saw an increased fervour for 
taxation, as Company representatives and tax officials sought to calculate how much they 
should or could extract from increasingly dispossessed countryside landowners. Others 
pushed into military service included merchants and their staff, forced out of business 
under pressure to sell goods at disastrously cheap rates to the increasing numbers of rogue 
British agents and soldiers. 
Once enlisted, the sepoy like their British counterparts did not choose for their 
company to be sent to Nepal. Their collaboration with that enterprise – the balance 
between subordination, discipline and threat, offset by prize money, adventure and reward, 
becomes critical. The spectre haunting their involvement would be one of loyalty – would 
the sepoy turn mutineer? Would they desert? Those stationed at Patna had a tainted history 
of this. During Mir Kasim’s rebellion in 1764 two sepoy regiments took their arms and 
marched to join the deposed Nawab of Bengal after having a request for higher pay 
rejected. They were captured and returned, and the EIC blew the ringleaders from cannons 
in front of a full parade ground. Discipline was restored and insubordination distilled in 
time for the Battle of Buxar.116 However, such retribution did not resolve the initial 
discontent. Instead, punishments like this could do one of two things: as intended, it could 
deter an individual from deserting or mutinying against the British in the first place; yet it 
could also lead to simmering resentment, ensuring that the next time an individual still 
discontented with their pay decided to run or turn, they would consider the time and place 
wisely.  
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In accounting for the involvement of Indian soldiers in 1767, it is not intended to 
homogenize the sepoy. The so far outlined background of the sepoys and reasons why they 
may have found themselves serving within the EIC ranks wrongly give the impression that 
they acted and reacted as a unit. The pull towards each of those factors for each individual 
could well vary wildly and shall be demonstrated in later chapters, the 1767 expedition 
offers a rare opportunity to analyse instances in which individuals broke the mould and 
acted differently.  
There was an important vacancy – the position of the guide. There were plenty of 
candidates in Patna: agents who had previous experience of leading EIC forces, or Biharis 
with local knowledge. However, it was Ram Das and Muktananda who had manoeuvred 
themselves into position as the forerunners. Having already provided the logistical details 
that ensured the expedition went ahead, they now assured Kinloch they could complete the 
job on pain of death: ‘With regard to the march to Napaul in the rainy season, they both 
declare and offer to forfeit their lives, that there will be no impediment from that now, a 
month, or three weeks since, & offer the same pledge to carry the Party safe to Napaul.’117 
These two individuals had already played a crucial role, and now having secured further 
employment, would continue to do so. It becomes pertinent to ask who exactly these 
individuals were, willing to bear messages, offer their knowledge, and ultimately offering to 
accompany an expedition back to Kathmandu? Why volunteer? What benefit did it offer 
them? 
An expedition’s guide led the way, acting as cultural interpreter, translator, and 
navigator. They had the ear of the commanding officer – an EIC servant visibly 
distinguished by his clothing, accommodation, authority and control over the expedition’s 
finances. From this position they could command respect, gain leverage, or act as a go 
between for other South Asian participants on the expedition. They could be highly valued, 
protected, fed and accommodated. It was by no means easy, the guides were not held in 
any position of prestige by the British officers – they would not sit at the same table, they 
would be held accountable, even for the errors of others. However, if they could perform 
their duties in conducting a formidable military force from one place to another, they could 
do so in relative comfort and be soundly rewarded in financial reimbursement. In the case 
of 1767 it could then lead to further reward from Jaya Prakash Malla, and further 
employment. This opportunity appealed to Muktananda and Ram Das. Having fulfilled 
their mission in delivering Jaya Prakash Malla’s letter and having witnessed the perceived 
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might of the EIC, they then considered how much they stood to gain simply by following 
one’s own footsteps back to Nepal, in the company of Kinloch, his entourage and their 
firearms.  
Alternatively, it may have been a condition of their employment in the first place; 
they may have been awaiting payment by the Malla Raja and were thus financially obligated 
to return. Perhaps service was not considered rendered unless they returned with soldiers 
in tow. We do not know for sure though that these individuals were in fact Malla’s 
denizens. They had the raja’s confidence to be entrusted with the call for assistance, yet 
they may have been selected from amongst his courtiers precisely because they were 
outsiders: Nepalese historian Baburam Acharya has speculated that Muktananda was a 
Kashmiri Muslim courtier, a social group from which many ambassadors and munshis 
serving the EIC would increasingly be drawn.118 Ram Das was reportedly a Vairagi, a Gosain 
who travelled throughout northern India, who with Muktananda allegedly thwarted the 
Gorkhali blockade by disguising themselves as fakirs.119 This would not have easily achieved 
were they known as close confidants of Jaya Prakash Malla, or easily recognized as 
Kathmandu courtiers, surely the case if Muktananda was indeed a member of the Kashmiri 
elite. If Acharya was correct in his identification of the guides, then neither were duty-
bound to return to Nepal. Instead, they would have made the choice to do so despite 
having seen the threat posed by the Gorkhalis. They would have weighed the risks incurred 
against the rewards of service, and chosen to stay. Ram Das on the other hand was very 
likely Nepalese – of the two it is the fakir who Kinloch turned to for local information. 
The expedition also recruited harkaras - a labour force of running-messengers and 
spies. Some were officials of royal households or direct dependants of magnates and British 
officials. Others formed ‘intelligence communities’ organized under headmen or merchants 
who were then contracted by anyone who could afford their services. EIC use of these 
agents was pitiful before 1785, with some sizeable enterprises only recruiting a handful of 
poorly paid runners. Their importance was increasingly recognized during the campaigns 
against Mysore and the Marathas.120 If the harkaras in 1767 were drawn from the labour 
pool of British magnates and officials at Patna, they may have been more trusted and may 
have proven themselves before. Though that was still no guarantee they would continue 
that service, it did mean they would be promised greater incentives and pay (although if 
Kinloch himself employed them, it is likely that they were in fact of lower status and pay, as 
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was customary of harkaras serving British military officers.)121 If they were drawn from the 
alternative option though, an ‘intelligence community’ in Patna that was more mercenary, 
their service could be duplicitous, as was the case with the Bedar community, settled a few 
miles outside of Seringapatam, whose members served both Tipu Sultan and the British.122  
The better trained harkaras were paid more and thus considered more dependable. 
That training involved running in hostile, challenging territory. Unless of course, they were 
pressed into service, which would have had the opposite effect on their dependability. In 
this earlier era before British intelligence developed, harkaras were often employed due to 
their travelling experience, meaning they could have been in contact with Nepalese, 
Gorkhali and British officials before 1767, and could have had opportunity to solicit service 
from each. There are figures moreover that show other Indian states within the Himalayan 
border region employing harkaras in vast numbers. The Nawab of Awadh alone was 
estimated to have around 20,000 in the 1770s, roughly one to every two soldiers, and 
considerably more than the Mughal Emperor with reputably 4,000 harkaras.123 
Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence within Kinloch’s journal and other sources to 
say for sure who the harkaras accompanying the 1767 expedition were. However, in this 
earlier era before the EIC mastered the importance of the running-spy, they would not 
have been well paid or skilled. 
 There was also a detachment of coolies, lascars and builders who would have been 
commanded by an officer of engineers. The journal never reveals who this officer was. 
Their relationship with the workforce, as well as the labourers’ inclusion in Kinloch’s 
entourage was critical since in the past, sepoys had proven reluctant and resistant to the 
provision of such labour. This was the case during the siege of St George Fort during the 
Carnatic Wars, wherein Colonel Lawrence was able to threaten punishment to the 
offending minority of sepoys whilst within the confines of the besieged fort, surrounded by 
many European soldiers: ‘finding that the soldiers on the working parties were somewhat 
unruly, the governor gave out immediate orders that all people employed should strictly 
obey my orders… and in case of neglect, be severely punished’. This was promptly 
followed by the execution of such a sepoy.124 Kinloch was not however in such a position. 
This group would have been responsible for porterage in the plains – Kinloch was assured 
by Jaya Prakash’s messengers that Nepalese porters would join them at Darbhanga, 
releasing many coolies from service. 
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Finally, there is potentially the largest, and certainly the least mentioned cohort of 
the expedition – the caravan of families, merchants, and other camp followers. The impact 
of this group is so often under-estimated. We know next to nothing about the specifics, 
since this was a group for which there are no recorded figures. In particular, the limiting 
power structures of the time allowed for a male hegemony over all written sources 
derivative from these encounters, and Kinloch and his contemporaries seldom mentioned 
women or their actions. This is a difficulty lamented by other historians writing on the 
wider region. Benjamin Hopkins for example, reflecting on his own work on the Afghan-
Pakistan borderlands, pointed out that ‘nowhere is [the silence of the archival record] more 
clearly seen in this manuscript than in its lack of detailed consideration of the role played 
by women’s agency in the making of the frontier’ adding that the archives in which he 
worked had ‘thrown little light on this critical dimension of the Frontier’s spatial 
dimension’.125 However, they were undoubtedly present for a significant proportion of the 
expedition. Non-belligerents would normally include women and children, merchants of all 
kinds of supplies, brothel keepers and prostitutes, religious figures (perhaps not dissimilar 
to the Mulla who promised the sepoys prize-money in 1765,) livestock and herdsmen. 
There may have also been some spies amongst them. It is possible that the caravan for the 
1767 enterprise was relatively small given the time of year and terrain. To endure those 
hardships in pursuit of profit was a choice made by some of these followers, particularly 
the merchants and itinerant holy men. Many, such as those employed by others, servants, 
bonded-labourers, and family members, would not have had that choice and could have 
been extremely reluctant participants. Though rarely mentioned, the caravan accompanied 
Kinloch most of the way to Nepal, until the topographical challenges ahead forced them to 
remain at Janakpur. Before that juncture, their unspoken presence certainly played a part 
that the ensuing chapter hopes to reconstruct. 
 
III:7 Conclusions 
 
Kinloch’s confidence ahead of his march now draws cringes. He boasted in his 
correspondence to the Select Committee that ‘neither the hills nor rivers will obstruct’.126 
He did not believe the landscape posed a problem, with full optimism that the European-
style EIC army would be able to traverse these obstacles. This was in part the arrogance of 
an adventurer and calculations of a man eager to make his mark, in part a result of the 
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impression he had received by subaltern informants, whose own agencies and interests 
were likewise at work in this knowledge transfer process. He did not consider the 
difficulties that such a large entourage would involve and there is little content within his 
journals that considers its composition and interests. Nor did he anticipate the living 
landscape – that the people within these spaces were not passive and that all three parties: 
the local Bengali and Nepalese, the expedition and the landscape, would clash and interact 
as different characters competed, collaborated and resisted. The next chapter charts these 
collisions.  
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Chapter IV – ‘This Day Set Out’: Marginalized Agency within the 1767 Expedition 
 
Summary 
 
Between Patna and Kathmandu lay rivers and floodwaters, villages and towns, jungles, 
chasms and steeped hillsides, the most challenging of terrains ever travelled by EIC forces 
in South Asia. This chapter uses Kinloch’s journal alongside other sources, taking the 
expedition day-by-day, highlighting any instance in which a marginalized character, 
sometimes fitting into the ‘subaltern’ description, had an influence on the expedition that 
has previously been neglected. That action will then be accounted for by considering the 
information available on that marginalized historical agent and historical circumstance, as 
the column progressed through the agricultural lands of northern Bihar, across the Tarai 
jungle, then into the Himalayan foothills. The chapter is chronological, following the 
expedition’s narrative. It is further structured by subsections on specific topics, or groups 
of historical agents, through which agency and influence is explored. These include flood 
management, food supply, local support in the face of a military column, foothills 
communities, and the Gorkhalis, before returning to the expedition’s own components: 
guides, messengers, and sepoys. 
 
IV:1 Flood Management and Flooding in Bihar 
 
The expedition set out from Patna on 26th August 1767. They would march from there to 
Darbhanga, then Janakpur. Despite any notions of wilderness that Kinloch may have 
harboured, hinted towards by his comparisons with the Scottish Highlands, it was not a 
march into uninhabited territory. Now part of Bihar, the region in 1767 was part of the 
Bengal province. Whilst James Rennell’s Bengal Atlas estimates a village to square mile 
ratio of at least 0.64 to 1.71, Rajat Datta estimated the population of what is now Bihar as 
ten million in 1790, no small number considering that the rest of the Bengal province was 
considered densely populated at twelve million.1  
 Whilst the British had an established trading presence in the region at Patna since 
the 1650s, it was only in 1765 that de facto political control was established there with the 
grant of the diwani. Northern Bengal at the time of Kinloch’s march was experiencing for 
the first time the ‘dual government,’ wherein the existing local rulers retained their styles 
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and dignitaries, receiving a stipulated annual income, whilst the Company administered the 
government and collected revenues through Indian officials.2 Changes were afoot; and 
whilst some were empowered, others were not. Take for instance the Company’s new 
approach towards textile manufacture. Bengal and Bihar were divided into segments, each 
with production centres and procurement stations, from which the local Gumashtas in 
Company employment were able to impose buying rates upon the weavers and producers. 
The Gumashta system enabled that class of intermediaries to grow wealthy and prestigious, 
greater regional profits being rewarded with a greater salary. Yet it also chained the small-
scale weavers and artisans to the purchasing prices and terms set by EIC officials, often 
considerably below the market value and rates they could hope to achieve in the earlier era 
of competing British, Dutch and French buyers.3 
The towns and villages of northern Bihar that the expedition travelled through 
were not completely enthralled to the Company’s manufacturing needs, also harbouring 
commercial and agrarian ties.4 This was certainly the case at Darbhanga and Janakpur. 
There, changing prices for foodstuffs and pressure from Company officials to grow cash 
crops such as opium and after indigo after 1777 forced many growers towards money-
lenders. Whilst agrarian communities mostly composed of small-scale growers begrudgingly 
welcomed the wolf to the fold, Bengali bankers saw opportunity in high-interest loans that 
could enthral producers into a debt cycle.  
The physical embodiment of the Company was not necessarily the red-coated 
sepoy, but the note-taking Bengali official. Subaltern agents certainly demonstrated an 
ability to attribute detrimental change to the EIC without observing explicit European 
presence, for instance in their support of Mir Kasim’s uprising. Such insight however, and 
the direction of community ire towards the EIC and its soldiers, should not be assumed. 
This territory was not simply hostile or loyal, dependent or disinterested. These changes 
were as much a catalyst of EIC expansion as they were a result of it, since they pushed 
farmers and weavers towards Company contracts, former manufacturing and agrarian 
labourers towards Company employment. Yet they did not necessarily stabilize or cement 
EIC authority and rule, stirring resentment that could lead to subversion and non-co-
operation. Therefore, upon finding an individual or marginalized social group in a position 
of agency in their encounter with the 1767 expedition, it is important to consider how they 
may have related to these political-economic changes in northern Bengal. These are 
considerations that Kinloch himself did not note in his journal and may not have made – 
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instead being burdened by pre-existing expectations of the landscape and people within it. 
It has previously been noted how agrarian societies in colonized countries, in particular the 
peasantry, ‘became repositories for all the cultural presuppositions that allegedly made 
those societies incapable of modern self-government and hence justified the paternal 
authoritarianism of Western colonial rule.’5 For Kinloch, this could include deceit and 
laziness, both the spectre of agrarian rebellion and a passivity under the yoke of despotism, 
since the South Asian peasantry were considered easily influenced. Therefore, whilst 
Kinloch’s tone is often either suspicious or dismissive (referring to both their ‘villainy’, as 
well as their being ‘timourous, harmless people’) the marginalized agents that he 
encountered are not automatically considered hostile to the Company.6   
The first instance in which marginalized agency helped direct the events of 1767 is 
the expedition’s ongoing struggle against nature: the immense floodwaters before them and 
the failed human management of that force. By the point of Kinloch’s departure at the end 
of monsoon season, the deluge broke the banks of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and all 
the large rivers of Northeast South Asia. This occurred annually with more or less severity 
depending on the rainfall, though northern Bihar and Bengal were particularly vulnerable, 
being augmented by the melt of the Himalayan snows into the north-south flowing 
Gandak and Kosi rivers, and their changing course. James Rennell’s personal 
correspondence sets the scene in Bengal, 1765:  
The country for nearly 70 miles near Dacca is entirely overflown during the months 
of July, August, and September, so that the towns and villages are only very small 
islands, and have a communication with each other by small boats. This 
phenomenon is occasioned by the overflowing of the Ganges and Brahmaputrey 
and without it the country would be parched up during the whole year. The food of 
the country being entirely rice, this annual inundation saves them the trouble of 
watering their lands, and keeping them in the state required for the production of 
that grain.7  
Whilst the waters helped irrigation, they also damaged settlements and required careful 
flood defence management. This included an intricate network of ditches, dams and raised 
causeways across northern India. One commentator, in a tract entitled The Art of Poolbundy, 
or Management of the Pools, laid down before the Select Committee on 28th June 1787, 
described a thousand-mile flood embankment that encircled an entire island-district. Whilst 
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this was perhaps an overstatement, such defences would nevertheless represent a 
remarkable feat of engineering.8 These needed repairs each year, before the monsoons. If a 
neighbourhood could not cover the costs of repairs, the land became inundated. Payment, 
finding the labour and organising the works was traditionally the responsibility of the local 
landowner. In Company territory, the work was frequently contracted to private engineers.  
The success of flood defences was highly politized. In fact, in the years following 
the 1767 expedition we find the abuse of flood defence contracts discussed at the highest 
level, featuring in the trial of Warren Hastings. Amongst the charges brought against the 
former Governor-General by Edmund Burke was an accusation surrounding the allocation 
of Poolbundy contracts in 1777. In the district of Burdwan, the Poolbundy contract had 
previously been granted to the local raja as the traditional political power, who was paid 
25,000 rupees a year from the Bengali Nawab’s office. After Buxar the EIC became 
responsible for the allocation of this contract. Hastings upon its renewal awarded it to 
Archibald Frazer, who was to be paid a sum of 120,000 rupees the first year, 80,000 for the 
second. Frazer was also granted the sole permission to judge whether one-off, special 
repairs were required, then bill the Company government upon their completion. Upon the 
contract’s expiry, it was renewed at a flat rate of 80,000, for three years.  
Burke noted that the position had not been advertised, and that the cost and length 
of the contract rendered it disadvantageous to the EIC. He pointed towards a survey 
completed by Mr Kinloch, Superintendent of Poolbundy Affairs (no relation to the Kinloch of 
1767) which estimated the annual cost of Frazer’s contract at 119,401 rupees, once special 
repairs had been calculated. Kinloch concluded that whatever extraordinary and unusual 
damages the defences had received, sustained either through neglect on behalf of the Raja 
of Burdwan or particularly heavy rains, warranted the first-year sum of 120,000, but not the 
high costs of 80,000 to 119,401 thereafter. Hastings was then said to have agreed on this, 
but continued Frazer’s contract regardless, despite a competing bid at 60,000 rupees by a 
Mr Thomson. Furthermore, Burke questionned the additional stipulation: that Frazer was 
allowed to create work for himself in special circumstances despite having already been 
granted the contract on the basis that he kept the defences perfect seemed highly 
suspicious. He called into question Frazer’s suitability for the contract, being a Justice 
Officer without local knowledge on construction experience, and alleged corruption on 
behalf of the Governor-General.9 Hastings infamously escaped these charges at great legal 
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cost. The relevance of this episode to the 1767 narrative is that there is the indication that 
Company agents prioritized profit over effective or cost-efficient flood management. 
A local political authority’s failure to finance and deliver flood defences could cause 
unrest and conflict, sometimes directed at the EIC. It was certainly a grievance held by the 
Raja of Tanjore (present day Thanjavur in southern India) when he petitioned to the 
Company in 1764, a sequence of events documented by Richard Owen Cambridge. The 
Raja already had an uneasy relationship with the British and the French prior to this. 
Tanjore was moved to alliance with the former due to the threat of the latter, alongside 
Mysore. This new alliance then halted the Raja’s own designs to ‘carry fire and sword’ to 
the country immediately south, Madurai, also allied to the EIC.10 His complaint in 1764 
however stemmed from a disagreement over flood defences. The Nawab of Arcot to 
whom he was subordinate had not allowed him the resources to repair the banks that held 
back the river Kaveri. He requested the EIC intervene, and use their considerable influence 
and leverage over the Nawab to ensure the flood defences were repaired. It is clear that the 
EIC favoured Mohamed Ali Khan of Arcot over the Raja of Tanjore from the terms in 
which Cambridge described them both.11 Their refusal of the latter marks the first in a 
series of sour turns in their relationship that led to war between them within a decade.12  
Flooding, the measures taken to prevent it, allocating those responsible for building 
defences, and the trials and tribulations of travel during the monsoon months all converged 
in 1767. Campaigns were often drawn to a halt during the rains. The Bengal Army had 
recent experience of this in 1767 – it greatly hindered the 1763 and 1764 campaigns – 
Major Carnac wrote at this point ‘our troops have suffered so much from the former wet 
campaign as not to have strength sufficient to bear the fatigues of another’.13 Yet Kinloch 
set out regardless, having been assured the floodwaters were passable. They were worse 
than expected, Kinloch noting in his journal how he ‘had certain intelligence that the 
Country before me was overflow’d for 7 Coss by the quantity of water in the Bagmutty 
[Bagmati], which, the Facquier my guide had all along assur’d me, he could carry me round, 
however he now found it impossible’.14 The flood waters were evidently higher than Ram 
Das expected. Any local resentment on these grounds would be targeted towards those 
responsible for ensuring they were well maintained – whom we learn from Kinloch’s 
                                               
10 Cambridge, An Account of the War In India, p.102. 
11 Ibid., pp.107-108. 
12 B.L. IOR/H/772 Miscellaneous papers collected by Thomas Wilks (1765-1771), p.7.  
13 Major Carnac to the Select Committee, 10 June 1764 in B.L. IOR/H/805 Papers from Bengal and Madras, 
p.1100. 
14 B.L. Mss Eur F128/140 Journal, 30th August 1767, Book 1, Folio 2b. 
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journal was ‘a local Phousdar who collects and pays his revenue to the Government at 
Patna’.15 In other words, the new diwan – the EIC.  
Kinloch needed help. He needed to move a sizeable army across rivers and 
floodwaters. He needed transportation, which the Company itself did not supply. Instead, 
he would need to commandeer boats from the local population. Consider the situation: the 
flooding was worse than the EIC and potentially also the South Asian guides had expected 
indicating defences had failed. The local political authority, the EIC, had failed to provide 
money and labour that could have alleviated this. Taxes had been raised and labour 
recruited, but it had been diverted to the military, not poolbundy. Now, that military force 
struggled to cross the very same waters that alternative spending could have prevented, 
requesting help from those living in the flood plains, the very people whose settlements 
would have been better protected. Consider furthermore that from Tanjore there is a 
precedent of discontent towards the EIC’s role in failed flood defences spilling into war 
with the Company, let alone non-co-operation upon request to supply boats. Consequently, 
we find in Kinloch’s journal not simply a failure by the villagers to provide the boats, but a 
failure to provide them despite a promise to do so. Kinloch ‘had sent several times before 
my march from Patna to Darbhanga for Boats to be provided for Crossing the Bagmutty, 
[Bagmati] and sent to Sandy Gaut [potentially Sandy Ghat]. I had accordingly advice that all 
which be got were waiting for me there’.16 Perturbed by this, he made new arrangements en 
route, sending out scouts ‘to prepare canoes for the carriage of the Guns’ … on my arrival 
I found only one prepared for the guns and a single Canoe’.17  
Contracting for transport by boat predated colonial rule in India, and boatmen 
were already established as contractors in 1767. By the 1780s there were an estimated 
300,000 working the rivers, according to James Rennell.18 However, it was not until the 
early 1770s that the EIC moved towards allocating regional riverine transport contracts, a 
system recently carefully researched by Nitin Sinha.19 Before that, and during the summer 
of 1767, they operated a fixed rate establishment, offering payment for service on an ad hoc 
basis. This system incurred great costs: over half a million rupees annually.20 For that 
reason the Company notoriously reverted to the use of force, placing a demand on the 
local villages, which Sinha has demonstrated were consequently deserted at the sight of the 
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sepoys.21 There is no indication that Kinloch demanded the supply of boats in 1767, but 
nor is there indication that he offered a fixed rate payment for them.  
It was not simply the provision of boats, but that of dandies, the labour at the oars, 
that Kinloch required. Whether they would volunteer depended on the nature of the work, 
the terms of service and the employer. Often, dandies deserted or did not turn up. One 
traveller wrote: ‘one fertile reason of boatmen’s desertion was the ill conduct of Europeans, 
who often stimulated them to do which, in their weak and clumsy boats, were really 
dangerous, and against all law or right, beat them when they refused or hesitated.’22 In 
1767, crossing many sepoys, supplies and artillery over burst rivers and floodwaters would 
represent considerable risk to prospective dandies. Moreover, these arrangements often 
involved payment to an agency in advance, the boatmen likewise receiving half their fee 
beforehand.23 Kinloch does not mention such a payment, and would later prove to be a 
severe employer.  
It is possible that there were no boats, or dandies available to row them – that the 
local population did intend to support the Company expedition in agreement for a fixed 
rate, but found they had no resources spare. However, such a scenario could then increase 
resentment towards the new EIC authority, able to fund soldiers but not the poolbundy 
repairs. Moreover, the local suppliers did not simply refuse because they could not or did 
not want to co-operate. Instead, they gave the impression, or at least someone gave Kinloch 
the impression, that the boats would be supplied. Without dandies, the coolies could have 
been tasked with rowing and navigating, but these were skills they would not have, leading 
to a slower pace and greater risk of accident. This had a great impact, Kinloch lamenting 
‘the time we were crossing here, some of our canoes being lost and three people drown’d 
obliged me to halt’.24 Eventually he found ten large boats with which the column crossed 
the waters in waves, each one taking twenty-six hours.25 The lost lives and time would 
prove critical later on, giving the Gorkhalis further time to reinforce and prepare. 
At this point, on 3rd September, Kinloch met an Italian missionary, Padre Mark. 
(Padrey Merk in B.L. Mss Eur F128/140, Mirk in the later edition.) It is worth mentioning 
since Kinloch lamented that he ‘had little or no material intelligence with regard the Nepaul 
Country from him’.26 This should have set alarm bells ringing – the EIC’s traditional 
channels of information had failed. Kinloch had not planned upon meeting any Capuchins, 
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and the expedition did not hinge upon their intelligence. However, it is unusual that he 
would meet one so far from their mission at Bettiah, on the road from Kathmandu where 
they had recently been resident. It raises the possibility that this individual had come from 
Nepal, that he did have intelligence of the Gorkhali defences being raised, but chose not to 
impart it. Had Kinloch known about the scale of defences being erected higher up in the 
foothills, he would have hurried, or requested reinforcements. Intelligence from this 
missionary would have proven crucial, but it was not provided. 
 
IV:2 Feeding the Expedition: The Supply and Withholding of Grain  
 
Kinloch expected to encounter difficulty in food supply as the expedition approached the 
foothills, having been forewarned by his guide Ram Das: ‘from Sidely [Sindhuli] to Napaul 
there were some villages, but my finding grain in them depended entirely on the people 
remaining when I arrived which was hardly to be expected.’27 The same guide therefore 
advised Kinloch to contract a local supplier, someone whom he could depend upon. 
Kinloch then ‘applied to Mr Rumbold telling him how much service depended upon this & 
he recommended Dondao Chudhary, who he had reason to believe by the Character Sita 
Broy gave of him to think proper person for such an undertaking’.28 This was Shitab Rai, 
the Raja of Patna and vassal to the Company, providing a character reference for a local 
grain merchant. That individual’s second name appears a corruption of Chaudhuri, a leading 
merchant in every trade who received fees, represented grievances to the government, 
regulated the price of commodities, settled minor disputes and most importantly in this 
context, met extraordinary demand when persons of rank or troops passed.29 Kinloch duly 
approached him before the expedition set out. 
With rice harvests dependent on the monsoon, and greater armies roaming Bengal 
year by year, there was undoubtedly friction over food supply in the mid-eighteenth 
century.30 In times of scarcity, there were often hoarded grain supplies to be had, yet the 
population’s access to that supply depended on its price, which teetered around the upper 
limit of affordability for many. For that reason, an overwhelming number of people in rural 
society, an estimated fifty percent, depended substantially on the market for their 
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subsistence requirements. Realising there was profit to be made, merchants raised the price 
in times of shortage to the point where wealthy elites could afford their food supply, but 
others could not. British sepoy armies greatly exacerbated this problem, since the Company 
bought food at the ‘Bengal Average’ price. In some areas this was greater than the regional, 
local price.31 Grain could be cheaper or more expensive, depending on the absence or 
presence respectively of a source of fixed demand such as an army.32 A merchant therefore 
stood to gain by selling to the EIC instead of the local population, or by matching the 
‘Bengal Average,’ guaranteeing a sale despite their rates standing well above the local, 
subaltern villager’s buying power. This problem worsened as Company armies grew whilst 
taxation and the price of foodstuffs increased after 1757. 
These difficulties reached breaking point within a few years of 1767 – manipulation 
of the market and hoarding were greatly to blame for the Bengal Famine. Local grain 
merchants were sensitive to Company manoeuvres, and could practice what Rajat Datta 
called ‘covert resistance’ in which they bought up grain reserves, in order to monopolize 
prices and supply, if they thought the EIC were about to do just that – perhaps if they were 
about to campaign (as was the case that summer in Patna, since it was no secret that 
Kinloch would soon depart.)33  
 This friction and Kinloch’s course of action opens up a further opportunity to 
discuss marginalized agency and influence – that of Dondao Chaudhuri, the contracted 
grain merchant. Whilst crossing the flood plains, Kinloch sent for this man. He had ‘given 
every direction I could think necessary three months before’, and had ‘offer’d to advance 
him a sum of money that nothing to material a matter might be wanting’.34 This was 
normal: in many cases money was advanced to local agents against the supply of finished 
goods in the future.35 Interestingly though, the merchant refused the offer, instead assuring 
Kinloch he ‘cou’d, in the space of a week, get everything ready if he had that warning’. 
Having given the merchant three weeks Kinloch now required food. He sent for Dondao 
Chaudhuri, only to find he had ‘not 600 m’d of grain in the buzzar’.36 Kinloch first used 
threats: ‘I told him he was now a follower of the Camp and might depend on it if he did 
not perform his promise I would not hesitate in making an example of him.’37 He then 
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suggested he would take EIC business elsewhere, ‘if he therefore thought he cou’d not 
discharge the office he had undertaken to tell me once and I would endeavour to get Mr. 
Liethieullier, salt-agent at Durbenga[Darbhanga], to undertake the contract.’ Finally, he 
promised a further advance. In response to this, the merchant assured Kinloch that ‘in the 
space of three days he would have 3000 m’d of grain ready’. He refused the money, and 
asked ‘why shou’d I [Kinloch] be so uneasy about him. He had always supplied General 
Carnac and Sir Robert Barker and never found them displeased’.38 
So began a game of cat and mouse in which the merchant did not supply, Kinloch 
delivered incentives and threats, the merchant renewed his promise, but once more did not 
supply. After that initial conversation the merchant avoided Kinloch, instead sending 
messengers. This pattern repeated itself throughout the course of the expedition. First, 
having had five days to supply instead of the agreed three days, he left a message to say 
‘that he was gone on before to Jannickpore where he would meet me with a sufficient 
supply’.39 Upon arrival there, Kinloch wrote that there was ‘as yet no account of the 
Choudrey, or his grain’.40 He left a representative at Janakpur, Mr Kyd, with instructions to 
send on any grain supplied. Upon his arrival at Sindhuli days later he was met with a letter, 
informing him that Kyd ‘had sent 50 bullocks loaded with grain that he had collected there. 
The Choudrey since I left him having not furnished an ounce, nor had he heard from him, 
or seen him.41 It was not until he was encamped at Hariharpur on the 11th of October that 
the merchant’s supply bullocks finally arrived. Kinloch wrote in despair: 
The villainy of the Chowdrey did not appear plainer in any instance than this. I had 
ask’d him at Durbhanga how many m’d it was common for a bullock to carry. He 
answered in Bengal four, but in the country I was going to three he was certain 
would be enough. I then told him to take care that he never sent less than three. 
For so many bullock load being common expression, I might always know the 
quantity. I had to depend on instead of two hundred and ten m’ds which this 
quantity ought to have been, it turne’d out to be less than thirty, and not a grain of 
salt.42  
This instance is indicative of previously marginalized resistance. The grain merchant’s 
promise without delivery sabotaged Kinloch’s expedition. The merchant may have 
genuinely believed he could provide the resources asked for, though this seems unlikely 
since he refused the advance payment. He may have had his doubts, but frantically tried to 
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procure the grain, induced by the Company’s promised payment rates. The provision of 
grain could be hindered by various natural conditions. Grain could not be kept in store for 
very long, being prone to damage by insects or damp. The market was usually a short one, 
with sales concluding mid-August. It only took a little extra rainfall to inundate the fields at 
the wrong time to mar the crops.43 1767 was such a year of heavy rainfall, and since 
Kinloch first contracted the merchant much earlier than September, that which was stored 
could have deteriorated or been sold elsewhere.  
The merchant was perhaps thwarted by someone else further on in the chain, 
marginalized farmers who could have acted upon deep-rooted bitterness at the merchant’s 
profit margins. This was a very complicated network of trading activity with rich and poor 
traders, and various intermediaries. As Urmita Ray described, the grain trade in rural Bihar 
involved ‘thousands of small transactions’.44 Nor does this difficulty need to be contained 
within the Darbhanga district. Due to the uneven spatial characteristic of the monsoon, 
crop failure rarely occurred simultaneously all over the province and food could be 
procured elsewhere in the province during shortages. Merchants often bought grain from a 
region with greater surplus, then sold it at a higher price in the region affected by crop 
failure. Yet those producers with the surplus did not benefit, being contracted by the 
merchant to sell at a fixed rate, before its greater value became apparent.45 It is plausible 
that the merchant thus faced dissent, or a lack of co-operation, elsewhere behind the 
scenes.  
Banerjee decries the general impression of local Bihari grain trade as a ‘shadowy 
sphere peopled by a medley of intermediaries, the functional differences of whom are not 
always recognized and whose activities seem to converge in a confused tangle of “petty” 
dealings’. They argued that ‘the networks of local trade formed little microcosms in 
themselves, each with its own tiny substructure, which became a component in the general 
structure of Indian trade as a whole’.46 There were therefore many individuals beyond 
Dondao Chaudhuri who were in a position to undermine the 1767 expedition. 
The first link beyond the farmers were storers, the grihastha-beparis, dominant 
peasants who could branch out. They purchased the produce of their neighbours at harvest 
or by means of advances. They then moved into the market. They generally made about 
twenty percent profit on a harvest, twice a year, but could not expand too far if they could 
not move their grain from the village to the market, that was done by the second link, the 
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Baladiya beparis, who had bullocks for hire. (This was not a problem in 1767, they had plenty 
of bullocks.) They were often poorer, but could be wealthy in some instances. Paikars were 
similar, but wealthier and higher caste.47 These two parties were primarily contracted by 
Mahajans – large, wholesale merchants. They usually secured grain through advances of 
payments to the link men of the trade (Baladiyas and Paikars.) Then there were Bhasaniya 
Mahajans: Gosain and Sannyasi merchants as well as Beruni merchants who more often 
transported grain by boat.48 
Banerjee wrote that ‘Chaudhuris also possessed a degree of control and supervision 
over markets as a whole… and often their offices even in the late eighteenth century were 
derived from the express permission and sanction of government’.49 Dondao Chaudhuri 
was empowered by Shitab Rai and was perhaps more closely associated with that local 
power than the ryots, farmers and smaller traders. Marginalized agency would have declined 
to provide in spite of these Chaudhuri’s connections to the raja. Then again, it may be 
precisely the Chaudhuri’s service in 1767 to the EIC soldiers, rather than the Raja of Patna, 
that deterred those lower down the chain from providing grain – Rai had previously 
appeared sympathetic towards the wider population during times of scarcity, drawing upon 
famine policies. The EIC as the new revenue collectors on the other hand did no such 
thing.50 After 1770 the EIC sought to encourage the movement of grain from one locality 
to another, though this often simply passed on the deficit, causing resentment and 
starvation. An attempt to counter this by regulating and limiting grain flows at times 
exacerbated the problem, often throwing urban centres like Patna into trouble.51 
The merchant himself could have been lying, he may have resented Company 
adherence to the ‘Bengal Average,’ since we know he had held previous contracts with 
both Colonel Barker and Shitab Rai, so was in a position to compare. Om Prakash has 
argued that after 1765, the EIC wielded further political leverage with which to coerce 
intermediary merchants, ending the ‘level playing field’ that they had previously enjoyed.52 
 Either way, 1767 was not a year of scarcity – grain reserves existed. As with the 
supply of boats, though we cannot say for certain whether it was the grain merchant, 
someone in the supply chain, somewhere in this previously marginalized local space, refused to 
provide grain destined for Company troops, despite Kinloch being given the impression 
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otherwise. In the long term, this led to famine amongst Kinloch’s expedition. In the shorter 
term, returning to the plains, it meant Kinloch had to rely on the support of the local 
villagers that he knew he could not guarantee, having initially contracted Dondao 
Chaudhuri for that reason. 
 
IV:3 ‘What Was I Now To Do?’: Rural Communities and EIC Military Occupation 
 
Whilst struggling over floodwaters and wrangling over food supply, Kinloch also made 
plans to negotiate with local villagers – for food, support, and direction. Likewise, these 
settlements would have heard of the approaching soldiers. As the expedition made 
progress away from Patna, they entered the traditional territory of the Raj Darbhanga, the 
Khandavalas. This family were Brahmins, claiming heritage from the old kings of Mithila. 
By 1767 the ruler was Raja Pratap Singh, having only recently shifted his capital to 
Darbhanga from Bhawara in 1762. The Khandavalas held a mixed reputation for high 
taxation alongside the promotion of local Mithili language and culture. Their relationship 
with the EIC deteriorated after Buxar – though Raja Pratap Singh held a court, privy 
council and hereditary succession, the British regarded him a zamindar only, not the head 
of a princely state.53 By Kinloch’s arrival this fallout had come to a head: 
The whole of this country from Darbunga is called the Tiroot [Tirhut] province, 
which is divided by the Cumwa Nulla, and formerly governed by Rajah Purtop 
Sing, but he failing in the payment of his revenues a force was sent to take him to 
which he delivered himself up in the year 1766, since which time a fousdar has had 
the nominal authority of the Rajah and Purtop has been kept prisoner at Patna.54 
Such a move on behalf of the Company may not have endeared them to the local elite – 
the landowners, headmen, even prominent merchants, who had flourished under Raja 
Pratap Singh’s leadership in the aftermath of his move to Darbhanga. That Kinloch would 
assume the loyalty of these people in a country wherein Company forces had marched, 
seized the raja and thrown him in a debtor’s prison seems short-sighted. 
 The wider population may also have had complicated feelings regarding the 
nominal authority that the EIC had established. The era after Plassey saw merchants and 
EIC agents alike enter rural trades previously regulated by the Bengal nawabs. Their profits 
were often made unfairly through violence and intimidation at the expense of the local, 
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forming the lament of Mir Kasim that ‘every village and district in that province was ruined 
by their hands’.55 Previously areas could serve to profit by engaging with foreign trade on 
their own terms. Now it had come to their doorstep and those terms were dictated. For 
many villagers the deliverer of ruin was not British, but local elites who mediated.56 Yet 
there was good reason to be angry with the EIC – in recent years under company influence 
Darbhanga had struggled: Kinloch considered it ‘a large, straggling, ruinous place,’ noting 
that ‘there is a phousdar for collection revenues, but seems to have little else but the name. 
Business being chiefly managed by a dewan, appointed by the government’.57 The local 
taxpayers may also have held conflicting opinions on the imprisonment of their traditional 
ruler. Raja Pratap Singh could have collected taxes from them, and then refused to share 
that revenue with the EIC as diwan of Bengal, which would have endeared him to neither 
the Company nor the marginalized taxpayer. Alternatively, Singh could have insufficiently 
collected taxes in the first place. If that were the case, following his imprisonment in 1766, 
the expedition would have arrived shortly after the villagers had their taxation collected by 
Company officials, at a higher rate than previously under the Khandavalas. 
On the other hand, the proximity of the Gorkhali threat gave the region an impetus 
to support the Company. It firstly damaged existing Himalayan trade networks, for instance 
Kinloch found a salt agent residing at Darbhanga who ‘complain’d much of the decay of 
the trade’. Merchants here faced financial difficulty: being able neither to ship their heavier 
cargos over the floodwaters, nor find a market for lowland goods in the warring hills. 
Instead, they were obliged to hoard resources, Kinloch observing such supplies of ‘pine 
from the mountains… likewise cutch, tinkaal, copper and iron’ for which ‘passage was 
obstructed’.58 This problem principally applied to those involved in the Himalayan trade, 
many of whom supported the EIC as a buyer or supplier. There were also signs though 
that Gorkhali raids had severely damaged the region’s agrarian economy. Kinloch observed 
that ‘the country still continues uncultivated which cannot be easily accounted for, (as by 
the appearance it seems to be extremely fertile and very pleasant) unless it be owing to the 
fear of the mountaineers to whose excursions it is quite open’.59  
Kinloch certainly argued Shah had established a punitive, oppressive presence in 
the region, believing him to have built a local fort from which to extract money from the 
locals: ‘Passed the kella [Killa in alternative text] of Kurgunge [Keergunge] uninhabited, it is 
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the small mud fort consisting of a square of 40 yards, with towers and angles, it was made 
by the Goorka Rajah 4 years ago, in which he kept a Fousdar for raising contributions.’60 
However the lack of cultivation in Darbhanga and Janakpur may not have resulted from 
Gorkhali incursions - the regional decay had occurred recently and was an ongoing 
observation of Kinloch’s, whilst the fort had been abandoned for some time by the 
Gorkhalis and left to ruin, rendering the timeline obscure and the correlation between 
Gorkhali incursions and observable economic decay an uncertain one. Some may even 
have benefitted during that time wherein Shah did have a presence in the region, perhaps if 
the Gorkhali agent’s ‘contributions’ raised were less than those extracted by Raja Pratap 
Singh, or more recently the British.  
There was certainly discrepancy between the different taxation levels and evidence 
that local populations preferred to direct their tax towards the least extortionate: since 
taxation rates were reviewed annually, some tenants took the opportunity to abandon tracts 
within EIC territory and focus instead on those further into the Tarai.61 The decay noted at 
Darbhanga could therefore demonstrate a realignment of priorities amongst Mithili tenants, 
towards their land that fell under Gorkhali taxation and authority. There are examples from 
within Bengal during the late eighteenth century of cultivators using their ability to relocate, 
or threatening the use of it, in order to achieve their aims. One ryot petition for instance 
stated ‘thou are head of one country, we have a thousand countries to go to, you are chief, 
we are ryotts, you will therefore order us justice’.62 Jon Wilson, who studied the 
circumstances around that petition, wrote that ‘agrarian relations were governed by a 
process in which peasants bargained to find the most secure and profitable site for 
cultivation’.63 If they did not find that site, they relocated. Therefore, if the Darbhanga 
region had been devastated, the royts there during Shah’s raids may have long since left. 
Those incumbent in 1767 would not have grievances against the Gorkhali on those 
grounds.  
Political loyalties and land cultivation were therefore fluid in these borderlands. The 
relationship between local political power and local subaltern becomes hazy. The traditional 
rulers were now at odds with the Company, yet there were also Gorkhali incursions and the 
suggestion that the Kurgunge Kella was occupied by Shah for some time. Whilst merchants 
                                               
60 Ibid., 14th September 1767, Book 1, Folio 13b. 
61 This was a tactic observed elsewhere in India by Eugene Irschick: ‘To evade taxes, the landowners resorted 
to various tactics, like providing false information and abandoning their fields’. Irschick, Eugene F. Dialogue 
and History: Constructing South India 1795-1895 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), summarized in 
Wickremesekera, ‘The Best Black Troops’, p.23. 
62 Petition of Ryots of Cargeehat, Futtypore & ca., in Jon E. Wilson, “A Thousand Countries to go to’: 
Peasants and Rulers in Late Eighteenth-Century Bengal’, Past & Present, 189 (November 2005) p.85. 
63 Wilson, “A Thousand Countries’, p.81. 
117 
 
already engaged with the Company lamented this situation, the response of groups without 
vested interest in EIC trade is unclear. These fissures meant the support that the expedition 
needed was by no means guaranteed. Apprehensions towards the British, Khandavalas and 
Gorkhalis help explain the course of events upon the expedition’s approach to Janakpur. 
Having sent ahead a message through concern over the grain merchant’s ongoing deviance, 
Kinloch ‘had an answer from the Jannickpore people that they would wait my coming or 
continue a little way from their villages and join me on the road and furnish me what I 
wanted’.64 However, upon his arrival, he ‘found the whole village abandon’d’. Whilst the 
expedition halted in the empty settlement, a fakir came in, and informed Kinloch that 
‘Bulram Dass [Balaram Das] the head man, and the people were at the distance of 2 Coss 
and wou’d come in next day, upon which I dispatched him with a letter full of fair 
promises and sent guards to protect their houses’.65 The local population had assured 
Kinloch they would meet him but then fled into the neighbouring countryside, leaving the 
expedition to find the village deserted. 
The villagers could have been afraid. The EIC in this instance was not embodied by 
a tax collector but a large sepoy army, and their coming threatened plunder and violence. In 
the past, land and property had indeed been seized by the use of military force.66 Kinloch’s 
order for guards to protect the houses demonstrates his concern over the likelihood of 
theft. The villagers may also have avoided Kinloch in order to avoid the expedition’s 
demands. Previously, expeditions had taken care not to establish cantonments within or 
too close to the towns and villages, for fear of a strain on provisions and relations.67 
Kinloch had not done this, and would later seize buildings in Sindhuli for shelter. It is 
furthermore evident from the journal that he intended to ask the villagers for provisions.  
Kinloch’s own assessment of the situation was that the villagers were torn between 
the previously outlined competing loyalties, writing ‘intelligence by the Hirarcahs this Day 
that most of the villages between us and the mountains were deserted, particularly 
Jannickpore at which I had been inform’d we shou’d find plenty of Grain the reason given 
for this was that the People were much at a loss whether to join us or the enemy’.68 The 
villagers fled in order to buy time, collectively stalling their encounter with the expedition 
whilst they decided upon a course of action. Villages often followed the loose leadership of 
a headman, but were at liberty to break from that, and perhaps the time they had bought 
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was spent discussing how best to approach the expedition’s presence. Eventually the 
villagers of Janakpur made a choice. On 15th September, Kinloch wrote that he had ‘got 
several of the head village people to come in. Promis’d them protection and gave them 
beetle [betel] and they on their part promis’d to supply me with what they could afford, but 
that the poverty of their country hindered them from giving much, as they were often rifled 
by their restless neighbours the mountaineers. They seemed timorous harmless people 
mostly facquiers’.69 They gave Kinloch plenty of encouragement to move on, emphasising 
the Gorkhali menace and presenting themselves as unthreatening, yet they offered the 
expedition very little help. It was a course of action that removed the army from its 
doorstep and potentially countered Gorkhali raids with minimal cost, obligation and 
contact on their part.  
Faced with dwindling food supplies and valuable time lost, Kinloch split his forces 
at Janakpur. It is at this point that the agency of a critical component of the expedition 
becomes relevant – that of the people in the baggage train. In particular, the role of the 
expedition’s porters becomes important, since they may have expected to be relieved of 
their duties at this stage, only to find that the Nepalese porters had not met them at 
Darbhanga. The presence of families, holy men and bazaar merchants would have had a 
positive effect on morale, yet they also brought difficulties and troubles. For these reasons 
Kinloch certainly endeavoured to keep them under military discipline. This was made clear 
to the grain merchant earlier on in the expedition and reiterated to the camp followers at 
Janakpur, where Kinloch ‘gave out the strictest orders against the Sepoy’s servants or 
women following them, [into the Tarai] that any who did wou’d be made severe examples 
of, and promised permission for their coming on as soon as the fort of Sidely [Sindhuli] 
shou’d be reduced’.70 Kinloch knew the sepoys would not want to be separated, yet he also 
felt compelled to threaten with discipline since military control over camp followers could 
be tenuous. They certainly had the opportunity to act independently, having already 
separated from the expedition in taking different routes across the flood waters.71 Whilst 
many would have little choice but to follow their employers or family members in the 
ranks, others would have had the option to return if the journey seemed troubled – the 
bazaar keepers in particular could have evaluated the risk versus potential profit. 
Nor did this civilian column simply follow in the footsteps of the military one. 
Instead, the military components were hindered, and had to make accommodations for the 
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civilian ones. Kinloch was obliged to split his forces send companies of builders ahead to 
repair the roads so that they could support the baggage livestock and carts. The presence of 
the baggage train also had the simple yet crucial effect of slowing the expedition down. On 
multiple occasions the mended roads were often then worsened by rainfall, causing delay.72 
Kinloch often found the need to pause whilst others caught up or rested. Such were their 
troubles between Darbhanga and Janakpur, with ‘many of the people knock’d up, with sour 
legs, cuts and pains from the badness of the road,’ that Kinloch was forced to halt 
altogether one day, ‘the artillery and buzzar bullocks being much fatigued as well as the 
people made me apprehensive we could not reach Jannickpore the next day, so determin’d 
to make an easy march’.73  
 By the time the expedition arrived at Janakpur it was clear that the civilian 
elements were slowing the march and consuming too much of the food supplies. The 
benefits on sepoy morale and comfort were not worth these troubles. They could 
themselves become unruly, given that Kinloch had at times prohibited them from accessing 
the grain supplies. He resolved to ‘set the bildars to work in order to repair the fort for a 
place to leave the baggage and followers in, as they would greatly add to the quantity of 
provision’.74 He left them behind, splitting his military forces furthermore, leaving two 
companies of soldiers behind under Mr Kyd. This was partly for the defence of the 
baggage train, and also a protective measure on behalf of the Janakpur residents, so 
Kinloch could ‘protect the villages from the oppression of our followers’.75 Days had 
already been lost, food had been consumed. Perhaps most critically, Kinloch split from his 
artillery – the cannon and horse had proven cumbersome over the floodwaters and sodden 
roads, and were slowing the sepoys’ progress. Kinloch ordered that they continue at their 
own pace, whilst the expedition pressed on. The significance of this separation would only 
transpire once Kinloch observed the scale of Gorkhali defences. Not only was the artillery 
crucial as a display of force and intimidation in South Asian warfare, it could more 
specifically have dislodged the mountain pass redoubts that the expedition was soon to 
encounter.76 
At this stage Kinloch wrote in his journal: ‘In such a situation what was I now to 
do? I saw a prodigious chain of mountains before me, the highest of which I was told I had 
to go over, to wait here for grain was giving the enemy an opportunity (if not done already) 
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to throw up works on mountains which seem’d by their height and nature to be the 
strongest of barriers’.77 He turned to his guide Ram Das for advice, asking how it was 
possible to proceed without a sufficient quantity of grain. The guide told Kinloch of ‘the 
many bad consequences’ of any delay, and assured him ‘that there was the greatest 
possibility of my [Kinloch] finding a large quantity of grain at Sidely [Sindhuli] where there 
were many people and many villages’.78 On this advice, Kinloch departed Janakpur into the 
jungles of the Tarai. He had left behind him a severe warning for the grain merchant, the 
bazaar, families and servants of his sepoys and a sizeable detachment of soldiers and 
artillery. He had secured neither logistical support to cross the country nor a sufficient food 
supply, owing on no small account to the decisions made by marginalized agents, and was 
acting upon intelligence provided by individuals who privately wished the expedition to 
proceed no matter what the challenge. The expedition had not made a good start.  
 
IV:4 Into the Hills: Encountering New Landscapes and Localities 
 
Upon leaving Janakpur on the 17th September, the expedition first made its way through 
the Tarai - a thick band of malarial jungle stretching far along the feet of the Himalayas - 
then trudged into steep valleys and peaks wooded with thick bamboo, oak and 
rhododendron forests. It was within this landscape that they floundered, a combination of 
natural forces and the actions of previously neglected historical agents. 
Kinloch’s march began through what he described as ‘a wild uninhabited jungle, 
and no trace to be seen of any living creature, except wild elephants, tiger and bears which 
are here in vast numbers’.79 It was here on the 18th of September that disaster struck. The 
expedition ‘enter’d the dry bed of a river, in which our road continued for near 2 Coss, and 
was oblig’d to halt in it there being no encamping in the jungle’. Kinloch observed that this 
was unsafe, noting ‘these beds of rivers are fill’d occasionally by falls from the 
neighbouring mountains; I was in some apprehension (as it had been very cloudy all day) of 
its coming down in the night, which must be with great velocity, there being trees torn up 
by the roots lying in the bed of it at least 100 feet from top to root’. Kinloch’s unease 
worsened through the night, as ‘it thunder’d and lighten’d with great violence and look’d 
black all round’. He turned to his guide Ram Das, fearing that the waters could spoil the 
supplies and ammunition magazine. He ‘sent for the Facquier and desired his opinion, 
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whether we shou’d not endeavour to cut down as much of the jungle as wou’d hold the 
buzzar, magazine and arms. He assur’d me there was no danger’.80 As the storm worsened, 
Kinloch wrote that he ‘desired one of the servants to look if it had the appearance of fair 
weather who returned crying. Carry away all the things or all will be lost. He was follow’d 
by a body of water which burst open that part of the tent wall’.81  
His journal continues; ‘I assembl’d the lascars and two artillery men, beseeched 
them to carry it off. They answer’d there was no carrying it to the other side and to remove 
to any other part of the bed of the river was the same for if the water continued to rise as it 
had done, there cou’d be no safety for it. I told them I was sure they cou’d carry it over and 
offer’d to show them the way.’82 Thus began a humiliating exhibition by Kinloch. In 
attempting to cross the flash flooding the current swept his feet out from underneath him. 
It carried him down for twenty-five yards, and ‘luckily brought me against the bank where I 
had hardly strength enough left to lay hold of the grass, I scrambled a little way into the 
jungle and found the people who got over climbing up trees’. The lightning presented 
Kinloch with a bleak vista: ‘the wreck of the camp, tents torn down, men & baggage rolling 
down with the stream and I doubted not it was out of my power to save the ammunition 
and grain. I thought the expedition wou’d end here and until daylight arriv’d I felt the 
utmost tortures.’83 When morning came, he assessed the damage. Fifteen stands of guns 
were washed away, almost all the ammunition ruined, and a day’s worth of grain lost. 
The first point of note from this forlorn picture is that the challenging Himalayan 
landscape, its unpredictability and formidable nature, should not be neglected as a key force 
in determining the events of 1767. Kinloch and the EIC considered this natural historical 
agent a static, unchanging entity. They did not prepare for the unpredictable. It seems 
strange, given how much Kinloch had endured at the hands of floodwaters in the plains, 
and having seen the storm break around him, that he did not follow his instinct and 
prepare the camp for a potential flash flood. Within this personal encounter with the 
Himalayan landscape, Kinloch underestimated its threat. The second point is that, upon 
once more consulting Ram Das and being assured that there was ‘the greatest probability 
of plenty at Sidely [Sindhuli]’ and that ‘no impediment remained to hinder the Choudrey’s 
grain from coming on’, the expedition continued, despite Kinloch’s own admission that 
this was a monumental calamity.84 The flash flood waters subsided and Kinloch continued 
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on. Once more he split his forces; sending an advance guard on to attack Sindhuli in the 
hope that he could secure provisions faster.  
 Kinloch’s difficulties in the Tarai and foothills would have been alleviated if he had 
support from the local people. This was something Kinloch was assured of in a letter 
received en route from Jaya Prakash Malla, who told him that ‘wou’d I make the greatest 
haste to Sidely, which as soon as I reduc’d many of their people wou’d join me’.85 Such 
assurances were premature, given the competing loyalties in this borderlands space. This 
was formerly the Kingdom of Makwanpur, recently defeated and annexed by Gorkha. That 
rendered the Tarai and lower foothills ‘a place of jolting interests between the Gorkhali 
authorities of Nepal and Awadh or what later became British India’.86 For the ruling Sen 
elites of Makwanpur the cities of Nepal Valley offered a refuge after Shah’s annexation, and 
this could have ensured a degree of loyalty to Kinloch on behalf of their subjects.87 They 
were however likewise besieged by the Gorkhalis in those cities, and were not in a position 
to offer Kinloch their support. Some of these elites did not traditionally fall in step with 
Jaya Prakash Malla and many landowners would proclaim themselves subject to different 
rulers at different times, depending on which one recognized their land rights and grants.88 
For that reason, The Sens of Makwanpur’s fall and subsequent asylum in Kathmandu 
presented an opportunity to dissatisfied local elites. Likewise, Shah was sensitive to this, 
and courted their support in return for land. 
By all means the Tarai and lower foothills were sparsely populated, yet in spite of 
Kinloch’s assessment, this was a managed wilderness – the jungles were harvested by 
neighbouring villagers for timber, honey, and other resources. Villages in the lower 
foothills and Tarai had reason to resent the Gorkhalis: these settlements were composed of 
many families, each providing different basic resources, yet there were certain provisions 
that had to be brought in, and the villagers were far from autonomous.89 They were 
therefore reliant upon wider trade networks that the Gorkhalis had blockaded. After the 
conquest of Nepal Valley these networks re-opened, yet the Tarai developed a new 
significance, becoming ‘the most prized acquisition of the Gorkhali rulers, partly because of 
its existing land revenues, royalty from timber exports, levies on pastures, and the export of 
elephants’.90 The resources and wealth of those living there would thus be vulnerable to 
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extraction by the Gorkhalis. Many were forced to migrate to India.91 In addition, the 
jungles expanded, increasingly considered a formidable defensive barrier, with Gorkhali 
attempts to control and reduce local cultivation of the forest. Historians have found 
hostility and resistance towards Gorkhali legislation and taxation in this era: those living in 
the Tarai abandoned tracts and relocated, escaping any new encroachment or levy, leaving 
the land to return to jungle.92  
Nor would the local population have liked that the EIC had brought soldiers to 
their doors, commandeering the houses of Sindhuli village – Kinloch spent the evening on 
the 23rd September in such lodgings, amongst those wounded in the first assault upon the 
neighbouring fort.93 Any local concerns about where the soldiers would be quartered and 
how they would be fed were therefore justified. 
Shah has previously been credited with making direct contact with the elites within 
this region. Ludwig Stiller once argued that, supposedly learning from his victory over the 
Mughals in 1763, Shah believed his ability to defend against invasion ‘increased in direct 
proportion to his ability to keep the British ignorant of the easier routes through the hills. 
From the very first stages of his unification effort he adopted the policy of closing off trails 
into the hills and settling trusted families in key points along those that were open’.94 The 
landowners at Sindhuli could consequently have been supported by Gorkha, that village 
and fort being such a key point. Evidence suggests the local elite did support Shah. 
According to Mohan Prasad Khanal, ‘a certain Ramchandra Parsai, a landowner of some 
repute from Mugitar near Sindhuli, provided strategic support and logistics to the 
Gorkhalis.’95 Kinloch originally planned to travel through Mugitar but was forced a 
different direction by Gorkhali fortifications. Ramchandra Parsai’s assistance therefore 
prevented EIC occupation and provisioning from his land. Kinloch himself reported that 
another ruler in the foothills, Chumpan Singh Thapa, had sent word to Shah, alerting him 
of the EIC expedition. Kinloch believed Shah upon receiving this ‘wou’d certainly send a 
body of his best Seapoys to dispute the place with me’.96  
The above two examples were both prominent landowners, (presumably literate if 
they were able to transcribe messages to Shah.) For the local subaltern population there is 
comparatively scant information available to suggest they either supported or opposed the 
British or Gorkhali. However, the journal does provide detail on one particular encounter 
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at this point that illuminates the competing loyalties individuals faced and the importance 
of the decisions they made. An advanced party under Lieutenant Hogan caught a mahajan, a 
merchant en route to Nepal Valley, and his servant. Kinloch attempted to capitalize on this 
local intelligence by sending on the servant and two harkaras with a message for Jaya 
Prakash Malla requesting reinforcements. He ‘disguis’d the Harcarahs like two facquiers, 
put the letter in a small bamboo which one of them us’d as a walking stick, and the plan of 
their operations being settl’d when they came into the country, away they went’. Later that 
evening they returned, with the servant claiming they were too sick to continue, a claim 
Kinloch treated with suspicion.97 The servant did not wish to perform this service – he had 
been mistreated having been caught and held by Hogan’s sepoys, moreover the bamboo 
trick was not innovative and if caught by the Gorkhalis, he would have been hanged. 
Rather than forcing the servant, Kinloch then ‘sent the Mahajan himself first on reassuring 
him he should be well rewarded’. He not only acquiesced, but would continue to provide 
Kinloch logistical support, later offering advice on crossing a river.98 Within this encounter 
we see two previously marginalized agents, the servant and the Mahajan, deciding whether 
to assist the expedition, based on an evaluation of reward offered versus Gorkhali threat 
posed. They both made different decisions based on what was a stake for them: whilst the 
Mahajan stood to gain from Himalayan and EIC networks, the servant’s incarceration at the 
hands of the sepoys was more severe, the risk greater, for less benefits. 
 
IV:5 Sindhuli Gadhi and the Role of Gorkhali Martial Strength 
 
The agency of the Gorkhali soldiers themselves finally made a play at Sindhuli Gadhi. 
Kinloch had a low opinion of the soldiers opposing him. He wrote of the ‘excessive high, 
rugged, terrible mountains, stony rough valleys, clear purling streams and jungles 
everywhere, inhabited by savages’. He described the Gorkhali weapon, the curved Kukri 
blade, as ‘something on the form of a bill hook with which they chop off hands and cut off 
noses, ears and lips, a work they seem dexterous in’.99 He considered the Gorkhalis 
‘extremely cowardly and timourous,’ suggesting they would ‘never venture to make an 
attack unless in such a situation that they are certain they cannot be annoy’d by you’. On 
explaining their service to Shah, Kinloch considered it pressed, and financially motivated: 
‘the Goorkha Raja having possession of all the forts on their country keeps them under as 
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much as possible, but I do not believe they fight for any regard or attachment to his causes, 
but from the hopes of a little plunder.’100 This was a commonly held view of South Asian 
soldiering, as observed by Channa Wickremesekera. Particularly resonant given that 
Kinloch had yet to encounter any Gorkhali soldiers was the perception that they avoided 
conflict: ‘the British perceived timidity and cowardice in the Indian soldier’s reluctance to 
close with the British enemy.’101 A more accurate depiction of the Gorkhali army’s 
composition, the Gorkhali soldier’s character, and their role within 1767 can be gleaned 
from a reading of Kinloch’s journal alongside Nepalese sources. That set of pre-existing 
values, typical of the colonialist’s ‘cruel oriental’ typecast, is challenged. 
The Gorkhalis were better armed and more orderly than expected. There is 
evidence from Shah’s correspondence to his generals that he redirected some of his forces 
besieging Patan to confront the British.102 These reinforcements are noted by Kinloch’s 
subordinate Hardy, who informed him of ‘a body of troops clouth’d in a kind of blue 
uniform and arm’d with matchlocks had arrived from Napaul, which I take to be the body 
of chosen troops intended for the defence of Sidely’.103 Such a unit of soldiers, regimented 
in their uniform and in their firearms, indicates an adaptability on behalf of the Gorkhali 
military: since precision-rank firing was finding success across South Asia, Shah could have 
developed this unit for that purpose. He may even have had assistance: as has been noted 
by Wickremesekera, as early as 1503 there were Milanese gunfounders in the employ of a 
ruler in Calicut as artillerymen, by the mid-seventeenth century the Mughal artillery was 
handled by a collection of European deserters, and by the late eighteenth century this had 
extended to infantry units.104 However, this portrait of proficiency and European training 
was not representative of the whole Gorkhali Army, as numbers swelled and reduced 
throughout the Gorkha conquests – Shah’s army required a certain number to maintain the 
siege of the Nepal Valley cities, which Ludwig Stiller deduced was nether less than 1200 
soldiers. This was greatly augmented in times of stress by conscripted recruits; peasants 
duly rewarded after their service.105 These soldiers having been drawn from across Gorkhali 
territory from the rural population, potentially against their wishes and without extensive 
military training, did not have the conditioned martial aptitude that nationalist historians 
have promulgated.  
                                               
100 Ibid., 25th September 1767, Book 2, Folio 6b. 
101 Wickremesekera, ‘The Best Black Troops’, p.84. 
102 Acarya quoted in Raj, Expedition, p.26. 
103 B.L. Add MS 16633 Journal of Captain George Kinloch. 
104 Wickremesekera, ‘The Best Black Troops’, p.67. 
105 Known as the Jhara system. Stiller, ‘The Role of Fear’, p.58. 
126 
 
What the Gorkhalis did benefit from in 1767 was a significant advantage in the way 
they were trained, in relation to the geographical space. South Asian soldiers in the late 
Mughal period have been attributed an individualistic approach to combat by historians, 
preparing primarily for hand-to-hand fighting.106 The EIC European style armies on the 
other hand practiced precision rank-firing. Whilst South Asian rulers including Shah had 
begun such training, that style was mostly advantageous in an open field. In 1767 however, 
the various redoubts built across serpentine roads by the Gorkhalis necessitated close 
combat. The thick jungle provided cover through which to retreat, and space restricted 
rank-firing. Importantly as previously highlighted, Kinloch had left behind his artillery. 
Kinloch did not encounter a fearful, uncommitted enemy. Instead, they fought 
doggedly. Upon seizing Sindhuli for instance he reported that the defenders ‘behav’d like 
brave and resolute men, as everybody agreed they cou’d not be above eighty [in 
number]’.107 This could be accounted for by considering their conscripted service more of 
an incentive to fight bravely, rather than a deterrent: they would have been recruited locally, 
from Sindhuli, and would thus have considered the EIC expedition invasive. Furthermore, 
their alternative, rural labour background could have helped them: they would not have had 
the appearance of soldiers, and would have made excellent spies. Shah’s letters reveal that 
he intended to use them that way, instructing them to ‘introduce ten to fifteen spies among 
the English troops’.108 This explains why the Gorkhalis in 1767 were able to estimate 
Kinloch’s fighting strength, which they believed as the expedition marched from Sindhuli 
to Hariharpur was at 700, whilst Kinloch had no idea what numbers he faced.109 Likewise, 
the dual use of the Kukri blade as both a weapon and a domestic tool could easily have led 
to the mistaking of farmers for soldiers in the eyes of the British, multiplying the threat and 
creating confusion.  
There are further reports within Nepalese sources that suggest the Gorkhalis used 
innovative tactics and local knowledge. Khanal described how the Gorkhalis advanced 
before the British, stirring wasp and hornet nests with arrows and sticks.110 There are 
variations on the wasp narrative that undermine its creditability, with Acharya writing that 
the wasps attacked the British without the Gorkhalis intervening. The description could 
alternatively be metaphorical – implying those local to the valleys troubled Kinloch greatly 
as he marched, regardless of whether they were ‘stirred’ by the Gorkhalis. It was critical 
then for the events of 1767 that the Gorkhali recruits fought so resiliently despite being 
                                               
106 Wickremesekera, ‘The Best Black Troops’, p.46. 
107 B.L. Mss Eur F128/140 Journal, 23rd September 1767, Book 2, Folio 2a. 
108 Raj, Expedition, p.22. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., p.29. 
127 
 
pressed into service. What is also certain however, is that the Gorkhalis did not meet 
Kinloch’s column in the open field at Sindhuli, and furthermore that although eventually 
overcoming the EIC sepoys, Kinloch was successful in seizing the fort. This contradicts 
the nationalist histories that have wildly exaggerated Gorkhali martial prowess in 1767, 
most obviously arguing that they won a pitched battle at Sindhuli that shattered Kinloch’s 
expedition. 
 
IV:6 Messengers and Guides: The Breakdown of Communications 
 
Beyond Sindhuli, the expedition struggled. It is at this point that some of the marginalized 
agents from within the expedition’s ranks can be revisited, beginning with the guides Ram 
Das and Muktananda. In Patna they had engineered a role for themselves, but as the 
journey continued their relationship with Kinloch deteriorated. On occasion, the guides 
provided critical, useful information. For instance, many of the sepoys would have fallen 
unwell were it not for Ram Das advising that they boil the river water and mix it with root, 
as a local antidote against its bad effects.111 However, even in the earlier stages, the advice 
they provided often proved incorrect or outdated. This was due to their confidence that the 
expedition would succeed: a belief in the proficiency of the EIC military regardless of the 
information provided. By October 1767 they had seen the red-coated sepoys struggle, and 
realized that they had over-estimated EIC competency. Likewise, Kinloch was increasingly 
left frustrated by the lack of local knowledge his guides held, and considered himself 
deceived. He arrived at this frustration painstakingly late – for instance even after the 
disastrous flooding of the 18th September, wherein the expedition was ravaged despite the 
guides reassurances that they were not at risk, he persisted with their advice, wherein he 
‘sent for the Facquier again to ask him what chance I had for supply on the road’.112  
These disappointments came to a head once Kinloch marched out from Sindhuli, 
onto the next mountain pass. Unsure how to proceed, he approached Ram Das and 
recorded the consultation in his journal: 
He told me it was very steep and very difficult until we got to Carcoat [Khurkot], 
the next village we were to come to, but that the enemy had no works in any part 
of the way nor did he believe they wou’d give any molestation except at one pass, 
which from the nature they cou’d very soon render impregnable. I ask’d him 
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whether he was certain they had no works there now, at which he answer’d he was, 
and a small part sent on wou’d be sufficient to process it.113  
Kinloch split his forces, sending Ensign Hardy onwards. He assumed the account of Ram 
Das was accurate. The next morning however, ‘a harcarah return’d from the officer & 
party, informing me that they had been repuls’d at the pass by the enemy, who had rais’d 
every strong works there, with great loss. I questioned the facquier, who was present, how 
his intelligence came to be so bad. The only answer he made was that the enemy had none 
there when he pass’d, that he knew the nature of the place, that it was easy to cut a road 
around and dispossess them.’114 Ram Das had not been in Nepal since the start of the year 
when the pass was perhaps unguarded– he did however know the terrain, which was 
unchanged, and he confidently asserted that the EIC sepoys would be able to cut around it.  
This brought about the first confrontation between Kinloch and the guides, the 
former writing: ‘as it was easy to see that the defence of the enemy had been a work of time 
I sent for the facquier and severely reprimanded him for his false intelligence, telling him 
‘by such blunders he wou’d effectively ruin the cause of his master, and put a stop to our 
troops being able to serve him’. Kinloch recorded his response as follows: ‘Had you sir, 
march’d when you first come to Patna or soon after your arrival there, which I often trust 
of you to, you wou’d not have met with any such obstructions. How then sir, shou’d you 
blame me, when you continu’d at Patna, everybody knew you were going to Napaul and 
your enemy had many correspondents there; Nay the English themselves wrote the 
Goorkha Raja, they were coming to fight him.’ Ram Das believed he provided information 
in good faith, and that he was let down by the lethargy with which the Company reacted 
and the strength of Gorkhali espionage. He furthermore lamented ‘After first seeing me 
you never told me of the certain time you wou’d proceed, until a very short time before 
you did, and thus while kept in a state of ignorance’. Kinloch considered himself sabotaged, 
Ram Das considered himself left in the dark, blamed for the Company’s delays. The two 
reached an impasse on the subject, Kinloch asserting that ‘it was needless to reflect on what 
was past but to endeavour to make the best of our present situations’.115  
This was a critical juncture: Kinloch would not punish the guide, but had to decide 
whether to continue with their service. Ram Das had done enough to convince him, since 
he one more asked for help: Kinloch ‘desir’d to know if there was another road to 
Nepaul…he told me I cou’d go by the Harriatpore Road over Mahabid, which tho a little 
more difficult than this I coud arrive by it at Napaul in six days’. He followed this advice, 
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and in the middle of the night formed a physical volte-face, abandoning the higher road to 
Nepal and instead attempted a dash westward, to Hariharpur Gadhi in present day Sindhuli 
district, Janakpur zone. From there they would cross the ‘Mahabhul pass’ then follow the 
Bagmati river into the valley. His guides continued to direct the expedition’s route. 
Kinloch’s reliance on them, and the problems that incurred, would continue.116  
Local knowledge was critical on the march to Hariharpur, ‘there being but one man 
who knew the road and he having gone on with Mr Hogan, who promis’d to return a man 
every night at the place he halted’.117 Frequently, none arrived, delayed by rains. It was 
within this space that fracturing relationships within the expedition played a part: between 
the guides and the other officers. By this stage tensions between Kinloch’s staff would have 
been fraught: whilst Kinloch’s brother Charles may have been more confidant, the junior 
subordinate officers were not in a position to undermine or challenge Kinloch – the 
commander having already demonstrated his disciplinary approach. Some officers did not 
have the patience for Ram Das and Muktananda that Kinloch had, and were perhaps 
aggrieved by the trust that they commanded from their superior. EIC officials often 
harboured distrust towards their South Asian guides and intermediaries, who inevitably 
belonged to or had experience of the very group that the EIC sought to dominate, either 
militarily or through commercial means. Their obliviousness to the language being spoken 
fostered a suspicion of the faithfulness of the translation being offered, the circles they 
moved in beyond the eyes of their European employers. C.A. Bayly called this the basic 
fear of the colonial official, writing, ‘he feared their secret letters, their drumming and ‘bush 
telepathy’ and the nightly passage of seditious agents masquerading as priests and holy 
men’.118 Therefore, Kinloch’s guides may have been regarded with suspicion and hostility 
within the camp. For example, at one point Ram Das wrote to Kinloch complaining that 
one of his officers ‘would not listen to anything he had told him’.119 
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Kinloch occupied the former residency of the Raja of Makwanpur at Hariharpur on 
2nd October.120 Here he was surprised to find the advanced party led by Hogan, who he had 
sent ahead to occupy the Mahabhul pass. Kinloch ‘immediately enquir’d the cause of his 
unexpected meeting, and he inform’d me that the Facquier had deciev’d him in all his 
intelligence, and had at the distance of five coss from this on his way to Mahabhul, brought 
him to the side of a rapid river which cou’d neither be forded or swam’.121 The next day 
Kinloch received a letter from Ram Das, explaining he had gone on to Nepal and that he 
would return in a few days. He also ‘complain’d much of Lieut. Hoggan’s behaviour to 
him’.122 Having fallen out with Hogan, the guide had abandoned the advanced party.  
Ram Das returned on 6th of October. He would not at first see Kinloch, being ‘so 
much tir’d and scratch’d by the jungle that he could not stir’.123 Instead he was examined 
the next morning after some rest and composure. He assured Kinloch he had been to 
Kathmandu, found Jaya Prakash Malla in great spirits upon hearing of the taking of 
Sindhuli, and then revisited how he ‘had in a manner quarrelled with Mr. Hoggan’. Kinloch 
drew a line under this, considering that ‘the one had misunderstood the other and now 
there was no remedy for it’. He did however ask Ram Das why he had ‘brought no letter by 
himself’, and why ‘the Rajah, agreeable to his promise, had neither wrote me at Sidely or 
sent any body to met me’. In response Ram Das said that the had sent via a subordinate ‘a 
letter from the Rajah that contained every circumstance I could wish to know’. He pointed 
out that ‘there were so many chokies of the Ghoorke’s people in the way that no man 
cou’d pass through or less than a dozen arm’d, and that he himself had pass’d throu an 
unfrequented jungle’. He assured Kinloch that the Raja of Kathmandu would send his sons 
to meet them, that there was a pass unguarded, but that Jaya Prakash could not weaken his 
defences to send soldiers because no amount from the city could withstand the encircled 
Gorkha forces. At the time Kinloch speculated that ‘all this except his not bringing a letter 
or anybody with him seem’d possible enough’.124  
Ram Das was incorrect. The passes were heavily defended and no support from 
Kathmandu would materialize. Other intelligence on the road ahead, its feasibility and the 
villages en route, likewise proved false. Since this guide was often given liberty to leave 
camp, how heavily invested was he in the expedition’s fortunes? On seeing the state of 
affairs amongst Kinloch’s ranks, would he have risked his life? The question arises whether 
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the guide did break through the Gorkhali pickets to arrive in Kathmandu, or whether he 
had instead considered his options while in the forest, wondering whether he would be 
punished for his clash with Hogan. The latter is entirely plausible given the uncertainties 
and the falsities within his account.  
Ram Das departed once more to observe whether the pass was open. He asked for 
an escort of twelve sepoys, which Kinloch acquiesced to upon condition that they were 
kept from going anywhere they could be attacked.125 Four days later on the 15th October the 
accompanying havildar and seven sepoys returned: 
They gave an account that they had fallen in with a body of the enemy upon 
Mahabhul who occupied it with great numbers, and were at work throwing up 
redoubts, that the Facquier had some conversations with them, until they began to 
fire upon him for he having observ’d the place where they were in first had halted 
the sepoys where they coud not be seen by the enemy. They now perceiv’d the 
enemy crowding on all sides upon the jungle, when he return’d and told them to 
make the best of their way, or they would be surrounded and cut off. They told him 
they could not answer to me for leaving him behind, but he desir’d them not to 
mind him for he wou’d care of himself. Upon which that party set out together. He 
with two or three sepoys ran into the thick jungle, and the harcarah with the letter 
took another road, that upon their returning the way they came found a large body 
had got round them, and now saw they had no other chance but fight their way tho’ 
them, which they did, and return’d to us, from all which circumstance I fear the 
facquier and the others are all cut off.126  
This was the last Kinloch heard of Ram Das. The events recounted raise a number of 
questions and possibilities. Ram Das had either lied about his visit to Nepal and was thus 
ignorant of these defences, or he knowingly and deliberately brought the expedition into 
conflict. What conversation passed between him and the Gorkhalis? He may have hoped 
for some intelligence from them that would shed light on an alternative route, or perhaps 
he hoped to inform them of Kinloch’s progress, and so swap sides. This would explain 
how the Gorkhalis knew to encircle the hidden sepoys. Either way, the encounter did not 
go to plan. Why then, did he reject the sepoy guard that he had insisted upon? Amongst 
the multitude of possible explanations, there are two opposing ones: he may well have 
thought separating ensured they all escaped, and could have then been captured or killed, a 
martyr to Kinloch’s cause. Or he could have seen the opportunity to escape from Kinloch’s 
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service, abandon the expedition whilst the Gorkhalis pursued the cornered EIC sepoys, cut 
his losses and find his own way out of the foothills.  
In ascertaining which explanation is most likely, it is worth considering a letter 
from Shah to his commander in the region, Ramkrishna Kuvar, stating that he had 
intelligence that ‘one of the men of the English, who had come up from Hariharpur, was at 
Kathmandu with a report that since the Jats were moving against the British from the west, 
no action was possible’.127 This implies that an individual from Kinloch’s entourage had 
indeed reached Kathmandu, then delivered an entirely different message to that which 
Kinloch instructed. Perhaps this was the fate of Ram Das, who in his time at Patna and en 
route had observed much about British circumstances and opted to relate this alternative 
account of the British position to Jaya Prakash Malla. This account likely ended the 
possibility that Malla would reduce his garrison in order to meet with Kinloch and conduct 
him into the valley, further decreasing the expedition’s chances of success. 
Kinloch’s journal also registers poor messenger service on behalf of the harkaras. 
For instance, the expedition’s progress from the Tarai to Sindhuli was characterized by 
false harkara reports and misleading information. So on the 21st September ‘a report spread 
that 200 of the enemy were on a hill before us, but it prov’d without foundation’.128 A few 
days later, another harkara scout ‘very luckily made a mistake in his intelligence by telling us 
the fort of Sidely was taken’ by the advanced guard Kinloch had sent on.129 Harkaras also 
failed to deliver the merchant’s servant to Kathmandu, and failed to inform Kinloch of 
Hogan’s progress to Hariharpur. Given the potential for duplicity, it could be asked 
whether their reports of Gorkhalis ahead on the approach to Sindhuli were a product of 
ignorance, or an attempt to stall and confuse the British? It could be asked whether the 
harkaras accompanying the merchant’s servant returned through fear, or a mission to 
ensure communication did not reach Kathmandu? It could be asked whether the harkaras 
sent by Hogan to Kinloch on the approach to Hariharpur were delayed by rain, or taking 
the opportunity to abscond? All of these remain possibilities.  
 
IV:7 The Sepoys: Fight or Flight? 
 
On 4th October Kinloch wrote, ‘my situation began now to be very alarming, the provision 
was out, all the rivers overflow’d so that there was no stirring from where we were. The 
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rain continues with great violence and want already begins to be echo’d from every corner.’ 
He began to record the duration of his hardships, that day being the ‘third day of the rain, 
first of the famine’.130 At this late stage in the expedition Kinloch became aware of the 
worsening mood amongst the sepoys: ‘the people extremely clamorous and wherever I 
stir’d nothing met me but complaints.’131  
 Desertion had troubled the expedition from a much earlier stage. Kinloch reported 
on the 9th of September, that ‘the past night, fourteen men deserted’, which he attributed to 
violent rains and sickness.132 Insubordination had also scuppered the initial assault at 
Sindhuli. By 22nd September the advanced guard of sepoys, once more led by Hogan, 
having taken the first redoubt of that fort, failed to occupy the larger fort further along the 
ridge, ‘owing chiefly to their, and their black officer’s bad behaviour who set them every ill 
example.’133 The soldiers had refused to wear boots approaching the fort, rendering them 
vulnerable to sharp rocks and Gorkhali traps, making great noise in the process. To 
counter this, Kinloch adopted harsh measures, ordering ‘that any man who made a noise or 
fir’d his piece wou’d be immediately put to death and likewise to put on their shoes before 
they went to storm, to prevent the spikes getting into their feet’.134 There were those 
Kinloch could trust, and those he could not. For example, the commander asked Ensign 
Hardy to investigate the feasibility of building a road around the Gorkhali defences, who he 
considered ‘a man I cou’d depend upon for such an undertaking,’ despite it being ‘not this 
gentleman’s turn of duty’.135 
Disciplinary issues escalated after the capture of Sindhuli, wherein ‘the gentlemen 
complain’d much of the behaviour of the Black Officers, and that the Seapoys appear’d 
extremely fearfull ever since the second repulse’.136 The difficulty with which the expedition 
overcame that fort, owing in part to the aforementioned resilience of the Gorkhalis and the 
lack of cannon, surprised the sepoys, challenging the assumption that their campaign would 
be an easy one. This discontent was then augmented by the imposition of reduced rations 
on the 16th September. Kinloch wrote, ‘not the least appearance of grain from the 
Choudrey, the people, harrass’d fatigu’d and hungry, began now to be extremely 
troublesome, and nothing but want, want, want was to be heard over the camp.’137  
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Kinloch tried a number of measures to alleviate sepoy concerns. He tried to raise 
morale by disseminating positive information, for example upon ‘hearing [news of]even a 
small quantity of grain… which I immediately ordered be publish’d’. He also tried deceit, 
upon hearing the rivers were ‘so swell’d that the Bullocks could not pass,’ he ‘order’d this 
not to be spoke of’.138 This attempt to control knowledge did not work – he 
underestimated the sepoy’s powers of observation: soaked to the skin and aching with 
hunger, able entirely capable of observing fast flowing rivers and the non-arrival of grain. 
These measures failing, he moved towards harsher disciplinary measures as a deterrent. His 
hand was forced on 28th September, in the expedition’s preparations to march on 
Hariharpur: ‘Ensign Osborn accus’d a subedar of the Pergunnah Sepoys [those from Patna] 
of Cowerdice which indeed was most flagrent and infamous. I had not a warrant for 
holding General Court Martial, but there having been many complaints of this nature it was 
not a time to stand on punctilio.’ As the trial finished, ‘another subedar of the same 
corps…told me he wou’d not stay at the fort, that if I would not relieve him he desir’d his 
discharge, and if he went away I might be assur’d his whole company woud follow him.’ 
The second subedar did not want to be part of the vanguard left at Sindhuli, perhaps in fear 
of the surrounding Gorkhalis. Kinloch ordered the same court martial try him and 
promptly, ‘both were sentenc’d to be broke and disgrac’d which was done in presence of 
the whole detachment.’139  
This did not bring an end to insubordination, yet Kinloch was happy with its 
outcome, returning to this tactic at the next instance on 7th October, wherein: ‘the Sepoys 
of the second brigade assembl’d in a tumultuous manner and every man spoke while each 
seem’d to strive who should be loudest…As I had some reason to think from the 
beginning that the clamour of the sepoys did not altogether proceed from the famine, I set 
on foot an enquiry into the cause of their behaviour, and ensign Woodman discovered it 
had been existed by Moon Sing a Zemadar of the 1st Battalion.’140 The Jemadar was subject 
to a court martial, ‘first being reduced to a sepoy, then tomtom’d out with a halter round 
his neck, and given five hundred lashes,’ which Kinloch observed was ‘in my own opinion 
both too mild’.141 That number of lashes would effectively kill a man. This was a severe 
sentence and its passing, alongside Kinloch’s belief that it was too mild, lays bare the 
staunch disciplinary approach he took forward. His next address warned the sepoys ‘they 
might be assur’d I woud upon no accounts suffer any insolent or mutinous behaviour 
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among them, and was fully determin’d to put the first man to death with my own hands 
who was guilty of either’. To which they ‘listen’d to what I said and were dismiss’d without 
the least murmuring’.142 From this point on Kinloch does not record any complaints. 
However, his ultimatum did not drive away the rains, nor hunger, nor the Gorkhali threat.  
Kinloch’s assertion of discipline in itself was not out of the ordinary, but aspects of 
it were. Firstly, his use of a court martial without proper authority abused a legislative 
loophole in 1767: frustrated by mutinous sepoys and over-zealous officers alike, the EIC 
had established a formal code of discipline in 1766. However, it would not be implemented 
in Bengal until 1768.143 That Kinloch would utilize this delay demonstrates the extent of his 
concern over discipline. Similarly, the reduction of rank and pay for a South Asian officer 
was not unusual. However, the subedars, and to a lesser extent the more subordinate ranks 
of the jemadars, havildars, and naiks, occupied a critical position of trust, as go-betweens for 
the European commanders and sepoys.144 The decisions of the subedars and jemadars in 1767 
to align with the sepoys, and of Kinloch to so ruthlessly reduce their rank and punish them, 
reflect a significant breakdown of these important intermediary relationships. 
From that point on, all the cards were revealed to the sepoy. Initially, notions of 
pay, prize and adventure lifted their spirits. This had not transpired, and instead they had 
suffered famine, fever and defeat, culminating in a series of forlorn attempts to cross a 
swollen river, being in an unknown environment with an increasingly disciplinarian 
commander. As these events developed and things turned sour, the choice to mutiny or 
desert seemed more and more inviting. Their likelihood of escape may have been slim, but 
then, their prospects were bleak regardless, and at least the chances of EIC capture and 
punishment likewise seemed far-fetched. They had a decision to make, and many chose to 
flee.  
This had a negative influence on the non-belligerent component still remaining – 
the coolies and builders who were no longer protected. Contemporary accounts certainly 
blamed the mutineers who had witnessed the breaking of the Jemadar. The mutinous sepoys 
were put back in order by Kinloch. Yet they then ‘deterred the camp followers from 
proceeding with the army’.145 If not verbally persuaded by the sepoys to run, many of the 
non-belligerents chose to regardless, given the inability of the sepoys to protect them. 
Kinloch wrote: ‘those who had been engaged to supply the troops were so intimidated that 
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not a man would move unless escorted by a sufficient force, and the coolies employed in 
carrying the grain would frequently in the night make off, leaving their burdens where no 
others would be possessed to take them up.’146  
The scale of desertion is unclear within Kinloch’s journal. For instance, he recorded 
on the 13th October that ‘last night the bildars, lascars, great many of the coolies and thirty 
sepoys deserted’.147 At this point Kinloch was bed bound through fever, and his diary 
scribbles are brief, so it is left unanswered whether or not the entirety of the builder and 
lascar cohorts left, which would be disastrous. Nevertheless, even more left intermittently 
over the coming nights. On the 14th October Kinloch seemed at loss how to counter this, 
and considered returning to Sindhuli but could not do so, lamenting that ‘supposing I then 
carried them to that place, their situation would be no better than here, and it was 
impossible after the hunger they had undergone to carry them to Jannickpore, without 
losing at least three fourth on the way, and so extremely troublesome were the jungle 
people now become that had a man only fallen few yards behind the rest, he was sure to be 
cut off in a most cruel manner’.148  
 
IV:8 Conclusions 
 
On the 17th October, Kinloch was woken from his fevered sleep by a very strange and 
sudden noise. He wrote in his diary that he ‘soon understood that the sepoys had taken 
their arms forc’d the guard and were going off in a body. It being in the dead of night and 
the matter carried this far with such secrecy, I had no reason to apprehend the worst of 
consequences and never doubted but it was general…’149 Both manuscripts stop abruptly at 
that point. Readers never find out whether it was in fact the sound of the sepoys deserting 
en masse, or another calamity. What is clear though is that a great number had left and that 
Kinloch’s measures had failed to deter them. Kinloch’s need to go beyond standard levels 
of discipline suggests that the EIC once more relied on support it could not guarantee. 
Chatterji estimated an entire four companies absconded, and other reports do not stray far 
from these figures.150 The resolution to mutiny on behalf of the hitherto marginalized rank-
and-file sepoy is absolutely crucial to the outcome of Kinloch’s mission.  
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The significance of the agency of marginalized historical subjects is not that those 
individuals were decidedly anti-colonialist – many were decisions not to take a particular 
side, rather than to support or oppose the expedition through provision of boats, food or 
information. Nor can it be said with much certainty whether they were pre-meditated. 
Instead, they were decisions made in changing circumstances, as events unfolded around 
the historical subjects in question, and the loyalties of villagers, sepoys and guides were 
tried. What is significant is that within the indomitable Himalayan foothills, the decisions 
that the sepoys, the guides, the Gorkhalis and local people made, their action and indeed 
their inaction, had far reaching consequences. Kinloch could observe them but was quite 
helpless in containing them, failing to redirect the venture in its spiral towards disaster.  
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Chapter V – ‘Those Whose Interest Is Against You’: The Aftermath of 1767 and Further 
EIC Expeditions to Nepal Before 1795 
 
Summary 
 
Chapters V and VI adopt two key arguments: firstly, the events of 1767, determined by 
marginalized agency, redirected the EIC’s approach to the Himalayas. Secondly, subsequent 
marginalized agency and influence continued to play a part in future endeavours. Chapter V 
firstly makes those arguments in relation to Nepal itself, evident in the EIC’s explanations 
for 1767 and further plans, and secondly places the aftermath of 1767 in relation to broader 
attitudes and trajectories in Company intervention at the peripheries across South Asia at 
the time. The chapter then continues that project by investigating further encounters 
between the Company and Nepal – the espionage of James Logan, military designs on the 
Himalayas, and the expeditions of George Foxcroft, William Kirkpatrick, and Maulvi 
Abdul Kadir Khan. It is argued that both the 1767 expedition and the ways in which 
marginalized characters influenced that encounter had a profound impact on how the EIC 
approached future endeavours, shifting from an overtly military policy to one of subterfuge 
and diplomacy. A pattern of marginalized, subaltern agency influencing the outcome of 
further encounters is observed. EIC commanders continued to rely heavily on the support 
of their guides; their fortunes greatly directed by the actions and interests of those local, 
intermediary, and oppositional groups that they encountered. Sometimes these draw 
parallels to the actions of those who played a part in 1767, sometimes similar historical 
agents act differently in pursuit of different outcomes.  
 
V:1 Immediate Ramifications of 1767 and Marginalized Agency in Plans for the Return to 
Kathmandu 
 
There are few clues left within the sources that shed light on what happened to Kinloch 
after the journal cut out. Kinloch ceased to write, either through inability or lack of will. 
The most recent historical investigation by Thomas Bell details how the expedition’s 
remnants arrived some days later at Bettiah – from Kinloch’s last reported position at 
Hariharpur they followed the Bagmati river southwards towards EIC territory.1 There are 
no accounts of any pitched battle or conflict, though it is likely that the Gorkhalis 
                                               
1 Bell, ‘What Happened to Captain Kinloch’s 1767 Expedition?’, 7-32. Bell refrains from asserting any further 
details without supporting evidence. 
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continued to harass the column until at least out of the foothills. There are no extant 
returns of the missing, wounded or fighting fit within the Company records, though 
estimates suggest they were severely depleted. If the Nepalese accounts estimating 
Kinloch’s forces at 700 as it marched to Hariharpur are considered accurate, and that the 
200 remaining builders and coolies then deserted, Kinloch would be left with around 500 
personnel. Such an exercise though is futile, given the dearth of sources and inaccuracy 
with which the Gorkhalis evaluated Kinloch’s strength. Kinloch himself survived, as did 
some of his close allies, including his brother Charles Kinloch and potentially Ensign 
Alexander Hardy, whose namesake materializes at Bettiah in 1770 as the recipient of 
further instructions.2 The surgeon James Logan also returned.  
The closest reference contemporary to Kinloch comes from William Kirkpatrick’s 
account of 1811, drawn from 1793 field notes that he wrote whilst on his own expedition 
to Kathmandu. This asserts that Kinloch withdrew to Barra in the Tarai, and ‘remained 
there for some time’. Kirkpatrick added that the water there was ‘particularly 
unwholesome’, reflecting that ‘it is not to be wondered at that Kinloch’s detachment 
suffered so much as it did from sickness’.3 There are further indications unto what 
happened after Kinloch’s journal cut out, as well as commentary on how those events came 
to pass, in a memorandum on the expedition, dated 6th February 1814, on the eve of the 
Anglo-Nepalese War.4 The unknown author believed that Kinloch’s enterprise was 
principally thwarted by the swelling of a river ‘so that it could not be crossed’ between 
Sindhuli and Hariharpur.5 Both Kirkpatrick and the memorandum consequently attributed 
failure to natural forces: poor water, and the river as a barrier, rather than asking why the 
lascars did create a bridge in that instance. It is an inconsistent conclusion since Kinloch 
did eventually cross that river, and reach Hariharpur. The author’s additional commentary 
does hint towards the significance of marginalized agency and actions. The memorandum 
notes that ‘the detachment was ill supplied with provisions, and the country people were 
slow in bringing in the grain,’ though does not speculate why they were so.6 The author 
also wrote that the sepoys ‘from the first had been disinclined to service’.7 These are 
                                               
2 James Alexander to Lieutenant Alexander Hardy, November 1770, B.L. IOR/G/28/2B, Patna: Consultations 
(1770-1771). Hardy appears to have been promoted. Alternatively, this could simply be a namesake, or 
relative. 
3 Colonel William Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, Being the Substance of Observations Made During 
A Mission to That Country, in the Year 1793 (London: W. Bulmer & Co, 1811), p.14. 
4 Memorandum Relative to Capt. Kinloch’s Expedition, pp.543-547. 
5 Ibid., p.544. 
6 Ibid., p.543. 
7 Ibid., p.544. 
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however comments that could be gleaned from a reading of Kinloch’s journal, rather than 
any proximity to the expedition, or those involved.  
In Calcutta and London, the EIC Company administration received the news of 
Kinloch’s failure with disbelief.8 Initially they balanced the gains and losses whilst fighting a 
rear-guard against the Gorkhalis, then considered whether they had a foothold from which 
to attempt a second expedition. Within these further encounters and plans it is notable that 
some lessons were learned, specifically in relation to the roles of marginalized historical 
agents, whilst others were not.  
From Bettiah, Kinloch’s forces rallied. The soldiers now occupied a band of the 
Tarai northeast of Bettiah – present day Barra District and neighbouring Parsa, within 
which the border city of Birganj lies. They remained consolidating their hold there until 
1768. They first captured the Parsa Gadhi, which Kinloch did not consider heavily 
defended. He wrote to Rumbold assessing the gains:  
Barra & Persa are two provinces and Mr Hardy assures me put together are more 
extensive than the Betteyah. It is the finest country I have seen; large plains & the 
soil in appearance so fertile that I am certain with inhabitants and proper 
improvement, might make them yield ten lacks (lakhs) per annum, but above two 
thirds of that I have seen is grass jungle and by the severity of the late government 
and its nearness to the hills; the people seem to be poor, are much harassed & are 
not very plenty considering the apparent richness of the country.9  
Barra and Parsa were occupied ‘for the purpose of reimbursing from its collections the 
expense of the expedition’.10 It was returned to Shah within two years on condition that the 
EIC received an 12,500 rupees in elephants annually as tribute. Whilst the intervention 
brought no long-term or significant territorial changes for the Company, the events of 1767 
damaged Kinloch’s pride and health. This motivated him to downplay the cost of defeat by 
emphasising the bounty of the occupied space, arguing that his capture of Parsa deprived 
shah ‘of an extensive, fertile country, which supplied him largely with both money and 
grain’.11 It also explains his support for a second expedition, but his reluctance to be 
involved in such a mission. He reiterated in his correspondence that he would not 
volunteer to lead a second intervention, stating ‘no lucrative views whatever could tempt 
me to be a leader’. Kinloch emphasized that he was no coward, that ‘honour obliges me to 
                                               
8 Raj, Expedition, p.4. 
9 George Kinloch to Thomas Rumbold, the Chief of Patna dated Persa, December 27 1767, in B.L. IOR/P/A/8 Bengal 
Proceedings 20 Dec 1767-21 Nov 1768. 
10 Memorandum Relative to Capt. Kinloch’s Expedition, p.545. 
11 George Kinloch to Thomas Rumbold, the Chief of Patna, dated Barra, December 25 1767, in B.L. IOR/P/A/8 Bengal 
Proceedings 20 Dec 1767-21 Nov 1768.  
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wish it in my power to put an end to the work I have begun,’ but that he did not consider 
‘rushing on certain dangers to be at all consistent with bravery’.12 Kinloch was greatly 
concerned for his reputation, which exacerbated the sickness he sustained in the foothills. 
This was not without precedent: one account from the Carnatic Wars details how an EIC 
captain whose sepoys mutinied had to capitulate to the French. He reportedly became 
fatally sick from shame and worry: ‘so sensibly affected by his misfortune that it threw him 
into a fever of which he died’.13  
Within Kinloch’s correspondence from the new territories, it is clear that his 
experiences in the foothills did not shake entrenched representations of oriental despotism. 
There is a continuity in his depiction of the Gorkhalis as marauders. Though his depleted 
forces had more success in the Barra and Parsa plains landscape outside of monsoon 
season, he remained oblivious to Gorkhali fighting strength and manoeuvres, reliant on 
scouts and guides, ‘I have not yet been able for certain to know which way the enemy are 
gone, but am told towards Hurrurpore.’14 He continued in his representation of Shah as an 
oriental despot and his insistence that his soldiers were pressed into fighting, ‘such are his 
cruelty and severity that the people have no other choice but his service.’15 He continued to 
judge the Gorkhalis a potent threat to the EIC, citing that if Nepal Valley fell, Shah would 
be able to increase his forces of 50,000 to 200,000, a force that no other hill states could 
counter, his armies ‘flushed with the conquest of that country… will no doubt prove a very 
troublesome enemy in the low countries’.16 
Kinloch and Rumbold also drew plans for a further expedition. Within these plans, 
the EIC mostly remained blind to the previous significance of marginalized agency. 
Instead, emphasis was placed on difficulties marching in the rain, and provisioning of food, 
without recognizing that these were not naturally occurring challenges. Kinloch wrote that 
‘the two great evils that I suffered, rain & the want of grain, will now be removed’.17 More 
precisely though it was the failure or refusal of marginalized, local agents to provide boats 
and dandies, and that of the grain merchant to provide provisions, that Kinloch suffered 
from. The EIC believed these problems overcome: it was no longer monsoon season and 
they could have found an alternative grain supplier. They did not contemplate alternative 
ways in which non-co-operation from local people could scupper a new expedition. 
Instead, Kinloch assumed once more that the local subaltern would support the Company 
                                               
12 Ibid. 
13 Lawrence, Narrative of the War on the Coast of Coromandel, p.64 
14 George Kinloch to Thomas Rumbold, the Chief of Patna dated Persa, December 27 1767.  
15 George Kinloch to Thomas Rumbold, the Chief of Patna, dated Barra, December 25 1767. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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over the Gorkhalis. He believed that once he was through the foothills into the valley, the 
local populace ‘will not…long dispute the matter with me’.18 He furthermore believed Shah 
would not be able to spare any troops, since they were ‘so much employed that he cannot 
send off any considerable body without untying their hands [the Malla rajas]’.19 After 
Kinloch had observed local landowners supporting the Gorkhalis whilst villagers fled from 
his sepoys, and having observed Shah reinforce the defences at Sindhuli and Hariharpur 
with ease, it is peculiar that he could so confidently assume local support. 
The marginalized agency that undermined the 1767 expedition was nevertheless 
given greater consideration at the second attempt. More sensitivity was given in the 
preparatory stage towards local support and local knowledge – the agent at Bettiah, Edward 
Golding, was entrusted to rally the local petty rajas in the hills for support on the basis that 
they were ‘Shah’s enemies, having reason to fear his growing power’.20 Their support was 
solicited not just to prevent them siding with the Gorkhalis, as was the case with the local 
elite at Sindhuli, but to ensure they bolstered an EIC expedition with ‘the bodys of their 
men who are mountaineers’.21 This time around, the company wanted to ensure they had 
soldiers with some experience of the foothills, since their sepoys’ shortcomings had proved 
so critical previously. Greater thought was given to the expedition’s composition. This time 
a full battalion and artillery to counter the new challenge of Gorkhali barricades and 
fortifications was proposed.22 It would seem moreover that the Company realized they had 
rushed into military action, upon the advice and impressions given by the Malla 
messengers. Their new endeavour would be more cautious, and ‘was not to be set foot in a 
day or to be gone about rashly’.23  
The proposed return to Kathmandu did not go ahead. Instead, by 1769 Nepal 
Valley had been conquered. The Gorkhalis finally defeated Kathmandu on a festival day. 
Whilst the people and majority of the guards celebrated, courtiers who had sided with Shah 
opened the gates. It was these people who proved crucial, deciding to betray the city most 
likely in return for assurances of their safety and reward. A full-strength EIC column would 
have significantly reinforced Kathmandu and boosted morale through the visible support 
of the British. However, Kinloch’s arrival there would not have prevented the city’s 
capture: it needed food and artillery, neither of which Kinloch brought.  
                                               
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Amatya, ‘British Diplomacy’, p.2. 
23 George Kinloch to Thomas Rumbold, the Chief of Patna, dated Barra, December 25 1767. 
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The expedition nevertheless had some longer-term implications for Gorkhali-EIC 
encounters and relations. The 1767 invasion deterred Shah from courting any alliance with 
the EIC, fostering a scepticism of British intentions. Referring to a future Company 
invasion, the Divyopadeś advised that ‘one day that force will come’.24 1767 reduced 
Nepalese enthusiasm for trade with the EIC, meaning the latter had to negotiate harder and 
make greater sacrifices on duties - tariffs from 1767 to 1816 have been estimated to favour 
Nepal by five to one.25 It also spurred the Gorkhalis to invest heavily in border defences – 
increasingly promoting the Tarai as a natural barrier after the devastating effect it had on 
the health of Kinloch’s soldiers, and recognizing that, owing to the difficulty of 
transporting artillery in the foothills, simple redoubts of earthwork and timber could stop 
an EIC column (many of Nepal’s border forts were constructed in the years between 
Kinloch’s expedition and the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814. The Divyopadeś advised that the 
EIC had ‘taken the plains’. It subsequently recommended that Nepal ‘prepare forts… set 
traps … and on a higher place cannon should be placed’, so that ‘in the gaps of the 
mountains an iron door should be built’.)26 Shah is also reputed to have armed some elite 
units with muskets taken from Kinloch’s soldiers, though there seems to be some 
uncertainty surrounding this. The Divyopadeś states that they ‘took their flintlocks’.27 
However, Kirkpatrick visiting in 1793 wrote that he had been told to expect the summer 
residence at Nuwakot to be adorned with them, then noted their absence.28 Nevertheless 
by the time the two belligerents once more squared up to each other in 1814, Nepal had 
increasingly shifted towards the use of matchlocks, possessing a far more considerable 
number than expected.29 
 
V:2 The Withdrawal from Hostilities in a Wider Context 
 
 
After the fall of Kathmandu, the EIC altered its policy towards Nepal. Conciliatory letters 
and complimentary presents were sent to Shah implying the Company had acted out of 
ignorance: ‘now as the praises of the addressee [Shah] have been heard from every quarter, 
the English have ceased to assist the Raja of Nepal and are desirous of entering into 
                                               
24 Divyopadeś, p.42. 
25 Jha, Battles of the New Republic, p.21. 
26 Divyopadeś, p.42. 
27 Ibid., p.46. 
28 ‘I had been told, previous to my visit, that this temple [in the palace compound at Nuwakot] was also 
decorated by some arms lost by Captain Kinloch’s detachment; but either my information was not correct, or 
they had been removed in compliment to me’. Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, p.116. 
29 Paget, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, p.4. 
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friendship with the addressee’.30 The lands Kinloch had seized were returned to Gorkha 
hands.31 The ongoing conflict between Kinloch’s forces and those territories in the Tarai 
seemingly drained EIC reserves, the Board of Directors writing that ‘the inconvenience and 
expense which must attend an expedition against the Goorkha Rajah would far outweigh 
the advantages to be reaped from the recovery of these Pergunnahs, and therefore 
disapprove of proceeding to hostile measures unless the Rajah should refuse to pay the 
tribute or attempt to commit depredations on the Bahar districts’.32 Protestations were 
made from Shitab Roy at Patna, as well as the EIC merchants there, but these were 
ignored.33 Nepalese historians explain this reversal as a symptom of Shah’s rise: ‘the 
Company realized they were backing the wrong horse in Jaya Prakash because they saw 
that the Mallas were of no match to Shah, and more than that the Mallas had lost their 
power.’34 However, the decision would not have been taken lightly, since it involved 
conceding Shah’s authority to the detriment of the ousted Christian missionaries and 
British traders. 
Instead, the decision to abandon military designs on Nepal at that time was 
influenced by events elsewhere across South Asia. The EIC were struggling in the 1767-
1769 Anglo-Mysore War, and within a few years would also fight the Marathas and 
Rohillas. This stretched the Madras and Bengal armies, and costs were spiralling. Vast 
expenditures on the new fort at Calcutta, war in South India in 1768, rising dividends for 
investors in London, and an annual tribute of £400,000 paid to the British government 
after 1767, all contributed to a growing financial crisis for the Company, leading to its near 
bankruptcy in London in 1772.35 Supplying any expedition during the Bengal Famine 
furthermore would have incurred costs and the hostility of Bengalis and EIC directors 
alike, aggrieved with affairs in India. Cost-cutting measures were a priority in the aftermath 
of 1767. The board wrote to Calcutta on 11th November 1768, ‘as we look with a 
favourable eye upon every attempt for the extension of commerce, we do not disapprove 
of the Expedition to Napaul, and are sorry it failed of success – you did right not to renew 
the expedition till the state of your forces would better admit of it, and to hold your 
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possession of the lands taken from the Gorkha Rajah as an indemnification for the 
expenses.’36 Their concern was how to recuperate losses. 
Back in Patna, efforts were made to draw a line under the 1767 venture. First and 
foremost, a scapegoat was found. Lacking the financial backing and resolve to authorize 
the second expedition, Rumbold threw Kinloch to the wolves of Calcutta in his letter to 
the Select Committee: ‘a too hasty decision and improvident progress when in want of 
provisions, against which Capt Kinloch had been duly warned, rendered [the expedition] 
unsuccessful.’37 Kinloch’s apparent adventuring combined with Rumbold’s growing ‘nabob’ 
reputation was further frowned upon by the Board of Directors, who wrote to incoming 
EIC governor John Cartier: ‘we cannot but take notice that the Napaul Expedition was not 
only undertaken without consulting him [Colonel Smith, the military commander over 
Rumbold] but the commanding officer of the detachment on that service [Kinloch] was 
never to have corresponded with him or sent him his returns, which is contrary to the rules 
of military subordination.’38 Channa Wickremesekera has demonstrated that sepoy failures 
could be attributed to the way in which they were commanded by EIC officers, or whether 
they had enough European officers.39 This was the case in 1767, drawing attention away 
from sepoy action and agency in the foothills. Kinloch was exonerated in time. However, 
his health never recovered from the illness he caught that year and he never returned to the 
Himalayan foothills, passing away early in 1769. His brother Charles left the EIC, aggrieved 
by his terms of employment, and served for the Dutch East India Company (hereafter 
VOC.) There he disputed once more with his employers, being briefly imprisoned before 
likewise dying of illness.40 They were both buried in Bengal.  
News of the 1767 expedition did not reach the British press, despite the frequency 
with which Indian events were reported and public appetite for such news. It is notably 
missing from the many newspapers and monthly periodicals in circulation, which have 
been called ‘the most important means by which information and speculation about India 
and the East India Company were disseminated to large numbers of people’.41 This was a 
notable omission – the press had shared news about the EIC and its campaigns ‘on a 
regular and frequent basis since at least the Seven Years War’.42 It is likely that the Board of 
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Directors took measures to limit knowledge of the 1767 expedition. They often held 
political leverage over newspapers, funding them and granting printing permission: ‘wealthy 
men such as Robert Clive and Warren Hastings befriended men in the press with their ill-
gotten gains from India.’43 The EIC therefore carefully curated news about their affairs, for 
instance ‘planting well-timed information in the newspapers artificially to raise and lower 
the price of Company stock’.44 The individual brokers in this information provision were 
usually the governors and military commanders themselves, in a position to determine 
which failures and successes were included in their press despatches.45 They would also 
have been acutely aware of the wider readership of these reports: the publication of victory 
narratives was particularly important given that British newspapers were circulated widely 
in European cities. One observer in 1756 noted that the London Chronicle seemed to have a 
greater continental circulation than any other paper.46 Likewise, the restriction of defeat 
narratives such as that of 1767 was imperative.  
The directors only had limited control over news returning from India – they tried 
and failed to prevent regular correspondence being disseminated before their official 
despatches could be digested, and they went to great lengths to challenge any newspaper 
reports inaccurately representing the state of affairs in Asia. As a result, the directors gave 
much thought to the information from India they reported to the General Court, knowing 
that whatever they announced would be reported to the press. Likewise, in their Company 
bulletins they published a rosy version of events, one that would neither deter investors nor 
dampen public expectations of the riches of India. The information that the EIC bulletins 
offered was not read uncritically, and there existed a climate of public suspicion and 
concern over Company activities that these measures did little to alleviate.47 Nevertheless, 
they were able to contain the news of defeat in 1767. 
The expedition did have public consequences regardless. Firstly, it instigated a 
changing attitude towards adventuring, and prize money as an incentive. This emerges 
during the First Rohilla War of 1773 to 1774, in which Company sepoys marched for the 
Nawab of Awadh. During this campaign Warren Hastings, recently appointed Governor-
General, expressed concern over the motives of the soldiers, particularly the notion of 
prize money and the treasures held in Rohilla forts. Writing to Colonel Champion, he 
lamented ‘there is one subject that alarms me. The very idea of prize money suggests to my 
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remembrance the former disorders which arose in our army from this source, and had 
almost proved fatal to it’.48 The expectation that joining an expeditionary force brought 
enhanced pay and the ‘spoils of war’ still haunted the EIC almost a decade on from the 
Batta Mutiny, despite efforts by the Company to crack down on this through the 
withdrawal of additional field pay.  
Company directors and politicians became more reserved before committing to 
peripheral wars and inter-Indian conflicts altogether. Growing ministerial intervention in 
the Company’s affairs hoped to prevent servants in India from involving the Company in 
unwanted wars, in spaces that could be made commercially profitable without military 
action. When the House of Commons resolved in 1782 that ‘to pursue schemes of 
conquest and extent of dominion, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the 
policy of this nation’, they were stating a principle that was universally accepted.49 London 
became sceptical of preparations for expeditions such as that of 1767, wondering whether 
alternative expedients had been considered before those on the periphery turned to armed 
force. It became possible for South Asian forces to greatly incite Company officials and 
cause agitation along its borders without the guarantee that there would be a punitive 
expedition – first the EIC would evaluate what was lost, and whether that loss warranted 
an attempt to recuperate. This was the case when the Raja of Ramgarh plundered Company 
territory in October and November 1770, wherein the Select Committee first asked that a 
subordinate ‘enquire into the particulars of this affair and transit an account of them’ 
before rushing into any action.50 This did not stop Company agents from themselves 
engineering military action, as was the case in 1767, but it does show an increased 
metropolitan awareness to it. There was also greater condemnation of patronage in the 
preceding years, with greater suspicion towards the family links and bonds of friendship 
between those advocating conflict, those appointing military officials, and those 
commanding the consequent expedition. This was the case in the First Anglo-Maratha War, 
the Select Committee reprimanding commanders for the ‘partiality in their choice of 
officers’.51 In particular there was perceived a Scottish clique within the Bengali military, 
which Kinloch could well have been a part of, that was viewed with suspicion.52  
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The EIC increasingly sought guarantees from Indian powers that the costs of 
intervention would be underwritten and honoured by Indian capital. There was some 
precedent for this before 1767, in Forde’s expedition to Golconda in 1758. This was 
remarkably similar in composition and context to Kinloch’s: ‘consisting of five hundred 
Europeans, one company of artillery, and sixteen hundred sepoys’, marching in October 
with some urgency, intervening on behalf of a South Asian power.53 Before departing 
Forde sought agreement in advance from the Raja of Vizagapatam that they would ‘pay the 
extra expense of our army during the time they should act together’.54 This however did not 
set significant enough an example for Kinloch to do likewise. He was perhaps unaware of 
these steps taken some years prior to his own appointment in Madras. 
These changing policies were not triggered solely by the Nepalese expedition. 
Disappointing revenues, the crippling effect of the Bengal Famine and the 1772 Banking 
Crisis all served as critical checks on EIC enthusiasm for military intervention and 
expenditure. The grant of the diwani was expected to reap great benefits, yet throughout the 
1760s revenues lagged behind speculation. This in turn caused great financial troubles 
domestically: stocks were traded based upon wild estimates of Company revenue, an 
estimated four million pounds profit.55 By some counts, the diwani actually generated losses 
rather than profits – private trade, corruption and exploitation of popular trade goods 
profit representing the actual wealth drain.56 The Bengal Famine, as much a consequence as 
a cause, augmented these dire financial straits, leading to the 1772 banking crisis. The 
difference however is that, as opposed to the 1767 expedition, these are not lacking in 
scholarship. They all feature prominently in Company histories, such as those of Keay, 
Tuck, and Lawson.57 Nor were they absent from public discourse. The Company was a 
source of significant taxation and investment, and its fortunes were the subject of national 
political debate.58 Indeed, a further check on EIC military adventures were the frequent 
parliamentary interventions, mandated by their financial rescues.59  
Efforts to condemn the rapaciousness of EIC agents and curb their adventuring 
did not mean this ceased altogether, in what is perhaps characteristic of the disparity 
between instruction from London and action in India. Neither the sins of the 1760s nor 
the famine nor banking crisis inverted either the practice of or concerns over ‘nabobism’. 
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Thomas Rumbold himself become Governor of Madras, amassing a personal fortune of 
£750,000 through bribes and pay-offs from 1778 to 1780. A parliamentary inquiry 
damaged his reputation, but came to nothing.60 Likewise Clive Hastings was yet to assume 
power. Though far from being the worst culprit, his would be the most infamous of trials 
for corruption. Similarly, intervention and adventuring without authority from Calcutta or 
London continued. Notably, the campaign into the Deccan that resulted in the EIC’s 
humiliating defeat at Wadgaon was not endorsed by Hastings and Calcutta promptly 
rejected the ensuing treaty, escalating the Anglo-Maratha War. Whilst the Company thus 
officially erred on the side of caution before entering future conflicts in the Himalayas, or 
elsewhere in South Asia, that did not prevent such conflicts eventually being committed to 
– EIC expansion in South Asia from 1767 to the final defeat of the Marathas in 1818 
suggests such caution did not ultimately win the day. There were moreover greater political 
incentives to wage war against certain rivals, for instance the aggressive Hyder Ali and his 
French advisors, meaning borderlands incidents legitimized EIC invasion and were 
welcomed rather than treated with hesitancy. Caution nevertheless played a part in some 
arenas, and partly altered the trajectory of EIC expansion. It certainly diverted their 
attentions away from Nepal after 1767.  
 
V:3 Logan’s Activities in Nepal 
 
The EIC did not give up on relations or interventions in Nepal entirely. After 1767 came a 
series of expeditions, both EIC officiated and independent, individual and group, militant, 
commercial or diplomatic, in which the British encountered the Nepalese and vice versa. 
This chapter now investigates the role of marginalized historical agents within these 
encounters from 1767 to 1793, beginning with isolated travellers before studying some 
further EIC expeditions. For each, it is asked whether the various parties involved in these 
encounters helped shape EIC representations of the Himalayas, whether their actions 
helped direct events, and what comparisons can be made with 1767.  
The years either side of 1767 saw a trickle of individual adventurers and traders 
encountering Nepal. Very little is known of these ventures – there are no diaries within the 
company archives with which to compare instances of marginalized agency alongside that 
of Kinloch, and very few letters from the adventurer-traders themselves, other than some 
secondary references and permissions to proceed from the Select Committee in Calcutta. It 
is nevertheless possible to observe some degree of marginalized agency – often acting 
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without official instruction or completely independent of the EIC, these individuals 
themselves could be considered marginalized actors in the histories of European-
Himalayan encounters, let alone the people and places of Nepal that they interacted with.  
Many of the independent traders mentioned in Chapter III such as Mirtle and 
Peacock continued to operate either side of 1767. However, the first individual to enter 
Nepal after the invasion of 1767 presents an intriguing alternative ending to that affair. 
This is the mysterious, embittered fate of James Logan, the surgeon from the very same 
expedition, who returned to Nepal shortly after, on a vendetta to undermine and oust Shah 
from power. Little is known of his person other than Kinloch’s account. He was greatly 
admired as a translator, having assisted with ‘his knowledge of the language on all 
occasions’.61 We learn from the journal that Logan ‘very gallantly offer’d his service as an 
officer’ to take part in the first assault on Sindhuli Gadhi, losing the end of his finger and 
‘receiving a dangerous blow on the head’ in the process.62 He survived, and made it back to 
Bettiah, then promptly offered his services for a second expedition to Henry Verelst. 
Logan wrote that he had heard of the Company’s plans to explore trade further, and that 
he was ‘ready to undertake a journey’.63  
Little is known of Logan’s adventuring. There exists a chain of correspondence 
with the EIC, in which he ‘permitted to undertake it as he proposed’.64 This has led to 
some conflicting accounts of his objectives, though most believed the enterprise was 
conciliatory and commercial. Amatya for example considered it ‘the best and brilliant 
example of the policy of conciliation played,’ further noting ‘the main aim of the mission 
was neither a political nor military one, but purely commercial’.65 Likewise British historians 
considered Logan exemplary of a ‘less aggressive approach’.66 Logan spent great care 
outlining the benefits of trade between Patna and Kathmandu, stating it was ‘capable of 
being much more considerable than it ever was’.67 He was given a letter from Hastings 
implying his was sent to Kathmandu in order to open up trade avenues, that read as 
follows: ‘as the opening up of trade between his country and Bengal would be mutually 
beneficial, the above said gentleman [Logan] would be deputed to arrange the matter’.68  
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However, contrary to this narrative, Logan did not return to Nepal with solely 
conciliatory intentions. His correspondence demonstrated a desire to engineer a Gorkhali 
downfall, with both strategic and personal motivations. His memorandums displayed much 
disapproval towards Shah and recommended to Calcutta that they continued their support 
of the exiled Jaya Prakash Malla. He assured Verelst that he ‘will undertake to find him 
[Jaya Prakash] out’, and ‘personally confer with him’, adding ‘there is no dobut that many 
of his old subjects are still attached to him’. Logan was confident that ‘a small 
force…would be sufficient to re-establish his government’.69 Moreover, he was injured in 
the 1767 venture and had readily volunteered for the abortive 1768 attempt. Logan 
certainly would have made a suitable emissary given his language skills and previous time 
experience of Himalayan travel, yet these attributes also made for a suitable spy. In 
addition, he had experience of war in this theatre –something valued higher after 1767. 
Therefore, whilst Logan’s pretences were to reason with Shah, carrying with him 
correspondence from Hastings to the Gorkhali ruler in case he was stopped, all the while 
he engaged in espionage and subterfuge: planning to solicit the support of local rajas 
against the Gorkhalis. Logan for example mentioned the Raja of Morang who had 
‘formerly proposed to Kinloch to join his force’, and had ‘invited me to his capital in the 
hills to settle the terms of this coalition’. Logan was ‘pretty sure of a hearty welcome’, and 
coincidentally was confident that ‘here I wou’d get intelligent guides’, it what was perhaps a 
reference to the disappointment of Ram Das in 1767.70 Certainly, Logan saw the potential 
for improved trade. However he did not envision the EIC conducting that trade with Shah, 
but a restored Jaya Prakash Malla. It is interesting that the EIC would send such a 
candidate with the history of trauma and vendetta that Logan had on a purely commercial 
enterprise, into a space where he could exercise individual agency. The EIC were not solely 
conciliatory, but were instead hedging their bets. 
Logan’s contemporary George Bogle wrote whilst in Tibet some years later that the 
Panchen Lama had received a letter from Shah, stating that ‘a Firangi had been sent back 
from Nepal’, wanting to know if the two were connected.71 Although this indicates that 
Logan’s mission to establish trade failed, it is less clear whether or not he returned any 
intelligence, or drew any local support away from Shah. We can nevertheless interpret from 
this encounter some features of EIC Himalayan policy – that they would endorse such a 
duplicitous enterprise is indicative of how highly they valued existing knowledge of the 
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Himalayas, or the possibility of augmenting it. Logan’s rogue status draws attention to ways 
in which colonialism could be delivered by intermediary characters. Alternatively, the dual 
agenda of the enterprise implies 1767 had thrown that EIC policy into disarray.  
 
V:4 ‘Plan Of Attack of a Mountainous Country’: Further Plans for Nepal and the Morang 
Intervention 
 
In 1774 the EIC received a further request for help against Shah, on this occasion written 
by the Raja of Morang, Karna Singh. The Gorkhalis had conquered Nepal Valley and were 
pushing westwards towards Morang in the Kirant region. Karna Singh requested military 
aid to check Shah, who likewise requested they stay neutral.72 The difficulties that 
undermined Kinloch, and EIC sensitivity towards the influence of marginalized agency, can 
be read between the lines of two mysterious documents within the India Office Records 
relating to that possible intervention. The first document, entitled A Sketch for a Plan of 
Attack of A Mountainous Country in India, is a handwritten advisory tract on unbound paper 
instructing the reader in a series of military considerations when invading such a 
landscape.73 The second document is entitled Plan for Attack on napaul with Anecdotes. Its 
subheading reads Plan for an Attack on the Napaul Rajah, to Oblige him to quite Morung & intently 
to reduce him or bring him to such terms as the Government thinks necessary. Seven proposals are then 
listed relating to the expedition’s composition, giving suggestions unto the route taken and 
making further logistical recommendations.74 
Although the two documents are undated, we can place certain parameters on 
them: Being in Warren Hastings’ private collection they very likely date before his 
departure from office in 1785, and could not possibly date later than his death in 1818 
unless by significant archival error. The Sketch for a Plan of Attack of a Mountainous Country in 
India could date earlier than Hastings’ arrival in India in 1773. The Plan for Attack on Napaul 
with Anecdotes dates from roughly around 1774, since it is written in response to Shah’s 
annexation of Morang that year, referring directly to both him and that conquest. Within 
this document are referenced certain individuals who occupied the same post as they did in 
Kinloch’s correspondence, such as Captain Grant who was stationed as the military 
command alongside William Golding at Bettiah, suggesting there were few years between 
that expedition and these plans. The authorial details are omitted and the handwriting is 
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fairly undistinguished. They could have been written by a clerk, transcribing for a senior 
officer, potentially Hastings or a military official. The two documents could have been 
written by different authors – creating the possibility that Kinloch himself wrote the earlier 
Plan of Attack of a Mountainous Country in India. The greater likelihood is that both documents 
were written by the same author in response to the invasion of Morang. Yet that unknown 
author had a detailed knowledge of the events of 1767, perhaps even direct experience, 
such are the parallels between the troubles Kinloch faced and the recommendations of the 
two documents. It is possible that James Logan was the author. His basic principles of 
Shah as a despot and the local rajas as potential allies form the basis for these plans. He 
could have still been in EIC service in 1774, and did have the required knowledge of the 
events of 1767 evident in those two documents. The Plan of Attack of a Mountainous Country 
does not refer to Nepal directly and could have been written in preparation for the 1772 
invasion of Cooch Behar, discussed in chapter VI. 
Kinloch’s initial troubles in Bihar occasioned by the monsoon march and 
difficulties obtaining a food supply are highlighted within these documents as problems to 
counter. The Plan of Attack of a Mountainous Country suggests the expedition should ‘march if 
possible early in the cold season that you may have full time before you to secure the 
country in your possession before rains set in, and have your provisions collected for the 
wet months, so that you may not fall a sacrifice to sickness by being obliged to march 
about them looking for subsistence’.75 
Just as Kinloch brought into the Himalayas a confidence in EIC soldiers, so the 
author likewise valued an assumed superior strategy and tactics: ‘You need not fear success 
let the enemy numbers be what they will, for a mountainous and wood country is a more 
favourable theatre for practising the wiles and strategems [sic] of war than open country, 
therefore a European officer has … the advantage in such a situation.’76 Yet the author also 
emphasized the need for artillery: ‘Nothing can be more useful with you in a hilly country 
than royals [Artillery units] they are easily carried and are of infinite service in clearing the 
heights of the enemy and drawing them from their forts upon the hills.77 They potentially 
recalled Kinloch’s despair in face of hastily constructed Gorkhali defences beyond Sindhuli 
and Hariharpur, and his lamenting the missing cannon, slowly making its way up from 
Janakpur, that would otherwise have made short work of them. 
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The author instructs their reader to gather intelligence on the route, that ‘your next 
care should be to enquire well into all the particulars relating to the country you are ordered 
to attack, the nature of the roads, the passes and nature of them, of the rivers their breadth 
and depth, of the forts their strength, garrison and situation, if there has not been a map of 
the country before.78 Poor roads, difficult, prodigious mountain passes, unfordable rivers 
and heavily fortified Gorkhali defences all featured to Kinloch’s detriment. The author 
prioritizes local knowledge, given that its absence hindered the 1767 expedition upon 
encountering these challenges, instructing ‘above all things look out for men of ability who 
are acquainted with the roads, forts, rivers, and spare no money or attention to render these 
men faithful to your service’.79 Within this instruction, the efforts advised to guarantee their 
loyalty implies that there had been past difficulty securing that, once more raising questions 
over the actions of Kinloch’s guides. 
The author recommends that a prospective commander should consider local 
interests, evoking the Mugitar landowner Ramchandra Parsai who reportedly supported the 
Gorkhalis. They advised to ‘get powers if possible to treat with all the principle people who 
border upon the country intended to be attacked, find out whether your success would 
coincide with their interests or not, for you would reap great advantage by knowing their 
particulars, by discovering those whose interest is against you and getting the assistance of 
those who wish well to the affair on which you are employed’. Importantly, the author 
demonstrates suspicion not just of those opposed to an EIC invasion, but also towards 
those invested in an expedition’s success, ‘for their description of the country those whose 
interest it is that you should be possessed of it of course will soften the difficulties to you 
whilst the others will increase them.’ The notion that they could likewise provide false 
information echoes the impression of ease given by the messengers in 1767. The writer 
thus recommends that upon hearing these accounts, the commander should ‘take the 
medium between them and you may form a pretty just notion of the truth’.80  
The guerrilla tactics of the Gorkhalis, their harassing of the EIC column, and 
Kinloch’s obliviousness to affairs at the rear or within advanced detachments such as that 
commanded by Hogan towards Hariharpur, are also echoed in the plan of attack. The author 
recommends that an expedition should always have flanking parties, and that upon one 
part of the column being attacked, the nearby officer should ‘acquaint the commanding 
officer with the nature of the attack made upon his people, the steps he has taken in 
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consequence, for in a woody and hilly country the commanding officer often loses the 
advantage of a view of what is done in all parts and must therefore trust for a while the 
judgement of others’.81 The writer advised to ‘avoid making halts in your march as much as 
possible as nothing is more discouraging to your own men or advantageous to your enemy, 
as the roads are narrow and the line of course much lengthened, the front ought to march 
extremely slow’.82 After explaining how they would counter the Gorkhalis should they 
attack the column’s rear, he asserts that ‘an officer can always turn the attack of the enemy 
into an advantage if he has superior genius and knowledge in the art of war.83 This final 
sentiment was potentially aimed at Kinloch, since his journal reported low morale as a 
result of the Gorkhalis attacking stragglers. 
The conduct and command of sepoys features in the Plan of Attack. Just as Kinloch 
wrote in his journal that the first assault on Sindhuli Gadhi was undermined by fear 
amongst the sepoys, this writer instructs: ‘Never move at height if you have reason to think 
the sepoys not seeing their officers or knowing of the number of the enemy will imagine 
dangers innumerable, and if once they are thrown into confusion at height all is lost.’ 
Similarly the Plan of Attack contains instruction in the composition, discipline and welfare 
of the camp followers, advising ‘you will have no place to apply to for conveniences of any 
kind, have good lascars therefore with you capable of constructing bridges mending 
carriages and diggers to dig wells upon occasion or make mines’.84 This draws plenty of 
parallels with the marginalized camp followers and support units in 1767 – the builders 
who struggled to repair the road from Janakpur, the lascars who fled on the approach to 
Hariharpur, the failure to build bridges over the rushing rivers of the foothills and the 
shortage of safe drinking water. Just as Kinloch had his concerns over the discipline of the 
baggage train, likewise the writer recommends that his reader should ‘take care and 
examine constantly the state of the coolies, cattle and carriage, else the poor coolies and cattle 
will be cheated of their provisions by the Circar, and the carriages will go out of repair for 
want of attention which is much neglected by the common people in this country, the lives 
of numbers may depend therefore upon your inspection into these particulars’.85 
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By 1774 the Gorkhali conquests had gathered pace, moving eastwards through 
Limbu towards Sikkim, swallowing up Morang.86 This threat combined with the request for 
help from Karna Singh of Morang prompted the writing of the Plan for an Attack on Napaul, 
intending ‘to oblige him [Shah] to quit’ the region.87 The author of that document hoped to 
avoid the same pitfalls that Kinloch was drawn in to. For instance the Attack on Nepaul 
document recommends drawing sepoys from across different Bengal outposts, suggesting 
the expedition should consist of ‘three companies from Capt. Robinson’s Battalions at 
Mungheer [Munger],’ and ‘some companies from that at Srinagepoore [Sringarpur]’ to then 
‘join the officer who is in command of the expedition at Purnea [Purnia]’.88 The author did 
not advise drawing the ranks from one specific Company factory, as was the case with 
Patna in 1767, wherein the local agent Rumbold was able to select his officers and sepoys. 
They were likewise wary of sourcing all sepoys from one garrison, where they could have 
had shared experiences of Company service and similar levels of loyalty or resentment. 
Shah’s network of spies, neglected historical agents reporting back on the EIC’s 
preparations at Patna and Jaya Prakash Malla’s court in Kathmandu were able to sabotage 
Kinloch’s expedition. In 1774 the author of the Attack on Napaul hoped to counter such 
Gorkhali intelligence through a series of measures. They firstly advised making ‘several 
manoeuvres and false attacks to draw the rajah’s troops & attention that way and to make 
him believe the sole intention of that expedition is to drive him away from his new 
acquired conquests,’ before advising upon another layer of deception: ‘let a battalion march 
to Bettiah as if to relieve Captain Grant & there remain till further orders… let the 
commanding officer set off with orders in his pocket for the battalion that was sent as if to 
relieve Captain Grant with the artillery, and as many companies as can be spared from 
Captain Grant’s post to obey his orders in everything.’89 The expedition’s purpose would 
not be so widely publicized that Shah would anticipate it. There would also be greater 
counter-surveillance measures, with detachments advised to ‘watch the motions of the 
Rajah’.90  
The document gives further consideration into the composition of the expedition. 
As with the Plan of Attack, the writer of the Attack on Napaul proposes sending a greater 
artillery detachment to counter Gorkhali defences, recommending ‘two 12 pounders, 60 or 
70 experienced lascars with royals and proper ammunition for the whole and two artillery 
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officers be ordered to proceed directly to Patna and there to wait for instructions and their 
instructions may be to proceed to Bettiah’. The writer presses the haste with which this 
artillery should be assembled and moved into position: ‘this is to be done immediately, that 
the guns and ammunitions should get up in time enough.’91 After all, Kinloch did have 
cannon in 1767. The problem he faced was that his artillery caravan did not move at the 
same pace as his sepoy units.  
 The Attack on Napaul continued to recognize the importance of Kathmandu, 
recommending the expedition march from Bettiah immediately into Nepal Valley, where 
the commander would ‘make his utmost efforts to gain possession of the capital before the 
arrival of the Rajah, perceiving his country in danger, moves back as is most probable’.92 
This time though there would be two columns: once Shah returned to Kathmandu the 
detachments previously watching his movements would seize Morang. Within this plan, the 
writer once more assumed local support just as Kinloch did, suggesting that ‘once the 
Rajah leaves the Morung territory it will naturally return under the governance of its old 
master’.93 Yet they also recommended that before the commanding officer set out he 
should ‘inform all the petty rajahs of the motives of his expedition to curb the ambition of 
the Gorkha & to reinstate them in their possessions’.94 Like that of the Plan of Attack, this 
writer also considered the landlords in 1767 who supported Shah. Moreover, soliciting the 
support of the petty rajas was something Kinloch advocated for the second relief mission 
in 1768. 
There are huge methodological questions incurred by these two documents – we 
know so little about their authorship, the speculation that they were written by someone 
involved in Kinloch’s expedition or with experience of expeditions into the foothills 
notwithstanding. Moreover, we know little about the documents’ readership. Were they 
ever shared, and who were they intended for? Since we find these two documents in the 
collections of the Governor-General, Hastings himself could potentially have read them, 
written them, or had them transcribed, yet this is unknown. The 1774 intervention in 
Morang did not go ahead, so it is impossible to say whether this advice would have been 
observed in the event that it was needed. However, these plans do show greater 
consideration towards how marginalized forces, such as the local population, could 
influence the journey. This may have been lost in historical analysis of Kinloch’s 
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expedition, but we see here that the potential actions of villagers, merchants, guides and 
sepoys in 1767 did feature in future EIC preparations.  
 
V:5 Regional Officials, the Capuchins, and Foxcroft’s Expedition to Nepal, 1783 
 
The next major enterprise into Nepal was that of George Foxcroft in 1783. Most British 
and Nepalese accounts of this venture consider it a diplomatic, commercial venture rather 
than a military one. He entered the foothills from Bengal with a selection of gifts and a 
letter from Warren Hastings to present to the Nepalese Raja, hoping to re-open trade.95 Yet 
Foxcroft’s mission was also an individual, adventuring endeavour. Foxcroft carried those 
gifts from Hastings, yet there is no record of his instruction to proceed, or plans to send a 
diplomatic, commercial expedition. Instead, there is an earlier record of Foxcroft 
requesting and being denied the role of envoy.96 Foxcroft would not have proceeded 
without permission in 1783, given that previous refusal. Hastings either acquiesced and 
appointed Foxcroft emissary or allowed him to proceed in a non-official capacity. The 
latter is most likely given that there is no official record of his venture, which was modest 
in size and scale. Moreover, although he did not enter Nepal in pursuit of monetary gains, 
Foxcroft did have personal ambitions for the enterprise – to accumulate knowledge with 
which he could write a history of Nepal.97 In this respect, Foxcroft’s expedition was hoping 
to consolidate orientalist intelligence. Given Hasting’s patronage of Indian arts, and officers 
who showed they could master them, Foxcroft’s desire to add to the pantheon of South 
Asian history writing was an attempt to secure the blessings of the Governor-General: for 
his expedition, for his career beyond that, perhaps for support in the publication of his 
account. 
This expedition has relevance for the study of marginalized historical agents and 
their role within Anglo-Nepalese encounters, as various local interests intervened to 
prevent Foxcroft from reaching Kathmandu. Bernardo Michael, who patched together the 
very few occasions on which Foxcroft appears within the British documents alongside 
Capuchin letters and the nuances of the Gorkha Court in the 1780s, has tentatively 
highlighted these.  
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 Foxcroft was able to proceed with relative ease through the Tarai.98 It is difficult to 
say whether this stage of the journey was achieved with the support of the local villagers, or 
in spite of non-co-operation. This was notably a region that had seen revenues increase 
three-fold after having passed from the Sens of Makwanpur to Gorkha, though whether 
this was from improved yield or increased taxation, Bernardo Michael and the primary 
sources are unclear.99 He then ran into problems at Hetauda, being refused permission to 
proceed by the Gorkhali commander of that area, Sardar Nabir Singh.100  
That decision was potentially influenced by intelligence from the Capuchin mission 
stationed at Bettiah. It would not be the first time a British expedition crossed paths en 
route to Nepal with that Capuchin order. Kinloch met with Padre Mark in 1767, yet the 
priest returning from Kathmandu had no information for him.101 In 1783 the Capuchins 
reportedly passed intelligence in the other direction. Foxcroft reported to Calcutta that 
Nabir Singh would not let him proceed after having received a letter from the Capuchins, 
claiming the expedition’s true intentions were to establish a factory in Kathmandu.102 This 
course of events was the result of either deception of misunderstanding. Although a 
permanent settlement in Nepal may have been a long-term ambition, Foxcroft was not 
equipped to set up a factory, nor did he have permission from either Nepal or Calcutta. 
The Capuchins perhaps misunderstood his aim to open a commercial dialogue. A more 
cynical explanation could be that they were wary of other European influences resident in 
the hill country, and chose to send a cautionary letter to the Gorkha court. There was no 
great animosity between the Capuchins and British at Bettiah. However, the Capuchins 
were a minority sect, an offshoot from the Franciscan order that by the end of the 
eighteenth century reportedly numbered just over 30,000 worldwide. Theirs was a tenuous 
position that they guarded carefully – sharing missionary space in Nepal with the 
denominations of the EIC and the British would not be a welcome prospect.  
The Capuchin letter was alternatively a fiction of Nabir Singh, grasping for excuses, 
aware that a large faction of the Gorkhali court would meet his decision to permit 
Europeans to proceed with hostility, Kinloch’s failed intervention being a recent memory. 
It is noteworthy firstly that upon Foxcroft’s return the Capuchins denied this interference; 
secondly that Foxcroft himself was made aware of its existence by the Gorkhali vakil, a 
lower-ranking emissary at Bettiah.103 That would mean a marginalized historical agent, who 
                                               
98 George Foxcroft to Warren Hastings 3rd June 1783, in Michael, ‘Describing Gorkha’, p.286. 
99 Michael, ‘Describing Gorkha’, p.280. 
100 Likely a corruption of Sirdar. See the glossary. 
101 This event, 3rd September 1767, was detailed more thoroughly in chapter IV. 
102 Michael, ‘Describing Gorkha’, p.280. 
103 Ibid., p.282. 
160 
 
could have been deflecting blame away from a Gorkhali anti-British policy towards inter-
European factionalism, played a significant role. Either way, political agendas behind the 
scenes blocked Foxcroft’s progress, and that of the EIC. 
 
V:6 The Sino-Nepalese War and Kirkpatrick’s Expedition, 1793 
 
In 1793, William Kirkpatrick headed a delegation despatched to Kathmandu from Bengal, 
in order to mediate in the Sino-Nepalese War. The EIC hoped this would open the region 
to British trade. Kirkpatrick also travelled to Nepal with personal aspirations: to write the 
first detailed English language record of the mountainous kingdom. From a critical reading 
of the consequent published Account of Nepaul alongside his personal correspondence with 
Governor-General Cornwallis, Nepalese accounts, and other contemporary observations, it 
is evident that marginalized historical agents, some of whom could be deemed subaltern, 
wielded great influence over the fate of the expedition. They determined the parameters of 
Kirkpatrick’s experience, both physical and representational, despite the fortitude of 
orientalist tropes. Ultimately, whilst the EIC considered this enterprise an abject failure, 
these hitherto marginalized individuals were able to achieve their aims and gain reward, 
culminating in the 1795 expedition of Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan which is subsequently 
discussed. 
Kirkpatrick’s 1793 expedition was in many ways a result of inter-Himalayan 
political manoeuvring. By the late eighteenth century, relations between Tibet and the 
expanding state of Nepal had drastically deteriorated. Accounts both past and present 
attribute this to the fact that the Newari currency became ‘much debased’ within the valley 
during the later Malla years. Upon Gorkhali conquest, Shah reinstated a purer quality of 
coinage for Nepal, yet such was the quantity of debased coin already in neighbouring Tibet 
that it could not be voided or recalled. This proved difficult in transactions between the 
two, with no agreement on exchange rates or where to attribute blame, which effectively 
drove trade to a standstill.104 Rumours abounded that the Tibetans were mixing dust into 
salt exports, the frontier became more hostile with heavier fortifications and military 
presence, and the standoff became an issue of national prestige.105 When in 1788 the 
Panchen Lama threatened to draw upon Chinese support and expel the Gorkhali from its 
borders, the latter invaded. Initially the conflict progressed well for Nepal, yet by 1792, a 
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substantial Chinese column had entered the fray and driven the Gorkhali as far back as 
Nuwakot.  
 With a formidable host on its doorstep, Nepal in 1792 thus faced a similar 
predicament to that of Jaya Prakash Malla in 1767. Whether to solicit the help of the EIC 
was once more a decision swayed by courtly interests and concerns over British influence 
in Nepal. The regent Bahadur Shah was Prithvi Narayan Shah’s second son. His elder 
brother Pratap Singh had ruled for three years until his death in 1778, leaving his own son 
the infantile Rana Bahadur Shah as king, with his mother Rajendra Laxmi Devi as regent. 
The following years were marked by bitter factionalism between those supporting the 
king’s mother and those supporting the king’s uncle, Bahadur Shah. Rajendra Laxmi Devi 
died in 1785 and the regency passed to Bahadur Shah, though there remained in 1792 
plenty at court who opposed him, questioning his legitimacy and his authority over Prithvi 
Narayan Shah’s grandson on the throne, who was by then nearing adulthood. He had to 
make allies and guarantee loyalties. Kirkpatrick observed this, writing that ‘considerations 
of expediency, suggested by a solicitude to maintain himself in his situation, have often 
compelled him [Bahadur Shah] to conciliate his colleagues, by compliances’.106 He needed 
to tread carefully: inviting the British after his father had opposed them did not cast him in 
the monarchical mould of Prithvi Narayan Shah, but that of the vanquished Mallas. This 
would not endear him to his courtiers or people. 
Moreover, there were French artillerymen at the court of Kathmandu. It was these 
individuals that Kirkpatrick referred to when he wrote that Bahadur Shah also kept ‘some 
European adventurers in his service, who would seem to have promised much but to have 
performed nothing’.107 Such Europeans were often found casting cannon or engineering 
for Indian rulers. In 1754 for instance there were Irish engineering officers serving the 
Nawab of Arcot alongside the British.108 The decline of French power in India from the 
Battle of Wandiwash onwards was not apparent to EIC officials at the time, and French 
mercenaries were regarded with suspicion. Mysore recruited a French-trained, musket 
bearing and heavily French staffed brigade of 20,000; from 1784 Benoit De Boigne 
revolutionized the Maratha ruler Scindia’s armies, with three brigades of European-style 
infantry.109 The colonial nation-state rivalries between these individuals can be over-
exaggerated. Instead, these individuals were not governed by loyalty to France. They were 
adventurers looking for profit and acting in their own interests. Many relied on the EIC to 
                                               
106 Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, p.197. 
107 Ibid., p.215. 
108 Lawrence, Narrative of the War on the Coast of Coromandel, p.7. 
109 Wickremesekera, ‘The Best Black Troops’, pp.70-72. 
162 
 
remit profits back to their home countries. De Boigne’s contract with Scindia even 
stipulated that he did not personally have to fight the English. It is nevertheless plausible 
that national allegiances did affect the cannon-casters’ reaction to the Kirkpatrick venture. 
Firstly, their presence outside the French territory of Pondicherry by no means ensured 
their relationship and loyalty to their homeland was distant and faint. Secondly, increased 
EIC presence in Kathmandu would herald their replacement by Company artillerymen, 
particularly if Kirkpatrick was right to suggest that they had not made much progress. If 
they had any leverage over the regent it would have benefitted them to emphasize the 
hostility and threat of the EIC. 
  Ultimately, the scale of threat, and pressure from those who observed that, swayed 
Bahadur Shah. He wrote to Lord Cornwallis in Calcutta requesting military assistance. 
Perhaps pre-empting this, the Tibetans likewise wrote, requesting the British did not 
intercede on behalf of the Gorkhalis, adding that the Bahadur Shah will ‘write lies and 
calamities’ in order to enlist EIC support.110 Cornwallis received and responded to both 
letters in the summer of 1792, yet contrary to the thoughts of historians writing on 
Kirkpatrick, he did not act upon them independently.111 Like Bahadur Shah within his royal 
court, Cornwallis had to balance competing agendas within the EIC – appeasing the 
Gorkhalis suited the hinterland merchants and stations, yet the Company also sought in-
roads to China. The EIC had just signed a commercial treaty with Nepal, yet ambassadors 
had recently reached Lhasa for the first time. He therefore turned to others for help, 
consulting his envoy, Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan, and his agents at Patna and Bettiah, 
requesting an account of the situation. The course of action he decided upon benefitted 
those consulted parties: he opted to stay neutral, offering to send a mediator to 
Kathmandu. That expedition would serve furthermore as a fact-finding enterprise, and as 
an opportunity to negotiate once more a commercial agreement, potentially even establish 
a residency in Nepal.112  
Kirkpatrick was the brother of James Achilles Kirkpatrick, resident to the court of 
Hyderabad from 1798 to 1803, case-studied in William Dalrymple’s White Mughals.113 A 
small group of dignitaries, including Lieutenants Gerard, Scott and Knox (who would later 
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become resident at Kathmandu) as well as a surgeon, Adam Freer, accompanied 
Kirkpatrick. A small military detachment of two companies offered some protection.114 
Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan joined the expedition, having ensured it went ahead, and secured 
for himself an emissary position amongst Kirkpatrick’s entourage. A Hindu mendicant, 
Guru Gajraj Misra, was employed as guide. Misra’s involvement draws strong parallels with 
that of Ram Das in 1767: he had previously been employed as a messenger, and had 
reportedly used that position to make the case to Bahadur Shah that the EIC offer was a 
dangerous one to turn down, adding nuance to Kadir Khan’s entreaties, who instead 
emphasised EIC mediation skills.115 There were also numerous coolies and harkaras. Porters 
were to be recruited en route. In comparison to the 1767 expedition, the EIC waited for 
preferable travelling conditions despite the urgency, and did not depart until the spring of 
1793. The relatively small military detachment reflected the diplomatic purpose of the 
enterprise and a reluctance to provoke hostilities or resentment from the local people 
whom the expedition once more would rely on for provisions. 
Like Kinloch before him, Kirkpatrick was instructed to keep a record of his 
journey: notable places, routes and events. He kept field notes, which he wrote up initially 
as a memoir, now within the India Office Records, and shortly after published as An 
Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul in 1811.116 Whilst there are plenty of extant versions of this 
account, this chapter draws from the first edition, and the account in its memoir form 
within the archive. Despite professions to the contrary within the preface, it was always 
intended to be read by a wider audience, greater informed by the burgeoning market for 
‘oriental histories’ and travel literature than that of Kinloch. Kirkpatrick’s memoirs were 
the intellectual property of the Company; it is with their patronage and sanctioning that it 
was published, and to the directors that it was addressed with gratitude.117 Published 
eighteen years after the expedition, Kirkpatrick’s book emerged on the eve of war between 
the EIC and Nepal, a context quite different to that in which he set out, wherein the 
Company hoped to act as peace-brokers, not invaders. He drew the history of Nepal from 
one particular historical text that was made to available to him whilst in the country. The 
maps and drawings within the 1811 first edition had been edited by the publisher’s artist, 
which could detract from their accuracy.118 Kirkpatrick’s Account of Nepal first consists of 
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five chapters describing his route to Nepal Valley, punctuated with additional detail, 
followed by four chapters containing further cultural, religious, historical and political 
observations. His journal can be read alongside his memoir papers, and other official letters 
and consultations relating to the expedition that were couriered to Governor-General 
Cornwallis in Calcutta. These letters received much archival attention as the first EIC 
delegation to reach Kathmandu, and many feature in the Account of Nepal appendix. 
The preface to the 1811 edition came with the caveat that the text had been ‘put 
into the hands of a literary gentleman for the purpose of its being properly prepared to 
meet the public eye,’ explaining that the memoirs ‘were thrown together in greater haste 
than was perhaps entirely compatible either with much accuracy of style, or clearness of 
arrangement’.119 Its publication was delayed, awaiting news from Knox’s residency in Nepal 
from 1802 to 1803 – there was a fear that it could be rendered redundant by a more up to 
date account, and a notion that it could instead be augmented by or grafted onto that 
report.120 The publisher tired of this and having incurred great expense, claimed in the 
preface to have ‘been reduced to the necessity of sending the work forth nearly in the same 
state in which it came to his hands’.121 This assertion certainly seems intentional; to avoid 
the accusation that he had manipulated it substantially.  
Kirkpatrick himself added that he did not feel he had stayed in Nepal a long 
enough duration to add to British ‘knowledge’.122 He was after all only resident in 
Kathmandu for two weeks. For this reason, Kirkpatrick is distanced from the published 
version, and it is important to credit other individuals whose voices are present, to 
unknown and varying degrees, within that text – the Court of Directors who made it 
available for publication, the friends who the preface author asserts persuaded him to 
publish, as well as the editor, despite their claim to have left the memoirs intact. A parallel 
reading with the writing of Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, who published that long-awaited 
account from Knox’s Nepal residency some years later, sheds some light on the changes 
that these other voices instigated. Buchanan-Hamilton did not believe that some passages 
covering Hinduism and the route to Kathmandu could had been written by Kirkpatrick, 
further arguing the author had not faithfully transcribed Kirkpatrick’s Indian language 
words.123 Kirkpatrick after all was in a position of slight authority over other orientalist 
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scholars, certainly over London publishers: he had previously written his own Hindoo 
Grammar book recommended to the Select Committee for Company publication.124 To 
navigate these, one has to take great care upon finding a discrepancy between the two 
different Kirkpatrick manuscripts, the field memoir and the Account, asking why a writer 
would choose to make the edit. 
Kirkpatrick’s experience drew heavily on pre-existing expectations and an 
orientalist understanding of the Himalayan foothills. For instance, within his memoirs 
Kirkpatrick reflected on the 1767 expedition, one of the rare near-contemporary accounts 
of that clash. Kirkpatrick notably neglects to attribute any EIC responsibility unto why it 
failed, instead arguing Kathmandu fell before Kinloch could relieve the city as a result of 
Ranjit Malla of Bhaktapur allying with Shah, and that the detachment fell victim to 
sickness. Whilst this itself is true, it discounts the marginalized agency highlighted in 
chapter IV. In contrast, he dismissed the Nepalese accounts of the encounter that he heard 
from Bahadur Shah, which emphasized military superiority and the clash at Sindhuli, 
writing ‘without authentic records, it is clouded by mythological fables’.125 Kirkpatrick was 
dismissive of Nepalese record keeping and their version of events, valuing instead recorded 
accounts and observation. Yet his re-writing of the 1767 campaign omits details that could 
prove embarrassing to the EIC, instead drawing attention to Nepalese betrayals.  
Kirkpatrick furthermore orientalized Shah in his attempt to validate the stories of 
brutality at Kirtipur: ‘The reduction of this place [Kirtipur] cost the Ghoorkali so much 
trouble, that in resentment of the resistance made by the inhabitants, he barbarously caused 
all the males he captured in it to be deprived of their noses’.126 Kirkpatrick’s explanation for 
how he came upon this account demonstrates how the event was used to emphasize 
Gorkhali cruelty without any discussion of the scale of this retribution, nor comparison of 
South Asian and Company punishment in the eighteenth century, as per the argument 
made in chapter III: ‘We came to the knowledge of this fact in consequence of observing 
among the porters who transported our baggage over the hills, a remarkable number of 
noseless men, the singularity of the circumstance leading us to inquire into the cause of it.’ 
However, it is doubtful that these were veterans of Kirtipur: that would have involved 
heavy recruitment of Kirtipur porters in Bengal, who were all of adult age twenty-six years 
previously. Instead, Kirkpatrick observed a number of convicted criminals, mutilated and 
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reduced to porter occupations, then augmented that observation with the accounts of the 
Capuchins. This ‘maiming of limbs’ was quite a common punishment, being considered the 
most preferable of five possible ‘severe punishments’ for serious crimes, according to 
Francis Buchanan-Hamilton upon his visit in 1802 (the others included ‘confiscation of the 
whole estate’, ‘banishment of the whole family’, ‘degradation of the whole family to the 
lowest tribe’, and ‘death by cutting the throat’. It is unsurprising that officials opted for the 
maiming instead.)127 By recalling Kirtipur, the porters kept their criminal past concealed. 
Kirkpatrick was thus critical of Nepalese and Gorkhali historical accounts in both these 
examples, reducing the Nepalese to a passive role, dismissing their record-keeping and 
supporting visions of barbarism with his own observation.  
Kirkpatrick relied on those around him to provide further details on anything 
beyond his line of sight. Yet the exact identities and roles of these individuals are quite 
vague, rarely explained beyond the identifier ‘the people I am with say,’ or alternatively, ‘I 
am told that.’128 Kirkpatrick often followed the identification of Nepalese knowledge with a 
dismissal of its veracity. For example the assertion that the Tibetans forbade shawl goats 
from leaving the country, a fact that Kirkpatrick accompanied with the caveat ‘which I 
derive entirely from the report of the Nepaul people,’ was footnoted as incorrect as per the 
contradicting report of a European observer, Samuel Turner, who ‘had several of them 
brought from Tibet to Bengal’.129 There was a purpose behind these identifiers – the reader 
could note which components of the account were a result of Kirkpatrick’s own 
observations, and consider them verified since they were observed by European eyes, and 
could brand those relayed to him by South Asian intermediaries as unfounded or 
untrustworthy.  
These practices disguised and discredited the extent to which Nepalese sources 
contributed towards information transmission and knowledge. Yet the details of 
Kirkpatrick’s account, the parameters of his experience, and the success of his enterprise 
were greatly shaped by marginalized historical agency. Within this encounter, it played a 
great part alongside the fortitude of existing orientalist tropes. C.A. Bayly wrote that 
colonial knowledge was derived to a considerable extent from Indian knowledge, ‘albeit 
torn out of context and distorted by fear and prejudice.’130 It is precisely at the intersection 
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between what Kirkpatrick expected to observe, and what he was told by marginalized, 
South Asian sources, that his account of Nepal was formulated. 
Such marginalized agency almost scuppered the expedition’s very outset when 
Nepal and China conducted a truce before Kirkpatrick departed. The mood amongst 
Nepalese and Chinese rank-and-file soldiers, weary of a campaign during the Himalayan 
winter, threatened the ability of both sides to continue the conflict. Whilst the former’s 
numbers had been severely depleted in successive withdrawals, battered by the snows and 
the cold, the latter experienced a fractured relationship with their Tibetan hosts – the 
requisitioning of local flour and livestock by the Chinese army aggravated villagers, who did 
little to speed its supply as the war continued.131 Despite having held the Chinese forces on 
the doorstep at Nuwakot near Kathmandu, Bahadur Shah had submitted and signed a 
widely unpopular peace treaty. The war having ended, citizens of Kathmandu became 
increasingly hostile towards the size and agenda of Kirkpatrick’s entourage rumoured to be 
approaching Nepal.  
These developments ceased the expedition’s raison d’être. It now faced the 
confusion of the soubahs - regional governors between Kirkpatrick and his destination, as 
well as the Nepalese envoys at Calcutta and Patna, unsure whether to permit him passage 
given that the war had concluded. They held the expedition at Patna, awaiting permission 
from the Nepalese Durbar to let the British proceed, and the hurrying back and forth of 
harkaras and emissaries.132 Bahadur Shah likewise took his time deliberating how his 
disaffected court would react, having recently signed the humiliating peace agreement. He 
eventually opted against damaging EIC relations, permitting passage. Difficulties in 
recruiting porters and the early onset of rains further delayed the expedition.133 
Once en route, the significance of local support and agency is evident from the 
outset of Kirkpatrick’s Account of Nepal, as he made his way through the Tarai, winding up 
through the foothills before dropping down into the Nepal Valley. Like others before him, 
Kirkpatrick and his surveyor Gerard struggled with measuring distance. They were reduced 
to tracking their progress by time observations, then comparing them at the end of the 
march. Such a method was very unreliable as Kirkpatrick conceded himself, and the 
expedition often found themselves in the dark about their location, reliant on the words of 
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his guide Gajraj Misra who he described as his ‘oral authority’.134 They also struggled to 
feed the entourage, Kirkpatrick describing the difficulties in obtaining provisions from 
local producers for a single day, without the help of Nepalese officials either in the region 
or accompanying him.135  
From Kirkpatrick’ arrival at the Nepalese borders, the expedition was chaperoned 
by a Nepalese military detachment. What he was able to observe, interpret and detail within 
his account was framed by this. These soldiers, commanded by a sirdar, and the soubah 
government officials provided him with all the geographical information he was not able to 
immediately perceive. It is apparent from Kirkpatrick’s description that these military 
commanders acted with relative freedom, particularly the smaller garrisons, commanded by 
an omrah, who ‘are everywhere wholly independent of the civil governors; their garrisons 
too, are chiefly composed of troops raised and formed by themselves, the regulars, or those 
of the line, being only occasionally employed under them; they have lands assigned to them 
for the support of themselves and men, and rank very high among the orders of the 
state’.136 This proposed degree of independence from Kathmandu gives greater pertinence 
to the choices made by a commander in the Tarai who notably chaperoned Kirkpatrick to 
Nepal along a western arc shadowing the route of the Bagmati, despite his interest in 
alternative routes and a desire to take the most expedient road, that of Sindhuli further east 
(which the 1767 expedition had attempted to traverse.) Potentially, that omrah hoped to give 
Kirkpatrick the impression that Nepal was only accessed with difficulty – something 
further apparent in their decidedly hostile translation of road and place names that 
Kirkpatrick would not himself perceive, for instance describing the above route as the 
‘sword-edge road’.137 
Within the published account of Kirkpatrick’s memoir, there is evidence of an 
extraordinary value placed on local agency by the Nepalese officials. Having arrived in 
Makwanpur from the Tarai, Kirkpatrick observed the agricultural wealth of the valley and 
attributed it to complete tax immunity for the local growers. Consulting his interpreter, he 
was told this was offered in case the deposed regional ruler of the Sen dynasty sought to re-
establish his control there.138 He speculated that ‘it may therefore be thought necessary, or 
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at least advisable, by the Nepaul government, to give the inhabitants of this distance [sic] 
such an interest in the permanence of its own authority, as shall leave them nothing to 
hope, but much to fear, from the success of an invader, whether it be their former master, 
or any other power’.139 The military chaperones relating this to Kirkpatrick could have 
deliberately portrayed Gorkhali rule in Nepal as just and accommodating rather than 
martial, and should be taken with as much suspicion as the British official’s commitment to 
the despot trope. On the other hand, this demonstrates a degree of caution and wariness 
around the interests of villagers in this space. 
Upon arrival, Kirkpatrick was first taken to Nuwakot, then to an encampment 
outside Kathmandu. He did not leave this site for the fortnight he was there. All 
observations from this point on were derivative from informants and from his occasional 
audiences with the regent Bahadur Shah and the young king Rana Bahadur Shah. He relied 
heavily on the ‘invaluable assistance of Gajraj Misra and Abdul Kadir Khan’.140 His attempt 
therefore to give an account of the country is characterized by his own professions of 
limitation and ignorance. In total he passed only seven weeks in Nepal. 
Beyond his intention to describe the country for the purpose of travel writing, he 
was also hindered in his commercial, diplomatic enterprise. By the time Kirkpatrick arrived 
in Nepal, the courtiers who undoubtedly had leverage over Bahadur Shah had tired of 
concessions to both the Chinese and the British. Kirkpatrick wrote that Bahadur’s 
conciliatory measures ‘according to the declaration of an intelligent person who 
communicated with me freely on this subject, have reduced the strength and energy of the 
Goorkhali dominion to the mere shadow of what it was under the more vigorous, or, more 
properly speaking, the more arbitrary sway of Purthi Nerain [Prithvi Narayan Shah]’.141 The 
courtiers of Nepal within this narrative are hardly subaltern by most definitions, but their 
agency and influence has previously been relatively marginalized, at least within either 
British or royalist-centred Nepalese histories. Their leverage over the political and 
diplomatic concerns of Nepal decided the fate of the Kirkpatrick expedition. A significant 
proportion of the court found that having already concluded the Nepalese-Chinese treaty, 
British presence in the valley no longer had any value. Some historians have even suggested 
the original, existing British-Nepalese treaty signed in 1790 was only acceded to in the hope 
that it would ensure British support against any possible Chinese counter attack (this was 
between two Nepalese offensives).142 The country’s diplomats, by many accounts 
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suspicious of EIC intentions, were perhaps apprehensive of a treaty that did not specifically 
offer the military assistance requested. However, the omission of such a promise could be a 
symptom of that very same suspicion – a fear that its formal inclusion could give the EIC a 
licence to station soldiers in Nepal. If that were the case and the Nepalese were expecting 
assistance on the basis of the pre-existing commercial treaty without it having specifically 
stated military support would be offered, Kirkpatrick’s expedition would have faced a 
challenge merely to cement the existing commercial terms let alone enhance them, since 
there was an unwritten assumption or expectation of support that had not been 
forthcoming.  
Kirkpatrick was hesitant in advancing his own concerns, having been made acutely 
aware by Gajraj Misra of the threat his presence posed to Bahadur Shah.143 He was shortly 
instructed to leave, having made no advances on the trade agreement. Exasperated, he 
departed concluding that ‘I have now ascertained with sufficient certainty that my residency 
at this court was not to be hoped for’.144 The expedition potentially brought more 
detriment than benefit to any existing relationship: Kirkpatrick was not subtle in his 
personal endeavours to gather material for his book, which observers considered clear 
evidence of espionage and intelligence gathering.145 His presence and note-taking in 
Kathmandu after the war had concluded represented an EIC interference in Nepalese 
politics that would not have been tolerated by Prithvi Narayan Shah.146 The EIC’s 
inconsequential intervention also appears to have sabotaged (in part) Britain’s unsuccessful 
ambassadorial visit to China the following year. Envoy Lord Macartney found he was 
rebuked at the negotiating table by none other than Duke Fu Kang-an, commander of the 
Chinese troops in Nepal, who attributed his failure at Nuwakot to the intervention of 
British soldiers.147 The Chinese had retreated well before Kirkpatrick’s entourage arrived in 
Kathmandu, yet Duke Fu Kang-an later became aware of their presence in the valley, and 
either mistook the numbers of his military guard or believed the expedition to have played 
some strategic, advisory role in the preceding battle. How pivotal this coincidence was in 
comparison to larger Chinese commercial ambitions and polices is of course questionable. 
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V:7 The Appointment of a South Asian Emissary: Kadir Khan’s Expedition, 1795 
 
British attempts to establish a presence in Nepal did not stop at Kirkpatrick, and the next 
venture attempted is very significant for a study of marginalized agency. In 1795 the EIC 
sent a new expedition that was critically different to those that had preceded it. They sent a 
Bengali, none other than Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan, not simply as a messenger passing the 
letters of Governor-Generals Hastings, Cornwallis or John Shore, nor a guide conducting 
others through the foothills like Ram Das or Gajraj Misra, but as an emissary in his own 
right, entrusted with the responsibility of representing and negotiating on behalf of the 
EIC.  
Unlike the exploits of Kirkpatrick, Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan’s 1795 venture rarely 
features in narratives of the EIC in the Himalayas and there is comparatively scant archival 
material. Khan presumably did write or at least was instructed to write either an expedition 
journal or a memoir of his own, since he was acting on behalf of the EIC in an official 
capacity and consequently was expected to document the venture as any other commander. 
It is unlikely that Khan would be excused from the provision of written reports because of 
his South Asian identity –the EIC’s demand for and scarcity of colonial knowledge of the 
Himalayas supersedes that. Furthermore, Kadir Khan in this instance was not acting in a 
harkara messaging capacity but an ambassadorial one - he was well versed in translating, 
speaking and writing, in Persian, English, Bengali, and the Kathmandu and Gorkha 
languages of Newari and Khas respectively – he was employed on the basis that he could 
carefully select his words, and be accountable for them. A record of those words was 
expected. The absence within the archive of any surviving such document reflects a greater 
issue of the physical marginalizing of Indian colonial accounts, rendered more subject to 
selective archival practice by its authorship. Kadir Khan’s account was perhaps more likely 
to be destroyed or removed since his words were inscribed with less authority than those 
of Kirkpatrick or Kinloch. 
 The choice to send a Bengali intermediary was an acceptance of the role 
marginalized agency had played up to this point: Kinloch had been thwarted by a lack of 
local geographical knowledge. In its absence, local populations had been reluctant to 
support a European officer in the provision of either supplies, transport, labour, or 
information. Foxcroft likewise was refused permission to proceed as a result of his overt 
EIC attachment, and Kirkpatrick had relied on the intervention of local officials to secure 
food. It was evident that an EIC official could not reach Nepal without the co-operation of 
the local. There is no reason a Bengali would fare any better in unfamiliar and challenging 
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territory such as the Tarai and Himalayas, yet the difficulties inherent within a European-
Nepalese encounter could be eliminated, and with greater mastery of local cultures, religion 
and languages, a Bengali envoy would be better placed to secure the support of the local.  
There were plenty of candidates. Informants and diplomats previously in the 
employment of Mughal elites, resident in Bengal and hence keenly aware of British power, 
had already played a crucial role in the subsequent territorial expansion of the Company 
throughout north India by this time.148 Christopher Bayly argued that there was a pattern to 
these Indian ambassadors, emphasising in particular a lineage of ambassadorial Mughal elite 
service, as well as family patronage of both the sacred, in holy centres, as well as the 
profane, with learned reputations. The decline in service offered by the Mughal rulers 
meant these ambassadors increasingly offered their services elsewhere.149 This was 
particularly so in Bengal after the demise of the Nawabs there.  
Over the years, Kadir Khan had manoeuvred himself into a position of trust, 
responsibility and reward for service rendered, to the point that he stood out above other 
potential emissaries for this expedition. He was the son of Mir Wasil Ali Khan, a servant to 
Mir Kasim. He rose to prominence as a judge of the Banaras Civil Court, and as an 
information collector for the British. He had experience in an intermediary capacity with 
Hindu states through his relationship with Amrit Rao, brother to the Maratha Peshwa, and 
had very likely accompanied his mentor Ali Ibrahim on diplomatic missions.150 He was 
furthermore related to Mahomed Reza Khan, the most important Indian administrator 
during Clive’s governance whose family was to inform British policy in Bengal from 1756 
to 1830.151 Mahomed Reza Khan had an uneasy relationship with Hastings, helping explain 
why these prominent Indian ambassadors in Bengal were not entrusted with a mission to 
Nepal anytime sooner than John Shore’s Governor-Generalship.  
The most immediate advantage that Kadir Khan offered as an emissary is one 
previously alluded to: that this was a journey he had made several times already. It is 
evident within both Kirkpatrick’s correspondence and his Account that it was Kadir Khan 
who recommended the EIC send an expedition in the first place, and that it was Kadir 
Khan who delivered Cornwallis’ messages to Nepal. He had furthermore helped draught 
the earlier treaty between the EIC and Nepal with Jonathan Duncan, resident at Benares, in 
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the year preceding the expedition.152 By acting as an envoy, he was a voice in the ear to 
both Cornwallis and Bahadur Shah the Nepalese regent, as the Chinese armies approached.  
An intriguing story emerges from Nepalese histories further exploring the role of 
Kadir Khan and that of Lama Shamarpa, a Tibetan exile in Kathmandu who supposedly 
encouraged the regent Bahadur Shah to invade Tibet in 1788.153 Kadir Khan allegedly wrote 
to Duncan on the eve of the Chinese counter-invasion, explaining that the presence of that 
Tibetan exile in Nepal and the consequent Chinese demand for his return was a result of 
his brother, the former Panchen Lama, being poisoned due to his negotiations with the 
British (this was the same individual whom George Bogle had struck up a friendship with, 
two decades earlier.) The Panchen Lama had in fact died from smallpox and the alternative 
story of poison has been explained as a fabrication of Kadir Khan, keen to attribute blame 
for the Chinese invasion on the British, and thus secure British support for Nepal.154 There 
is no evidence for this within the EIC’s letters on the expedition, though they may not all 
be extant and if this story was indeed related by Kadir Khan to the British it would suggest 
a great degree of creativity on behalf of the Bengali emissary.  
Kadir Khan’s appointment represented a significant change in EIC Himalayan 
expedition policy wherein they built upon experience, and not of a military kind. Yet, even 
beyond the employment of a South Asian intermediary into a Company position of 
responsibility and negotiation, there were features of the 1795 Kadir Khan expedition that 
emphasize the importance of marginalized agency, both in determining the fate of previous 
ventures and within Kadir Khan’s venture. For a start, the EIC recognized that an 
entourage considerably smaller in size and less militant would be more likely to secure 
support en route.155 Once more, intermediaries travelling between Calcutta and Kathmandu 
before the expedition played an important role – whilst Kadir Khan himself could be 
considered marginalized within existing historical accounts, it was the Hindu mendicant, 
Guru Gajraj Misra, who made the preliminary voyage to Nepal (as Kadir Khan did for 
Kirkpatrick), convincing the now reigning Rana Bahadur Shah of the EIC’s friendly 
intentions sufficiently enough to secure Kadir Khan an invite.156 By this time, Misra’s stock 
had risen greatly in Calcutta, Shore writing that ‘the only channel through which I can hope 
to make a favourable impression on the Rajah of Nipaul is a brahmin by the name of 
Gurjraje Misser, who has always been disposed to promote our wishes, and whom Captain 
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Kirkpatrick found possessed of great influence with the court of Nipaul.’157 Misra managed 
to secure Kadir Khan permission to proceed against the odds - the majority of courtiers 
remained hostile towards a tying EIC commercial treaty.158 Nor could Misra draw upon 
Kadir Khan’s help at this stage: the Bengali ambassador was unwell for the majority of the 
planning and travelling, being struck down by illness in the Tarai.159 
Nepalese accounts argue that Kadir Khan made his entreaties on mercantile, 
economic grounds, coming to them ‘in the form of a merchant’.160 The expedition was 
marginally more successful than that of Kirkpatrick: whilst it did not establish a residency 
or enforce the failing commercial treaty, the conversations held between Maulvi Abdul 
Kadir Khan and Rana Bahadur Shah have been said to have improved EIC-Nepalese 
relations nonetheless. It is cited as a forerunner for Nepalese support in opposing the 
rebellion of Wazir Ali, a claimant to the Nawab of Oudh, as well as Nepalese co-operation 
in his capture.161 Khan’s experience in Nepal greatly advanced his own career. He wrote 
extensively on the region, augmenting his knowledge of Indian diplomacy. In particular his 
reports on the Tarai region was highly valued for explaining the migrations of herdsmen in 
the region. He later served in the Lucknow residency, and was amply rewarded for his 
service to the EIC with a land grant in Benares.162  
 
V:8 Conclusions 
 
Despite EIC efforts to move beyond the events of 1767, the spectre of Kinloch’s 
enterprise, even the spectre of marginalized agency within that encounter, haunt the 
expeditions that followed. The significance of marginalized historical agents in those later 
expeditions demonstrates that 1767 was not a unique convergence of factors, but actually 
established a longer pattern of EIC-Nepalese relations and contact throughout the rest of 
the century. 
In terms of the representation of Nepal that participants returned to the EIC, 
existing expectations remained steadfast; an orientalized, despotic, backward mountain 
fiefdom stubborn to the benefits of EIC trade. For James Logan this reflected the serious 
trauma of defeat and injury. In Kirkpatrick’s case, the re-entrenchment of such views 
reflects the changing political dynamics at the point of his Account’s publication as the 
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Company teetered on the brink of the Anglo-Nepalese War. However, lessons learned are 
evident within numerous EIC approaches: their plans for a second invasion, Logan’s 
mission and the designs for Morang in 1774. There are furthermore competing agencies 
and influences within the Foxcroft and Kirkpatrick encounters, mostly present in 
differences within the Nepalese court, as they processed the fortunes of war and peace with 
China. The fates of expeditions were carefully orchestrated by other hands, and the values 
that the EIC commanders brought back were augmented by those manoeuvres. The 
parameters of Foxcroft and Kirkpatrick’s encounters, who they met and where they went, 
were determined by marginalized parties. 
The EIC ultimately found this period in Anglo-Nepalese relations a frustrating one. 
However, Kadir Khan’s story demonstrates ways in which from 1767 to 1795, local, 
sometimes subaltern yet always marginalized individuals could progressively pursue their 
agendas either within an EIC expedition or upon encountering one. This often met with 
great success and reward, whilst the majority of these ventures failed to achieve their goals. 
176 
 
Chapter VI –Marginalized Agency in Wider Himalayan Ventures and Early Nineteenth-
Century Expeditions to Nepal 
 
Summary 
 
Chapter VI continues the project of chapter V in charting the impact of 1767 and the 
influence of marginalized historical agents within colonial encounters. However, it casts a 
wider net in space and time. None of the expeditions discussed so far took place in a 
vacuum of Anglo-Nepalese relations. The web of competing British, Bengali, Nepalese, 
Tibetan, and Chinese interests that played a part in Kirkpatrick’s 1793 expedition 
demonstrates this. Nor did Nepal represent the EIC’s only point of contact with the 
Himalayan states and peoples. The chapter therefore first considers encounters 
contemporary to Kinloch but further afield geographically: in the Tarai lowlands, Bhutan, 
and Tibet. The chapter then focuses on later expeditions to Nepal: the residency in 
Kathmandu of William Knox, the subsequent published Account of Nepaul by Francis 
Buchanan-Hamilton, and the Anglo-Nepalese War in the early nineteenth century. These 
later expeditions demonstrate the significance of marginalized agency within EIC-Nepalese 
encounters, and consequences of that agency, over a longer period of time.  
 
VI:1 – The Sannyasi Uprising and Rennell’s Cartography 
 
The Fakir and Sannyasi Uprising took place between the EIC territories and the Himalayan 
foothills, spanning most of the late eighteenth century. Whilst the British interpretation at 
the time and that of colonial era historians consider it banditry taking greater opportunity 
in the aftermath of the Bengal Famine, Indian nationalist historians consider it a precursor 
to the independence struggle, rooting all grievances in the seismic changes from 1765. 
Marxist historians more recently emphasize underpinning economic hardships that tied 
fakir and Sannyasi together, considering the conflict a ‘Peasant War’. Jon Wilson further 
identified these binary interpretations in the works of James Scott, who ‘suggests that 
instances of violent rebellion are only the most emphatic expression of a ‘hidden transcript’ 
of resistance that reflected the peasant’s permanent opposition to and exclusion from the 
structure of authority’.1 These interpretations argue for an ‘irreconcilable antagonism 
between fundamentally opposed social forces,’ that ‘does not provide room for an analysis 
of how the perception of those antagonisms emerged, nor of how subject-positions that 
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regarded themselves as necessarily opposed emerged’.2 This section revises James Rennell’s 
attempts to map the Himalayan foothills in the context of this uprising, demonstrating 
ways in which marginalized historical agents influenced European cartographical practices 
at this time. That revision furthermore counters existing partisan accounts of the uprising 
by demonstrating the hybridism of this conflict. The nuances of communal or individual 
grievances and interests help explain the emergence of those opposing subject-positions. 
The fakir and Sannyasi groups straddled India and Nepal, clashing politically with 
regional powers in both these spaces. Many of the Sannyasi sects’ principle monasteries 
were within the Himalayas, for instance that of the Giri sect at Joshimath, (Jyotirmath in 
present day Uttarakhand) a group that played a prominent role in the rebellion.3 Their 
trading interests spanned Awadh, Bengal and Nepal, whilst their pilgrimage routes criss-
crossed the Tarai and the lower foothills.  
In their encounter with the emergent Gorkhali state, the Sannyasis were aggravated 
by Prithvi Narayan Shah’s re-invigorated taxation system that neglected their tax privileges, 
as he sought to finance his campaigns. Their avoidance of these new duties drew ire from 
the Nepalese Durbar. The Sannyasis consequently did not support Prithvi Narayan Shah, 
and hoped that the re-instating or resistance of regional hill-rajas might better protect their 
religious privileges. Shah reportedly encountered the Sannyasis in his youth. Upon an 
earlier visit to Benares, the young prince had argued with and killed two Mughal customs 
officers. He was sheltered, concealed and then conducted to safety by a Sannyasi who in 
return was promised repayment upon the conquest of Nepal. Years later upon hearing of 
Shah’s ascension to the throne, the Sannyasi ‘repaired to that country and reminded the 
chief of his promises’. Shah acknowledged the validity of the story but refused to reward 
the Sannyasi on the grounds that the promise had ‘been extorted through fear’. The affair 
soon escalated when the aggrieved mendicant ‘assembled five hundred of the religious 
order’ of Sannyasis against the Gorkhalis, causing further unrest along the border between 
Shah’s new territories and British Bengal.4  This Sannyasi pressure moved Shah to a more 
conciliatory stance with the EIC: the Nepalese Durbar wrote to Warren Hastings in May 
1773, expressing his anxiety to cultivate peace in order to counter the insurgency.5  
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There were also violent and sporadic clashes between Sannyasis and the EIC as 
early as the 1760s. The Sannyasis depended heavily on trade networks, notably silk, as well 
as money-lending. The EIC increasingly attempted to profit from these networks by raising 
dues on transactions with raw product cultivators and creating monopolies. In return, the 
Sannyasis resorted more often to smuggling.6 Many of the earlier clashes thus derived from 
the pursuit of smugglers. A further financial pressure on the Sannyasis in the years 
preceding the Permanent Settlement of 1790 was the increasing tax on lands previously 
exempted, and their ranks were indeed reinforced by peasant ryots unable to keep up with 
the demands of zamindars and Company collectors.7  
Sannyasis and fakirs were aggrieved by the company restrictions on their 
movements and shrine worship. Following the upheaval of 1757 and 1764, the fakirs 
travelled far more frequently in larger groups for security, something the EIC considered 
alarming and sought to prohibit in their territory from 1773 onwards. These measures were 
not designed as an attack on religious practices, instead being motivated by paranoia over 
stability and a quest for legitimacy in the eyes of the zamindars whose estates were 
plundered. They nevertheless represented an intrusion into established religious practices – 
rights of mobility, arms, and exemption from duties were intrinsically linked to the 
Sannyasi ‘holy man’ status.8 It was also a prohibition on political, commercial rights: 
Sannyasis like ryots could relocate their labour through their nomadism. The notion that 
these subjects alternatively had ‘a thousand countries to go to,’ were they not provided 
justice by the British, was similarly apt for the itinerant Sannyasis.9 Attempts to prohibit 
their movements therefore deprived them of this advantage in their negotiations with 
landholders and local elite. 
It was this prolonged, sporadic conflict that provided the backdrop for the next 
EIC venture through which marginalized agency and influence can be assessed: the 
Himalayan foothills section of the geographical survey of Bengal, under the direction of 
James Rennell. This enterprise was instructed by Clive in the mid-1760s. Before then, 
geographical knowledge derived mostly from smaller maps, drawing upon information of 
French, Indian, and Dutch reports, rather than the work of EIC surveyors. Clive planned 
to connect these various attempts, iron out the differences within them, and create a single 
map of EIC territorial acquisitions – for the multiple purposes of scientific enquiry, 
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revenue and taxation, military control and administration. James Rennell had previously 
surveyed for the navy, had already begun surveying vast swathes of Bengal, and was 
twenty-four when appointed by Clive in 1767 to complete a general survey of EIC 
acquisitions.10 This drew him to the Himalayan foothills, a region for which EIC knowledge 
was, as previously outlined in chapter III, desperately inadequate. Writing to his former 
guardian in England on 25th September 1767, Rennell described the venture that lay ahead 
of him: ‘I am now going to traverse the countries that lie east and southeast side of the 
Brahmaputrey, you may not expect to hear from me until this time again twelvemonth, as 
the length of the expedition will take up near that time. No country in the world perhaps is 
less known to Europeans than the countries lying between China and Indostan, and indeed 
how should it be otherwise, as the company have made very few discoveries until within 
twenty years past.’11  
Rennell’s encounters with the Himalayan landscapes and the rebelling Sannyasis are 
rich in source material: he wrote extensively, both formally to various patrons and 
governors, and informally to friends and family in Britain, notably to members of the 
Burrington family with whom he grew up.12 In addition, Rennell published the Bengal Atlas 
in 1779, as well as his Memoirs of a Map of Hindoostan in 1783. His field journals were also 
published in time.13 His encounter provides an important opportunity for the study of 
marginalized agency, playing a critical role in Rennell’s representation of the Himalayas to 
the EIC and eighteenth-century Britain.  
Firstly, his experience of the Himalayas and the Sannyasis left him physically and 
emotionally scarred by trauma. This can undoubtedly be read in his writing on the 
Himalayan foothills and augments colonialist notions of hostile, savage peripheries. Such a 
perception pre-dated his encounter with the Himalayas. He wrote on 31st August 1765 
before proceeding up the Brahmaputra that he expected to meet ‘a number of barbarous 
nations to pass through, some of them extremely jealous of Europeans’.14 However, a 
violent event within near the confluence of the Tista and Brahmaputra rivers affected him 
for life. In February 1766, Rennell was in the rear-guard of a military detachment chasing a 
cohort of what he called fakirs. In their flight they stumbled upon Rennell and a skirmish 
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ensued, of which Rennell wrote: ‘I had the misfortune to be surrounded by the enemy, & 
received several cuts from their broad swords, one of which threatened my death.’ He was 
seriously wounded and carried back to Dacca.15 Within his correspondence to his friends 
he provided further gruesome detail: ‘one of them [his arms] was cut in three places, and 
the shoulder belonging to the other divided. One stroke of a sabre had cut my right 
shoulder bone through, and laid me open for nearly a foot down the back, cutting through 
or wounding several of the ribs. At the left elbow the muscular part was taken off by the 
breadth of a hand; I had besides a stab in the same arm and a large cut hand which has 
deprived me of the use of my forefinger. I had some other scratches, and found a large cut 
across the back of my coat.’16  
The significance of this for the purpose of this study is twofold. It firstly secured 
Rennell’s violent representation of the Himalayan foothills, demonstrating how personal 
experience and isolated incidence could reinforce and disseminate notions of oriental 
barbarity – Rennell’s letters, journals and memoirs would have received a wide and varied 
audience. Secondly, it explains a reluctance to proceed into that space without a sizeable 
military guard, and an enthusiasm to do so for purposes of retaliation, Rennell writing on 
the event ‘I have owed them a drubbing ever since’.17 Over a year later on 25th September 
1767 he lamented ‘the accident that befell me on the banks of the Brahmaputrey in 
February 1766 seems to have hurt my constitution beyond the possibility of remedy in this 
country’.18 Rennell would subsequently be followed by James Logan, in returning to the 
foothills to exact revenge after sustaining an injury (outlined in chapter V.) 
Rennell’s correspondence also sheds light on the subaltern role within the Fakir 
and Sannyasi Uprising. This cuts across more rigid definitions, such as the large-scale 
banditry of colonialist historians or the peasant uprising of the marxists, and instead 
demonstrates a more hybrid, multi-faceted uprising across different social groups for 
different reasons, drawn together or apart circumstantially, within and across localities.  
The social structure of the Sannyasis lends itself to mass subaltern agency. Slight 
deviations in practice notwithstanding, each group was known as a math, led by a mahant 
who was voted in as head by gurus. There was no superordinate Mahant with authority over 
others. Chelas were disciples, recruited by the gurus.19 Everyone within the Math had some 
significance – the mahant was the spiritual leader, the gurus had great freedom to recruit, and 
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the chelas were given responsibility to conduct trade, being advanced great sums of money 
to do so.20 All positions within the math therefore had opportunity to act independently, 
and be involved in some form of decision making. Though the Sannyasis and fakirs 
maintained religious privileges and pursuits, by the eighteenth century they had become 
prominent moneylenders, traders and landholders. For Suranjan Chatterjee, this was the 
horizontal connection between different sects – bonds of trade.21  
The multi-faceted nature of the Sannyasis’ grievances led to some overlap, and 
some friction, with those of the wider Bengali population. For instance, it has been 
assumed by marxist and colonialists alike that the Sannyasis’ activities and rent-free land 
drew resentment from the zamindari elite - indeed there were Sannyasi and fakir attacks on 
zamindar estates.22 Yet there was also cause for zamindar solidarity with the rebellious sects 
– Sannyasi proximity to a zamindar and the latter’s patronage could cement their power 
and status within a community, whilst the armed chelas could bolster that zamindari’s 
private army.23 Even for smaller cultivators, holy men held a paradoxical position; being 
revered religiously yet begrudged for their customs avoidance by those burdened the most 
by EIC taxation.24 Whether to support the Sannyasis was thus a circumstantial decision, 
evaluating these competing grudges or benefits. That loyalty could shift. For example, in 
the aftermath of the Rangpur Uprising of 1783, whilst some peasants involved joined the 
Sannyasis, others returned to cultivation.25  
An alliance between Sannyasi and landowner precipitated Rennell’s injury in 1766 – 
the surveyor struggled to hire local coolies and porters, writing that he ‘was not able to 
procure a single one, although I offered a sufficient price’. He likewise found the ‘country 
people’ refused to supply him and his entourage with provisions. Upon enquiry, Rennell 
discovered it was ‘all owing to the villainy of the Dewan of Olyapour [Ulipur] who had 
threatened to punish any person who should supply me with men or provisions’. On 
January 11th, ‘under a thick cover of fog’, he proceeded to the diwan’s house with a 
detachment of sepoys, only to find he had ‘got intelligence of our march and was gone 
before we entered the house’. Rennell threatened the servants who remained to reveal the 
landowner’s location, or he would set fire to the house, ‘which was done accordingly soon 
after’. He then set fire to the house, and moved away a distance.26 Shortly after, the fire was 
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extinguished and the diwan came in pursuit, supported by around 450 private soldiers, 
villagers and fakirs by Rennell’s estimation, acting together against the EIC expedition’s 
presence in the region.  
There is further evidence within Rennell’s journal of the Sanyasis and fakirs working 
alongside local populations and unnamed historical agents. His concession that the 
Sannyasis had detachments in different villages reporting on his movements supports 
Chatterjee’s argument that local peasants were informing the Sannyasis on the transmission 
of sums of money, or sepoys on the march.27 Rennell reinforced the notion that, having 
completed their plunder, the Sannyasis then moved to a neighbouring district and shared 
that collection with their collaborators.28 It was this local support, and these guerrilla 
tactics, that so thwarted the EIC and prolonged the conflict – in spite of the deployment of 
four battalions of the Company’s forces, officials were forced to concede that revenue 
could not be collected safely, that ‘the inhabitants made communion with the marauders 
and the whole rural administration was unhinged’.29 
Marginalized agency played a critical part in the surveying process itself, since 
Bengali intermediaries were integral to the project. Large-scale survey operations drew 
heavily on Bengali labour: the support of guides, messengers, porters, for logistical support. 
For example, it was through the harkaras that Rennell remitted the maps and portions of 
the journal written so far to Calcutta.30 They also drew upon Indian knowledge. Rennell 
was amongst the earliest EIC surveyors to use their own observation and field work rather 
than existing reports, but he did not do so exclusively: he relied on local geographical 
instruction and though he certainly conducted many of the Brahmaputra and Ganges Delta 
surveys personally, he also drew upon the route marches of soldiers and surveyors, British 
and Indian, particularly after the injuries sustained in 1766.31 He provided a rare 
acknowledgement of his comparatively marginalized South Asian informants for regions in 
which he did not travel personally. He singled out an unnamed ‘Sepoy Officer,’ presumably 
that which led the military detachment he was accompanied by after 1766. There are then a 
number of Indian surveyors credited – ‘Ghulam Muhammad, for the rocks and country 
                                               
27 Ibid., p.73. & Chatterjee, ‘New Reflections’, p.9. 
28 B.L. IOR/H/765 Letters of Major James Rennell, p.220. 
29 Chatterjee, ‘New Reflections’, p.8. 
30 It is hard to ascertain how regularly this service was rendered since Rennell did not record every instance in 
which he remitted his work - acknowledgements such as that of the 10th June 1764 wherein he wrote that he 
had ‘despatched a hirkar with the maps and journal’ were infrequent. Rennell, The Journal of Major James Rennell, 
p.16. 
31 Kapil Raj, ‘Circulation and the Emergence of Modern Mapping: Great Britain and Early Colonial India, 
1764-1820’, in Claude Markovits, Jacques Pouchepadass & Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds, Society and Circulation: 
Mobile People and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia 1750-1950 (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), p.76. 
183 
 
between Bengal and the Deccan’, Mirza Mughal Beg for north-western India,’ and a 
Brahmin Indian called Sadanand, a man of ‘uncommon genius and knowledge,’ for 
Gujarat.32  
Like Kinloch and Kirkpatrick, Rennell was critical of South Asian information. He 
validated it against his own experiences, for example in June 1764 he felt obliged to 
‘proceed father up [a creek] to get better intelligence’.33 In other instances he rejected or 
challenged that information.34 These checks were not just the meticulousness of a young 
and enthusiastic officer or the belief in European scientific observation. They demonstrate 
a suspicion around the intent and effectiveness of these marginalized historical agents 
providing logistical support or knowledge – just as it helped, it could also hinder. For every 
instance in which Rennell does obtain information, there is one wherein his requests for 
detail fail, and he is obliged to write that he ‘could not learn from the country people any 
particulars’.35 Whilst some co-operated, others did not. On occasion, non-co-operation was 
more subtle than armed resistance. Similar to the villagers of Janakpur in 1767, Rennell 
encountered avoidance: ‘I had some thoughts of proceeding as far as Catchubary, in order 
to take a view of the country, as well as to be informed of the situation of the fir forests, 
but finding the natives very averse to it, and that they withdrew into the country in order 
that we should not be able to procure provisions, I judged it prudent to desist without 
further orders, as being foreign to the service now in execution.’36 Rennell likewise suffered 
from desertions by porters, as Kinloch had before him.37  
These challenges account for a degree of sensitivity within Rennell’s journals and 
instructions towards how local populations may react to his surveying, suggesting that their 
agendas and action could indeed scupper the enterprise, should they be unhappy. For 
example, he was ordered on 5th April 1765 to conduct his survey of rivers with sensitivity to 
local interests, notably the Brahmaputra ‘as high as it can be done without offending the 
natives’.38  
Marginalized historical agents thus had agency with which they subverted and 
frustrated European surveying enterprises. However, their involvement was critical and 
                                               
32 Rennell, Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan, pp.vi, 66, 69.  
33 Rennell, The Journal of Major James Rennell, p.21. 
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36 Ibid., p.60. 
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38 Ibid., p.42. 
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would continue, even develop, in the ventures of Rennell’s successors. Thomas Call for 
instance wrote that he had ‘for a year and a half past, employed 6 munshies [Munshis] and 
30 Hurcarrows [harkaras] at my own expense, to travel through the different parts of India 
to collect information’.39 These were often employed on the basis of previous services 
rendered, and the EIC invested in the instruction of Indians as surveyors in the years after 
Rennell, giving them greater responsibility to expand colonial knowledge.40 Indian surveyor 
information was not merged with that of colonial officials seamlessly – it was always 
subject to the critical processes such as those of Rennell, just as Kinloch did with the 
information of his guides. Yet that contribution, and ability to direct expeditions and the 
extent of knowledge, initially evident in Rennell’s experience, becomes colossal and crucial, 
particularly in the Himalayas, wherein surveying was undertaken by the pundits later in the 
nineteenth century.41 
 
VI:2 ‘I Can Depend On His Exerting Himself For My Behalf’: George Bogle in Bhutan 
and Tibet.  
 
By the 1770s, the EIC still pursued the ultimate prize: open trade with Tibet, access to its 
lucrative silk and shawl markets, and overland access to China. However, the 1767 
expedition had failed to secure trade routes through Nepal Valley and the Gorkhalis 
occupied significant passes at Kyirong, Kuti, Morang, and Sikkim. The Board of Directors 
therefore began to investigate alternative routes further afield, through Assam and 
Bhutan.42  
In similar circumstances to 1767 wherein Jaya Prakash Malla requested help, it was 
the intersection of this colonial agenda and Himalayan political intrigue and conflict that 
drew the EIC into Bhutan. In 1770 the Bhutanese Druk Desi Zhidar occupied territory in 
neighbouring Cooch Behar, sandwiched between Bhutan and EIC territory around 
Rangpur.43 Zhidar seized the Cooch Behar raja and replaced him with his own factional 
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candidate. In 1772 that puppet-ruler, Rajendra Narayan, died of fever and Zhidar’s envoy 
was ousted from the region. The Bhutanese then invaded with great force. The newly 
installed raja of Cooch Behar Dharendra Narayan was overrun, and called upon the EIC 
for assistance. Sensing the opportunity to establish influence over an alternative route to 
Tibet, a Company expedition led by John Jones set out from Rangpur.44  
This was the first military intervention in the foothills after 1767. There is no extant 
expeditionary journal for this encounter within the archives, although there are summary 
accounts by Samuel Turner and John Stewart.45 It was potentially the subject of the Plan of 
Attack of a Mountainous Country, which although in Hastings’ personal collection, could have 
predated his rule. That uncertainty notwithstanding, there are some notable differences in 
strategy, and similarities in marginalized factors of opposition, between previous 
expeditions and the Cooch Behar intervention. Firstly, the Company initially rejected 
Cooch Behar’s terms that they reimburse the EIC with one lakh rupees. Given the 
uncertain, often spiralling costs of war, the Company instead insisted payment through 
annual revenue and diplomatic agreement, effectively annexing the state. Secondly, the 
1772 military venture did not risk heavy losses in an immediate assault on Bhutanese 
fortifications, like Kinloch had at Sindhuli. Instead, Jones paused, writing to the Bhutanese 
and requesting their withdrawal, allowing for Cooch Behar reinforcements to arrive in 
support. Jones did not engage the sepoys until facing the Bhutanese on more open ground 
at Chichacotta in which the expedition’s artillery could be deployed. Summarizing the 
encounter, John Stewart wrote in 1777 that although ‘fierce in their assault…the 
management of artillery and incessant fire of musketry was beyond any idea which they 
could have conceived’.46 Writing in 1783, Samuel Turner similarly commended the bravery 
of the Bhutanese, but added that ‘it was impossible that they could content long against the 
superior advantage of firelocks and cannon’.47 Historian A. Deb added, ‘Shidariva [Zhidar] 
had not grasped the significance of the cannonade at Plassey.’48 The depleted Bhutanese 
were ousted from Cooch Behar. Zimpe, Zhidar’s commander and nephew, was killed, and 
Dharendra Narayan was reinstated. The EIC could have pressed home their advantage at 
this point. However, the expedition then encountered familiar troubles: many of the 
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column fell sick and died in the Tarai, including Jones.49 Company soldiers once more 
faced an alliance of Sannyasis and local elites – in the closing stages a great number came to 
support Zhidar, preventing further progress into the foothills.50  
At that stage, another regional power received entreaties. Zhidar upon struggling 
against the EIC sepoys called upon the mediation of Lobsang Palden Yeshé, the Panchen 
Lama and one of two political and religious figures of authority in Tibet.51 The Panchen 
Lama wrote to Governor-General Warren Hastings on Zhidar’s behalf, stating that 
although the Druk Desi had ‘committed ravages and other outrages on your frontiers’, he 
was ‘of a rude and ignorant race’, and had ‘met with the punishment he deserved’. The 
Panchen Lama took it upon himself ‘to be his meditator’, since ‘the charge and 
administration of the country, for the present, is committed to me’. He requested that ‘you 
will cease from all hostilities against him [Zhidar], and in doing this, you will confer the 
greatest favour and friendship upon me’.52 By this time the conflict was concluded and 
Cooch Behar had become a de-facto tributary state of the EIC. That dialogue had 
nevertheless begun and a brief exchange of letters was enough to convince Hastings that a 
diplomatic mission would be welcomed into Tibet.  
George Bogle was selected as envoy. He was certainly a gifted administrator, yet his 
appointment can also be accounted for by a network of patronage, the same Lowland 
Scottish clique of Kinloch. Bogle worked in close proximity to Hastings after letters of 
introduction. Alexander Hamilton who accompanied him as surgeon was likewise a family 
friend. They would depart from Calcutta, travel through Bhutan to the Panchen Lama’s 
residence in Tibet, using a Jesuit map provided by Hastings.53 Primarily, they were sent as a 
guarantee of peace, and as an opportunity to establish a trade dialogue. Yet Bogle was also 
instructed by Hastings to meticulously observe flora and fauna, people and places.54 This 
was both orientalist curiosity and military espionage. In fact, at roughly the same time as 
Bogle’s mission, James Logan in Nepal was feigning friendliness on the one hand, drawing 
plans for war on the other. Military force was always a veiled threat and plausible protocol. 
Bogle was no exception, as per Hastings’ instructions for him to resort to such a suggestion 
                                               
49 Turner, An Account of an Embassy, p.21. 
50 Deb, ‘Cooch Behar’, p.82. 
51 The other within the Gelugpa Order of Buddhism being the Dalai Lama. Usually the older of the two 
would mentor the other during their infancy, however at times wherein both had reached their majority, or 
when one feared the influence of the other’s regent, or Chinese ambassadors, the relationship between the 
two different spiritual leaders could become fraught and competitive.  
52 Translation of a letter from Teshoo Lama to Warren Hastings, received 29th March 1774, in Turner, An Account of an 
Embassy, p.21. 
53 Kate Teltscher, The High Road to China: George Bogle, the Panchen Lama, and the First British Expedition to Tibet 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2006), p.24. 
54 Ibid., p.34. 
187 
 
if needs be. Therefore, whilst making overtures of peace Bogle also wrote a tract, 
Observations made on the proper mode of attacking Bhutan, for Hastings.55 
In contrast to the 1767 expedition, there are many primary sources available for the 
study of George Bogle’s journey. Like Kinloch he was instructed to keep a journal, which 
he did diligently. Bogle’s process of recording field notes has been described as such: 
On his arrival in Bhutan, he took a large sheet of paper, and folded into twelve – 
‘duodecimo size’ to fit into his pocket. He jotted down notes as he went. When one 
page was full, he would unfold the paper to go on to the next. Sometimes the 
pencil would break, and he would have to wait for the next resting place to sharpen 
it, then try to recall the details of what had passed. As he progressed, the notes 
extended to cover the whole sheet; but with the frequent opening and unfolding, 
the constant rubbing in his pocket against crumbs of bread and seeds of trees, the 
script grew faded and in parts illegible. It was only later that he would attempt to 
reconstruct the narrative in his ink-written journal.56  
The ink-written journal was copied and archived. This transition from hasty field notes to 
ink book written upon his return places distance between Bogle’s narrative and the events 
he observed. However, Bogle’s notes on this sheet of paper were not the only observations 
he made en route, and the narrative is augmented by its reading alongside the letters to his 
brother and sister, as well as those written by Hamilton. Bogle’s correspondence also 
provides a fresh perspective, being written for a different audience. The tone of the letters 
to Bogle’s siblings is more jovial and familiar. There also exists a version of Bogle’s journal 
that was published for a much wider audience, though it was not composed during his own 
lifetime but considerably later in 1876.57  
Of the historical characters within this venture whose role could be considered 
marginalized, either within Bogle’s entourage or encountering him en route, a particularly 
important agent was Bogle’s guide, Puran Giri Gosain. Historian Kate Teltscher has 
previously drawn great attention to the role played by this individual, and his relationship 
with Bogle, so for that reason a brief summary of his contribution, its similarities and 
differences to that of Kinloch’s guides, will suffice. A gosain of Jyotirmath in the Himalayan 
foothills, it was Puran Giri who delivered Lobsang Palden Yeshé’s letter to Hastings.58 He 
was chosen to conduct Bogle and Hamilton back into the mountains, and in that respect 
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played a very similar role to those of Muktananda and Ram Das in 1767. However, Bogle 
entrusted Puran Giri with his business, investing him with responsibilities of negotiation, (‘I 
think I can depend on his exerting himself for my behalf,’) and relying on him to explain 
and interpret the world around him.59 Bogle’s confidence in Puran Giri would later be 
echoed in Shore’s previously described confidence in Gajraj Misra after he had safely 
conducted Kirkpatrick to Nepal.60 It was a relationship improved as Puran Giri performed, 
and the expedition progressed successfully. Kinloch’s relationship with his guides on the 
other hand was one of suspicion over loyalty, questions over true conduct, reflecting the 
different circumstances under which their relationship operated - Kinloch travelled through 
hostile terrain, towards an imposing enemy – it was not in the best interests of his guide’s 
safety that he progressed, and the prospects of reward diminished rather than developed. 
Considered comparatively, both examples of success and failure demonstrate how critical 
that relationship between guide and guided could be. 
The relationship between the Panchen Lama in Tibet and the new Druk Desi that 
suceeded Zhidar in Bhutan was not without animosity. Different Buddhist orders held 
power in each state, the Gelugpa order presiding over the Panchen and Dalai Lamas in 
Tibet, the Drukpa School in Bhutan. By 1773, relations were tense: whilst the Gelugpa 
order were banned from establishing monasteries in Bhutan, the Panchen Lama offered 
shelter to the deposed Zhidar.61 The Druk Desi therefore had reasons to deter Bogle, whose 
enterprise could enrich Tibet and the fortunes of the former ruler. Likewise, the Panchen 
Lama was apprehensive of EIC agendas. He received particularly damning reports from 
emissaries to Chait Singh, the Raja of Benares, who painted a rapacious, expansionist 
portrait of the British, whilst the regent to the Dalai Lama also voiced his suspicion at the 
enterprise.62 Bogle himself speculated that it was due to the invasions of Bhutan and Nepal 
that the Panchen Lama was reluctant, and hoped to present the British as passive, 
defensive and commercially orientated.63 Both of these characters were swayed however, by 
the entreaties of Puran Giri. Moreover, the gosain personally told the Qianlong Emperor of 
Hastings, Bengal, and the EIC, when he made a second journey overland to Beijing.64  
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Bogle and Hamilton were initially part of a large cohort including sixty-seven 
servants kitted out in matching uniforms.65 They then recruited porters en route. Bogle’s 
reflections on his servants and porters, the service performed and their willingness to do 
so, are mostly positive: ‘This is a service so well established, that the people submit to it 
without murmuring. Neither sex, nor age, exempts them from it… a girl of 18 travelled one 
day 15 or 18 miles with a burden of 70 or 75 pounds – we could hardly do it without any 
weight at all.’66 In subsequent ventures, Hamilton was notably more dismissive of their use. 
He remarked in his own correspondence that ‘rousing lascars or coolies is here exceedingly 
difficult,’ making his plea that some were sent from Bengal, ‘for god’s sake give the 
Burdwan coolies any money to come this length, I have been these four days, any luggage 
not yet arrived, greatly harrowed owing to the negligence of your subedar Rosham Khan 
who let half the coolies run away.’67 Hamilton’s letters provide greater detail unto the 
everyday delays that exasperated the two European travellers. On one occasion, Hamilton’s 
progress to Tibet was paused for the recovery of a lost dog.68 He was also stalled whilst 
harkaras took their time delivering messages to and from Calcutta. All the while, Hamilton 
lamented the lack of horses.69 
Within another passage we learn some further information about the terms and 
delivery of service that may help account for these difficulties: 
The only means of transporting goods in this hilly country is by coolies… there are no 
particular clans of people who follow this profession; they are picked from among 
the inhabitants, receive an allowance for victuals at the pleasure of the people on 
whose service they are employed, and are relieved by others procured in the same 
manner at the next village, by order of the headman, without which not a coolie is to 
be had.70  
The porters therefore, whilst appearing to Bogle to take up this responsibility without 
complaint, were not paid directly and selected by the village authority. This inability to 
choose engagement in the contract undoubtedly opens up questions over loyalty and 
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willingness – was this considered a community responsibility by those who took part, or a 
contract undertaken by the headman, enriching them rather than the wider village? That 
would certainly pivot on the avarice, or perception of avarice, of that local authority, and 
could vary from village to village. These relationships explain some of the difficulties Bogle 
had further into the Bhutanese foothills, wherein he had to frequently resort to coaxing, 
berating and tending to his staff.71 He believed this to be a combination of oriental laziness, 
and a result of Montesquieu’s ideas of biological determinism – the notion that people 
born in the tropical climate were naturally slow moving, their constitution unsuited to 
strenuous work such as travel through the mountains. He said as much to John Stewart, 
writing ‘Your Bengalees may do very well for plain ground but they are not for the ups and 
downs of this world’.72 After two months of service he dismissed them and the majority of 
the caravan, drawing on fewer porters. Although Kate Teltscher argued this was to avoid 
the suspicious gaze of Chinese representatives in Lhasa, it’s also likely that he was tired of 
the delays they caused, as winter approached and he remained south of the Himalayas.73  
The Bhutanese population that Bogle encountered on the way also played a part by 
receiving him positively. Teltscher has suggested that Bogle’s willingness to adapt to 
Bhutanese expectations, and adopt Bhutanese customs, down to the growing of a 
moustache, fostered successful relations with the local.74 His willingness to learn Bhutanese 
certainly reduced the role of interpreters between himself and the people he met (although 
it meant some individuals occupied the important position of instructing him, and thus 
marginalized agency was not completed side-stepped as a result of his scholarship.) Yet 
Bogle’s reception with the wider Bhutanese population, particularly those accommodating 
enough to shelter his entourage, was also rooted in the deep unpopularity of Zhidar, the 
former Druk Desi who taxed extortionately in order to fund the construction of a new 
palace, which is cited to have ‘encouraged great discontent’.75 
Bogle found even after Puran Giri secured permission for him to proceed to Tibet, 
that he could not depart Tashichodzong where he stayed until the arrival there of the 
Bengali merchant Mirza Settar, who was progressing up from Rangpur with further 
supplies – resources that the new Druk Desi had not provided.76 There was a further delay 
orchestrated by marginalized historical agents – a brief uprising led by supporters of the 
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deposed Zhidar, who occupied Simtokha, the strategic dzong that dictated passage along all 
roads to and from Tashichodzong. Bogle could not guarantee how this faction of the wider 
Bhutanese population, loyal to the former Druk Desi who fought the British, would react to 
his mission. He remained locked in the capital until the rebellion was defeated by 
conscripts from local villages.77 
 Bogle spent six months at Shigatse in Tibet, building an amiable relationship with 
Lobsang Palden Yeshé that is remarkable for its friendliness, openness and the curiosity of 
both parties. Bogle returned to Calcutta whilst Puran Giri proceeded to China, hoping to 
augment new commercial opportunities. The Qianlong Emperor by Puran Giri’s own 
reports was engaged and interested in a Tibetan link to Bengal, however whilst in Beijing 
Lobsang Palden Yeshé became ill, dying in November, 1780. Bogle too passed away in 
1781. Puran Giri benefitted greatly from the Bogle mission. He was permitted to establish 
the Bhot Bagan math near Howra in Bengal, with himself as mahant. The site also served as 
a de facto Tibetan embassy and residence for visiting Tibetan merchants and monks. Puran 
Giri continued in his role as an intermediary, developing Bhot Bagan into a significant 
monastery until his own death in 1795. EIC-Tibetan links waned after that, as relationships 
with China and Nepal worsened. Yet the EIC’s courtship of Tibet, at times hindered but 
greatly facilitated by marginalized agency, had begun. 
 
VI:3 ‘A Country of Mountains’: Turner, Davis and the Romanticist’s Lens 
 
In 1782 Hastings received a letter from Lobsang Palden Yeshé’s brother Shamarpa, 
informing him of the sixth Panchen Lama’s death, and their reincarnation, Palden Tenpai 
Nyima, the seventh Panchen Lama. Shamarpa was regent at the time and hoped to 
strengthen his own position by cultivating stronger relations with the EIC, as both Qing 
China influence, and that of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa reaching his majority, increased. 
Hastings planned an expedition to cultivate such relations. Samuel Turner joined the EIC 
as a cadet in 1780 and by 1783 had risen to the rank of Lieutenant. His appointment as 
emissary represents a return to previous policies of military commanders in ambassadorial 
positions, reflecting the level of reconnaissance that they were expected to undertake, 
though this appointment was also one of patronage between Turner and Hastings – they 
were cousins. Turner set out with Samuel Davis and the surgeon Robert Saunders, 
travelling in palanquins. They were once more led by Puran Giri Gosain.78 
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Upon his return to Calcutta, Turner presented the governor-general with ‘a hasty 
narrative of my interview with the young lama’. He had however, ‘carefully committed to 
writing upon my employment on this extraordinary service.’ Years later in 1800, he 
published his account of the journey and his time in Tibet, which was the first of its kind 
since Bogle’s journal was not yet made available to the public.79 Within his introduction 
Turner emphasized his lack of credibility as a writer, yet wrote that ‘the novelty and 
curiosity of the subject will, in some degree, compensate for my own deficiencies’.80 This 
text was re-packaged for the public years after the field notes were written, like that of 
Kirkpatrick. Turner described his surroundings in an emergent romanticist convention. He 
was in awe of nature – the serpentine, precipice roads, lofty, snowy peaks, vistas of 
monasteries topping crags and pine on the mountainside, the ‘finely romantic views with 
which we were delighted’.81 His writing is more artistic than previous accounts, for example 
his vivid description of the monsoon, ‘a torrent of the heaviest rain that descends with 
wonderful impetuosity.’82 This ‘endeavour to delineate the appearance of a region, little 
known, and to mark so much of the manners of the people’ occupies far more content 
than the progress of his diplomatic enterprise – the explorer wrote that he omitted ‘the 
repetition of all that passed relative to the business of my commission’ since ‘to attempt the 
recital here, would be entering into tiresome detail, widely deviating from my present 
design’.83  
The 1783 expedition was unprecedented in its inclusion of the romanticist artist 
and surveyor, Samuel Davis, who made a number of sketches of the Himalayas. Four 
appeared in Thomas Pennant’s The View of Hindoostan (1798) whilst nine featured in 
Turner’s Account. Six were engraved by his friend William Daniell in 1813, entitled Views in 
Bootan, from the Drawings of Samuel Davis, Esq.84 More were published posthumously. There is 
no extant copy of his diary, though his son John Davis did read extracts to the Royal 
Asiatic Society in 1830.85 Two further passages appeared in the Oriental Annual of 1837.86 
The surgeon Robert Saunders likewise contributed a scientific account of Bhutan and Tibet 
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from the point of view of their geology and botany, published in Philosophical Transactions 
LXXIX (1789).87 
Within Turner’s account there is evidence of compromises and accommodations to 
avoid the same delays and circumstances, triggered by marginalized agency, that hindered 
previous expeditions. For example, Turner hoped to travel in a smaller party, acutely aware 
of the delays occasioned by a large entourage. On the borders of Bhutan, he met the Druk 
Desi’s chaperone. He wrote: ‘As they were encumbered with much baggage, and many 
attendants, to avoid the inconvenience of travelling with so large a party I persuaded them 
to go on before us.’88 Despite these measures, marginalized agency continued to impede his 
itinerary. At one stage the travellers were detained overnight awaiting the better part of 
their baggage, which remained on the road from Rangpur. Upon its arrival, it became 
apparent that ‘many of the coolies, or porters, had left us in the course of the night’.89 Turner 
was reliant on the assistance of the Druk Desi’s regional agents ‘to supply the deficiency of 
the carriage, which, at every stage, occasioned us much perplexity and trouble’.90  
One agent in particular stalled Turner greatly, a regional soubah official who had not 
made adequate preparations with which to provision the expedition going forward. Turner 
wrote: ‘I could not help expressing my disappointment at finding that no preparations had 
been made for my journey, after I had already passed so much time at Rungpore, [Rangpur] 
especially as I had conveyed intimation of my approach to the Daeb [the Druk Desi].’91 It is 
evident from the ‘violent altercation’ that Turner’s chaperone had with this soubah that the 
delay was not instructed by their master. The soubah may genuinely have struggled 
preparing the labour and carriage. Alternatively, he deliberately stalled Turner in order to 
cultivate influence: their relationship soon turned very amicable, with excursions shooting, 
hill-trekking and boozy evenings playing cards.92 
The decisions made by marginalized historical agents eventually played a critical 
role, upon the arrival of a messenger from the regent Shamarpa and the Panchen Lama, 
with passports for two Europeans to travel onwards. Turner recorded that ‘a long 
negotiation with him took place; and as he was little accustomed to foreign intercourse, it is 
extraordinary what absurdities and prejudices I had to combat’. In this instance, the EIC 
envoy negotiated unsuccessfully with a lowly harkara. The latter refused to allow all three 
                                               
87 Robert Saunders, ‘Some Account of the Vegetable and Mineral Productions of Tibet and Bootan’, 
Philosophical Transactions, LXXIX (1789). 
88 Turner, An Account of an Embassy, p.8. 
89 Ibid., p.6. 
90 Ibid., p.10. 
91 Ibid., p.29. 
92 Ibid., pp.29-39. 
194 
 
travellers to proceed, and Davis remained behind. Turner implied that it was Tibetan 
suspicion of the surveyor’s skills that led to this refusal.93 However, the Panchen Lama did 
not specifically name which Europeans would be permitted entry, only that their number 
was limited. The best efforts of Turner and Puran Giri could not persuade the harkara 
otherwise. He refused to give way on the basis that Bogle had travelled only with a surgeon, 
fearing that he would be punished.94 Due to this individual’s obduracy the expedition’s 
draughtsman, the very feature that made its composition extraordinary, proceeded no 
further than Tashichodzong.  
Michael Aris claims it is not known how much longer Davis remained in Bhutan.95 
However his journal, being rich in detail on aspects of Bhutanese society covering many 
religious festivals, indicates that he did not return to Bengal promptly.96 These observations 
read alongside Turner’s account and Davis’s drawings demonstrate to the reader the 
intersection between the representation of Bhutan that the EIC adventurers expected, that 
which they did observe, and how the Bhutanese hoped to be perceived. Davis’s depiction 
of Bhutan and the Bhutanese contrasts sharply with those of Nepal in its non-violent 
depiction. His drawings were orderly and serene – neat temples and dzongs set to majestic 
mountain valley vistas. Even during a rebellion that he witnessed, Davis noted that the 
Bhutanese ‘shewed [sic] a tenderness of each other’s lives which, without scruple, I should 
have attributed to their want of courage, had they not given proof of the contrary in their 
war with us’.97 Cooch Behar was by this time annexed. Bhutan had submitted to a peaceful 
treaty and trade from British Rangpur. There was no impetus to represent this Himalayan 
space as a hostile periphery. The Bhutanese however were keen to emphasize the authority 
of the Druk Desi over that of the Dharma Rajas. For that reason, Turner, Davis, and 
Saunders saw very little of the religious Dharma Raja figureheads. They were given much 
freedom over their movement – taking excursions unchaperoned during their four-month 
stay – yet they were kept away from the Dharma Rajas at the monastery of Cheri in an 
exhibition of the Druk Desi’s political supremacy.98  
Orientalist expectations convergent with deliberated Bhutanese representations of 
authority meant the travellers did not challenge this vision of the despotic. It has had a 
lasting, damaging influence on British colonial attitudes towards Bhutan. Davis’s journal 
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contains what Michael Aris termed ‘a mild condescension, a natural ethnocentrism, yet one 
very far removed from the grossly racist response shown by many British in the East in the 
next two centuries’.99 This endearing description was nevertheless a colonizing device that 
patronized Bhutanese society and expressed European superiority. The same ethos allowed 
Aris to deploy the word ‘medieval’ in his evocation of Bhutan without a consideration of 
its simple, feudal and backward connotation amongst European readers. Aris writes: 
‘although the word is of course absent from Davis’s vocabulary – it was only invented in 
the nineteenth century – I have not hesitated to use it in the title of this book.’100  
Aris further asserted that ‘Davis’s legacy played no part in the development of 
those imaginary utopias which the West continues to locate in the trans-Himalayan 
region’.101 Turner’s writings and Davis’s drawings bear many hallmarks of European artistic 
convention and emergent orientalist representations suggesting to Aris that they were 
shaped by existing knowledge, rather than contributing to it significantly. However, what 
they encountered in Bhutan was something altogether surprising and original. Davis wrote: 
‘To call this a mountainous country merely would not sufficiently distinguish it from others of 
a like denomination, nor give a proper impression of its true character, when that term is 
understood to imply an intermixture of hills and valleys. But if a country of mountains be an 
intelligible phrase, it may with great justice be applied to Boutan, or at least to that part of it 
through which I have travelled.’102 The reception they received and places they observed in 
this encounter fundamentally expanded European horizons of Himalayan spaces, also 
contributing nuance alongside Gorkhali martial representations. 
Puran Giri conducted Turner to Shigatse where he was relatively successful: He 
met with the infant Panchen Lama and Shamarpa on 4 December 1783 and was given 
assurances by the regent of the ‘unshaken attachment’ between Tibet and Calcutta, and 
promised that EIC merchants would be welcomed.103 These matched the assurances given 
to Bogle some years earlier. Turner benefited greatly from their Himalayan enterprise, 
being granted a substantial reward. Upon returning from India in 1798 and the publication 
of his Account, subsequently translated into German, French and Italian, he received the 
desired scholarly acclaim and was admitted to the Royal Society.104 The career of Davis 
likewise flourished: rising within the Company’s civil service he struck up a friendship with 
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William Jones, founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He entered this institution and 
became reputed as an expert on Indian astronomy, himself joining the Royal Society in 
1792. He returned to the Himalayas with artist Thomas Daniell and his nephew William 
Daniell in 1791.105 Commercially the adventures of Bogle and Turner brought some 
favourable rates in Tibet, and Puran Giri’s monastery near Calcutta. However, these 
advances were fairly short-lived. Despite having progressed EIC-Tibetan relations, 
Shamarpa had to seek refuge from Chinese officials in Kathmandu shortly after Turner’s 
visit, having alleged that his brother the former Panchen Lama was poisoned. It would be 
almost three decades before another British representative travelled to Tibet in 1811. That 
was Thomas Manning, the first Englishman to enter Lhasa. Though he travelled with a 
letter of introduction from the Select Committee and met the Dalai Lama, he did so 
primarily as a Sinologist and ambassador to China. The Sino-Nepalese War brought all 
trade to a halt for almost a century, undermining any advances made in the 1770s and 
1780s. Inroads to China were instead developed along the seaboard through the port of 
Canton, which would come to dominate European-Sino relations up to the Second Opium 
War.  
 
VI:4 The 1802 Kathmandu Residency 
 
The EIC were brought back to Nepal through an unusual chain of events including 
unexpected love and loss, an abdication and reclamation, factionalism, and political 
intrigue. Key roles within this narrative were executed by marginalized historical agents. 
 Nepal upon Kadir Khan’s departure in 1795 was no longer under the regency of 
Bahadur Shah, since his nephew Rana Bahadur Shah had reached adulthood. The new 
raja’s advisors succeeded in ousting Bahadur Shah from his inner circle. The former regent 
was then later imprisoned on charge of soliciting Chinese support, hoping to reclaim 
power. In 1797, Rana Bahadur Shah executed his uncle, removing his foremost political 
rival. Stability would be short-lived. The raja’s three successive marriages plunged the 
succession into crisis and competition. He first married Raj Rajeshwari Devi, a Princess of 
Gulmi. Secondly, a woman named Subarna Prabha Devi. There are two conflicting 
accounts on this person’s identity, though both stories caused great controversy: whilst 
some Nepalese histories claimed her to be slave, others claimed that she was already 
married to a prominent general. The raja’s unconventional marriage was further frowned 
upon when Subarna Prabha provided a male heir, which Raj Rajeshwari had not. Then, 
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Rana Bahadur Shah fell in love with Kantivati, a widow who had travelled to the temple 
complex of Pashupatinath for devotions. Kantivati lived in the royal palace for six months 
before marrying the king, despite being forbidden as a widow.106  
Though mostly marginalized solely as a love interest, Kantivati played a pivotal role 
in Nepal’s fate by insisting that she would not marry before Rana Bahadur Shah changed 
the line of succession, ensuring that when her son Girvanyuddha Shah was born in 1797 he 
was named heir. Without a male heir herself, Raj Rajeshwari and her faction supported this, 
whereas Subarna Prabha did not. Shortly after, Rana Bahadur’s beloved Kantivati fell ill. 
The raja consulted physicians and holy men who could not prevent her health from 
deteriorating. He withdrew into spiritual retreat in the hope it would revive her, abdicating 
in favour of Girvanyuddha Shah and naming Raj Rajeshwari as regent. Kantivati’s 
subsequent death in 1799 was devastating to him. Enraged, Rana Bahadur Shah punished 
those who had advised ascetic retreat and attempted to reclaim the throne. This drew 
Nepal to the brink of a civil war since many courtiers and military figures sided with the 
new infant Raja Girvanyuddha against his father. Widespread violence was averted when 
Rana Bahadur Shah fled to Varanasi. Raj Rajeshwari accompanied him and Subarna Prabha 
became regent.107 
The events that followed represent the victory of marginalized historical agents 
over superordinate figures. From Benares, Rana Bahadur Shah began to solicit the support 
of the EIC, hoping to launch an expansive military campaign against the courtier-
controlled regency of Subarna Prabha. However, the EIC were hesitant to intervene. This 
was greatly influenced by the regency’s intermediary Gajraj Misra, who having served 
Kirkpatrick in 1793 and Kadir Khan in 1795 had seen his political influence rise. His 
overtures at this time greatly countered the appeals of Rana Bahadur Shah. The EIC 
initially deterred from intervening by uncertainty over Nepal’s relationship with China, 
whom they hoped to avoid conflict with.108 The Governor-General, Richard Wellesley, 
proceeded to Patna in October 1801 in order to personally conduct interviews for 
guidance. He spoke to Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan alongside two messengers from Nepal 
including Gajraj Misra. They informed him that ‘the Kingdom of Nepal is not, in any 
degree, dependent on the Chinese Empire, and that no connection subsists between those 
states, of a nature to limit the right of the Rajah of Nepaul to contract engagement with 
foreign powers’.109 The assurances that China were uninvolved enabled the EIC to pursue a 
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new allegiance with Girvanyuddha’s regency, intead of the former raja. That these agents 
would provide such assurances is unsurprising, since they had travelled to Patna to secure 
EIC support. Their words persuaded Wellesley and Rana Bahadur Shah was ignored.  
 In return for their endorsement of the new regency, the EIC asked for a trade 
agreement. The terms they requested demonstrate the EIC’s concerns and intent. The 
treaty first stipulated that both the company and the Raja of Nepal should ‘constantly trust 
themselves to improve the welfare of the two states,’ and also ‘the prosperity and success 
of the government and subjects of both’. This allowed for the argument that should the 
Nepalese Durbar deny the EIC trade avenues into the country, they would be preventing 
its subjects’ prosperity and violating the treaty. The treaty then asserted that ‘the 
representation of evil disposed persons shall not be attained to without proof,’ reflecting 
Company concerns over Anti-British voices within the Nepalese court. Thirdly, the treaty 
insisted that ‘any further disputes need to be settled formally, with the British resident, 
Vizier [of Awadh] and Nepali government,’ and that ‘the Raja should declare any 
correspondence received by any other EIC agents’.110 Due to the localized negotiations 
conducted in previous years, the EIC wanted to move disputes away from the periphery, 
back into the high political arena. Kinloch after all had not sought permission from either 
London or his superior military commander Colonel Smith.111 
The treaty was agreed upon and signed on 26th October 1801. To enforce it, the 
EIC proposed to send an envoy that would reside in the city. This paved the way for 
Britain’s first Himalayan residency, led by William Knox. He was further tasked ‘to gather 
information about Nepal’s inner and outer conditions, civil and military administration, 
resources and mines, and so on. For this reason, he was accompanied by the military 
surveyor Charles Crawford.112 However, despite being explicitly mentioned in the 1801 
treaty, the presence of a British Resident was not accepted immediately, being subject to 
the political intrigues still raging in Nepal Valley. Knox had to wait many weeks on the 
border before being allowed to proceed.113 Meanwhile, Subarna Prabha’s court debated 
whether to permit entry. Objections were reportedly raised by Tribhuwan Singh over the 
number of Europeans that a residency would bring – unlike the ventures of Foxcroft and 
Kirkpatrick, or Bogle and Turner in Bhutan, Knox travelled with two companies of sepoys. 
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Singh’s faction pointed out that the strength of the escort which accompanied the envoy 
was ‘capable of effecting a revolution in the state’.114  
These suspicions would not dissipate over time. On the contrary, the British 
Residency soon became entangled in factional conflicts, plots and intrigue. William Knox 
was acutely aware of the courtier pressures that had undermined the welcome of Foxcroft, 
Kirkpatrick and Kadir Khan before him. For that reason, the EIC sought to cultivate their 
own courtier support through a tactical allegiance with the Raja of Butwal.  
According to Knox’s correspondence, vakils of the Raja of Butwal regularly 
appealed to him at Patna for friendship, which he supported on the grounds that it would 
increase EIC influence over Kathmandu.115 Knox’s saw in Butwal an opportunity, partly in 
manpower: ‘To keep the Nepaul Government true to their engagements they must believe 
that they could easily be punished for violating them, but this they know to be 
impracticable unless we acquire command over such a number of the hill people as would 
be requisite for the transportation of provisions and luggage, without which a military force 
could not penetrate any distance into their country.’116 He also considered it a military 
benefit: ‘his [the Raja of Butwal] country opens the easiest access to theirs, [Nepalese 
Government] the most accurate information can be obtained from him and his people 
respecting the roads and passes, and his troops, not inferior to their own in quality, would 
be in number more sufficient to take those duties which, however necessary, could not be 
performed by men unaccustomed to making their way through pathless woods and over 
almost alpine mountains.117 Knox’s advocacy of an agreement with Butwal on these 
grounds demonstrates intersecting agendas and recollections. His arguments evoked 
memories of the 1767 expedition, and the benefits of this agreement echoed the 
recommendations outlined from the Plan of Attack of a Mountainous Country written at the 
time of Shah’s annexation of Morang. Yet they are themselves a repetition of the Vakils’ 
overtures to Knox. They too were drawing thinly disguised parallels with the EIC’s past 
difficulties. Their voices reflect that of Ram Das in Kinloch’s 1767 letters to Rumbold.  
 Knox hoped an agreement with Butwal in advance of his residency would 
‘reconcile the people of Nepaul and indeed all the hill chieftains to a connection with us’. 
Wellesley acquiesced to this plan, primarily for the access to timber that the Butwal Raja’s 
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friendship could provide. He was acutely aware of the high stakes, advising Knox that he 
‘did not deem it expedient’ to make their Butwal agreement so public that it ‘might lead the 
administration of Nepaul to apprehend that these distinctions originated in a systematic 
intention of eventually enforcing the execution of the terms of the treaty through the aid of 
that chieftain’.118 The Governor-General hoped for a more informal agreement wherein the 
Raja of Butwal would voluntarily offer support and information, should the occasion 
arise.119 However, unbeknownst to Knox, the Raja of Butwal was not a close confidant at 
the court. Instead, he was effectively a political prisoner in Kathmandu having quarrelled 
with the Shahs over his ancestral territory. He represented a dissident, suspect faction 
within the Nepalese court. In part due to the solicitations of marginalized agents and in 
part due to a desire to counter previous errors by drawing upon the support of 
marginalized courtiers, Knox and Wellesley had unwittingly aligned themselves with an 
enemy of the Nepalese state who did not wield much influence over the young raja or 
regent.  
Shortly after Knox’s arrival the political situation shifted: a marginalized historical 
agent triumphed. This was Raj Rajeshwari Devi.120 The first queen had become estranged 
from Rana Bahadur Shah as his favour with the EIC slipped away and his behaviour 
became erratic. In 1802 she seized the regency for herself, and from that position of power 
dismantled Knox’s influence and the practice of the 1801 treaty. Leaving Benares, she 
travelled to the Nepalese border with a small entourage. Subarna Prabha sent soldiers to 
prevent her entry and arrest her. Upon this encounter the soldiers reportedly disobeyed 
their commanding officer, instead escorting Raj Rajeshwari Devi to Kathmandu. The 
audacity with which the queen travelled back unarmed and alone to Nepal, and the choice 
of the soldiers to support her, are significant examples of unexpected decisions made by 
marginalized agents that re-directed the relationship between the EIC and Nepal. Upon 
assuming the regency, Raj Rajeshwari first demanded from Knox the financial accounts of 
Rana Bahadur Shah – suspecting that the 1801 treaty was returning a sum to him that 
benefitted the EIC more than Nepal. She promptly withdrew the former raja’s pension.121 
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Knox’s outstanding request to establish a further residency and factory in Kirtipur was then 
promptly refused.122  
Further factors conspired against Knox that demonstrated a suspicion of his 
duplicitous dialogue with the Raja of Butwal. The guards placed at his door soon began to 
interfere with his communications with courtiers. The herb and plant collections of Francis 
Buchanan-Hamilton who accompanied Knox, completed by South Asian intermediaries, 
were likewise stopped.123 These marginalized soldiers essentially cut the residency’s 
communications. The final blow was struck when two British visitors, Proctor and Lloyd, 
were denied passports to Kathmandu. Knox issued an ultimatum, demanding their access. 
Raj Rajeshwari Devi did not respond, and Knox left frustrated.124  
Colonial histories attribute the failure of the mission to a lack of support from 
Calcutta, since Wellesley was pre-occupied with campaigns against the French and 
Marathas, and was wary of jeopardizing Chinese trade.125 However, more significant was 
Raj Rajeshwari Devi’s return to Nepal and her dismissal of the enterprise, considering 
Knox a persona non grata. With the complicity of soldiers escorting her and chaperoning 
Knox, his communications and manoeuvres were checked. The residency was withdrawn 
and the treaty of 1801 was declared null and void in January 1804.126 Shortly after, the 
Queen regent annexed the territories of Knox’s erstwhile co-conspirator the Raja of 
Butwal. Relations between Nepal and the Company, according to historian Amatya, 
‘relapsed to the same negative state as they were before the first treaty with Nepal in 
1792.’127 There were two notable beneficiaries: Raj Rajeshwari Devi emerged triumphant 
and powerful over dissident courtiers, and Mirza Madhi, a lowly South Asian munshi 
amongst Knox’s entourage, was alone permitted to remain in Kathmandu as an EIC 
representative, effectively inheriting Knox’s role.128 
 
VI:5 Buchanan-Hamilton’s Account of Nepal 
 
Accompanying Knox was Doctor Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, who in the footsteps of 
Orme, Dalrymple, Kirkpatrick and others wrote an account of the countries he travelled.129 
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Buchanan-Hamilton had an extensive career in South Asia before being appointed surgeon 
to the Knox Residency. He had studied medicine, specializing in the causes and treatment 
of Malaria. He arrived in Calcutta in 1794 and joining the presidency’s medical corps. In 
that role he travelled far, acting as surgeon on the expedition to Burma in 1798 and 
surveyor of Mysore in 1800.  
Buchanan-Hamilton’s An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal reflected on his time there 
in 1802 to 1804, was itself written in 1814 before the Anglo-Nepalese War, and was not 
published until 1819.130 The introduction reveals that it was amended in the interceding 
years.131 Buchanan-Hamilton had previously published travel narratives, for instance the 
survey and narrative from his work in South India.132 He intended to do the same with his 
experiences in the Himalayas. The Account’s corrective nature (this is notably the first text 
to adopt the ‘Nepal’ spelling other than Guiseppe de Rovato’s short account) is generally 
considered by historians a sign that it was well researched.133 Buchanan-Hamilton spent 
fourteen months in Kathmandu; whereas Kirkpatrick spent a fortnight encamped outside, 
and neither Kinloch, Logan nor Foxcroft reached the valley.  
Buchanan-Hamilton’s publication is critical to the study of marginalized agency 
within EIC-Himalayan encounters. He credited an array of sources from which his 
representation of Nepal derived, which was relatively unusual (whilst Rennell as previously 
discussed mentioned some individuals, and both Kirkpatrick and Bogle credited their 
primary guides Gajraj Misra and Puran Giri, Kinloch rarely did so).134 First on his list was 
Ramajai Batacharji, ‘an intelligent Brahman, from Calcutta, whom I employed to obtain 
information, so far as I prudently could, without alarming a jealous government or giving 
offence to the resident [Knox] under whose authority I was acting.’135 This figure drew 
upon similar expertise to that of Kadir Khan, appearing as a master linguist able to 
interpret the accounts of Buchanan-Hamilton’s other agents. Whilst caution with regards 
both the Gorkhalis and Knox himself may have hindered his movements, he certainly 
enjoyed a degree of liberty in Kathmandu. A more subaltern addition than Ramajai 
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Batacharji to Buchanan-Hamilton’s list was an unnamed former slave who he employed to 
collect plants: ‘finding him very intelligent, and a great traveller, I employed him to 
construct a map, which I have deposited in the Company Library.’ In rendering this 
service, this marginalized individual secured liberty from the domestic services to a great 
extent. Buchanan-Hamilton continues: ‘In order to enable himself to execute this task with 
more care, he refreshed his memory by several journeys in different directions.’136  
With regards the agendas behind this support, Pratyoush Onta rightly argued ‘the 
possible motives of his sources in volunteering such information cannot be adequately 
discerned from what he said about them in his book’.137 There are nevertheless patterns 
that emerge from Buchanan-Hamilton’s observations, and notable alignments in their 
interests and his representation of Nepal. Many of these individuals had been outcast from 
the country. Maps had been drawn up by Sadu Ram Upadhyaya, the royal priest to the 
Palpa Raja, exiled to EIC territory, and Kanak Nidhi Tiwari, a merchant who had 
prospered in Palpa prior to Gorkhali conquest.138 The Palpa rajas had sponsored plots and 
solicited EIC support in retaking their lands ever since. Buchanan-Hamilton also consulted 
Agam Singha, who claimed a hereditary Kirant chieftainship and who had been 
dispossessed by the Gorkhas. The list also featured Narayan Das, a scribe whose ancestors 
had held prominent political positions before been exiled.139  
Given the vested opposition of his sources to the Gorkhalis, alongside the 
impending Anglo-Nepalese War, it is unsurprising that Buchanan-Hamilton paints a violent 
picture of Prithvi Narayan Shah, particularly in the demise of two heirs to the title of Raja 
of Makwanpur in the aftermath of its annexation. Reciting a Brahman’s story of their 
murder, one by ‘the most cruel tortures which continued three days before he expired,’ the 
other poisoned to cause ‘the most dreadful ulcerations,’ the surgeon wrote ‘the character of 
the prince does not leave much room to think that he would hesitate about employing such 
means’.140 Buchanan-Hamilton’s account further supported Kirkpatrick’s theory that 
Kathmandu fell after Ranajit Malla of Bhaktapur ‘entered into a league with Prithvi 
Narayan against Kathmandu’, a portrait of oriental betrayal and scheming that rendered 
Kinloch’s success or failure trivial.141 This representation of violent and deceitful Nepalese 
monarchs was later used to justify the invasion of Nepal. 
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Buchanan-Hamilton subjected South Asian information to the same critical 
processes that Kirkpatrick applied in his conversations with Bahadur Shah, wherein their 
accuracy was queried based on the informant’s South Asian ethnicity and record-keeping 
practices. When observing that Kirkpatrick omitted the city state of Gorkha from the 
Chaubisi alliance, Buchanan-Hamilton noted that ‘Gorkha was probably omitted by the 
Gorkhali who gave him the information; as it being included would have been 
acknowledging for the former supremacy of Yumila [another city state within that league 
that the EIC believed had previously held authority over the others] which the chiefs of 
Gorkha now disavow’.142 There is further evidence of such influences and inconsistencies 
within his own informants’ knowledge. For instance, he accepted the denial by one 
informant known as Hariballabh that the Yumila rajas extended their authority into 
Garhwal, against the consensus of all other reports. He valued Hariballabh because he was 
not just local to that country, but a ‘trusted Brahmin’.143 He failed to observe however that 
as an elite, local to that region, he would not likely acknowledge Yumila sovereignty. This 
was precisely the same trap that he criticized Kirkpatrick for falling in to. Whilst Buchanan-
Hamilton did posit different informants’ knowledge against each other critically, he did not 
recognize the value he placed on certain backgrounds himself, nor the competing political 
agendas of his more trusted informants. 
Buchanan-Hamilton prioritized his own experience first. Yet he also drew upon the 
support of this array of intermediary figures. Some of these such as Ramajai Batacharji in 
turn employed subordinates, rendering his own interpretation a third-hand account. 
Intelligence from his informants provided the entirety of Buchanan-Hamilton's experience 
for some regions from Srinagar to Sikkim. In these passages, he drew heavily upon the 
advice of a Lama, ‘who with part of his flock had fled the district of Puraniya to escape 
from the violence of the Gorkhalese, and who constructed a map of the country.’ He 
furthermore turned to mendicants and pilgrims like those before him, attributing the 
position of the source of the Ganges on Indian maps to their knowledge.  Buchanan’s 
ultimate reliance on these sources is demonstrated by his own concession that his maps 
were incomplete – there being no information regarding the Karnali basin.144 Thus, his 
position of dependence offered these different marginalized historical agents the 
opportunity to either secure greater freedom and reward, or push their own version of 
events according to their agenda, or both.  
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Beyond the assertion that Buchanan-Hamilton's Account of the Kingdom of Nepal was a 
product of his interaction with marginalized historical agents, there is further evidence 
within that text of marginalized agency playing a part in EIC-Nepalese encounters. For 
example, Buchanan-Hamilton’s observations on the Tarai contribute towards a re-
evaluation of cultivation and the seemingly ‘natural’ barrier of the jungle. Upon travelling 
through, many European observers including Kinloch considered it uninhabitable, poorly 
cultivated, and abandoned through fear of the Gorkhalis. Buchanan-Hamilton’s informants 
provided him with a different interpretation. He was told that, prior to the Gorkhali 
conquest, the petty rajas of the lower hills ‘did not promote the cultivation of this low land. 
They rather encouraged extensive woods, and contended themselves, in a great measure, 
with the produce of the forests’.145 He believed the Nepalese Durbar continued this, 
particularly around the strategically important places of Hetauda, Makwanpur, Hariharpur 
and Sindhuli.146 This indicates that Kinloch battled against both natural forces and the 
support that the local population gave, and furthermore that this was an existing policy that 
the Gorkhalis recognized and adopted. (This theory though should be treated with a degree 
of caution – migratory, nomadic Adivasi groups would maintain the forest regardless of 
whether there was an EIC threat on the doorstep. It furthermore casts the Gorkhalis in a 
militant role, prioritizing defence over cultivation and exaggerating their isolationist 
position.) 
Buchanan-Hamilton like Kirkpatrick before him emphasized the relative autonomy 
of the regional soubahs, officials who effectively replaced exiled petty rajas in hillforts like 
Makwanpur. Whilst unable to administer more severe sentences, Buchanan-Hamilton drew 
attention to the ease with which they blocked complaints to Kathmandu, adding that 
collections of revenue were ‘in a great measure left to the discretion of the Subah’.147 
Greater still was the freedom of the sirdar, the military governor with jurisdiction over 
civilian authorities, able to administer capital punishment ‘without any reference to the 
court’ of Kathmandu.148 
Francis Buchanan-Hamilton was approached for his Himalayan knowledge in the 
future. When war broke out, the EIC asked Buchanan-Hamilton to revise his old notes, 
recognizing the importance of his knowledge, and the importance of those who provided 
it.149 Likewise, they consulted the various exiles and their emissaries in peripheral towns like 
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Almora and Gorakhpur.150 That becomes more pertinent once it is understood that he 
himself used South Asian informants. 
 
VI:6 South Asian Knowledge and the Anglo-Nepalese War 
 
By the 1814 the Gorkhali Empire had reached its peak. Having conquered Sikkim in the 
east, they annexed Garhwal and Kumaon in the west before being checked at Kangra by 
the Sikh Empire in 1809. Their high Himalayan border with Tibet had remained 
undisturbed since 1792. To the south however, the Gorkhalis went to war with the EIC. 
Whilst the British maintained an interest in opening trade routes to western Tibet and the 
lucrative shawl-wool production there, the two states primarily clashed over land rights. 
Nepal had annexed Butwal, a territory that paid revenue to Awadh, which in turn paid the 
EIC. The existing literature on this conflict is extensive, including works on the logistics of 
war.151 There are also volumes of documents within the India Office Records relating to its 
conduct and progress.152 The task of considering the role of marginalized historical agents 
within the Anglo-Nepalese War has not been completed, though Bernardo Michael notably 
emphasized the importance of small-landowner border disputes in contrast to the elite-
level discussion over the Raja of Butwal’s territory.153 The Anglo-Nepalese War provides a 
neat comparative point with 1767, being the EIC’s first invasion into Nepal since then. 
This chapter now highlights ways in which past failures and marginalized historical agents 
played a critical role, primarily in the planning stage of the conflict. 
Parallels are first observed in the EIC’s strategic design for the conflict. Efforts 
were made to avoid the mistakes of the past, and mitigate against previous Gorkhali 
strengths. Rather than a march to Kathmandu through easily defendable passes, the 1814 
invasion instead heeded the advice of the Attack on Nepaul in launching numerous columns 
across the frontier, stretching the outnumbered Gorkhali forces. Cautious of the costs of 
war and intervention, the enterprise was funded in part by the Nawab of Awadh, on whose 
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behalf the EIC claimed intervention. Officials in Calcutta ascertained first whether a war 
with Nepal would jeopardize their Chinese trade, echoing concerns before the deployment 
of Knox’s residency.154 The EIC sent surveyors into the foothills in order to guarantee the 
routes, for instance Felix Raper who returned extensive reports about Kumaon.155 The 
campaigning did not begin until after the rains. There was a greater endeavour to 
counteract Gorkhali messaging and espionage: in the past Shah had corresponded with the 
Company in order to buy time. This was attempted by the Nepalese Durbar in 1814 and 
was abruptly dismissed. There was more of a concerted effort to intercept correspondence 
– the archives contain extensive Nepalese letters and their translations bound for spies and 
servants.156 EIC surveyors were able to pinpoint the key east-west lines of communication 
in Nepal through which these messages were passed, and suggest ways in which it might be 
severed.157  
The invasion force’s composition differed to that of 1767, with a greater impetus 
on knowledge of the terrain and language. For instance, the soldiers of Harrakh Deo Joshi, 
an elite from Kumaon and Garhwal who was exiled after Gorkhali conquest, would 
constitute a key component.158 The EIC also hoped for better communications between 
the military column’s leadership and South Asian cohorts, the commander asking the 
government ‘to sanction expenditure on a “pundit for Persian and Newari” an English 
writer and a larger establishment of runners’.159  
The EIC made a concerted effort to solicit Indian informants and those with 
Himalayan experience. Much of the knowledge from this source base was pooled together 
by George Rutherford, Civil Surgeon at the border town of Moradabad. Christopher Bayly 
wrote extensively of these efforts in Empire and Information.160 Rutherford offered his service 
based on his knowledge of the Himalayas, having managed the Company’s timber agency 
and overseen the annual investment in hill produce at Kashipur, present day 
Uttarakhand.161 Through Rutherford, the company turned to a wide-ranging array of 
individual and group informants, many of whom were previously involved in EIC-
Nepalese encounters.  
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For example, the EIC sought the advice of William Moorcroft. In his previous 
capacity contracting as a Superintendent of Stud for the Company, Moorcroft had travelled 
alongside Captain Hyder Young Hearsey to Tibet in 1812. Disguised as gosains with the 
support of local guides, they crossed into Tibet from Jyotirmath. On their return via the 
Sutlej Valley they were detained by the Gorkhalis, but escaped. Moorcroft and Hearsey 
travelled through a political tinderbox: the region was still contested by Nepal and the Sikh 
Empire. Their commercial success was limited – although they found Tibetan lakes and 
shawl goats, the search for suitable horse stock continued. However, many individuals 
involved still profited from the enterprise: On the eve of the Anglo-Nepalese War the EIC 
approached William Moorcroft who in turn went to the marginalized historical agents he 
had encountered in 1812 for knowledge – merchants, indigo planters and horse-breeders 
who he had met on his travels.162  
In reward for his provision of information, Moorcroft secured permission to travel 
extensively from 1816 until his death in 1825, visiting Bukhara in Uzbekistan. This 
expedition earned him renown and his narratives were published in 1841.163 By the 
nineteenth century such adventuring had mostly been curtailed by faster sailing times with 
which the Court of Directors could instruct their servants, the extensive copying of 
consultation and accounts that would-be adventurers were subjected to from 1754 and 
1787 respectively, and the very public condemnation of ‘nabobs’ alongside the trial of 
Hastings.164 Moorcroft’s further exploits were an exception, permitted in recompense for 
his services. Hearsey likewise actively provided information in exchange for further 
opportunity. He wrote to Calcutta in August 1814 providing rough sketches of Himalayan 
scenes, requesting command of a military detachment.165 He was provided funds with 
which to raise irregular cavalry in Rohilkhand later that year.166 
Moorcroft employed a Kashmiri Muslim as a guide, Izatullah. This individual was 
appointed on the basis that he was well connected with the Delhi intelligentsia, being the 
grandson of a Mughal Governor in Lahore, Mir Niamat Khan, who had held power in the 
1740s and 1750s.167 Whilst his connection to such regional local elite mirrored that of Kadir 
Khan and the Bengali families, Izatullah also had a potential predecessor from Kashmir, if 
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it is believed that Muktananda was indeed Kashmiri, as suggested by Baburam Acarya.168 
On Moorcroft’s recommendation, Izatullah provided the extensive ‘information from a 
Cashmeereean’ alluded to in Rutherford’s letters.169 In return, he accompanied Moorcroft 
to Bukhara, and was highly regarded amongst EIC officials, being described by 
Elphinstone as ‘intelligent, well-informed and unusually methodical’. From this position he 
was able to publish his own travelogues.170 
The EIC learned of a route to Kathmandu from one Francis Neville, a contact of 
Moorcroft.171 Neville’s father was French and had served Prithvi Narayan Shah, casting 
artillery (some accounts suggest there were two or three French soldiers at the court in the 
late eighteenth century.) Neville had remained in Nepal Valley, establishing a business there 
and becoming fluent in Newari. That Neville would help the EIC in 1814 is a curiosity, not 
being British by birth but French-Nepalese, and being one of the few Europeans permitted 
to live in Nepal, where he would have spent the majority of his life.172 Whilst the 
intelligence he provided demonstrated the route to the EIC, it was not entirely useful – it 
failed to provide critical information on the terrain itself. Interestingly one of the other 
French cannon casters, those present at the Nepalese court at the time of Kirkpatrick’s 
expedition, also provided intelligence.173  
Private traders such as Neville in Kathmandu had to be either very wealthy, or very 
resilient. Trade in Bengal, particularly that which involved the transportation of resources, 
demanded payments in advance that were high risk – subject to fluctuating prices, theft, 
banditry, damage and potentially piracy should commodities be shipped.174 For that reason, 
it was customary for such independent traders to buy the protection of some person of 
authority.175 Therefore, they often occupied a position wherein they had close contact with 
local elites, particularly courts outside EIC influence and political control. Their 
relationship to those political centres could be complicated – they could rival that local 
ruler in providing information to the EIC, engage in espionage, act as intermediary, or 
alternatively could pass information the opposite direction, to the South Asian court as 
their patron. Such complexities could explain the inconsistencies in Neville’s intelligence. 
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South Asian sources of information on Nepal were highly valued, regardless of 
rank. The EIC interviewed wealthy traders and harkaras alike.176 Rutherford urged that the 
former, merchants previously based in Nepalese trading establishments, ‘should also be 
used to secure valuable information from the cultivators of the interior.’177 The harkaras 
meanwhile provided information, and were used to convey messages to the local elite. They 
delivered the Governor-General’s proclamation to the hill chieftains between the Sutlej and 
Jumna, asking for assistance against the Nepalese.178 This was followed by similar 
proclamations issued to the inhabitants of Kumaon and Garhwal.179 One important source 
was the Raja of Palpa, his pundits and officers. The Raja himself had been in detention in 
Kathmandu in 1805 and gave a detailed, if outdated, account of the Nepali military 
establishments.180  
Many of these endeavours, such as employing suitable guides and approaching 
exiled rulers, echoes the 1767 approach as well as the recommendations of the A Sketch for 
a Plan of Attack of A Mountainous Country in India, and the Plan for an Attack on the Napaul 
Rajah, which were discussed in chapter V.181 The difference though was the critical 
evaluation of these agents that preceded their employment: in 1814 the EIC first asked 
questions unto a potential source’s ambitions, loyalties and reliability. Kinloch asked no 
such questions of Ram Das, Mucktananda or the merchant employed en route in 1767. The 
marginalized historical agent’s impetus for offering assistance was now given greater 
consideration. C.A. Bayly wrote that ‘as a check on their reliability, the British kept detailed 
notes on the harkaras whom they employed as the war progressed. These do not appear to 
have been recruited from a particular ethnic or regional group’.182 The EIC hoped to avoid 
entrusting important duties to a harkara who might abscond, as was possible in 1767, or 
recruit solely from a specific group that could also be approached by Gorkhali agents in 
India. Calcutta rejected a plan to arm the subaltern territory captured in the Tarai on the 
grounds that their loyalties could not be ensured, instead writing to them emphasising 
various benefits of Company rule.183 
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Agents who might pass information both ways were treated with suspicion, in 
particular the gosains of Patna and Benares. Notably one prominent religious figure, Mahant 
Banwari Das, seemed to command a greater part of his income from Nepal Valley despite 
being in possession of a substantial revenue grant in Bihar.184 Owing to his suspected 
patronage by the Shah rajas, the EIC were unwilling to solicit his help or pass on 
information to those in his circle. Another mahant, Hari Sewak at Dehra Dun, was flagged 
for passing on daily information to the Gorkhali soldiers.185 In the past, the EIC did not 
exercise such caution.  
 
VI:7 Conclusions 
 
As the war progressed, it became apparent that despite these adaptations, the Company’s 
struggles continued: ‘even a year after hostilities began the British had little political and 
military intelligence from the heart of the Nepal Kingdom. Their information was still 
drawn from exiles and spies who reported on the north-south routeways.’186 The EIC once 
more commented that, contrary to their expectations, ‘the expulsion of the Goorkhas is not 
a general wish.’187 Ultimately, historical agents in 1814-1816 retained the ability to act 
contrary to the EIC’s expectations, they continued to influence EIC fortunes, either 
facilitating success or frustrating it. Eventual British victory in this conflict should not 
distort the fact that this victory incurred a great cost. Nor does it represent EIC mastery 
over the challenges imposed by the agency of marginalized people of the Himalayan 
foothills and Tarai. Instead it was that agency, and the decisions of those people to support 
(or in other instances oppose) the EIC that facilitated success and shaped its trajectory.  
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Chapter VII - Drawing Conclusions: The Wider Significance of Marginalized Agency 
within Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Nepalese Encounters 
 
Summary 
 
A close reading of Kinloch’s journal has demonstrated how marginalized historical agency 
greatly influenced the 1767 expedition’s fortunes: Ram Das and Muktananda played 
significant roles throughout, first in delivering messages, designing an impression of the 
circumstances that would guarantee the venture departed, and then as guides conducting 
the expedition through Bihar and into the foothills. Similarly, the help or hindrance of local 
parties was critical, from the villagers who withheld their boats and dandies, to those who 
evaded the sepoys at Janakpur and those in the foothills allegedly provisioning the 
Gorkhalis. These individuals and communities frequently acted in ways in that were 
unexpected and unplanned for by the EIC. Even those contracted beforehand failed 
Kinloch, causing him to either adapt or flounder, for example the grain merchant Dondao 
Chaudhuri. These actions and responses to the presence of the EIC soldiers drove the 
expedition to a position of despair, and to circumstances in which the marginalized 
historical agents within the expedition’s ranks either refused to travel, delivered ultimatums, 
or absconded. Collectively, these instances of agency sabotaged and scuppered the 1767 
intervention.  
Observations from subsequent EIC-Himalayan encounters in the late eighteenth 
century, concluding with the Anglo-Nepalese War, demonstrate some ways in which the 
1767 expedition affected EIC approaches to the Himalayas. The substantial military, 
strategic difficulties ensured that armed intervention as an expedient was not deployed for 
over forty years. Significantly, the agency of hitherto marginalized parties instigated those 
changes: for example, observations unto the efficiency and loyalty of sepoys and porters in 
1767 led to more commercial, diplomatic ventures such as that of Foxcroft or Kirkpatrick. 
Furthermore, from within the historical sources relating to those later expeditions, it is 
evident that the marginalized historical agents continued to wield great influence over the 
progress, even the outcome, of EIC ventures. The commanding officers continued to rely 
greatly on the assistance of those close to them. Notably the intermediary roles played by 
Puran Giri to Bogle and Kadir Khan to Kirkpatrick were crucial in conducting those 
emissaries to Tibet and Nepal. Their fortunes likewise continued to be orchestrated behind 
the scenes, according to more local, marginalized agency and interests: either the Capuchins 
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or regional Gorkhali officials barred Foxcroft from progressing, and the factionalism 
within Kathmandu court politics undermined Knox’s residency.  
This chapter now concludes the thesis by assessing the impact of that so far 
established marginalized agency in 1767, and in subsequent encounters up to 1814, on a set 
of wider historiographical debates.1 The findings of the thesis are first positioned in relation 
to debates surrounding colonialism in eighteenth-century South Asia: The chapter 
acknowledges ways in which the application of Orientalism to EIC colonial policy in this era 
is problematic, but nevertheless emphasizes the presence of orientalist knowledge (or the 
idea of oriental despotism) within the colonial encounter as a historical agent that was itself 
challenged, reinforced, and utilized. Complexities within the historical role of South Asian 
collaboration and the substantial influence of South Asian interests on colonial trajectories 
are then underlined. The second part of the chapter revisits debates about Nepalese 
nationalism, nation-building and national identity: the Gorkhali conquests represent a 
significant divergence from traditional models of eighteenth-century South Asian statehood 
and power trajectories that have previously reflected a ‘decline,’ although there are some 
limited comparisons to be made between Nepal and the de-centralized, ‘successor’ states. 
The agency demonstrated by individuals and communities occupying borderlands spaces 
challenges existing notions that a distinctly Nepalese identity emerged at this time. Those 
peripheral historical agents nevertheless contributed greatly to EIC-Nepalese and Anglo-
Himalayan political relations. The third and final part of the chapter explains the 
implications of marginalized historical agency within EIC-Himalayan relations for existing 
methodological and historiographical debates surrounding the study of the colonial 
encounter: the deconstruction of these events demonstrates how agency on behalf of 
various different parties playing a part in an encounter’s outcome. Whilst some 
components of the encounter are more easily observed than others, it is critical that each 
component is explored and credited. Ultimately, there often exists an unknown quantity of 
marginalized historical agency with the colonial encounter.  
 
VII:1 Anglo-Himalayan Encounters and the Study of Eighteenth-Century Colonialism 
 
The study of marginalized agency within Anglo-Nepalese encounters has ramifications for 
the study of colonialism in eighteenth-century South Asia: in relation to debates about the 
existence and fortitude of ‘orientalism’, and in relation to debates about the role of the 
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South Asian collaborator, South Asian resistance and South Asian interests in shaping the 
direction of colonialism.  
Chapter I demonstrated ways in which previous accounts of the EIC interventions 
in this era were shrouded by what Edward Said termed ‘orientalism’. Colonial knowledge of 
the Himalayas and colonial imperatives augmented each other. Explorers, surveyors, 
soldiers and historians alike encountered Nepal, the Nepalese, and Nepalese history with 
preconceptions. Shah was considered autocratic and barbaric, the wider population 
groaning under the weight of his despotism. These features collectively justified the 
promotion of colonial intervention and expansion. Their experience in the Himalayas 
reinforced this vision: the accounts of commentators like Daniel Wright echoed their 
predecessors such as Francis Buchanan-Hamilton.2 Over time, the representations changed 
to suit changing colonial agendas – for example the gurkhas presented in George 
MacMunn’s Martial Races, written after their incorporation into the British Army, were 
passive and loyal, in comparison to the Gorkhalis within Buchanan-Hamilton’s account, on 
the eve of the Anglo-Nepalese War. Their own accounts therefore augmented that colonial 
knowledge base.  
A review of the marginalized agency discussed reveals the inaccuracy of this 
representation. Prithvi Narayan Shah’s rule was not autocratic: he relied on the support of 
the military and civilian elite such as those within the Chaubisi Rajya who assisted him in his 
initial campaigns, or the landowner Ramchandra Parsai who upon hearing of Kinloch’s 
intervention chose to assist the local soldiers. Nor did those living under Gorkhali rule 
suffer from Shah’s despotism – many benefitted from military service or patronage. 
Furthermore, Nepal did not represent an isolated hill-state, reluctant to engage in wider 
political networks. Shah cultivated far-reaching alliances such as that which he began with 
the Druk Desi Zhidar in Bhutan. Closer to the turn of the nineteenth century, an 
investigation into the causes of the 1793 expedition reveals Nepalese involvement in the 
complicated, pan-Himalayan conflict of the Sino-Nepalese War that in turn hindered Lord 
Macartney’s ambassadorial visit to China the following year. Nor were the other Himalayan 
states isolated or adverse to involvement in international affairs: Puran Giri’s travels on 
behalf of the Tibetan Panchen Lama from Calcutta to Beijing reflect this. 
Historians have argued that neither orientalism nor oriental despotism guided 
British colonialism during the late eighteenth century, and that Said’s concept rooted in the 
study of South Asian texts is more applicable to nineteenth- and twentieth-century South 
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Asia. Amongst others, Christopher Bayly has suggested it did not characterize EIC 
expansion, writing that ‘ideas of Oriental Despotism…were not at this time regarded as 
manuals of political theory for Europeans in India. Rather, they were attempts to make 
room in European mentalities for the great Kingdoms of the East’.3 For Bayly, the visions 
of India and the Himalayas returned by travellers ‘were not tools of epistemological 
conquest, so much as conceptual fig-leave to conceal desperate ignorance’.4  
However, the role of the concept of the oriental despot within Anglo-Himalayan 
encounters reveals the fig-leaf metaphor, and the dismissal of Orientalism’s application to 
the late eighteenth century, to be over-simplistic. Certainly, the EIC were desperately 
ignorant of the Himalayas, relying on the knowledge of Capuchins, traders and gosains 
amongst others. Yet a fig-leaf does not provide an imitation of what it conceals – upon 
observing the fig-leaf, the viewer is well aware that something is amiss, and that it is not an 
accurate representation of the human anatomy. On the other hand, orientalist knowledge 
of the Himalayas did not just conceal EIC ignorance. Instead, it was replaced with a 
masquerade: a set of values that were accepted as an accurate representation of the 
Himalayas. Its success depended on how convincing it could be. If representations of the 
Gorkhalis and Shah were considerably different than what was expected as per the viewer’s 
existing knowledge, it would not be accepted and EIC ignorance would be self-evident. 
The masquerade (orientalist knowledge) could merely replace desperate ignorance, or it 
could be constructed as per the interests and motivation of the masquerade’s creators (for 
example an EIC servant) in order to draw a particular response and reaction. This was 
achieved by appealing to the societal norms and values of the viewer (eighteenth-century 
Britain.) For this reason, orientalism is undoubtedly present within the 1767 encounter: 
Kinloch used existing notions of oriental despotism as a disguise in his representation of 
Shah. This was deliberate: it allowed him to pursue his own interests, in gaining permission 
for an intervention.  
Bayly wrote that ‘Company servants were able to make and maintain relations with 
Indian powers in a pragmatic way’.5 This reflects the freedom with which EIC agents could 
pursue their agendas in this era of distance between themselves and the Court of Directors, 
itself a common denominator in the expeditions of Kinloch, Logan and Foxcroft. What 
Bayly does not acknowledge are the ways in which the deployment of orientalist tropes 
played a significant role within the maintenance of those power relations, despite them 
being forged on the ground, away from London. In a wider South Asian context, visions of 
                                               
3 Bayly, Empire and Information, p.48. 
4 Ibid., p.50. 
5 Ibid., p.48. 
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Mughal decline in order to justify EIC intervention and expansion is present within 
Alexander Dow’s History of Hindostan. Published in 1772, Dow supported British action on 
behalf of Mughal sovereignty on the grounds that the emperors had lost control due to the 
‘villany of their servants’, that ‘virtue had fled from the land’, and that India had ‘fallen into 
pieces’.6 Recent events in Nepal were considered an appendage to this fragmentation, Dow 
adding that ‘in the vallies which intersect that immense ridge of hills [the Himalayas] there 
are several independent rajas, too inconsiderable to be formidable’.7 More specifically in 
relation to Nepal, orientalist tropes a prominent part in William Kirkpatrick’s encounter, 
and in his adherence to stories of the mutilation and massacre at Kirtipur in 1766, 
previously discussed. Kirkpatrick’s narrative would later be drawn upon by company 
servants forging new relations with South Asian powers: by those advocating an invasion 
of Nepal in 1814. Nor was this concept deployed exclusively by Europeans: Ram Das and 
Muktananda certainly crafted reports that appealed to Kinloch’s sense of oriental cruelty, in 
order to ensure their employer Jaya Prakash Malla’s objective of enlisting EIC support was 
achieved. It is therefore inaccurate to claim that ‘orientalism was largely devoid of 
significance for the exercising of power within India’.8 Such a discourse was present 
regardless of whether or not EIC colonial policy represented a consistent, clear set of 
interests and directives in the late eighteenth century. 
Initially, British accounts would not recognize South Asian agency whatsoever 
within the ‘conquest of India’. As Huw Bowen describes, these narratives were ‘seldom 
alive to the influence of local political and economic forces and cast the growth of the Raj 
as a coherent imperial strategy, as an inevitable imperial destiny’.9 The most infamous 
example of this is that of Robert Clive and the Battle of Plassey. This event has traditionally 
been considered a turning point in the history of India, and the beginning of British 
territorial control in Bengal. It was the culmination of South Asian agendas and 
manoeuvres that led to British ‘victory’ in 1757, notably a plot hatched in various corners 
of Bengali society to replace the incumbent Nawab Siraj-Ud-Daulah with his general Mir 
Jafar.10 However, for centuries Clive was lauded as the military hero and foremost 
antagonist, with historians drawing attention to British numerical disadvantage without 
recognition that the overwhelming majority of the Bengali soldiers did not fight, under 
instruction from Mir Jafar. In a Himalayan context, the actions of Gorkhalis were similarly 
                                               
6 Dow, A History of Hindostan, p.406. 
7 Ibid., p.420. 
8 Bayly, Empire and Information, p.48. 
9 Bowen, Lincoln, Rigby, The Worlds of the East India Company, p.xv. 
10 Wilson, India Conquered, p.99. 
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discredited ten years later in 1767, with both contemporary EIC commentators and 
present-day historians instead favouring an emphasis on natural disasters and the choices 
made by Kinloch himself.11  
Yet EIC expansion would not have been possible without the collaboration and 
assistance of South Asian allies and intermediaries. Company officials both before and after 
Plassey were relatively few in number, instead their tax and trade revenues revolved around 
the co-operation or competition of South Asians.12 This is self-evident within the Anglo-
Nepalese encounters discussed: the 1767 expedition predominantly comprised of South 
Asian sepoys, and was directed by South Asian collaborators, Ram Das and Muktananda. 
Later, the support of hill-rajas such as those of Palpa or Butwal were critical to the success 
or failure of EIC ventures. This has been appropriated by colonial historians to emphasize 
colonial benevolence, South Asian support, or even a South Asian origin: it is where Indian 
social groups lent their support to the emerging Company that shows South Asian origins – 
they were not merely assisting, but co-creating.13 Nationalist and postcolonial historians 
have found this unsettling, and have instead drawn attention to resistance, such as 
campaigns like that of Mir Kasim in Bengal, or the Fakir and Sannyasi Uprising as a 
specifically anti-British movement. This is evident within those interpretations of Shah as 
an anti-colonial champion, like that of Hem Raj Kafle discussed in chapter I.14 The 
difficulty is that such discourse creates a binary between ‘collaborator’ and ‘resistor,’ 
problematic in its deprivation of South Asian agency. Both characters are fixed in those 
roles, and react to the agency of British colonists, rendering South Asia ‘a place that has 
things done to it and reacts accordingly’.15 As Prasannan Parthasarathi writes, ‘the agency 
for the making of colonialism continues to rest with Europeans: the focus of much of this 
writing continues to be Europeans and their actions’.16  
The role of South Asian agency within Anglo-Nepalese encounters on the other 
hand offers a number of opportunities to cut through such binaries. Firstly, collaboration 
with the EIC in the Himalayas did not necessarily condone colonialism, but was instead 
followed as a political expediency. Jaya Prakash Malla’s apprehension before requesting 
assistance is indicative of this, as is the Raja of Butwal’s assistance to William Knox. The 
help was not offered through any desire to see annexation of Nepal or Butwal to British 
Bengal, but a wish by the Raja to restore his own authority there. Service was not provided 
                                               
11 For example the attribution of blame on Kinloch, From the Select Committee Proceedings, cited in Raj, 
Expedition, p.14. 
12 Bayly’s masterful work, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, is exemplary of this. 
13 Prasannan Parthasarathi, ‘Merchants and the Rise of Colonialism’ in Alavi, ed., The Eighteenth Century, p.210. 
14 Kafle, ‘Prithvi Narayan Shah and Postcolonial Resistance’, p.138. 
15 Jon E. Wilson, ‘Early Colonial India Beyond Empire’, The Historical Journal, 50:4 (December 2007) p.952. 
16 Parthasarathi, ‘Merchants and the Rise of Colonialism’, p.209. 
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out of allegiance to the British, but an alternative party such as Jaya Prakash Malla for Ram 
Das, or the Panchen Lama for Puran Giri.  
Secondly, the discussed examples of collaboration and resistance reflect ways in 
which the EIC were pulled into South Asia, or pushed out of further involvement there, by 
inter-Indian and inter-Himalayan affairs (notwithstanding their own intent on having 
dominion over South Asia and enthusiasm with which they accepted such involvement 
when offered.) Consider the fortunes of William Kirkpatrick and William Knox in 1793 
and 1802: factions within Nepalese courtly politics orchestrated both their visits to 
Kathmandu, and they were both cut short when the political situation changed (these 
changes being the end of the Sino-Nepalese War and the ascendancy of Raj Rajeshwari 
Devi for Kirkpatrick and Knox respectively.) The EIC rarely understood that these forces 
moved in the background, or that they were very unlikely to achieve the aims with which 
they set out. Kirkpatrick’s raison d’être in Kathmandu had ceased before he even departed, 
whilst Knox had undermined the residency beforehand in his allegiances to Subarna 
Prabha Devi and the Raja of Butwal, rather than Raj Rajeshwari as the new regent.  
In summary, the marginalized agency discussed within Anglo-Nepalese encounters 
draws attention to both the fortitude of orientalist tropes, and the ways in which they could 
be deployed within the encounter, by both South Asians and Europeans, in order to 
influence the outcome. Pausing to analyse the actions of supposed ‘collaborators’ or 
‘resistors’ within these encounters gives greater credit to their agency as historical 
individuals. This untethers them from such rigid definitions which are laden with 
assumptions around reactivity and loyalty to colonial aims and agendas. EIC colonial 
expansion was therefore the result of an entanglement with inter-Indian politics, in which 
the interests of the participant EIC servants such as Kinloch played only a small part.  
 
VII:2 Anglo-Himalayan Encounters and the Study of the Emergent Nepalese State and 
Nepalese Identity 
 
The study of marginalized agency within Anglo-Nepalese encounters from 1767 to 1814 
provides a significant contribution to nation-state and national identity historiography: The 
trajectory of Gorkhali power, and the means through which it was achieved in the late 
eighteenth century, confounds existing attempts in wider South-Asian historiography to 
categorize states in this period as either ‘declining,’ de-centralizing’ or ‘successor’. In 
relation to Nepalese nationalist historiography, the interjection of marginalized agency 
within that narrative of state-formation asks critical questions of the supposed 
development of a national Nepalese identity at this time. That interjection emphasizes the 
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significance of geographically and politically peripheral factors in shaping EIC-Nepalese 
relations. 
At first glance, the eighteenth century in South Asia was a time of significant 
change: in 1700 the majority of the subcontinent was ruled by the Mughal emperor 
Aurangzeb Alamgir, in which the EIC were peripheral coastal traders alongside other 
Europeans. By 1800 the political landscape had transformed, and was now characterized by 
immense struggles between the Marathas and the British, with Mughal authority in Delhi 
merely a figurehead, and other European traders more or less departed. The intermittent 
years were for a long time characterized as a ‘dark age’ of chaos and decline, in which the 
Mughals themselves were despotic and exploitative.17 This was itself a component of the 
colonial discourse, justifying intervention and British possession. More recently, historians 
have emphasized a ‘decentralization’ of Mughal authority and economic activity in states 
such as Bengal and Mysore. Attention has likewise been drawn to the vibrancy of successor 
states, and a new South Asian political order in which the Maratha and Sikh Empires 
claimed significant ascendancy rather than British conquest.18  
Once the previously neglected Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet and 
incorporated into the fold of South Asian studies, these visions of the eighteenth century 
crumble. The rise of the Gorkhali state from 1743 to 1814 defies such orderly 
categorization. The emphasis that this thesis has placed on hitherto marginalized 
competing political agendas within the Gorkhali conquests challenges notions that this was 
an era of chaos, a ‘dark-age,’ in which martial law and force ruled. Gorkha’s assimilation of 
smaller states counters the assumption that this was an era of political fragmentation. Nor 
was its rise a component of the de-centralization of the Mughal Empire: unlike the Sikh 
Empire likewise in ascendancy, the hill-rajas had not previously been vassals to the 
Emperor and did not conquer any former territory of the Mughals, excepting tracts of the 
Tarai from the Nawab of Awadh. Nepal was not a tributary state to another South Asian 
power that would appeal to the EIC, such as Tanjore. The Kathmandu Durbar was not a 
significant theatre for the play of European rivalries through the support of different 
factions, as was the case for Arcot. There is some resemblance between the Jhara military 
system of the Gorkhalis and that of the Marathas.19 However, despite both being upland, 
Hindu states, there were no light, fast cavalry raids or marauding parties. The Gorkhali 
                                               
17 The most notable example of this is Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707, 3rd edn, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
18 The works of Muzzafar Alam, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Christopher Bayly are notable examples of these 
interpretations.  
19 Stewart Gordon, Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eighteenth Century India (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
220 
 
soldiers were directly trained for the terrain in which they fought, but that training was not 
innovative, but quite traditional. The emergence of Nepal by the turn of the century 
therefore encourages us to consider South Asian state-making in the eighteenth century on 
a more regional, fragmented basis.  
State-formation in the Himalayas cannot be separated entirely from that of the rest 
of South Asia, and certainly a critique within chapter I was that such a comparative point 
had previously been neglected. However, Gorkha’s rise to power can be placed within a 
network of ‘connected histories’.20 The implications of and relationships with those South 
Asian developments should be recognised alongside those across the mountains (Nepal’s 
turbulent relationship with Tibet and China in this era) and indeed the mountain 
topography of Nepal itself, unique in its size and scale. This has been described as ‘the one 
underlying feature’, in Nepalese history which ‘even today distinguishes the Himalayan 
region from others in South Asia and elsewhere’.21A good example of these connected 
histories intersecting with the significane of that landscape is Kirkpatrick’s expedition, 
wherein two Himalayan states went to war over historic commercial issues mostly 
contained within that space – the salt trade and Malla coinage. Owing to Tibet’s tributary 
status, China was soon drawn into the conflict. The parameters of the EIC’s involvement 
were shaped by a wider South Asian history of European soldiers fighting for South Asian 
rulers, and Bahadur Shah’s wariness of the consequences of that. Ultimately though, 
despite these Indian and Chinese interjections, the conflict was concluded before 
Kirkpatrick even set out, owing to very localised features in that topography and space – 
the Chinese army being undermined by local supply in the high, bleak setting of the 
mountain passes, and Bahadur Shah bowing to local, partisan pressure to sign a treaty.  
Chapter I demonstrated ways in which historians of Nepal considered this period 
one of national identity forging, and state formation. This ranged from canonical writers 
such as Baburam Acharya and Dili Raman Regmi to more recent endeavours such as that 
of Hem Raj Kafle. These texts emphasized the unification rather than conquest of small 
polities and cultures with shared characteristics, that quickly rallied around a Nepalese state 
in response to colonial aggression. By all means the Gorkhalis did undergo the rise in 
power that evades categorization into either a declining state or successor state as per the 
above argument, becoming a considerably larger state that maps very neatly onto present 
day Nepal. However, the study of marginalized agency within this rise reveals conflicting 
loyalties within this narrative. Contrary to nationalist accounts, very few participants in 
                                               
20 Subrahmanyam, ‘One Asia or Many?’, 5-43. 
21 Clarke, ‘Blood and Territory’, p.96. 
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these encounters conceptualized a ‘state of Nepal,’ or ‘Nepalese identity,’ during this era. 
The factionalism between the three Malla rulers of Nepal Valley in 1767, and the ways in 
which some Patan merchants felt stronger ties to Gorkha, demonstrated little unity 
amongst Newari cities, let alone the wider foothills region. Once more, the unique 
mountain landscape secures this divergence in patterns of state formation. As Clarke 
reflected, whilst ‘Elsewhere in Asia traditional states had been incorporated into modern 
empires and then gave rise to their own states in a western image. In the Himalaya, any 
such clear progression as detailed above is constrained by mountain topography, and there 
is a continual tendency to drop back into more local relations’.22 Dissident voices 
throughout EIC-Nepalese encounters and throughout the rise of the ‘Gorkhali Empire’, 
such as the Rajas of Morang in 1774, Butwal in 1802, and Palpa in 1814 further validate 
this. 
The significance of developments within peripheral spaces inbetween South Asian 
polities for wider political relations is mirrored elsewhere in the eighteenth century 
Himalayas. Consider for example Mahesh Sharma study of the hill-state of Kangra, which 
at the turn of the nineteenth century was sandwiched between the Gorkhali and Sikh 
Empires. Whilst most states were swallowed up by the Gorkhalis, the ruler of Kangra 
opted instead to negotiate a treaty with Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Empire, in order to oust 
the Gorkhalis from his territory.23 Once the latter were defeated however, the Sikh 
Maharajas struggled to control their new vassal state. Sharma writes: such protests, though 
led by powerful regional chieftains with limited goals, were all the more significant as they 
could mobilise fluid ethnicities, communities and nationalities spread over a vast geography 
of hilly terrain’.24 In emphasising these challenges, Sharma hoped to point out ways in 
which ‘the authority of the Maharaja was constantly contested and re-constructed, 
particularly by the margins’.25 
 With regards the marginalized, subaltern historical agents within this thesis, visions 
of the state and state boundaries in this space and time align more closely with Benedict 
Anderson’s conceptualization of borderlands. According to Anderson, boundaries in pre-
modern South Asia were ‘porous and indistinct’ façades where sovereignties faded 
imperceptibly into one another’.26 This was applicable to those regions in which the 1767 
                                               
22 Ibid. 
23 Mahesh Sharma, ‘The Frayed Margins of Empire: Early Nineteenth Century Panjab and the Hill States’, The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 54:4 (2017), p.510. 
24 Ibid., p.530. 
25 Ibid., p.528. 
26 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.226. 
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expedition travelled through, wherein the loyalty of villagers to local rajas, whether to the 
Khandavalas of Darbhanga, Sens of Makwanpur, Mallas of Kathmandu, or Shahs of 
Gorkha, were unclear and shifting. In his analysis of borderlands space and the Marathas, 
Stewart Gordon added that a frontier was a ‘broad band between two heartland areas, in 
which the Deshmukh or petty rajah might pay taxes and offer loyalty to either side or none 
or both, depending in the perceived relative strength of the kingdoms’.27 The concept of a 
‘heartland’ is problematic since it prioritizes an external culture over a local one: 
interpreting the EIC-Nepalese borderlands this way is to fill that space with weakened 
degrees of British and Gorkhali influence, rather than localized political interests. Gordon’s 
comment is nevertheless significant in its reflection on shifting loyalties: this is observable 
in the recruitment of former landowners in 1814 such as Harrakh Deo Joshi, and in the 
possibility that settlements like Janakpur and Darbhanga were abandoned in order to avoid 
taxation. 
The actions, interests and decisions of marginalized historical agents occupying the 
borderlands region were not motivated by Nepalese nationalism or an association with a 
Nepalese identity. However, they did play a fundamental role in the development of Anglo-
Nepalese relations. The events of 1767 instigated a changing state-level approach to the 
borderlands region: one that placed an emphasis on the fortification of strategic passes, 
since that prevented Kinloch’s progression that autumn.28 It was moreover in the aftermath 
of 1767 that the Gorkhalis began encouraging a re-wilding of the Tarai jungle as a natural 
barrier.29 Finally, the contribution made by local interests within Anglo-Nepalese 
encounters, such as the accommodation of EIC sepoys at Darbhanga or the provisioning 
of Gorkhali soldiers at Sindhuli, led to greater freedom and incentives offered to peripheral 
residents on behalf of the state. This was observed by Kirkpatrick, who was informed that 
these were offered to prevent allegiance to the former Sen rulers.30 
 Local encounters with EIC expeditions drew those inhabitants into allegiance and 
relations with the British. These in turn significantly influenced the outcome of Anglo-
Nepalese conflicts and disputes. The Raja of Morang may have contacted the EIC in 1773 
after having permitted independent traders to operate in the region. The invasion of Cooch 
Behar by John Jones in support of Dharendra Narayan drew that state into the colonial 
sphere. These encounters could likewise divert communities into the Gorkhali fold: the 
encounter between the residents at Sindhuli and the 1767 EIC column led to greater 
                                               
27 Gordon, Marathas, Marauders and State Formation, p.38. 
28 Neil Howard, ‘An Introduction to the Fortifications of Central Nepal,’ European Bulletin on Himalayan 
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29 A policy suggested within the Divyopadeś, p.42. 
30 Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, p.24. 
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patronage of those landowners by Shah and greater links to Nepal Valley. Collectively these 
events, influenced by marginalized agency, directed EIC-Nepalese relations towards the 
confrontation of 1814, a significant, wide ranging colonial conflict involving multiple 
columns and draining the EIC finances. As Christopher Bayly argued: frontier wars they 
might have been, but they did stall the Company government.31  
 The enquiry into how marginalized historical subjects acted and reacted within 
EIC-Nepalese encounters contributes greatly to the history of eighteenth-century South 
Asian state formation: the revised interpretation of Gorkhali expansion unchains those 
events from metanarratives of South Asian nationhood in this era, whether colonialist 
views of despotic, martial and declining states, or emergent economic centres that 
decentralized former Mughal authority. Instead, Nepal must be regarded on its own terms. 
Within that historical narrative, the actions and loyalties of borderlands communities and 
peripheral historical agents indicate a subscription to neither a Nepalese state, nor a 
Nepalese identity. Nevertheless, their actions within EIC-Nepalese encounters proved very 
significant in directing relations between the two powers. 
 
VII:3 Marginalized Agency and the Deconstruction of the Encounter 
 
The role of marginalized agency within EIC-Nepalese encounters from 1767 to 1814 has 
implications for the wider study of such agency (whether local, subaltern or peripheral) in 
eighteenth-century South Asia. Firstly, it demonstrates the futility in mapping patterns or 
essentializing criteria onto such historical agents. Instead, the examples discussed within 
this thesis allow for a recognition and celebration of the hybridity and unpredictability in 
the roles played and actions taken. Secondly, the acknowledgement of those roles allows 
for a historiographical revision of how we approach the study of the ‘encounter’ itself, 
encouraging the deconstruction of such a historical event into multiple interactive 
components. Whilst some of those components are more difficult to analyse than others, 
this should not result in their dismissal, but could instead lead to a recognition of their 
unknown quantity. There is therefore a consistency in the presence of marginalized agency 
within the encounter.  
Although there are repeated actions and striking similarities, there are no definitive, 
essential rules for how the marginalized historical agents within EIC-Nepalese and wider 
Anglo-Himalayan encounters acted, considered over a number of criteria: Some individuals 
local to the borderlands regions in which these encounters took place supported the EIC 
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against the Gorkhali state in their actions, for example Agam Singha and Harrakh Deo 
Joshi during the Anglo-Nepalese War, whilst others did vice versa, for instance 
Ramchandra Parsai and Chumpan Singh Thapa at Sindhuli in 1767 or Hari Mahant Sewak 
at Dehra Dun in 1814. Whilst some delivered resources to the EIC, such as the merchant 
Mirza Settar travelling to join George Bogle in Bhutan, others failed to provide that service, 
for example the grain merchant Dondao Chaudhuri in 1767. That trader was also deceptive 
and misleading with regards his capacity to help, whereas the villagers at Janakpur were 
open in their explanation that they could not do so. Some individuals approached the EIC, 
for example the emissaries of Jaya Prakash Malla in 1767 and Dharendra Narayan in 1773, 
whilst others evaded any encounter with the British, notably those at Janakpur in 1767 and 
those who avoided contact with James Rennell at Olipur. There were some individuals 
whose information was valued, whilst that of others was dismissed. The character reference 
with which the loyalty of Mahant Banwari Das was questioned in 1814 is testimony to this. 
The value placed on such intelligence was often misplaced, as was the case with that of 
Ram Das in 1767. These temporary allegiances were not unchanging: sepoys, coolies and 
guides appear to leave Kinloch’s side in the closing stages of 1767. Francis Neville on the 
other hand moved the opposite direction, providing geographical knowledge to the EIC in 
1814 despite a lifetime of residency and patronage at the Nepalese Durbar. 
 The reason for these inconsistencies is that there is no underlying cultural or 
political identity common to the marginalized historical subject. Instead, what emerges is a 
hybridity in marginalized agency, and a productivity in asking what individual circumstances 
might have led to the actions taken. In considering the roles of intermediaries within 
exploration narratives, Felix Driver recently called for an approach that ‘would highlight 
the networks, resources, and practices on which exploration depended, and through which 
intermediaries gained their influence. We need to consider the spatial infrastructure and 
logistics of expedition-making; the role of in-between places as well as people’.32 This is 
certainly helpful in explaining the events of 1767 and subsequent encounters: the actions of 
villagers and landowners at Sindhuli that year cannot be understood without an 
appreciation of their position in relation to both the Gorkhali military conscription and 
reward being enacted, and to the presence of an EIC military force. An individual within an 
encounter may well be involved in networks spreading far beyond the space in which that 
takes place. For example, the landholding interests of Mahant Banwari Das in 1814 spread 
from Patna to Nepal Valley. These networks could in fact stretch far beyond the colonial 
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lens, even if right before their eyes: George Bogle did not recognize ways in which the new 
Druk Desi in 1774 was hindered by support for his predecessor Zhidar until that support 
had erupted into civil war. William Kirkpatrick was oblivious to ways in which his presence 
in Kathmandu intersected Anglo-Chinese relations, and William Knox did not recognize 
the ongoing courtly struggles between Raj Rajeshwari Devi and her detractors. 
The significance of these networks and relations beyond those directly involving the 
EIC s prompts us to ask what exactly constitutes an ‘encounter’. This thesis, as an 
exploration of the roles played by marginalized agency within these interactions, 
encourages an interpretation of the encounter as an interface between many separate 
components: within each meeting between multiple historical agents during the EIC 
expeditions discussed, attention has been drawn to a number of different factors. The 
existing knowledge of each agent, whether each participant lived up to these expectations, 
how their actions might be influenced by previous events, are all components present 
within the encounter amongst many other such factors, and have the ability to influence 
the outcome. In turn, experiences from that interaction and experiences of that outcome 
could be present in a subsequent encounter.  
The difficulty in such a deconstructing interpretation, in relation to the study of the 
specific component of marginalized agency, is that some components are more visible to 
the historian. Components are easier to identify if the historical agent wrote extensively 
about them, or provided an alternative record of them. The outstanding example of this is 
George Kinloch, and his journal. On the other hand, components relating to marginalized 
historical subjects, for example their expectations or agendas, are considerably less 
documented. The historian is then left with an incomplete deconstruction. They are able to 
analyse and measure the historical significance of some components, but not all of them. 
These uncertainties, particularly around the marginalized components, has led some 
historians to despair. For instance, in the preface to the edited text of Kinloch’s journal, 
Yogesh Raj reflected upon the historical fog over the events of Sindhuli in 1767 and 
concluded that ‘a more productive question would be to ask whether there are any 
historiographical returns for investing so much attention to ‘decisiveness’ in historical 
events’.33 For Raj, the incomplete historical record of the encounter meant that the role of 
the marginalized and the wider importance of 1767 for EIC-Nepalese relations could not 
be ascertained. Other historians have argued that the outcome of the encounter was 
influenced more heavily by the colonizer’s expectations and representations, since the 
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colonizing discourse was too strong for marginalized components to present a challenge. 
The consequent experience drawn from an encounter was disseminated and shared in 
written accounts, giving further weight towards those colonialist components.34 
Even if a colonial agent consciously recognized colonialist preconceptions that 
either jeopardized the encounter or provided an incorrect representation of themselves and 
those they interacted with, they could not prevent its presence and fortitude. Consider the 
intermediary Puran Giri’s role in a conversation between Samuel Turner, Samuel Davis, 
and the Druk Desi, Jigme Singye. The latter, having sent Hastings a landscape of his winter 
palace, desired to know if it was displayed, and if he might have a depiction of the 
governor-general’s house. Turner confirmed that it was on display, Jigme Singye then asked 
whether either of them could draw. Turner wrote as follows:  
My interpreter (with that false policy which is inseparable from a suspicious mind) 
eagerly grasping at an evasion, began to answer, that an Englishman was master of 
every art and science; astronomy, geography, mathematics, mechanics. I stopped 
him; for no vanity could allow such indiscriminate and preposterous praise; and I 
told the Raja in plainer terms that drawing constituted in England a branch of 
education; and that as we made unequal progress in the art, I could boast but little 
skill in it, but that my friend Mr. Davis had attained a great degree of perfection.35 
This reflects a challenge in dismissing the significance of colonialist preconceptions within 
the encounter: Puran Giri, when asked a question, posed his response having assumed how 
exactly Turner would have wanted him to: that in turn was likely based on previous 
interpretations on behalf of the British over at least a decade of service. Yet he was 
incorrect, since Turner did not intend himself to be represented as a ‘master of every art’. 
The emissary concluded ‘the employment of an interpreter was no less troublesome than 
protractive of our conferences’.36  
 The solution is not to dismiss or downplay the role of colonial components in 
favour of those relating to marginalized historical agents. As Felix Driver reflected, ‘in the 
context of exploration, there is a risk that turning the spotlight on the agency of 
intermediaries such as guides, consultants and interpreters simply replaces one kind of hero 
                                               
34 This was particularly resonant given that many encountered South Asia exclusively through EIC literature. 
‘Colonial categories were forged in the exchange of texts between officials, not in moments of encounter with 
Bengali everyday life’. Wilson, ‘A Thousand Countries’, pp.106-7. 
35 Turner, An Account of an Embassy, p.75. 
36 Ibid., p.76. This incident is further compounded by the source base, since Turner is narrating on behalf of 
Puran Giri. Moreover, Turner’s subsequent intercession is highly unlikely to have taken place, or been 
understood by the Druk Desi – if he had understood Puran Giri’s rhapsody for the English, he would not 
then have needed the interpreter. 
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myth with another.’37 Instead, it is more productive to embrace the uncertainties around 
non-colonial, marginalized components, since they create an unknown quantity in 
marginalized agency. For instance, consider Kinloch’s journal entry from 2nd October, 
1767: ‘March’d to Harriatpore plain. Cross’d ten nulla and rivers in our way, picked up a 
fisherman who conducted us greatly and facilitated our journey, for the harcarah who 
return’d from Mr Hoggan led us twice out of the road.’38 The fisherman in this encounter is 
crucial – they were one of the few individuals within the foothills in 1767 to actively engage 
with the EIC expedition, doing so in a supportive role that corrected the mistakes made by 
a harkara. There are so many further questions though that could enrich our understanding 
of this wider encounter: was the fisherman the only individual to help Kinloch in this way, 
or was this the only instance in which Kinloch recorded such help? Were they acting 
faithfully, given that the road ultimately led to heavy Gorkhali fortifications? Was this 
individual possibly acting on behalf of Shah, given that he had instructed spies to be 
introduced amongst the British? These questions are no more answerable now than they 
were to Kinloch at the time. However, merely positing the questions and exploring the 
plethora of possible answers is enough to challenge previous colonialist assumptions that 
they acted in full support of Kinloch, and nationalist ones that the region was hostile to the 
EIC. 
 
VII:4 Conclusions 
 
The role of marginalized agency in shaping EIC-Nepalese and wider Anglo-Himalayan 
relations has previously been neglected. However, as Jon Wilson wrote, ‘even the most 
marginalized people had some capacity to tell their own stories and act for themselves.’39 In 
revisiting this series of encounters, this thesis hopes to have begun investigations into such 
stories and actions, drawing attention to the significant contribution of marginalized agency 
as one of many interactive components within the encounter. It is acknowledged that there 
are many unknown quantities that render such investigations challenging; often difficult to 
conclude decisively, on which new methodologies could shed light. The contributions that 
these investigations make to wider historiographical debates could likewise be further 
developed, with more comparative discussion in relation to other South Asian regions and 
networks that are beyond the parameters of this thesis. In the meantime, it is clear that the 
interests, actions and reactions of marginalized historical agents, by contributing 
                                               
37 Driver, ‘Intermediaries and the archive of exploration’, p.25. 
38 B.L. Mss Eur F128/140 Journal, 2nd October 1767, Book 2, Folio 15b. 
39 Wilson, ‘Agency, Narrative, and Resistance’, p.246. 
228 
 
substantially to the colonial encounter, influenced the consequences of EIC expeditions 
and fortunes in the Himalayas to a far greater degree than previously credited.  
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Appendices 
 
A Note on Anglo-South Asian Nomenclature  
 
Even before the colonial encounter, cities and places within South Asia could have held 
various names over the centuries, reflecting various languages, rulers and linguistic 
preferences. Eighteenth-century colonial officials were not known for their accuracy of 
spelling, often writing South Asian names phonetically and with little consistency. There 
are therefore many variables and influences, including the South Asian subject that initially 
recounts the name, the colonial official transcribing it, and those who copied it, that have 
resulted in a plurality of terms, often for individual places or people. A further layer of 
names has been added from the 1950s wherein governments of post-colonial national 
states endeavoured to reclaim the toponymical landscape from the discourse of colonialism 
by re-establishing former names, or promoting new ones altogether in local or new national 
languages of Hindi and Nepali.  
It is recognized that both colonial and postcolonial names therefore reflect specific 
agendas, and the enforcement of them. Their usage is not intended as an endorsement. 
However, a thorough investigation unto their contested construction is beyond the 
parameters of the thesis. In the interests of consistency, this thesis has adopted a number 
of rules in its nomenclatural choices. In the event that there is uncertainty, all disparate 
terms used are included in the glossary.  
- Wherein people and places are discussed in their colonial context, the colonial 
official name is adopted (for instance, Calcutta.) 
- Wherein people and places are discussed in their present-day context, their 
contemporary official name is adopted (for instance, Kolkata.) 
- Names for people and places within quotes are left unedited. For instances wherein 
the person or place is not clearly identifiable from the quotation, their 
contemporary official name is bracketed (for instance, Lalitpur [Patan].)  
- Names within quotes are identified outside the quotation by their International 
Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration spelling (for instance, Ram Das.) 
- Place of Publication details are listed as they appear in the text (for instance, 
Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakashan, 2009.) 
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Select Glossary 
 
Term Definition 
Ali, Hyder The Sultan and de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Mysore, 1761-1782. 
Ali, Wazir A claimant to the throne of Awadh who rebelled against the British 
at the turn of the nineteenth century. His defeat and capture was 
aided by Nepalese support. 
Almora Border town between Nepal and British India in 1814, capital of 
Kumaon. 
B.P. Koirala 
Highway 
A road in present day Nepal, also called the H 06. The B.P. Koirala 
Highway roughly correlated with the portion of the intended route 
that Kinloch was not able to access. 
Bagmati A river running from Nepal Valley though the foothills to Bihar. 
Baisi Rajya A loose confederacy of city-states in western Nepal, consisting of 22 
states in the Karnali-Bheri river basin annexed by Nepal mostly in 
the 1780s and 1790s. 
Baladiya bepari A South Asian occupational term. A contractor who had bullocks for 
hire, often involved in the transport of grain in Bengal and Bihar. 
Barker, Robert; 
Colonel 
EIC Senior Officer previously stationed in Patna prior to the 1767 
expedition. 
Barra A district in northern Bihar seized by Kinloch in 1767 alongside 
Parsa. 
Batacharji, 
Ramajai, 
A Brahmin from Calcutta who was employed to provide information 
by Francis Buchanan-Hamilton during his stay in Kathmandu. 
Batta Additional pay offered by South Asian armies including the EIC. The 
Batta offered by the EIC was intended as a bonus to sepoys and 
officers in the field, or outside of EIC territory. Its withdrawal was 
the source of a mutiny in the 1760s. 
Bedars  A community of messengers and runners (see Harkara) settled a few 
miles outside of Seringapatam, whose members served both Tipu 
Sultan and the British. 
Beg, Mirza 
Mughal, 
An Indian surveyor credited by James Rennell for his information 
about north-western India. 
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Beruni merchants  A South Asian occupational term: merchants who more often 
transported grain by boat in Bihar and Bengal. See also Bhasaniya 
Mahajans. 
Bettiah A city in north-west Bihar. In 1767 the Bettiah Raja held the most 
land in Bihar. The EIC based an Agent there who received Jaya 
Prakash Malla's initial letter to the Company. 
Bhadgaon An alternative Nepalese name for the Malla city of Bhaktapur, often 
used in Nepal Valley. See also Khwopa. 
Bhaktapur  A Sanskrit/Nepalese name for a Malla city-state within Nepal Valley, 
east of Kathmandu. See also Khwopa and Bhadgaon. 
Bharat A term for South Asia, historically referring to the subcontinent that 
refers to India in its contemporary use. 
Bhāratas Ancient Indian civilization. 
Bhasaniya 
Mahajans 
A South Asian occupational term: merchants who more often 
transported grain by boat in Bihar and Bengal. See also Beruni 
merchants 
Bhawara  A village in Northern Bihar, formerly the capital of the Khandavalas 
of Mithila (Tirhut) until it was relocated by Raja Pratap Singh in 
1762. 
Bhot Bagan A Tibetan Math and temple in Bengal, conscreted in 1776 and gifted 
to Puran Giri Gosain by Warren Hastings. 
Bhotia Ethnic, cultural Himalayan group involved in the salt trade in 
Kumaon.  
Bogle, George, An EIC diplomat who travelled to Tibet in 1774. 
Brian Houghton 
Hodgson 
EIC Resident at Kathmandu in the nineteenth century, who wrote 
extensively on the country of Nepal. 
Buchanan-
Hamilton, Francis; 
Doctor 
An EIC diplomat who travelled to Nepal with William Knox's 
expedition from 1802-1804. Buchanan-Hamilton later wrote an 
account of the country. 
Burke, Edmund, Eighteenth-century British politician and critic of the EIC. 
Butwal A territory between Nepal and India. 
Cabral, Juao, Portuguese Jesuit who visted Nepal in 1628. 
Cacella, Estevao, Portuguese Jesuit who visted Nepal in 1628. 
Call, Thomas, An EIC surveyor in the eighteenth century. 
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Carcoat  Khurkot, a settlement en-route to Nepal Valley between Sindhuli and 
Hariharpur. 
Chaubisi Rajya A loose confederacy of city-states in western Nepal, consisting of 24 
states in the Kali-Gandaki river basin, including Lamjung, Palpa, 
Kaski and Gorkha. The confederacy historically had included 
Nuwakot, although by the 1760s this was a tributary to Kathmandu. 
Chaudhuri A leading merchant in every trade who received fees, represented 
grievances to the government, regulated the price of commodities, 
settled minor disputes and most importantly in this context, met 
extraordinary demand when persons of rank or troops passed 
Chaudhuri, 
Dondao, 
A merchant contracted by the EIC to provide grain for the 1767 
expedition to Nepal. 
Chela  A disciple within a Sannyasi Math, recruited by Gurus and given 
freedom to conduct business for the Math. 
Cheri  The monastery in Bhutan that housed the Dharma Rajas during the 
eighteenth century. 
Chetri A caste within the former Khasa Empire and within Gorkha. 
Chichacotta The site of a battle between the Bhutanese and the EIC expedition of 
John Jones, 1773. 
Clive, Robert; 
Major-General 
EIC military and civil commander in the 1750s and 1760s. 
Cooch Behar A state inbetween the Bhutanese foothills and EIC Bengal in the 
1770s.  
Coolie Colonial term for a labourer in South Asia. See also Dandie. 
Cornwallis, 
Charles; General 
Twice Governor-General of India, from 1786-1793 and in 1805. 
Crawford, Charles, Military surveyor who accompanied William Knox to Kathmandu in 
1802. Crawford drew the first European map of Nepal Valley. 
Dalai Lama  One of two political and religious figures of authority within the 
Gelugpa Bhuddist order in Tibet, the other being the Panchen Lama.  
Dandie Colonial term for a rower in South Asia. See also Coolie 
Daniell, Thomas, Prominent orientalist painter, friend and correspondent of Samuel 
Davis who accompanied him to Garhwal in 1791. Uncle to William 
Daniell. 
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Daniell, William,  Prominent orientalist painter, friend and correspondent of Samuel 
Davis who accompanied him to Garhwal in 1791 and engraved his 
drawings in 1813. Nephew to Thomas Daniell. 
Darbhanga A town in Northern Bihar that the 1767 expedition travelled 
through. See also Khandavala 
Das, Balaram, Headman of Janakpur in 1767. 
Das, Fakir Ram, Kinloch's guide in 1767. Ram Das was reportedly a Gosain who 
travelled throughout Northern India. 
Das, Mahant 
Banwari,  
A prominent religious figure at Patna during the Anglo-Nepalese 
War who also held land in Nepal Valley. 
Das, Narayan, A scribe whose ancestors had held prominent political positions 
before been ousted from the Himalayan foothills during Gorkhali 
expansion. 
Davis, Samuel, A romanticist artist and surveyor who accompanied Samuel Turner 
as far as Bhutan in 1783. 
Deb Raja See Druk Desi. 
Devi, Narenda 
Laxmi, 
Queen of Nepal, wife of Prithvi Narayan Shah, mother to Pratap 
Singh Shah. 
Devi, Raj 
Rajeshwari, 
Former Princess of Gulmi, first wife of Rana Bahadur Shah, and 
regent of Nepal from 1802 to 1806. 
Devi, Rajendra 
Laxmi, 
Regent of Nepal from 1778 to 1785. Wife to Pratap Singh Shah, 
mother to Rana Bahadur Shah. 
Devi, Subarna 
Prabha,  
Queen Consort of Rana Bahadur Shah. 
Dhanavanta  A Nobleman who allegedy betrayed the Kathmandu city garrison and 
opened the doors to the Gorkhali in 1767. 
Dharma Rajas The verbal, physical and mental reincarnations of the original Drukpa 
Shabdrung, the individual founder of the Drukpa order. These 
Dharma Rajas delegated civil authority to the Druk Desi. 
Dhulikhel A strategically important gadhi in Nepal that Kinloch planned to pass 
en route to Nepal. 
Diwani One of two offices within Mughal administration, alongside the 
Nizamat. The Diwani gave tax collection rights to the office holder, 
the Diwan. The EIC gained the office of the Diwani of Bihar, Bengal 
and Orissa in the aftermath of the Battle of Buxar. 
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Druk Desi The civil authority in Bhutan, meaning ‘Thunder Dragon Regent,’ 
often known in colonial sources as the Deb Raja.  
Drukpa The dominant Buddhist order in eighteenth-century Bhutan. 
Drukpa Shabdrung The founder of Bhutan, unifying the country in the early seventeenth 
century. Leader of the Drukpa Buddhist order. 
Dumja A settlement between Dhulikhel and Khurkot, along the present day 
B.P. Koirala Highway in eastern Nepal. Also referred to as Dumjah 
and Daupchah. Kinloch was promised by Jaya Prakash Malla that 
reinforcements would meet him there en route to Nepal.  
Duncan, Jonathan, EIC resident at Benares at the time of the 1793 expedition. 
Durbar A term for the court of a South Asian ruler, for example the 
Kathmandu Durbar. In Nepalese cities, governmental and royal 
complexes were consequently named 'Durbar Square.' Since the royal 
court often relocated, this thesis has often referred to the 'Nepalese 
Durbar,' unless specifically based at Gorkha or Kathmandu. 
Dzong Bhutanese term for a fortification. 
Ellis, William, EIC Factory chief at Patna during the 1760s. 
Foxcroft, George; 
Captain 
EIC Emissary to Nepal in 1783.  
Frazer, Archibald,  A former Justice Officer in Bengal, appointed contracts for flood 
defences by Warren Hastings in the 1770s. 
Gadhi A term for a fortification in South Asia. 
Gandaki A river running south from Nepal into Bihar. 
Gelugpa The dominant Buddhist order in eighteenth-century Tibet. 
Giri Sect A Sannyasi sect that was based in the 1770s at Jyotirmath in present 
day Uttarakhand. 
Golding, Edward EIC agent at Bettiah to whom Jaya Prakash Malla's request for help 
was intially delivered.  
Gorakhpur In 1814 this city was an important outpost for the EIC, close to the 
western Nepalese border. 
Gorkha A city-state in Western Nepal, birthplace of Prithvi Narayan Shah. 
Gorkhali A resident and subject of Gorkha. 
Grand Trunk 
Road 
One of the oldest roads in Asia, running from Chittagong to Kabul 
via Patna, Agra and Delhi. 
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Grant, [unknown]; 
Captain 
EIC military commander stationed at Bettiah in 1767, alongside the 
Company agent Edward Golding. Grant may have been a rival to 
Kinloch for leadership of the 1767 expedition. 
Grihastha-beparis,  Grain cultivators who were in a position to expand. They purchased 
the produce of their neighbours at harvest or by means of advances. 
This they then moved into the market. 
Guiseppe; Padre, Father Guiseppe de Rovato, a Capuchin monk who resided in 
Kathmandu in the 1760s and wrote a prominent account of Nepal. 
Gulmi City state in Western Nepal during the eighteenth century. 
Gumashtas South Asian intermediaries, imposing rates on behalf of the EIC 
onto weavers and producers in 1760s Bengal. 
Gurkha Colonial term for a soldier from Gorkha, later from wider Nepal and 
the Himalayas, specifically relating to the Gurkha military regiments. 
Guru A role within a Sannyasi math, more widely used by colonial officials 
to reflect a person's religious status. 
Gurung A caste within the former Khasa Empire and within Gorkha. 
Hamilton, 
Alexander, 
A surgeon employed by the East India Company who accompanied 
George Bogle to Tibet, and later returned to the Himalayas himself. 
Hardy, Alexander; 
Ensign,  
A subordinate officer within the 1767 expedition to Nepal. 
Hariballabh An informant to Francis Buchanan-Hamilton in Garhwal. 
Hariharpur The site of a Gadhi in the Nepalese foothills. 
Harkara South Asian term for a running messenger, also used in espionage. 
Hastings, Warren; 
Governor-General 
Governor-General in Bengal at the time of the Bogle, Foxcroft and 
Turner expeditions.  
Havildar A rank within the EIC army, specifically for a South Asian officer, 
subordinate to the Jemadar. 
Hearsey,Hyder 
Young; Captain 
Accompanied William Moorcroft to Tibet in 1812, and later 
provided information during the Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Hetauda Settlement within the Nepalese Tarai where George Foxcroft was 
detained in 1783. 
Hogan, [unknown]; 
Lieutenant 
A subordinate officer within the 1767 expedition to Nepal. 
Hurst, George, An independent merchant given permission to trade from Bettiah 
during the 1760s. 
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Izatullah  A Kashmiri Muslim who guided William Moorcroft on his venture 
into Tibet in 1812. Izatullah later provided information during the 
Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Janakpur A settlement en-route to Nepal Valley between Darbhanga and 
Sindhuli. 
Jemadar  A rank within the EIC army, specifically for a South Asian officer, 
subordinate to the Subedar. 
Jhara Military labour system imposed by  Prithvi Narayan Shah. 
Jones, John; 
Captain 
The military commander of an EIC intervention in Bhutan in the 
1770s. 
Jones, William, A Prominent orientalist painter, friend and correspondent of Samuel 
Davis. 
Joshi, Harrakh 
Deo, 
An elite from Kumaon and Garhwal who supported the 1814 EIC 
invasion of Nepal with soldiers. 
Josi, Nilakantha, Resident of Bhatakpur and spy for the Gorkhas in the early 1760s. 
Kadir Khan, 
Maulvi Abdul, 
A Bengali emissary who represented the EIC in Kathmandu in 1793, 
leading a delegation in 1795. 
Kang-an, Fu; 
Duke  
Commander of the Chinese troops in Nepal in 1792, who attributed 
his failure at Nuwakot to the intervention of British soldiers. 
Kangra The site of a battle between the Nepalese and the Sikh Empire in the 
early nineteenth century, prior to the Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Kantipur Newari name for Kathmandu, a city in Nepal Valley. 
Kantivati, Queen Consort of Rana Bahadur Shah. 
Karnali A river in far-western Nepal. 
Kashipur A town in present day Uttarakhand and a site of an EIC timber 
station in the early nineteenth century. 
Kaski A city-state in western Nepal. 
Kathmandu  The present day capital of Nepal, one of the three city-states within 
Nepal Valley, besieged by the Gorkhalis in 1767. See also Kantipur. 
Kazi A prominent political office within the Gorkhali state, given military 
and civil responsibility. Sometimes written as Kaji.  
Keergunge An unclear site near Darbhanga in eighteenth-century Bihar and the 
site of a killa. 
Khan, 
Anwaruddin, 
The Nawab of Arcot from 1744 to 1749 whom the EIC supported. 
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Khan, Mahamed 
Reza, 
The most important Indian administrator during Robert Clive’s 
governance whose family was to inform British policy in Bengal from 
1756 to 1830. A relative to Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan. 
Khan, Mir Niamat 
, 
A Mughal Governor and grandfather of Izatullah. 
Khan, Rosham; 
Subedar 
South Asian solider given responsibility over coolies and sepoys within 
Alexander Hamilton's expedition. 
Khan, Wasil Ali  An assistant to Mir Kasim and father of Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan. 
Khanchi Nepalese city-state that allied to Gorkha prior to Prithvi Narayan 
Shah's ascension.  
Khandavala  Dynastic family established in Northern Bihar, the hereditary Rajas 
of Darbhanga. 
Khasa A former empire that encompassed western Nepal and Nepal Valley, 
from which the Gorkhali language was derivative. 
Khurkot A settlement en-route to Nepal Valley between Sindhuli and 
Bhaktapur, referred to by Kinloch as Carcoat. 
Khwopa  The city of Bhaktapur has a distinctly different form 
of Newari language to that of Patan and Kathmandu. Khwopa was 
its title in that language.  
Killa A term for a fortification in Bihari languages, alternatively spelled 
kella. 
Kinloch, [unknown] Held the office of Superintendent of Poolbundy Affairs in 1770s Bengal. 
Kinloch, Charles; 
Ensign 
Brother to George Kinloch, accompanying him to Nepal in 1767, 
later in the service of the Dutch East India Company. 
Kinloch, George; 
Captain 
Commander of the 1767 expedition to Nepal. 
Kirant Former name for a broad region of Eastern Nepal encompassing 
Limbu and Morang, sometimes referred to as Kirat. 
Kirkpatrick, James 
Achilles; 
Lieutenant Colonel 
British resident at Hyderabad from 1798 to 1805; brother to William 
Kirkpatrick. 
Kirkpatrick, 
William; Captain 
Emissary to Nepal in 1793 who later wrote an account of the 
country. 
Knox, William; 
Captain 
The first British resident to Nepal in 1802. 
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Kosi A river running south from Nepal into Bihar. 
Koss  Also sometimes written as Coss, Kos, Kosh, Krosh, or krosha. A South 
Asian unit of distance, roughly 1.91 miles or 3.07 kilometres. Along 
the Grand Trunk Road and northern India wherein the EIC 
encountered the Himalayas, it usually referred to a distance slightly 
over 2 miles or 3.2 kilometres. 
Kukri Sometimes written Khukuri; a traditional Nepalese and Gorkhali 
curved blade for both martial and everyday use. 
Kumaon Region in present day India, annexed by the Gorkhas and ceded to 
the EIC after the Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Kunga Rinchen, 
Kunga, 
Druk Desi of Bhutan from 1773 to 1776. 
Kuti One of two significant passes over the Himalayas between Nepal and 
Tibet. See Kyirong. 
Kuvar, 
Ramkrishna,   
A regional Gorkhali commander opposing the 1767 EIC expedition. 
Kyirong One of two significant passes over the Himalayas between Nepal and 
Tibet. See Kuti. 
Lalitpur An alternative Sanskrit/Nepalese name for the city of Patan. 
Lamjung A city-state in western Nepal. 
Liethieullier, 
[unknown] Mssr,  
A salt merchant at Darbhanga in 1767. 
Logan, James, Surgeon to the 1767 expedition. Logan returned to Nepal in the early 
1770s. 
Madhesh The eastern portion of the Tarai region in Nepal.  
Madhi, Mirza, A South Asian munshi amongst Knox’s entourage in 1802 who was 
permitted to remain in Kathmandu as an EIC representative after its 
1804 departure. 
Magar A caste within the former Khasa Empire and within Gorkha. 
Mahabharat Range A significant low-lying mountain range running north of the Tarai, 
east to west along the base of the Nepalese foothills. 
Mahabhul  Alternatively spelled Mahabid; a pass through the Himalayan foothills 
from Hariharpur to Nepal Valley, referred to within Kinloch's diary. 
This was potentially a corruption of Mahabharat. 
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Mahajan Wholesale merchants, with the ability to secure contracts through 
large advance payments. 
Mahant  The head of a Sannyasi Math, elected by the gurus. 
Makwanpur Settlement and hill-state between Nepal Valley and Bettiah, Bihar.  
Malla, Jaya 
Prakash, 
Raja of Kathmandu in 1767. 
Malla, Jaya 
Pratap, 
Raja of Patan in 1767. 
Malla, Ranjit, Raja of Bhaktapur in 1767. 
Manning, Thomas, A Sinologist who travelled to Lhasa from Bengal in 1811, meeting 
the Dalai Lama. 
Mark, Padre, A Capuchin monk stationed in Bettiah whom the 1767 encountered. 
Referred to in Kinloch's journal as Padrey Merk. 
Math  A South Asian term for a Sannyasi monastery, or temple.  
Maund  A South Asian term for a variable weight; 76 pounds in Bengal, 37 ½ 
in Surat. 
McGwire, William, An EIC agent and opium trader at Patna in the 1760s. 
Mir Jafar Nawab of Bengal from 1757 to 1760 and 1763 to 1765. 
Mir Kasim  Nawab of Bengal from 1760 to 1763, replacing Mir Jafar. Mir Kasim 
rebelled against the EIC in 1763 before being defeated at the battle 
of Buxar. Mir Kasim also invaded Nepal in support of the Raja of 
Makwanpur. 
Mirtle, William, Independent contractor in the Himalayas during the 1760s, 
specializing in timber and maritime supplies. 
Misra, Gajraj,   An emissary who served both Maulvi Abdul Kadir Khan in 1795 and 
William Knox in 1802. 
Mithila  Also known as Tirhut. Ancient kingdom in the Tarai ruled in the 
1760s by the Khandavala dynasty (Rajas of Darbhanga). 
Moorcroft, William, Superintendent of Stud for the EIC who travelled extensively over 
the Himalayas in search of horse stock to trade. 
Moradabad A town in the present-day state of Uttar Pradesh, where an EIC 
agent was stationed at the time of the Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Morang A region in eastern Nepal. 
Mugitar A settlement near Sindhuli. See Parsai, Ramchandra. 
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Muhammad, 
Ghulam, 
An Indian surveyor credited by James Rennell for his information 
about the Deccan region. 
Muktananda Kinloch's guide in 1767, Also sometimes written Muctan 
Unda. Secondary literature suggests Muktananda was a Kashmiri 
muslim. 
Munshi Colonial South Asian term for an administrative official.  
Mustang A Kingdom in western Nepal, bordering Tibet.  
Naik A rank within the EIC army, specifically for a South Asian officer, 
subordinate to the Havildar. 
Narain, Ram  South Asian trader who operated a trading monopoly at Patna with 
William McGwire in the 1760s. 
Narayan, 
Dharendra, 
The Raja of Cooch Behar, installed by Cooch Behari elite after the 
death of the Bhutanese-supported Rajendra Narayan. 
Narayan, 
Rajendra, 
The Raja of Cooch Behar, installed by Zhidar's intervention in the 
early 1770s. 
Neville, Francis, An independent merchant born in Kathmandu, who resided there 
until the outbreak of the Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Newari A language, culture and ethnic group, based in Nepal Valley and 
resident in the three cities of Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan. 
Nizamat One of two offices within Mughal administration, alongside the 
Diwani. The Nizamat gave territorial rights to the office holder, the 
Nizam. 
Nuwakot A hill-state and city on the edge of Nepal Valley, en route to Tibet. 
Nyima, Palden 
Tenpai,  
The seventh Panchen Lama and one of two political and religious 
figures of authority in Tibet. 
Omrah A military regional official within Nepal. 
Osborn, 
[unknown]; Ensign 
A subordinate officer within the 1767 expedition to Nepal. 
Paikar An occupation similar to Baladiya beparis, but wealthier and higher 
caste 
Panchen Lama One of two political and religious figures of authority within the 
Gelugpa Bhuddist order in Tibet, the other being the Dalai Lama.  
Pandit, Harihar,  An envoy employed by Prithvi Narayan Shah, sent to negotiate an 
alliance with Palpa against Lamjung in the early 1750s. 
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Pant, Gangadhar,  An envoy employed by Prithvi Narayan Shah, sent to negotiate an 
alliance with Tanahu against Lamjung in the early 1750s. 
Parbat Nepalese city-state that allied to Gorkha prior to Prithvi Narayan 
Shah's ascension.  
Parsa  A district in northern Bihar seized by Kinloch in 1767 alongside 
Barra. Within Parsa was a small gadhi occupied by the EIC. 
Rajatarangiri Sanskrit text detailing the historical narrative of Kashmir. 
Parsai,  
Ramchandra, 
A landowner from Mugitar near Sindhuli who allegedly supported 
the Gorkhalis in 1767. 
Parwana South Asian term for a trading licence. 
Pashupatinath A Hindu temple complex and site of pilgrimage in Kathmandu. 
Patan  A City within Nepal Valley, south of Kathmandu. See also Lalitpur. 
Patna A major city on the banks of the Ganges from which the 1767 
expedition set out. Patna was an important trading town and EIC 
political centre. 
Peacock, Francis, An independent trader in the Himalayas during the 1770s. 
Phousdar South Asian term for a petty law officer or collector. 
Poolbundy The practice of building flood defences and measures to alleviate 
flooding in eighteenth-century South Asia. 
Praman Eighteenth-century South Asian term for a member of the merchant 
gentry in Patan and Kathmandu. 
Pradhan, 
Abhusasingh,  
Resident of Kathmandu and spy for Gorkha in the 1760s. 
Pundit A messenger also entrusted with espionage. The British Raj became 
increasingly reliant on their Himalayan services in the late nineteenth 
century. 
Puran Giri A Tibetan Gosain who became an important emissary, intermediary 
and guide to George Bogle and Samuel Turner. Known within 
colonial sources as Purangir. 
Purnia Settlement between Morang in Nepal and British Bengal. 
Rai, Shitab,  The Raja of Patna in 1767, referred to in Kinloch's journal as Sita 
Broy. 
Rana, 
Manikantha, 
 An envoy employed by Prithvi Narayan Shah, sent to negotiate an 
alliance with Kaski against Lamjung in the early 1750s. 
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Rao, Amrit, Brother to the Maratha Peshwa, a friend of Maulvi Abdul Kadir 
Khan. 
Raper, Felix,  EIC Surveyor of Kumaon and Garhwal in the prelude to the Anglo-
Nepalese War. 
Rennell, James; 
Major 
Surveyor-General for the EIC, tasked with mapping Bengal in the 
eighteenth century. 
Rumbold, Thomas, EIC chief at Patna in 1767, a member of the Bengal Council and 
later Governor of Madras 
Rutherford, George, Civil Surgeon at the border town of Moradabad during the Anglo-
Nepalese War. 
Ryot Farmers and small traders in eighteenth-century South Asia. 
Sadanand An Indian Surveyor credited by James Rennell for the information 
that he provided about the Gujarat region. 
Sandy Ghat A present-day settlement in Bihar north of Patna, where the 1767 
expedition paused. 
Sarhad Local term for the ‘frontier’ in the Afghan-Pakistan borderland. 
Sarhadi Local term for a frontier person in the Afghan-Pakistan borderland.  
Sarkar A regional South Asian territorial unit, a component of a Soubah. The 
regional governor of this unit was likewise called a Sarkar, sometimes 
referred to as Circar. 
Saunders, Robert, EIC Surgeon who travelled to Tibet for the expedition of Samuel 
Turner, 1783. 
Sen, Digbandhan, Raja of Makwanpur from 1764, brother-in-law to Prithvi Narayan 
Shah. 
Sen, Hemkarna, Raja of Makwanpur, father of Prithvi Narayan Shah's wife. 
Settar, Mirza, A Bengali merchant contracted to provide George Bogle with 
supplies. 
Sewak, Hari 
Mahant, 
A prominent religious figure at Dehra Dun who was noted for 
passing on daily information to the Gorkhali soldiers during the 
Anglo-Nepalese War. 
Shah II, Alam,  The Mughal emperor from 1760 to 1788. 
Shah, Bahadur, Second son of Prithvi Narayan Shah, brother to Pratap Singh Shah, 
and regent during the reign of his nephew Rana Bahadur Shah. 
Shah, 
Girvanyuddha, 
Raja of Nepal from 1799 to 1816, during the Knox residency and the 
Anglo-Nepalese War. 
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Shah, Narabhupal, Raja of Gorkha from 1716 to 1743, father to Prithvi Narayan Shah. 
Shah, Pratap 
Singh,  
Raja of Nepal, 1775 to 1778. First son of Prithvi Narayan Shah and 
Narenda Laxmi Devi, elder brother to Bahadur Shah, father of Ran 
Bahadur Shah. 
Shah, Prithvi 
Narayan, 
Raja of Gorkha and Nepal, 1743 to 1775. 
Shah, Rana 
Bahadur, 
Raja of Nepal from 1778 until his abdication in 1799. Until 1794, rule 
was administered by regents. 
Shamarpa  Brother to Lobsang Palden Yeshé, the sixth Panchen Lama; regent to 
Palden Tenpai Nyima, the seventh Panchen Lama. 
Shigatse A city in Tibet and traditional residence of the Panchen Lama. 
Shore, John; 
Governor-General 
Governor-General in Bengal at the time of the Kadir Khan 
expedition. 
Shuja-Ud-Daulah The Nawab of Awadh from 1754 to 1775, opposing the EIC at the 
Battle of Buxar. 
Simtokha A strategically important dzong in Bhutan. 
Sindhuli Gadhi A fortification and settlement in the Nepalese foothills, on the road 
to Nepal Valley from Janakpur. 
Singh Thapa, 
Chumpan  
A petty raja within the foothills who allegedly informed Shah of the 
EIC's approach in 1767. 
Singh, Abhiman Father-in-law to Prithvi Narayan Shah and father to Narendra Laxmi 
Devi, a Rajput chief in Varanasi. 
Singh, Chait, The Raja of Benares at the time of George Bogle's expedition. 
Singh, Karna, The Raja of Morang in 1774; requested EIC intervention when 
invaded by the Gorkhalis. 
Singh, Moon,   A Jemadar who was court martialled by Kinloch on 7th October 
1767. Potentially the anglicanization of Mun Singh. 
Singh, Nabir Regional Gorkhali commander who refused George Foxcroft 
permission to continue to Kathmandu in 1783. 
Singh, Pratap, The Raja of Darbhanga at the time of the 1767 expedition. See also 
Khandavala. 
Singh, Tribhuwan,  Courtier during the regency of Subaranaprabha who objected to the 
Knox residency. 
Singha, Agam,  Himalayan petty Raja who claimed a hereditary Kirat chieftainship 
and who had been dispossessed by the Gorkhas 
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Singye, Jigme,  Druk Desi of Bhutan from 1776 to 1788. 
Siraj-Ud-Daulah The Nawab of Bengal from 1756 to 1757, opposing the EIC at the 
Battle of Plassey 
Sirdar A military regional governor within eighteenth-century Nepal with 
jurisdiction over civilian authorities. 
Sivalik Range A significant low-lying mountain range running encompassing the 
Tarai, parralel but south of the Mahabharat range. 
Sonam Lhundub, 
Sonam,  
Druk Desi of Bhutan from 1768 to 1773. Alternatively called Shidariva 
in colonial sources. See also Zhidar. 
Soubah Officials who effectively replaced exiled petty rajas in hillforts such as 
Makwanpur, acting as local governors in Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. 
The term also designated the region that they governed. 
Srinagar Ancient capital city of Kashmir. 
Subedar A South Asian military rank. 
Sultan, Tipu The sultan and de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Mysore, 1782 to 
1799. 
Tanahu A city-state within Nepal. 
Tarai A thick band of malarial jungle stretching along the feet of the 
Himalayas and most of the border between present day Nepal and 
India.  
Tashichodzong  The capital compound in Bhutan and residence of the Druk Desi. 
Thar-Ghar  Nepalese term for the elite families with traditional links to the royal 
family. 
Thomson, 
[unknown],  
Independent contractor in Bengal during the 1770s. 
Tirhut  Also known as Mithila. An Ancient kingdom in the Tarai ruled in the 
1760s by the Khandavala dynasty (Rajas of Darbhanga). 
Tista A river running from the Eastern Himalayas through Sikkim, Bengal 
and Bangladesh. Sometimes referred to as Teesta. 
Tiwari, Kanak 
Nidhi,  
A businessman who had prospered in Palpa prior to Gorkhali 
conquest. 
Turner, Samuel; 
Captain 
An EIC officer and envoy to Tibet in 1783. 
Ulipur Settlement in northern Bengal, wherein James Rennell came into 
conflict with the local ruler and wider population. 
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Upadhyaya, Kirtira 
Jananda, 
A member of the nobility of Kathmandu in the 1760s and a spy for 
Gorkha. 
Upadhyaya, Ram,  A sadu, the royal priest to the Palpa Raja, exiled to EIC territory at 
the time of the Anglo-Nepalese War, who provided a map for 
Francis Buchanan-Hamilton. 
Vairagi South Asian term for a holy man who travelled northern India, 
similar to a gosain.  
Vakil  A term for a South Asian envoy, a messenger invested with greater 
responsibility than a harkara. 
Vamśāvalīs Historical narratives of Nepal, collected and translated by a series of 
EIC residents and scholars. 
Verelst, Henry; 
Governor 
EIC Governor of Bengal at the time of the 1767 expedition to 
Nepal. 
Woodman, 
[unknown]; Ensign 
A subordinate officer within the 1767 expedition to Nepal. 
Yeshé, Lobsang 
Palden,  
The sixth Panchen Lama and one of two political and religious 
figures of authority in Tibet 
Yumila A city state within the Chaubisi Rajya 
Zhidar  Druk Desi of Bhutan, 1768 to 1773. Alternatively called Shidariva in 
colonial sources. See also Lhundub, Sonam. 
Zimpe Zhidar’s nephew and military commander against the EIC in 1773. 
 
